Resource allocation with sensing-based interference price is considered for multi-users cognitive radio (CR) network, in which the primary base station (PBS) controls the secondary users' (SUs) transmission by pricing the SUs' interference power. SUs firstly initiates data transmission based on the sensing decision and then PBS sets the interference price according to each SU's interference power. Stackelberg game is formulated to jointly obtain the maximum revenue for PBS and optimize the resource allocation to maximize the transmission gain for SUs. Two practical CR network models are investigated: the sensing based spectrum sharing(SBSS) and the opportunistic spectrum access(OSA). For each scenario, the resource allocation strategy is investigated under the two pricing schemes, namely uniform interference pricing and non-uniform interference pricing. Especially, the stackelberg equilibriums for the proposed games is characterized, and the distributed sensing based interference price bargaining algorithm is proposed according to different channel state information (CSI) for the non-uniform interference pricing case. Numerical examples are carried out to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed game algorithm under different pricing scheme.
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