Abstract
Resource allocation with sensing-based interference price is considered for multi-users cognitive radio (CR) network, in which the primary base station (PBS) controls the secondary users' (SUs) transmission by pricing the SUs' interference power. SUs firstly initiates data transmission based on the sensing decision and then PBS sets the interference price according to each SU's interference power. Stackelberg game is formulated to jointly obtain the maximum revenue for PBS and optimize the resource allocation to maximize the transmission gain for SUs. Two practical CR network models are investigated: the sensing based spectrum sharing(SBSS) and the opportunistic spectrum access(OSA). For each scenario, the resource allocation strategy is investigated under the two pricing schemes, namely uniform interference pricing and non-uniform interference pricing. Especially, the stackelberg equilibriums for the proposed games is characterized, and the distributed sensing based interference price bargaining algorithm is proposed according to different channel state information (CSI) for the non-uniform interference pricing case. Numerical examples are carried out to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed game algorithm under different pricing scheme.
Highlights
Fast and reliable wireless communication is becoming a major part of our daily lives such as online shopping, e-health, social networking, etc
Different from the previous works, we propose a game-theoretic approach using the stackelberg game to jointly optimize the utility of primary base station (PBS) and secondary users’ (SUs) in the multi-user cognitive radio network
It indicates that the PBS revenue and the sum rate of SUs increases with the probability P(H0) increases before reaching the maximum point
Summary
Fast and reliable wireless communication is becoming a major part of our daily lives such as online shopping, e-health, social networking, etc. The interference power constraint has become one of the most effective methods to protect the quality of service (QoS) of PU in CR network These studies didn’t consider the PU’s revenue due to the licensed spectrum occupied by SUs. it is necessary to consider the optimization of the PUs’ transmission benefit under the imperfect spectrum sensing. The joint the sensing-based interference power price and resource allocation problem in the sensing-based spectrum sharing model is formulated as a two-stage stackelberg game between the PBS and SUs. The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: 1). A stackelberg game is formulated to jointly maximize the revenue of the primary network and the utility of the secondary network for the proposed sensing-based interference pricing strategy.
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