Form Of Practical Knowledge Research Articles

Toward a Sociology of Social Scientific Knowledge

When abstract, quantitative and generalizing sociologies are juxtaposed to qualitative sociologies, the relationship is often seen as complementary or competitive. Our purpose is to articulate a different type of relationship between abstract social scientific knowledge (as exemplified in Survey Research [SR]) and the form of concrete and particularized knowledge represented in ethnomethodological conversation analysis. SR, historically, represents what we (following Jean Converse) refer to as the `ascendance of the objectivized subjective realm'. Like other kinds of (in Ted Porter's phrase) `mechanical objectivity', this ascendance is everywhere made possible because it is accompanied by practitioners' (researchers' and interviewers') tacit, practical forms of knowledge that enable them to work through the situated problems endemic to SR. As endeavours that locate orderliness and social organization in the details of actual social activity, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis find that SR Centres have intrinsic interest as sites of locally-produced structures. Investigating the situated tacit practices of investigators actually conducting SR and survey interviews, ethnomethodological and conversation analytical approaches to SR are also akin to the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), which has largely investigated practices in natural science laboratories. This may suggest that there is `symmetry' between natural and social science, but we also argue that `asymmetry' is a serviceable notion for science studies. Indeed, understanding the asymmetry between survey-based and ethnomethodological social sciences offers potential for communication (rather than a `state of non-intercourse') between sociologists and the scientists they study. As an illustration of the Sociology of Social Scientific Knowledge (SSSK), we examine a successful attempt at `refusal conversion' in an SR Centre.

“Sailing in Calm Waters Doesn't Teach”: constructing expertise through problems in work—the case of Finnish human resource developers

abstract This article examines the construction of occupational expertise through problematic situations encountered during everyday work. The human‐centred and knowledge‐intensive domains of current working life, for instance human resource development (HRD), contain various problem situations which tend to be open and unstructured, lacking a single solution. Those ill‐defined problem situations characterise also HRD as a domain of expertise which requires multidisciplinary formal knowledge and, especially, the ability to make use of it. Accordingly, it is suggested that learning to be an expert in HRD can be seen as a constructive process where varied formal knowledge and previous experiences of the domain are applied, contested and transformed into new forms of practical knowledge. Thus, much of the expertise in HRD will eventually be constructed through experience in practical problem‐solving situations. Those situations and the ways in which a HR developer interprets an event and chooses and tries out resolutions can be seen as an interpretative and narrative process which influences the construction of expertise. The study presented here aimed to understand within the narrative framework the nature of problematic situations in work as an experiential resource for the construction of expertise among HR developers. Twenty experienced HR developers in various workplaces in Finland were interviewed and asked to tell about problematic situations, how they were resolved and what was learnt from the process. The interviewees’ stories exhibited the diversity of HRD as a domain of expertise. However, in sum, communication, interactivity, collaboration and the involvement of management, which are commonly presented as ideals in HRD, are in fact the primary sources of problematic situations, and thus also of new learning in the HR developer's world. On the basis of the interviewees’ stories about problems and resolutions it is concluded, firstly, that much of an HR developer's expertise seem to be constructed through promoting and acting in dialogue, and, secondly, that it can be characterised as a flexible and inclusive state of mind rather than the application of routine procedures, and that going through problematic situations bestows confidence regarding practical knowledge in future situations.

Wheelchair intervention -- a client centered approach

The experience physiotherapists and occupational therapists gain from wheelchair prescription, adjustment and adaptation, is often a form of practical knowledge which may be difficult to generalize and communicate. This paper presents a method to make this experience and the discussion about goals and ranking of wheelchair functions more explicit and more systematically documented. According to our practice, illustrated by a case study, it seems to be a helpful tool for decision and evaluation in the individual cases. The next step will be to use this approach to gather quantitative data from different groups of clients.

Eating out and the commercialisation of mental life

This paper reflects on a sociological study of eating out in the UK. After a brief résumé of the study and its main empirical findings it addresses questions about the relationship between social scientific and other forms of practical knowledge about consumption. In the context of a process referred to as the commercialisation of mental life, the paper isolates a number of features which distinguish sociological from market research approaches to the topic. It is argued that too determined a practical focus to the study of consumer behaviour is likely to compromise understanding.

Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Social Sciences: Reply to Ingram and Meehan

This article defends methodological and theoretical pluralism in the social sciences. While pluralistic, such a philosophy of social science is both pragmatic and normative. Only by facing the problems of such pluralism, including how to resolve the potential conflicts between various methods and theories, is it possible to discover appropriate criteria of adequacy for social scientific explanations and interpretations. So conceived, the social sciences do not give us fixed and universal features of the social world, but rather contribute to the task of improving upon our practical knowledge of on-going social life. After arguing for such a thorough-going pluralism based on the indeterminacy of social action, I defend it from the post-modern and hermeneutic objections by suggesting the possibility of an epistemology of interpretive social science as a form of practical knowledge.

Reflective practice in nursing: issues and implications for nurse education

Reflective practice is a frequently used but inadequately defined concept in nursing. Part of the reason for this may be the inadequate conceptualisation of the process of reflection. This paper argues that now is an appropriate time to critically examine the notion of reflective practice and maintains that there is a need for more debate and research into the nature of reflection in nursing. This paper reviews recent nursing ideologies and explores the concept of reflective practice in relation to different forms of practical knowledge. It discusses and critically analyses the attraction of reflective practice to different interest groups and concludes by examining the implication of reflective practice models of nursing for nurse educators.

Philosophy in Germany

In the Critique of So-called Practical Knowledge Alf Ross wishes to show that ethical judgments are nonsensical. He begins by asserting that when people speak about practical knowledge they mean knowledge which contains an unconditional command to the will, and this, he points out, involves a confusion between knowledge and volition. Thus, since all ethical theories are forms of practical knowledge, they are doomed to failure. All ethical theories can be classified into two types: they all belong to the ethics of value or the ethics of duty. These differ very radically, since the one takes value and the other duty as its fundamental concept; but they are inadequate for the same reasons. Both value and duty are self-contradictory concepts, and both awareness of value and awareness of duty are quite different from what ethical theories suppose.