Abstract
Power-sharing coalitions in deeply divided places can take centripetal or consociational forms. Respectively, these aim to foster moderation and inclusivity by restricting coalitions to moderate parties or proportionately to incorporate the main political forces. Using the case of Northern Ireland (1973–2015), this article assesses the merits of a particular consociational coalition, based on sequential and proportional allocation rules, by contrast with centripetal (and alternative consociational) coalitions. Sequential and proportional coalitions have clear constitutional design advantages that deserve more attention from academics and policy-makers concerned with the government of deeply divided places.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
