Power Of Appointment Research Articles

Central Bank Independence and the Federal Reserve's New Operating Regime

The Federal Reserve is exposed to a greater degree of political influence under its new operating regime. We survey the relevant literature and describe the Fed's new operating regime. Then we explain how the regime change reduced de facto central bank independence. In brief, the regime change increased the appointment power of the President and improved the bargaining power of Congress. We offer some suggestions for bolstering de facto independence at the Fed.

Constitutional Politics, Court Packing, and Judicial Appointments Reform

Reforming the Supreme Court is at the center of the political and legal landscape for the first time in generations. The growing gap between the ideological composition of the Court and the democratic will of the electorate, along with perceived procedural irregularities in the appointment of Justices over the last five years, has fueled calls for radical change including expanding the size of the Court. Those calls have in turn triggered renewed efforts to repair the appointments process through term limits and a regularized appointments schedule. But in an age of peaking partisanship, the bipartisan cooperation that would be necessary for that proposal to pass seems far out of reach. This Article offers a novel path forward. First, it completes the unfinished work of designing a full solution to the broken appointments process by addressing the problem of Senate stonewalling, like that we saw in 2016 when the Republican Senate refused to confirm any nominee put forward by President Obama. It offers the only viable solution to that problem: vesting the appointment power in the President in office at the time the vacancy arises. Second, because that solution would require a constitutional amendment, it analyzes the prospects of achieving that challenging goal through game theory. It offers three models of the parties’ strategic behavior in the face of a cycle of escalation: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, and the Asymmetric Hawk-Dove Game. The analysis shows that the increased salience of escalating constitutional hardball tactics in general alters the incentive structure for the parties in a way that makes judicial appointments reform the winning strategy for both parties. It arrives at the counterintuitive conclusion that in this moment of cratering cooperation and collapsing constitutional norms, there may thus be a rare political and legal opportunity to restructure the judicial appointments process for the better and for good.

State-Appointed Directors, Related-Party Transactions and Corporate Opportunities in ‘Open’ State-Owned Companies

State shareholding in Italy has features which are linked both to the quantitativesignificance of the phenomenon and to the fact that special powers of appointment and removal of directors and members of the board of statutory auditors may be entrusted to the state as well as other public entities, such as municipalities, by means of the articles of association. These special powers have no equal in other legal systems. Among these powers, the power of appointment of directors is the most significant because the particular relationship between the nominating public authority and the director appointed by it may result in a significant influence on the company’s interests. In ‘closed’ public limited companies special powers of direct appointment may be entrusted to the state-shareholder in a proportional manner to the size of its shareholding.

The Mechanics of Cultural Diplomacy: A Comparative Case Study Analysis from the European Context

ABSTRACTThe National Institutes for Culture have not attracted much scholarly attention examining their managerial practices. The aim of this article is to explore how the state expresses its agency over the Cultural Institutes of six European countries: the UK, Germany, France, Spain, Sweden, and Greece. Agency presents varying modalities, making instrumentalism more multifaceted than has been implied so far. The authors are introducing here a framework of five “touchpoints” to capture and analyze instrumentalism in cultural diplomacy. Funding, agenda setting, evaluation, hierarchy, and appointment power constitute the typical system of interactions between the Cultural Institutes and their reporting authorities.

When to Act Is to Say: Appointment as Conflictogenic Discourse in the Cameroonian Administration

Promotion to high office in the Cameroonian administration, appear to be one of the main topic of political communication in Cameroun. The communitarian claims of appointment put both individuals and communities in competitive situations and are often the source of social conflicts. The problem is to understand the focus of political communication on appointment in the Administration in Cameroon and the possible link that it could have with conflictuality in the country. From a theoretical point of view, each act of appointment can be understood as a message from the President of the Republic whose power of appointment is unlimited. The president’s acts of appointment; on the one hand; and the demands from communities, on the other, appear to be a kind of communication. Data analysis will be guided by the theory of "the actor and the system". From a methodological point of view, we used documentary observation in the national and international press. We also had an in-depth interview with a former minister who, however, requested anonymity. Finally, our 26-year service as an employee gives us the advantage of experience gained through participatory observation. It appeared that appointment, through the numerous and consistent advantages that it confers on the promoted, thus appears to the citizens, as the main means of access to the fortune from which the covetousness of both the individuals and their communities of origin arises. Unfortunately, the state is unable to meet all expectations. However, individual, as well as community, strategies of access to appointments expose the nation to more division than cohesion.

The Job Market for Justice: Screening and Selecting Candidates for the International Court of Justice

AbstractOver the past few decades, states have granted greater independence and authority to international courts, yet still retain their ability to control who sits on the bench. This article examines how governments use their power of judicial nomination and appointment in the context of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and assesses the relative influence of three factors on states’ vote choices for ICJ candidates: the candidates’ probability of (in)sensitivity to political considerations; their qualifications; and the role of interstate politics. Drawing on a new dataset of candidates nominated for election to the ICJ between 1949 and 2010, we demonstrate that electing states base their initial vote choices largely on the same set of factors within both bodies that elect ICJ judges: the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. In particular, professional experiences signaling a probability of insensitivity to political considerations reduce a candidate's expected vote share. A candidate's qualifications, on the other hand, do not appear to make a considerable difference in winning more votes. Finally, the amount of support during the nomination stage is highly correlated with vote share, suggesting that considerable screening occurs prior to nomination and that the number of nominations received facilitates co-ordination of vote choice across states.

The Impact of the Auditor Selection Process and Audit Committee Appointment Power on Investment Recommendations

SUMMARYAfter the global 2007–2008 financial crisis, regulatory bodies proposed alternative auditor selection processes to enhance auditor independence such as mandatory audit firm rotation or mandatory tendering (i.e., rotation that allows for the current auditor to be reappointed). However, these alternative selection processes may not be effective if management has substantial influence over auditor appointment decisions. We posit that disclosures of high appointment power of the audit committee will enhance the perceived effectiveness of rotation and tendering, and thus increase investment recommendations. In an experimental study involving 118 experienced investment professionals, we examine the impact of the auditor selection process (mandatory rotation, mandatory tendering, and voluntary selection) and the appointment power of the audit committee (high, low) on investment recommendations. We find that audit committee appointment power affects investment recommendations only when a possible auditor change is anticipated (i.e., in the case of rotation and tendering), but not when the auditor selection is voluntary. Further, rotation and tendering lead to a higher recommended investment likelihood than voluntary selection, but only when an audit committee has high appointment power. In all, the findings underscore that investors do not view auditor selection processes in isolation of a company's internal corporate governance mechanisms.JEL Classifications: M42; M48; G11.

A Big Bang for Japanese Mandarins? The Civil Service Reform of 2014

ABSTRACTIn 2014, the largest reform since the US postwar occupation was enacted in Japanese civil service. It was designed as the final step of the two-decade-long effort to restructure the “1955 System,” that is, the politico-administrative system developed under the Liberal Democratic Party’s hegemony. Its purpose was to remold Japan’s independent-minded bureaucrats into the elected officials’ obedient servants. Unfortunately, the reform is unlikely to deliver expected results. The failure’s major reason concerns the fact that Japanese bureaucracy’s unusually large role in policymaking paradoxically discourages elected officials to use their major reining tool against it, namely, appointive power.

The Missing Element: Examining the Loyalty‐Competence Nexus in Presidential Appointments

What distinguishes a loyal appointee from a competent one? Applying novel methodological tools to a unique data set of 3,366 resumes of individuals appointed by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama across 51 different federal institutions, we (1) provide an operational definition of loyalty and competence and (2) demonstrate that there are subdimensions of loyalty and competence. We also provide initial insights into how George W. Bush and Barack Obama employed the various subdimensions of competence and loyalty. Our most important contribution is to provide the missing element in principal–agent models and presidential appointment power, by identifying the background characteristics and subdimensions of loyalty and competence.

Can a British Virgin Islands trustee use a special power of appointment to amend a discretionary trust and exclude a discretionary object?

This article analyses the decision of Bannister J, at first instance, and the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, on appeal, in the matter of The New Huerto Trust, ex p. Royal Fiduciary Group Limited.1 The case raised the question whether British Virgin Islands law follows English law on the availability, in general, of special powers of appointment for the purpose of amending a discretionary trust by, amongst other things, excluding one or more discretionary objects, and of the availability, in particular, of the special power of appointment conferred by the New Huerto Trust for that purpose.

The Constrained Governor

In the vast majority of American states, governors have unrestricted authority to fill Senate vacancies, and in an average decade, one-third of all Americans have been represented by an appointed senator. Despite the importance of Senate appointments both theoretically and substantively, no published study has investigated the dynamics of gubernatorial selection. In this paper, we compile an original data set of Senate appointees as well as the list of the candidates the governor considered but did not select. We model the governor’s selection and discover that despite having no formal constraints on their appointment power, governors behave as constrained actors. In particular, we find that governors eschew the potential appointees who are closest to their policy views and instead appoint the candidate who is closest to the ideological position of the voters in their state. This effect is particularly pronounced when the governor is eligible for reelection within two years. These findings have both theoretical and normative implications for understanding Senate appointments, gubernatorial decision making, and the implicit power of the electorate.

Development of the estate planning industry through the introduction of the trust in Hungary

Parallel with the implementation of the trust in Hungary, the complete legal environment was harmonized to conform to the trust rules. The author explains some of the misunderstandings of the continental law trust. In particular, the article describes the historical background, the beneficiary’s protection with in personam rights, the interpretation of the general trust rules, the asset segregation, the power of appointment, and the beneficiary’s position. The article concludes that the Hungarian trust meets the trust definition provided by the Hague Convention and, moreover, that it is a genuine clone of the Anglo-American trust.

Competition Model and the Change of Local Governments’ Behavior—and Governance of China’s Local Government Debt

“Promotion tournament model” is used to explain the Chinese economic miracle. The key of the promotion tournament model is competition for economic growth which brings economic growth together with some societal problems. Competition for economic growth influences local governments’ behavior and is one of the reasons for the rapid rising of local debts. The article proposes a new competition model—competition for inhabitants’ satisfaction. It is a better choice under the system of political centralization with fiscal decentralization in China. It gives inhabitants the right to supervise the government officials while the central government has the power of appointment. Competition for inhabitants’ satisfaction changes the local governments’ investment and finance behaviors, which is meaningful to improve China’s local government debt governance.

Presidential Control of the Judiciary via the Appointment Power: Evidence from Russia

In many countries, the president is involved in appointing judges. Does this lead to selection of friendly judges who then promote the president’s interests? This question is explored here in the context of Russia, where judges are often said to favor the executive. I gather data on 2000 court cases, and analyze them by exploiting changes in the appointment rules. I find clear evidence that judges selected by the president favor the government more than do their peers. In the process, the article develops a new solution to the sample selection problem endemic to the analysis of court decisions. ( JEL D02, K40, P37)

The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution Really Say About President Obama's Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia

After Justice Antonin Scalia’s death, politicians wasted no time before teeing up a political battle over his replacement. Republican Senators — led by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell — immediately announced that they would not consider or vote on any replacement nominees from President Barack Obama. Instead, Senate Republicans deliberately seek to transfer President Obama’s power to appoint Justice Scalia’s replacement to the next elected President. This plan has generated substantial debate, but the debates have yet to engage with some of the most important historic, pragmatic, and constitutional risks of the plan. With Judge Merrick Garland’s nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court pending and Donald Trump, the presumptive nominee of the Republican Party, announcing his alternative list of nominees if elected, this Article seeks to bring greater attention to these risks.We begin with history and show a striking fact that has not yet been recognized: There have been 103 prior cases in which — like the case of President Obama’s nomination of Judge Garland — an elected President has faced an actual vacancy on the Supreme Court and began an appointment process prior to the election of a successor. In all 103 cases, the President was able to both nominate and appoint a replacement Justice, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This is true even of all eight such cases where the nomination process began during an election year. By contrast, there have been only six prior cases in which the Senate pursued a course of action that — like the current Republican Plan — deliberately sought to transfer a sitting President’s Supreme Court appointment power to a successor. In all six such cases, there were, however, contemporaneous questions, not present here, about the status of the nominating President as the most recently elected President. The historical rule that best accounts for senatorial practices over the entirety of U.S. history is thus the following: While the Senate has the constitutional power to provide advice and consent with respect to particular Supreme Court nominees and reject (or resist) particular candidates on a broad range of grounds, the Senate may only use this power to deliberately transfer a sitting President’s Supreme Court appointment powers to a successor in the highly unusual circumstance where the President’s status as the most recently elected President is in doubt. Given this more than two-century long tradition, the Senate Republicans’ current plan marks a much greater departure from historical precedent than has thus far been recognized. There is, however, still a further question whether the historical rule we uncover reflects a mere senatorial tradition, which should govern internal senatorial practices of fair dealing, or has further ripened into a constitutional rule that should inform the best interpretation of constitutional text and structure. In either case, the consequences of the plan are far more serious than its architects could have originally understood. After describing both possibilities, we suggest that Senate Republicans should rethink their plan so as to avoid these newly exposed historical, pragmatic and constitutional risks. Instead of continuing forward, the Senate should do what it has always done in similar past circumstances. It should proceed to full Senate consideration of Judge Garland or any other nominees that President Obama submits in a timely manner.

Democratic Procedures in the CCP's Cadre Selection Process: Implementation and Consequences

AbstractSince the early 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has put in place a series of measures to allow more Party members to participate in the cadre selection process. “Intra-party democracy” was promoted as a remedy to solve the corruption and social tension that resulted from overly concentrated personnel power. How effective are these formal procedures in constraining the appointment power of core Party leaders and institutionalizing the influence of a larger group of cadres? Drawing on archival research, interviews and quantitative data, this paper examines two components of intra-party democratic reform: “democratic recommendation,” which serves as a gateway to cadre promotion, and the semi-competitive elections at Party congresses. This in-depth study finds that the efforts to expand bottom-up participation are hindered by loopholes in formal regulations, informal practices and the frequent rotation of Party officials. Meanwhile, the reform measures have brought changes to the personnel system by complicating the Party secretaries' exercise of appointment power and altering the incentives of ambitious cadres. The implementation of intra-party democracy could improve the vitality of one-party rule, and its ebbs and flows imply a divide within China's top leadership over the direction of political change.

Prime Ministerial Powers of Patronage: Ministerial Appointments and Dismissals Under Edward Heath

This article examines how Edward Heath utilised the Prime Ministerial power of ministerial appointment between 1970 and 1974. It does so within the context of the difficulties that Heath experienced in managing the ideological tensions within his party during his leadership tenure and his subsequent removal from the leadership of the Conservative Party in early 1975. Critically, by utilising Cabinet Office papers (PREM 5), the article demonstrates how his Chief Whip, Francis Pym, made a series of recommendations on how ministerial allocation could be used to aid party management and address backbench criticism about his leadership, and how Heath disregarded much of this advice.

The Impact of Auditor Selection Regime and Audit Committee Autonomy on Investment Decisions

After the recent financial crisis, regulatory bodies proposed and, in some cases, enacted alternative auditor selection processes such as mandatory audit firm rotation or mandatory tendering. Although in many countries the audit committee has the authority to appoint the external auditor, in practice management frequently has substantial influence over such decisions. We posit that high appointment power of the audit committee will enhance the effectiveness of rotation and tendering, thus, increasing investment recommendations. In this experimental study involving 118 experienced investment professionals, we examine the impact of the auditor selection process (mandatory rotation, mandatory tendering, and voluntary selection) and the appointment power of the audit committee (high, low) on investment recommendations. The results indicate that, first, audit committee appointment power affects investment recommendations only when a possible auditor change is anticipated (i.e., in the case of rotation and tendering), but not when the auditor selection is voluntary. Second, rotation and tendering both lead to a higher recommended investment likelihood than voluntary selection, but only when an audit committee has high appointment power. In all, the results highlight that the auditor selection process and audit committee appointment power are viewed by investors as interdependent.

The Limited Power of Female Appointments: Abortion and Domestic Violence Policy in the Carter Administration

538 Feminist Studies 41, no. 3. © 2015 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Doreen J. Mattingly The Limited Power of Female Appointments: Abortion and Domestic Violence Policy in the Carter Administration In 1977 in the United States, Second Wave feminists were poised to make a meaningful impact on federal policy. Jimmy Carter’s successful 1976 presidential campaign had included an open wooing of feminist support : he had created a “51.3 Percent” committee to address women’s issues and he had told feminist audiences that he “wanted to be known as the President who achieved equal rights for women, just as President Johnson had won civil rights legislation for blacks.”1 Once elected, Carter appointed an unprecedented number of feminist women to high office, many of whom were committed to addressing the concerns of marginalized women and advancing policy on issues such as sexual violence and reproductive rights. These appointees were linked to a dense feminist organizational presence in Washington that was unprecedented in its size and diversity. Not surprisingly, many feminists had high expectations for the new administration. 1. Cynthia Harrison, “Creating a National Feminist Agenda: Coalition Building in the 1970s,” in Feminist Coalitions: Historical Perspectives on Second-Wave Feminism in the United States, ed. Stephanie Gilmore (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 30. See also John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993); and Sara Evans, Tidal Wave: How Women Changed America at Century’s End (New York: Free Press, 2003). Doreen J. Mattingly 539 Despite these promising conditions, feminists made little headway on policy during the Carter administration (1977–1981). Federal funding for abortion was eliminated; no permanent offices that would have advocated for women’s issues were created; and bills supporting domestic violence shelters, support for “displaced homemakers,” and quotas for female-owned businesses were defeated or extremely diluted. In addition, no additional states ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and several states rescinded earlier ratification votes. Some of these failures can be attributed to the general loss of feminist momentum and the emergence of a conservative backlash in the late 1970s. Anti-ERA organizing fueled the rise of a conservative “family values” movement that would shape social policies for more than a generation, and neoliberal economic conservatives were challenging the welfare-state programs that feminists sought to expand. But in Washington, there was an addition challenge —the unreliable support of Carter himself. Despite his promises, Carter felt that by appointing women he had met his commitment to feminists and did little to support feminist policy goals that went beyond eliminating discrimination. This paper makes an important contribution to the history of feminist action by looking in detail at the efforts of Jimmy Carter’s feminist appointees to influence policy. In particular, it discusses the actions of the most visible feminist in the White House, Margaret “Midge” Costanza . Carter named Costanza director of the Office of Public Liaison, a department that was created to manage relations between the White House and citizens’ groups. Her position as the first woman to serve as Assistant to the President, in concert with her gregarious nature and strong support for women’s issues, made Costanza a very visible symbol of affirmative action for Carter. Yet Costanza, like many other high-level feminist appointees, met opposition within the White House when she tried to advance women’s issues. Her persistent advocacy contributed to her marginalization within the White House. Just twenty months into the administration she resigned in frustration.2 This paper begins with a discussion of the unique circumstances surrounding Carter’s feminist appointees, followed by a detailed exploration 2. For Costanza’s complete story, see Doreen J. Mattingly, A Feminist in the White House: Midge Costanza, the Carter Years, and America’s Culture Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 540 Doreen J. Mattingly oftwomeetingsheldbyCostanzainJuly1977.Thefirstwasanimpromptu meeting of roughly forty prochoice Carter appointees, all deeply troubled by a statement made by Carter in support of the Hyde Amendment banning federal funds for abortion. The same month, Costanza hosted a groundbreaking White House meeting about battered women, in which high-level bureaucrats heard testimonials from domestic violence victims and shelter advocates. While both meetings broke new...

The Limited Power of Female Appointments: Abortion and Domestic Violence Policy in the Carter Administration

538 Feminist Studies 41, no. 3. © 2015 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Doreen J. Mattingly The Limited Power of Female Appointments: Abortion and Domestic Violence Policy in the Carter Administration In 1977 in the United States, Second Wave feminists were poised to make a meaningful impact on federal policy. Jimmy Carter’s successful 1976 presidential campaign had included an open wooing of feminist support : he had created a “51.3 Percent” committee to address women’s issues and he had told feminist audiences that he “wanted to be known as the President who achieved equal rights for women, just as President Johnson had won civil rights legislation for blacks.”1 Once elected, Carter appointed an unprecedented number of feminist women to high office, many of whom were committed to addressing the concerns of marginalized women and advancing policy on issues such as sexual violence and reproductive rights. These appointees were linked to a dense feminist organizational presence in Washington that was unprecedented in its size and diversity. Not surprisingly, many feminists had high expectations for the new administration. 1. Cynthia Harrison, “Creating a National Feminist Agenda: Coalition Building in the 1970s,” in Feminist Coalitions: Historical Perspectives on Second-Wave Feminism in the United States, ed. Stephanie Gilmore (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 30. See also John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993); and Sara Evans, Tidal Wave: How Women Changed America at Century’s End (New York: Free Press, 2003). Doreen J. Mattingly 539 Despite these promising conditions, feminists made little headway on policy during the Carter administration (1977–1981). Federal funding for abortion was eliminated; no permanent offices that would have advocated for women’s issues were created; and bills supporting domestic violence shelters, support for “displaced homemakers,” and quotas for female-owned businesses were defeated or extremely diluted. In addition, no additional states ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and several states rescinded earlier ratification votes. Some of these failures can be attributed to the general loss of feminist momentum and the emergence of a conservative backlash in the late 1970s. Anti-ERA organizing fueled the rise of a conservative “family values” movement that would shape social policies for more than a generation, and neoliberal economic conservatives were challenging the welfare-state programs that feminists sought to expand. But in Washington, there was an addition challenge —the unreliable support of Carter himself. Despite his promises, Carter felt that by appointing women he had met his commitment to feminists and did little to support feminist policy goals that went beyond eliminating discrimination. This paper makes an important contribution to the history of feminist action by looking in detail at the efforts of Jimmy Carter’s feminist appointees to influence policy. In particular, it discusses the actions of the most visible feminist in the White House, Margaret “Midge” Costanza . Carter named Costanza director of the Office of Public Liaison, a department that was created to manage relations between the White House and citizens’ groups. Her position as the first woman to serve as Assistant to the President, in concert with her gregarious nature and strong support for women’s issues, made Costanza a very visible symbol of affirmative action for Carter. Yet Costanza, like many other high-level feminist appointees, met opposition within the White House when she tried to advance women’s issues. Her persistent advocacy contributed to her marginalization within the White House. Just twenty months into the administration she resigned in frustration.2 This paper begins with a discussion of the unique circumstances surrounding Carter’s feminist appointees, followed by a detailed exploration 2. For Costanza’s complete story, see Doreen J. Mattingly, A Feminist in the White House: Midge Costanza, the Carter Years, and America’s Culture Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 540 Doreen J. Mattingly oftwomeetingsheldbyCostanzainJuly1977.Thefirstwasanimpromptu meeting of roughly forty prochoice Carter appointees, all deeply troubled by a statement made by Carter in support of the Hyde Amendment banning federal funds for abortion. The same month, Costanza hosted a groundbreaking White House meeting about battered women, in which high-level bureaucrats heard testimonials from domestic violence victims and shelter advocates. While both meetings broke new...