Power-sharing Coalitions Research Articles

Power-Sharing Coalitions and Ethnic Armed Conflict

How do multiethnic coalitions affect the risk of violent conflict? We argue that government leaders form larger ruling coalitions as the uncertainty over violent threats from radical sub-groups increases. We formalize this argument in a novel multi-actor model. Our game-theoretic approach illustrates how power-maximizing government leaders reduce the risk of rebellion by sharing power with radical subgroup leaders, while only slightly increasing the risk of coups. Empirically, we rely on a novel selection estimator and data on ethnic coalitions to investigate the predictions from our theoretical model. Our findings show that the conflict-reducing effect of power sharing increases once we consider the endogeneity of coalition formation and conflict. Our results also demonstrate that power-sharing coalitions are most effective when including radical sub-groups. Our study has important implications for research on coalition formation, authoritarian politics, and armed conflict.

Profits from Peace: The Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Corruption

Summary Does power-sharing drive corruption in post-conflict countries? We conceptualize government elites in any post-conflict situation as rent-seeking agents who need to ensure the support of their key constituencies to remain in power. Power-sharing institutions—especially cabinet-level, executive power-sharing institutions—systematically shape these rent-seeking motives. Power-sharing cabinets create political coalitions dominated by small circles of government and rebel elites with direct access to state resources and low levels of loyalty toward the government leader. Also, the provisional nature of many power-sharing institutions increases rent-seeking incentives: facing a limited time horizon in office, rent-seeking elites within the power-sharing coalition are likely to capture as many rents as possible before they have to leave office. Thus, post-conflict countries with power-sharing institutions should exhibit higher aggregated levels of rent-seeking measured as the level of corruption in a country. In a statistical analysis of all post-conflict situations during 1996–2010, we find that power-sharing cabinets substantively increase corruption in post-conflict countries and that this effect is stronger in the presence of natural resource rents. These findings add quantitative evidence to the debate about drivers of post-conflict corruption. Moreover, they highlight a trade-off between short-term stability and long-term negative effects of corruption for post-conflict political and economic development.

Peter Emerson: From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics. Electing a Power-Sharing Coalition

Knižní recenze / book review.

Patterns of democracy: Coalition governance and majoritarian modification in the United Kingdom, 2010–2015

The UK is often regarded as the archetype of Westminster democracy and as the empirical antithesis of the power-sharing coalitions of Western Europe. Yet, in recent years a different account has emerged which focuses on the subtler institutional dynamics that limit the executive. It is to this body of scholarship that this article responds, locating the recent chapter of coalition government within the wider context of the UK’s democratic evolution. To do so, the article draws on Lijphart’s two-dimensional typology of democracies, developing a refined framework that enables systematic comparison over time. The article demonstrates that over the course of the 2010–2015 Parliament, the UK underwent another period of majoritarian modification, driven by factors including the long-term influence of the constitutional forces unleashed under Labour and the short-term impact of coalition management. The article makes several important contributions, salient in the UK and beyond. Theoretically, it offers a critical rejoinder to debates regarding the relationship between institutional design and democratic performance. Methodologically, it demonstrates that the tools of large-scale comparison can be effectively scaled down to facilitate within-case analysis. Empirically, it provides a series of conclusions regarding the tenability of the UK’s extant democratic architecture under the weight of pressures to which it continues to be subject.

Power-Sharing Executives: Consociational and Centripetal Formulae and the Case of Northern Ireland

Power-sharing coalitions in deeply divided places can take centripetal or consociational forms. Respectively, these aim to foster moderation and inclusivity by restricting coalitions to moderate parties or proportionately to incorporate the main political forces. Using the case of Northern Ireland (1973–2015), this article assesses the merits of a particular consociational coalition, based on sequential and proportional allocation rules, by contrast with centripetal (and alternative consociational) coalitions. Sequential and proportional coalitions have clear constitutional design advantages that deserve more attention from academics and policy-makers concerned with the government of deeply divided places.

Power-sharing in a re-united Cyprus: Centripetal coalitions vs. proportional sequential coalitions

Power-sharing coalitions in severely divided places can take centripetal or consociational forms. Respectively, these aim to foster moderation by restricting coalitions to moderate parties from different ethnic communities or inclusivity by ensuring that coalitions are broadly and proportionately representative of the main political forces. This article draws on the experience of Cyprus to show the limits of negotiating centripetal coalitions even under “most likely to succeed” conditions. It investigates a major centripetalist initiative on the island between 2008 and 2010, and explains why this failed to catalyze a negotiated settlement. Likewise, the article points to the limits of classic consociational approaches in mediating power-sharing arrangements, particularly approaches that rely on corporate ethnic quotas. Contrary to conventional wisdom and much international practice, the article shows that consociational coalitions can take a liberal form that bypass such quotas. Specifically, the article presents and defends an important innovation in consociational theory and practice: the proportional sequential (PS) coalition. PS coalitions are automatically determined by election results, and allocate portfolios on a proportionate and liberal basis amongst a divided polity’s main political parties. We argue that PS coalitions can provide a broadly inclusive and negotiable settlement in the context of a re-united Cyprus as well as in other divided polities.

Electing an All-Party, Proportional, Power-Sharing Coalition, a Government of National Unity

There are many instances when a group of people might want to choose a committee, a fixed number of individuals to undertake a particular collective function. At their AGM or annual conference, residents in a community group, shareholders of a limited company, members of a trades union, and those of a political party, may all want to elect an executive: one person to be chair, another secretary, a third treasurer, etc. All these posts require different talents and all the individual office bearers undertake necessary but separate functions for the successful operation of that committee. In like manner, a parliament may choose to elect a government of national unity (GNU). The only voting procedure so far devised by which a given electorate—those concerned at an AGM or members of parliament (MPs)—may elect, not only those whom they wish to be in cabinet, but also the ministerial posts in which each of those chosen will then serve, is the matrix vote. This paper describes 1) an experiment held at the Political Studies Association of Ireland (PSAI), undergraduate conference in Dublin on 23rd June 2012 inwhich participants, role playing as members of the Irish parliament, elected a GNU; and 2) the matrix vote methodology, such that others may also employ this voting system. An obvious instance would be for the election of an all-party power-sharing executive in a post-conflict zone.

The presidential and parliamentary elections in Kenya, December 2007

On 27 December 2007, Kenyan voters participated in the fourth elections since the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1991, casting ballots for the president and members of parliament. Little violence occurred on election day, and observers considered the voting process wellorganized. However, delay by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) in announcing the results incited serious unrest in the country. Challenger Raila Odinga had taken an early lead on the first day of counting, but incumbent President Mwai Kibaki erased that margin and went on to win by 2%. The hasty inauguration of Kibaki on 30 December, and claims of vote rigging, fostered violence throughout the country. The fighting resulted in nearly 1200 deaths, 500,000 displaced persons, and the widespread destruction of land and property. Mediation efforts by former United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, led to a power-sharing coalition government in February, 2008 leaving Kibaki with the presidency while creating the post of prime minister for Odinga. Independent analyses and the work of the Independent Review Commission to study the election revealed deep flaws in the vote tally process, undermining the credibility of the ECK’s official results. Since the ballot counts are untrustworthy, we present the results of our nation-wide exit poll. These data provide the only reliable information on the results of Kenya’s 2007 elections.