Power Of Appointment Research Articles

The Power of Appointment: Political Appointments, Electoral Competition and Electoral Violence in Côte d’Ivoire

ABSTRACT Studies of electoral violence find that electoral competition accounts for why and where violence occurs. The article suggests that political appointments are used by regimes to improve their electoral performance. This has implications for patterns of competition and violence. Appointments reduce the need for electoral violence overall but incentivise competition in moderately contested opposition areas, leading to more pre-electoral violence in these areas. The article relies on newly collected data on political appointments for the 2020 elections in Cote D’Ivoire. The introduction of competition and violence in moderately competitive opposition areas, this an important corrective for work on electoral violence.

The Parliament and Cooperative Oversight of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Why Civil–Military Relations in Indonesia is Stable but Still in Transition

Parliamentary oversight is a cornerstone of democratic control of the armed forces, but its influence on civil–military relations (CMR) remains underexplored. We argue that parliaments in transitioning democracies face unique structural challenges in developing robust oversight of the military compared to advanced democracies. We developed a typology of three distinctive types of parliamentary oversight and proposed that cooperative oversight potentially offers a solution to structural challenges faced by parliaments in transitioning democracies. In our case study of Indonesia, cooperative oversight promoted harmonious working relations between the Parliament and the military/executive, stabilizing CMR. However, cooperative oversight also stalled civil–military reforms, eroded democratic management of the defense sector, and reinforced an unhealthy dependence on the military to self-regulate and the President’s appointment power of the armed forces’ commander. Over the longer term, we believe that the Indonesian Parliament needs to incorporate a mix of oversight strategies and raise its institutional capacity to strengthen oversight of the defence sector.

Article: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Overlooked Procedural Deficiencies in ICSID’s Annulment Structure

i style=""Over the past several decades, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes’ annulment procedure has proved an object of consternation for states and investors alike. The substantive principles of Article 52 of the ICSID Convention are commonly criticized as either too expansive or too narrow. The author contends that this criticism is misplaced, however, and that it is procedural deficiencies which will plague ICSID’s annulment proceedings in this time of broad investor-state dispute reform. Overconcentration of annulment committee appointment and challenge power in the hands of the Chairman of the ICSID Committee and ICSID Secretariat, compounded by continued problems of ‘double-hatting’ at the annulment level, threaten the due process rights and autonomy of parties to ICSID annulments. The author proposes a feasible restructuring of annulment appointment and challenge procedure under the ICSID Arbitration Rules as a potential rectification of these procedural flaws, including a dispersal of appointment power, a new pool system for annulment panel members, and the creation of an independent review body to consider challenges to annulment panel members.

Holding residential property on inter vivos trusts in Singapore: transfers of equity interests

Abstract Following amendments to the ACD regime in Singapore, transferring equity interests to and from a trust with no beneficial owners will attract ACD, as will the exercise of a power of appointment by a trustee to grant equity interests to a beneficiary. Renunciation of interests in a bare trust will also attract ACD. Together with the introduction of ABSD (Trust), it is now impractical to use trusts to hold residential properties for succession planning purposes. Remaining options are to gift the properties without any strings attached or bequeath the properties in a will and risk subsequent changes to death taxation.

When does a purported exercise of a power of appointment impliedly revoke a previous revocable exercise of the power?

Abstract This Article considers in detail the recent decision in Equiom (Isle of Man) Ltd v Velarde on the exercise of a power of appointment. The Testatrix had a power of appointment in conventional form exercisable in favour of her issue. She had exercised it in 1997 in favour of two of her three children only but reserved a power of revocation. In 2007 she made a Will containing a residuary gift in favour of all her children. The gift used the word “appoint” in addition to the words “leave, devise and bequeath” and referred to property “over which I shall have any power of disposition whatsoever” but there was no express reference to the power of appointment, the previous appointment or the power of revocation. The issue was whether the gift in the Will impliedly revoked the previous appointment and the Judge, upholding the decision of the Deputy Master, held that it did.

Japanese prime ministers and party leadership

This article shows what were/are the features of Japanese prime ministers as party leaders, as well as how and why these features have changed over the last 20 years. It focuses on three dimensions: party centralisation, internal cohesion and leadership security. On party centralisation, the electoral reform of 1994 introduced a single-member district system into the House of Representatives, or Lower House. This reform ended intra-party competition within the LDP that had existed under the multi-member system and since then the party has become much more centralised. On internal cohesion, the electoral reform has provided the prime minister with a powerful instrument to control the party: the power of endorsement. On leadership security, prime ministers like Koizumi Junichirō and Abe Shinzō were successful in restraining rebels and securing their leadership by effectively using the power of endorsement along with the power of appointment. However, a considerable number of prime ministers in the 21st century have had short tenures of about one year. While the personalisation of politics has made the position of popular prime ministers more secure, it has made unpopular prime ministers highly vulnerable.

Institutional design of Ghana and the Fourth Republic: on the checks and balances between the state and society

The paper interrogates Ghana’s institutional design efforts since the 1950s and argues that the longstanding political stability of the current Fourth Republic notwithstanding, a perennial feature of all regimes is the assumption that the state has the capacity and willingness to check itself. The Fourth Republic has two flaws. First, the three arms of government – executive, legislature and judiciary – must put each other in check, and society is only mainly invited to vote in four-year cycles. Society must trust the state to exhibit goodwill. The second flaw, which is the more problematic, is the apportioning of unfettered power of appointment and dismissal to the executive, which disproportionately overshadows the two other arms of government. Using extensive archival data, local media and secondary sources, the paper interrogates the power dynamics between the state and society over time. The conclusion is that neither a very strong state nor a disproportionately assertive society is good for political stability. A weak state and a dormant society are no better options either. Ghana’s civil society has contributed to taming the power of a strong state, and that is the best promise for sustaining the current regime if it continues on this pathway responsibly.

Advancing forward—narrowing the divide between powers of advancement and powers of appointment

Abstract Oliver Embley explains the differences between powers of advancement and powers of appointment, including how such powers can be exercised to benefit non-objects of a trust. The article discusses the differences between powers of advancement and appointment and how modern trust deeds have blurred the lines between the two. The article considers PQ and another v RS and others [2019] EWHC 1643 (Ch) and how a power of appointment can be exercised to benefit a non-object of a trust.

From an Illiberal Posture to an Anti-liberal Other: The Changing Composition and Jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional Court

This article reveals the change in the Turkish Constitutional Court’s (TCC/Court) jurisprudence due to the transformation in its structure. We develop our arguments on the assumption that the Court’s ideological attitude is determined according to interaction with political actors and argue that from 1980 onwards, two facts were determinant: (1) the role of the constitutional amendment in 2010 in relation to court-packing aim and (2) the role of President of Turkish Republic due to his appointment power. To this end, we examine the changing ideological line of the TCC by focusing on selected rulings delivered during Court’s two eras divided by 2010 constitutional amendments. We argue that the TCC dramatically changed direction from liberal towards anti-liberal line in its decisions and structure. Before 2010, members who did not act in line with the president who appointed them and did not have a sharp ideological stance were encountered. This situation was reflected in the voting behaviour of the members and brought ambivalent attitudes. After 2010, this situation was reversed and especially as of 2017, some members became loyal to the president, and it was seen that the court acted with a sharper division in critical decisions and transform into an anti-liberal stance in its jurisprudence. constitutional review, Turkish Constitutional Court, judicial behaviour, constitutional judges, decision-making in constitutional courts

Presidential Control of Independent Agencies’ Leadership and Personnel: A Two‐Case Study of Interbranch Contestation over the Bureaucracy and the Unitary Executive under Donald Trump

AbstractThis article assesses recent developments in the interbranch struggle over control of the bureaucracy, specifically independent federal agencies and the impact of the unitary executive theory during the presidency of Donald Trump. It examines controversies that involved two Supreme Court cases about independent agencies: Lucia v. SEC (2018), which addressed administrative law judges and the president's appointment power, and Seila Law v. CFPB (2020), which addressed agency leadership and the president's removal power. The two cases have received some attention from legal scholars, but they are not well known among presidency scholars, and they are important for understanding how the unitary executive theory and the interbranch struggle over control of the bureaucracy have developed in recent years.

Constitutional Reform and the Gender Diversification of Peak Courts

Do the processes states use to select judges for peak courts influence gender diversity? Scholars have debated whether concentrating appointment power in a single individual or diffusing appointment power across many individuals best promotes gender diversification. Others have claimed that the precise structure of the process matters less than fundamental changes in the process. We clarify these theoretical mechanisms, derive testable implications concerning the appointment of the first woman to a state’s highest court, and then develop a matched-pair research design within a Rosenbaum permutation approach to observational studies. Using a global sample beginning in 1970, we find that constitutional change to the judicial selection process decreases the time until the appointment of the first woman justice. These results reflect claims that point to institutional disruptions as critical drivers of gender diversity on important political posts.

Limits to freedom in public service broadcasting: the case of South Korea

South Korea’s public service broadcasting sector comprises a unique combination of editorial independence and government influence, which primarily rises from the South Korean president’s authority to appoint key media figures in the public sector. While this does not necessarily lead to restraints on freedom of speech, it leaves public service broadcasters (PSBs) vulnerable to interference when those at the top of government seek to shape media content and editorial tone. A study of the years 2008–2017 demonstrates one such case, in which former Presidents Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hey used the power of appointment to steer PSB news content in favor of their respective administrations. The reactions among PSB journalists and staff show they actively resist the government when they feel their independence is compromised. The paper concludes that such resistance is of limited effect as long as the power of appointment lies in the hands of the president. Only policy change that grants complete independence can guarantee freedom of speech among public broadcasters in South Korea.

Prime Ministerial powers of patronage: Ideology and Cabinet selection under Margaret Thatcher 1979–1990

This article will examine how Margaret Thatcher utilised the Prime Ministerial power of Cabinet ministerial appointment between 1979 and 1990. The article will utilise the Norton taxonomy on the Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP) to determine the ideological disposition (non-Thatcherite versus Thatcherite) of her Cabinet members across her eleven years in office. It will assess the ideological trends in terms of appointments, promotions and departures from Cabinet and it will use archival evidence to explore the advice given to Thatcher to assist her decision-making. Through this process the article will demonstrate how Thatcher was more ideologically balanced than academics have traditionally acknowledged when discussing her Cabinet selections. Moreover, the article will also demonstrate the significance attached to media presentation skills to her decision-making, thus challenging the emphasis on ideology as a dominant determinant of Cabinet selection.

Neopatrimonialism: The Immense Power of Appointment of the Liberian Presidency

This study examines important factors of disenfranchisement of political subdivisions in Liberia, especially counties and districts due largely to the presidential power of appointment. The study analyzes survey, empirical, and constitutional amendment data gathered by Afrobarometer (Round 7 Survey), election statistics, and public officials’ appointment information. It then correlates associations between the number of county executives, presidential tenure, and referendum approvals to demonstrate a diminishment of democracy due to denying citizens’ right to vote for their local leaders. This has resulted from a gradual enhancement of the Liberian president’s power of appointment, which developed neopatrimonialism in Liberia and continues to foster a patronage system of governance that increases public corruption, a practice that has minimized state capacity, fostered state instability, and raised the potential for conflict.

Can a State Legislature Give Itself the Power After Election Day to Appoint a Slate of Presidential Electors for Its State?

Suggestions are swirling that some state legislatures might try to void a close popular vote in this year’s presidential election and after Election Day give themselves the power to appoint their state’s presidential electors or certify a slate of electors themselves. This Note analyzes the prospects for such action in eight swing states. We begin by recounting an effort in the Louisiana legislature in 1960 to replace a slate of Democratic electors appointed by the voters. With that history in place we ask whether the legislatures in these eight states can convene after Election Day. For those that can the next Part argues that as a matter of federal and state constitutional law they must repeal an existing permanent statute. The states with a political alignment making repeal and replace possible must then contend with the provisions of Title 3. 3 U.S.C. § 1 requires electors to be appointed on Election Day unless, as specified in 3 U.S.C. § 2 the state has “failed to make a choice” on Election Day. We review the history of these provisions and conclude that 3 U.S.C. § 2 does not allow a legislature to intervene and appoint electors when the popular vote count is close. Indeed, we note that four of the states in focus have taken advantage of 3 U.S.C. § 2 with explicit statutory provisions in case of a tied popular vote. As late as 1968 another one of these states took of 3 U.S.C. § 2 by giving the legislature appointment power if no slate of electors received a majority of the popular vote. We conclude by explaining that in seven of the eight states it would be clearly contrary to state law for the legislature to intervene and certify a slate of electors by itself. In the one state in which that might be possible we argue that the legislature cannot be convened in special session.

Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime

The Federal Reserve is exposed to a greater degree of political influence under its new operating regime. We survey the relevant literature and describe the Fed's new operating regime. Then we explain how the regime change reduced de facto central bank independence. In brief, the regime change increased the appointment power of the President and improved the bargaining power of Congress. We offer some suggestions for bolstering de facto independence at the Fed.

When Democracy Trumps Populism. European and Latin American Lessons for the United States. Weyland, Kurt and Raúl L.Madrid (Editors) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2019), 238 p., ISBN 978‐1‐108‐48354‐4

When Democracy Trumps Populism. European and Latin American Lessons for the United States. Weyland, Kurt and Raúl L.Madrid (Editors) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2019), 238 p., ISBN 978‐1‐108‐48354‐4

‘All Right, I Will Do as You Say’: Leadership and Followership in Ibsen’s Pillars of Society

The inverted relationship between leaders and followers is the product of the false consciousness that Henrik Ibsen presents in Pillars of Society. To the playwright, this relationship has been a disruptive phenomenon as it excludes, rather than includes those whose perceptions are different from the leader's personal view. The result is unprecedented levels of failure in security, economy and welfare policies. This failure, as I argue in this article is also blamed on the followers who seem not to know the role, they are to play towards the success of the political system they support. The few who understand the concept of followership see their efforts thwarted and frustrated by the leaders in place. Ibsen therefore questions the political environment, and presents the authorities in place and their followers as responsible for the poverty, injustice and exploitation in their society. By paying attention to what constitute the landmarks, stages or watersheds of nineteen century Norwegian and European politics, and by focusing on the question: ‘Who leads the work of government?' this article analyses Ibsen's characters (leaders) who use their power of appointment and election to maintain a broadened support, not by working under the advice of experts who have a better grasp of national agenda, but by turning to close friends and associates who sympathize with their own hopes and plans. The article therefore aims at carrying out a literary analysis of Pillars of Society as a strategic technique to de-centre the dominant rhetoric that ‘to lead, one must induce followers to permit him or her act for goals that represent his motives and motivations'.

Article 146: Officers and Servants and the Expenses of the Supreme Court

Article 146 of the Constitution, provides for the appointment of Officers and servants of the Supreme Court, the power is conferred on the Chief Justice of India in respect of appointment of Officers and servants on the establishment of the Supreme Court. Subject to certain conditions prescribed in Article 146, the absolute power of recruitment, appointment and control of the staff of the Supreme Court is conferred on the Chief Justice of India. The approval of the President is necessary insofar as it relates to matters specified in the proviso to Clause 2 because the budget has to be provided by the Central Government.

The Power to Appoint: Presidential Nominations and Change on the Supreme Court

Can presidents use their appointment power to pull the Supreme Court closer to their own ideological preferences? Using new and novel tests of existing theories of appointments, we provide the firs...