Power Transition Theory Research Articles

The Sino-Russian strategic understanding on the Arab uprisings: Motivations and implications

This article seeks to analyse the emerging Sino-Russian strategic understanding on the Arab uprisings of late 2010 and beyond by investigating its underlying motivations and its implications for Middle East and international politics. Building on the assumptions of ‘power transition theory’ in explaining great power interactions, it is argued that the Sino-Russian strategic understanding on the Arab uprisings dovetails with their pre-existing strategic posture in relation to global politics, and was motivated by their joint rising dissatisfaction with US unilateralist and hegemonic policies in the region. Such policies, from a Sino-Russian perspective, tended to exclude, rather than accommodate, the interests of both powers in this pivotal part of the globe. This prompted Russia and China to capitalize on their growing military and economic power and join efforts in the form of a strategic understanding in an attempt to effectively challenge an intrusive and overreaching hegemon and secure their interests in the region. This strategic understanding has had significant implications for the configuration of great power relationships in the direction of challenging US regional hegemony and facilitating a shift in the regional and global balance of power.

How to avoid a contest for supremacy in East Asia

This article challenges the increasingly dominant narrative of an inevitable quest for supremacy in contemporary East Asia. It argues that the narrative rests on a foundation of power transition theory that is conceptually and historically flawed, and that it risks an unnecessary war. The article contends that strategists should instead start thinking about constructing a system in which power and privileges in East Asia are held in equilibrium in a manner conceptually similar to the associative balance/shared hegemony of the Long Nineteenth Century. In such a system, Asia would not be “America’s,” but neither would it be “China’s.”

Sino-US Competition in Asia Pacific through the Lens of Power Transition Theory

Sino-US Competition in Asia Pacific through the Lens of Power Transition Theory

The power transition and the US response to China’s expanded soft power

Abstract Many scholars have examined how the United States should respond to a rising non-democratic China. Contrary to the well-debated hard power domain, little attention has been devoted to China’s soft power. This study is arguably the first to systematically investigate the US response to the establishment of Confucius Institutes—China’s global initiative to expand soft power. We argue that the US decision to establish Confucius Institutes is influenced by both macro- and micro-level variables. At the macro-level, as suggested by the power transition theory, the United States is more likely to accommodate Confucius Institutes when China shows a higher level of satisfaction with the United States. At the micro-level, US universities and state governments host Confucius Institutes due to budget saving and community engaging. Our analysis sheds light on how the United States makes trade-offs when confronting China’s expanded soft power, and it provides yet another prominent example of money buying influence in international relations.

Is China’s rise now stalling?

The variations on power transition theory so widely used to frame analysis of U.S.–China relation tend to assume the inevitability or at least strong probability of China surpassing the United States in economic power if not necessarily military power. In the terminology of social psychology’s attribution theory, China is imputed with the identity of a state that is inevitably rising. The Chinese Communist Party encourages this attribution among Chinese people and foreigners. But China’s economic rise – the foundation of its comprehensive rise – appears to have entered an inflection point in the mid-2010s and may now be stalling. In critical respects, China increasingly resembles the last two countries that ‘attempted’ a globe-level rise: the unsuccessful cases of postwar Japan and the Soviet Union. China’s labor force is shrinking; the country relies excessively on unsustainable debt increases to fuel economic growth; and pollution is seriously harming public health. But even if China’s rise conclusively stalls, it may take quite some time before the Chinese public and outside observers recognize the new reality because of intrinsic biases in the cognitive logic of attributing identities to actors.

A real driver of US–China trade conflict

Purpose According to the conventional wisdom, trade is not a zero-sum game, but a positive-sum game. By allowing countries to focus on producing the goods that they can produce relatively efficiently, free trade is largely beneficial for everyone involved. Then, why are the world’s two largest economies (i.e. the USA and China) currently engaged in a trade war, which is likely to hurt their own economies? What is the driving force for the trade war between the two economic giants? The purpose of this paper is to offer an explanation of the underlying cause of the US–China trade war. Design/methodology/approach In an effort to make sense of the trade war between the USA and China, the paper draws the insights from the two international relations theories – i.e. hegemonic stability theory and power transition theory. Findings As China continues to threaten US hegemony in the world in general and East Asia in particular, the Sino–US competition for hegemony will intensify over time. As a result, the trade war between the two countries may persist longer than many anticipate. Further, even if the trade war between the two superpowers ends soon, a similar type of conflict is likely to occur later as long as the Sino–US hegemonic rivalry continues. Originality/value The central thesis of this paper is that “US fear” about its declining hegemony and China’s rapid rise as a challenger of US hegemony is driving a US-launched trade war with China. Since the underlying cause of the trade war between the world’s two largest economies is political (i.e. the Sino–US hegemonic rivalry) rather than economic (e.g. US attempts to improve the trade balance with China by imposing tariffs on Chinese goods), the paper contends that the full understanding of the trade war requires close attention to the importance of power competition between the two superpowers.

The Perils of Hubris? A Tragic Reading of “Thucydides’ Trap” and China-US Relations

In the last few years, Graham Allison’s “Thucydides’ Trap” has stimulated much discussion within International Relations (IR). Most IR scholars understand Thucydides’ Trap as a shorthand for power transition theory, and view it as highly inadequate for analyzing China-US relations. This article seeks to offer an alternative, tragic, understanding of Thucydides’ Trap that may have more purchase on the analysis of the dynamic of China-US relations. It first argues that while Thucydides’ Trap shares power transition theory’s focus on the shifting balance of power, it is also different from the latter in its emphasis on the emotional implications of changes in the balance of power. This article then explores a tragic understanding of Thucydides’ Trap. Economic success often encourages a rising power to display ambition, confidence and enhanced sense of self (what Allison calls “rising power syndrome”), which leads to loosened restraint, overextension, and strategic blunder; meanwhile, its assertive and ambitious moves spark a ruling power’s fear, insecurity and even paranoia (what Allison calls “ruling power syndrome”), which prompts it to take “preventive” actions in response to the rising power’s assertiveness. This article finally looks at China-US relations through this tragic lens. It suggests that this tragic understanding of Thucydides’ Trap can illuminate the emotional aspect of China-US relations, and also argues that the Thucydides Trap Research Project should henceforth develop an emotional line of inquiry into interaction between the great powers.

Power Transition Theory Revisited: When Rising China Meets Dissatisfied United States

Dissatisfaction is a major concept in power transition theory, which postulates that a rapidly rising power tends to be dissatisfied with the international system and would thus attempt to reform or replace it, whereas the hegemonic power would, by default, be satisfied with and work to maintain the status quo. This paper, however, offers an alternative outlook on the reigning-rising power dynamics by examining the conditions for and implications of hegemonic dissatisfaction and rising power satisfaction. It argues that although China, as a potential systemic challenger harboring grievances against the existing global regimes, has been a recurrent subject for studies, it is the United States, the established hegemon, that appears increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. The U.S. dissatisfaction is informed by a set of internal and external factors often justified with a reference to China as a challenger, and is manifested in a number of anti-system strategies, including unconventional diplomatic rhetoric, as well as withdrawal from various international institutions or attempts to undermine them. The U.S. discontent, as contrasted with China’s satisfaction as a rising power, has a number of potential geopolitical and economic implications at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, endangering the viability and sustainability of the universally accepted political and economic regimes.

Geo-Political Checkmate in the Indian Ocean Region: 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, Energy Security and Indo-US Nexus

The study intends to explore the connection between China’s energy security, 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), and its anticipated impacts on Indo-US strategic perception in the Indian Ocean region. China’s economic prosperity and industrial boom is fomenting different variables to upset the U.S. led world order. In the back drop of energy security as core national interest, Chinese leadership has exceptionally focused the maritime domain. In addition to this, for uninterrupted industrial growth, China largely relies on energy imports that have turned its attention to the strategic value of the Sea lines of communication (SLOCs). However, China’s newly emerged interests and subsequent investment in different sea ports along the oceanic supply chain of Indian Ocean is fuelling Indo-US strategic distrust in the region. The study concludes that China’s carefully crafted Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is to challenge the status quo to protect its (China) core national interests in Indian Ocean The divergence of strategic interests in Indian Ocean is heralding a new multipart strategic competition that will transform the Indian Ocean into breeding ground for naval arm race. To understand the shifting geo political realities, the researchers used the Power Transition theory.

A Study on the Competition for Semiconductor Hegemony among Korea, China and U.S.A.

4차 산업혁명의 핵심인 반도체 산업에서 한국은 메모리반도체 강자로 자리잡았다. 메모리반도체 시장에서의 패권 다툼은 신흥 도전국의 시장 진입 시도와 이를 억제하려는 패권국의 노력이 다양한 형태로 나타나고 있다. 국가안보와 연계된 반도체 산업의 특성상 기업간 경쟁 차원을 넘어, 각국 정부는 전략적으로 개입하여 산업정책과 무역정책을 구사하고 있다. 한국이 메모리반도체 패권을 유지하는 데 필요한 실질적인 전략수립을 위해, 본고에서는 세력전이 이론, 동맹전이 이론, 헤게모니 쇠퇴 이론, 전략무역 이론에 입각하여 메모리반도체 시장에서의 시장 지배자와 시장 진입자간 패권경쟁 양태를 살펴본다. 경제 이론과 국제정치 이론을 접목시켜 볼 때, 현상 유지를 원하는 시장 지배자인 패권국은 후발주자 진입 억제를 위해 무역제재, 인수합병 저지, 배타적 가격 전략, 사다리 걷어차기 등 전략을 구사한다. 현상 타파를 원하는 시장 진입자인 신흥 도전국은 자국 산업 경쟁력 제고를 위한 세제 지원, 보조금 지급, 무역 보복, 인재 스카웃, 인수합병, 동맹 참여 등을 시도한다. 시장 환경이 결코 한국의 메모리반도체 패권유지에 유리한 방향으로 순조롭게 흘러가지 않는 국면에서, 국가안보를 확보하기 위한 정부의 외교적 노력의 필요함을 주장했다.Korea has been a dominating presence in the memory semiconductor industry which has played a key role in the 4th Industry Revolution Era. There are many forms of competition for hegemony, such as the attempts of new challengers to enter the market and the efforts of super powers to deter them. Semiconductor industry is not just a matter of economy, but a matter of national security, which leads to government engagement in trade and industrial policy. This research is written in order to offer ideas for an adequate action plan that the Korean semiconductor industry needs to implement. This research focuses on hegemony competition in the memory semiconductor market between dominant firms and market entering firms using recent examples, and is based on the power transition theory, alliance transition theory, hegemonic decline theory and strategic trade theory. According to economic and international political theories, dominant firms - as super powers - want status quo. So they block exporting important semiconductors to competitors, stop M&A s by competitors, use limit pricing strategy and kick away the ladder, which can deter challengers from entering their market. Challengers want to change the regime. As a result, they reduce corporate taxes, offer subsidies for firms, implement retaliation on trade, scout for top talented engineers and scientists, try to merge other firms and join alliances in order to enhance their competitiveness in the market. Under the unfavorable circumstances for Korean firms to maintain dominance, this research emphasizes the importance of diplomatic efforts to guarantee national security.

БРИКС как предмет изучения теории международных отношений

This article examines the phenomenon of the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa from the perspective of several theories of international relations; in particular, power transition theory, soft power and peaceful coexistence concepts, the theory of “global regionalism” and status theories are reviewed. Each explains both the BRICS phenomenon and the role of this integration association in the present-day international relations system. It is concluded that, depending on research objectives and the way it is applied, each theory - despite limitations - has explanatory power. Together they create an interdisciplinary basis for studying complex phenomena such as the BRICS.A number of modern theories hold that, along with the pursuit of purely material and pragmatic interests, the BRICS countries actively use this integration association to strengthen their positions in the world arena and elevate their international status.It is also concluded that the BRICS succeeded in creating an image of an alternative model of world order based on the principles of cooperation, mutual respect and balance of interests, rather than mandate, discrimination and hierarchy. It is premature to make a statement that a principally new type of interstate relations or an international institution has been created within the BRICS framework. At the same time, it is also certain that some positive experience has already been accumulated in the framework of this forum, and that this association offers good prospects for the future. For this reason it is of considerable interest for international relations theory.

In the Shadow of the Thucydides Trap: International Relations Theory and the Prospects for Peace in U.S.-China Relations

Rising powers and the consequent shifts in the balance of power have long been identified as critical challenges to the international order. What is the likelihood that China and the United States will fall into the Thucydides Trap, meaning that the two countries will fight a major war during a potential power transition? This article creates a framework of seven variables, derived from dominant international relations theories and Graham Allison’s “twelve clues for peace,” that predict the likelihood of major conflict between a rising and an established power: degree of economic interdependence, degree of institutional constraints, domestic political system, nature of relevant alliances, nature of nuclear weapons programs, the sustainability of the rising power’s growth, and its level of dissatisfaction. It then evaluates the values of these variables in the context of the U.S.-China relationship to determine whether pessimism about the prospects of peace is warranted. This analysis leads to more mixed conclusions about the prospects of peace than liberal international relations theory and Allison’s twelve clues would suggest. This research further operationalizes power transition theory and has practical implications for U.S. policy toward China.

Discerning states’ revisionist and status-quo orientations: Comparing China and the US

International Relations literature often refers to states’ motivations as revisionist or status-quo oriented. Such attributions are especially prevalent in discourse on the power-transition theory, suggesting that the danger of war rises when a revisionist China catches up to a status-quo US. Such attributions, however, are rarely supported by systematic evidence providing a direct comparison of Chinese and US conduct. We undertake an analysis of how these countries have behaved differently over time according to their policy pronouncements, their participation in international institutions and agreements, and their voting in the United Nations. Our analysis challenges the conventional wisdom that a rising power tends to be revisionist whereas an incumbent hegemon is invariably committed to the defense of the international order.

The Likelihood of Cyberwar between the United States and China: A Neorealism and Power Transition Theory Perspective

The studies addressing cyberwar and depicting electronic doomsday scenarios, such as cyber version of 9/11, are immensely policy-driven. They lack a theoretical rigor in their explanations, causing a theory-policy gap in the study of cyberwar. This gap is more acute in the discussion on cyberwar scenarios between China and the United States (U.S). Additionally, while some used neorealist frameworks to understand the nature of U.S-China relations in cyberspace, they did so mostly with no systematic analysis of the likelihood of cyberwar between the two. I intend to bridge this theory-policy gap by examining the prospect of cyberwar between the U.S. and China using Neorealism and Power Transition Theory (PTT). I argue that PTT offers a more useful framework. Applying PTT indicates that while cyberwar currently seems unlikely, China will become cyberwar-prone to switch the status quo in cyberspace to its favor, especially if it achieves offensive cyberwar capability parity with the U.S. while simultaneously remaining dissatisfied with the cyber order. I utilized secondary empirical sources in the relevant literature in conducting this study.

Thinking about Change: American Theorizing and Chinese Reasoning on World Politics

This essay addresses conceptions of change in two influential U.S. theories of international relations (power-transition theory and leadership long-cycle theory), and their resonance with Chinese predilections in thinking about and coping with change. We examine both convergences and distinctions between American IR theorizing and Chinese understanding on three key questions concerning change in world politics: (1) who is the key agent of change? (2) why does change take place? And (3) how does change happen in history? We highlight the bimodal feature of Chinese strategic thinking of how to make a change in world politics. We suggest that Chinese leaders respond to pressures stemming from both their domestic and international environment. They tend to be more risk-acceptant when facing a deteriorating situation and more inclined to pursue a moderate approach when facing a benign environment. External actors, especially the United States, will play an important role in shaping China's choices.

Interactions between hard and soft power: The institutional adaptation of international intellectual property protection to global power shifts

Prevailing power transition theories focus on hard sources of power to explain why international institutions do, or do not, adapt to shifts in the balance of power among their members. This article argues that, in the wake of such a shift in the balance between emerging and established powers, institutional adaptations depend on both their hard and soft power resources. Soft power matters for institutional adaptations because both emerging and established powers have to justify the use of hard power to their respective audiences. Whether emerging or established powers are able to use the hard power they have depends crucially on rhetorical resources, such as claims of legitimacy and their (transnational) societal resonance. We provide empirical support for our argument through an analysis of the adaptation of the Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights agreement and the adaptation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Emerging powers such as Brazil, India and South Africa were able to bring about institutional adaptations because they not only had the hard power to undermine the respective institutions, but could also build on civil society support that legitimized their demands or constrained established states’ use of hard power to fend off their demands.

Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the Rise of China: Long Cycles, Power Transitions, and China’s Ascent

In this article I borrow insights into repeated patterns of global political change from long cycle and power transition theories and apply them to the rise of China. China is on a trajectory to become the largest economy in terms of total economic size, but viewed through the prism of those insights, it has considerable weaknesses or barriers to overcome in order to become a global hegemonic power. Nonetheless, the rise of China could produce significant instability in the interstate system as it develops into a revisionist power. It is too early to conclude that China is a revisionist power, but some signs suggest China has revisionist aims in the Asia Pacific and could become one in the future. In this context, restraining the growth of Beijing’s dissatisfaction with the current international order by accommodating it through appropriate roles and status must be considered more seriously by Washington. Another option is for Washington to enhance and upgrade its military capabilities in the Asia Pacific, but its ability to do so successfully hinges on its ability to reinvigorate the US economy.

Power Transitions, Status Dissatisfaction, and War: The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895

ABSTRACTAlthough power transition theory offers a powerful model of international conflict, scholars have not adequately operationalized the theory's key variable of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the status quo. We argue that status dissatisfaction is an important component of a rising state's overall dissatisfaction with the system. We apply our revised power transition framework to the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War. Japan's revisionist foreign policy was driven by economic and security threats posed by China's control over Korea, dissatisfaction with Japan's place in the China-dominated East Asian hierarchy, the hope for recognition as a great power by the West, status-related domestic pressures, and by belief change that was endogenous to shifting power. Despite several earlier crises, Japan made the decision for war only after it had achieved parity with China, which is consistent with power transition theory's hypothesis that under conditions of shifting power, parity is a necessary condition for war.

Challenging the Power Consensus: GDP, CINC, and Power Transition Theory

ABSTRACTPower Transition Theory (PTT) has hitherto often relied on power indicators like Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) to capture its power variable. The underlying assumption is that these indicators are highly correlated, and thus it matters little as to which one the researcher chooses. I call this PTT's power consensus and argue that this consensus is problematic, as the choice of power indicator is often crucial. For PTT, it does not only matter whether such indicators come to similar results by and large; the position of certain singular actors—such as the dominant power, its prime challengers, and the top ranked great powers generally—is even more essential. However, it is precisely with regard to the positions of these actors that we find important discrepancies between what PTT's favored indicators (GDP and CINC) suggest. Analysis of some crucial historical and recent cases supports my challenge to the power consensus. First, the celebrated peaceful power transition between the United Kingdom and the United States in the nineteenth century becomes suspect under closer scrutiny, as GDP places the United States entering the parity zone at a time during which it must arguably be counted as a dissatisfied power. Second, a number of CINC-exclusive power transitions in the twentieth century are not accounted for by GDP. A few possible options might mitigate the power-problem for the cases under scrutiny, however scholars of PTT should generally be much more conscious about their choice of power indicator.

Power, Wealth, and Satisfaction

Power transition theory (PTT) has had a progressive research program for more than half a century. In spite of this, one of its key concepts, satisfaction, has remained undertheorized. A compelling theory explaining why growth would make some states dissatisfied in the context of power transitions and others satisfied has not been articulated. It is argued here that satisfaction must be theorized at two levels of analysis: the global and the dyadic. The key to distinguishing satisfied versus dissatisfied states at the global level lies in specifically differentiating between the structural effects of changing power and the satisfying effect of increasing wealth. At the dyadic level, conflict over territory creates a perfect storm of state dissatisfaction. The study develops a theoretical framework for a multilevel understanding of satisfaction and its impact and tests it across politically relevant dyads from 1950 to 2001. The evidence strongly supports the hypotheses.