Abstract
ABSTRACT Studies of electoral violence find that electoral competition accounts for why and where violence occurs. The article suggests that political appointments are used by regimes to improve their electoral performance. This has implications for patterns of competition and violence. Appointments reduce the need for electoral violence overall but incentivise competition in moderately contested opposition areas, leading to more pre-electoral violence in these areas. The article relies on newly collected data on political appointments for the 2020 elections in Cote D’Ivoire. The introduction of competition and violence in moderately competitive opposition areas, this an important corrective for work on electoral violence.
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