Potomac Books Research Articles

Recent Works on U.S.–Latin American Relations

Recent Works on U.S.–Latin American Relations Gregory Weeks (bio) Borders and Bridges: A History of U.S.–Latin American Relations. By Stewart Brewer. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006. Pp. 197. $49.95 cloth. Neighborly Adversaries: Readings in U.S.–Latin American Relations, 2nd ed. Edited by Michael LaRosa and Frank O. Mora. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007. Pp. 371. $29.95 paper. Addicted to Failure: U.S. Security Policy in Latin America and the Andean Region. Edited by Brian Loveman. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. Pp. 367. $27.95 paper. Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945. By Alan McPherson. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006. Pp. 208. $45.00 cloth. Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean. Edited by Alan McPherson. New York: Berghahn Books, 2006. Pp. 301. $85.00 cloth. Making the Americas: The United States and Latin America from the Age of Revolutions to the Era of Globalization. By Thomas F. O'Brien. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007. Pp. 390. $24.95 paper. U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years: Opportunities Lost or Opportunities Squandered? By David Scott Palmer. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006. Pp. 125. $24.95 paper. [End Page 247] Imágenes de un imperio: Estados Unidos y las formas de representación de América Latina. By Ricardo D. Salvatore. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 2006. Pp. 191. There have, of course, been countless books on different aspects of U.S.– Latin American relations, especially after the Cuban Revolution increased U.S. governmental and scholarly attention to the region. Long gone are the days when the subject was dominated by U.S.-centric diplomatic historians like Samuel Flagg Bemis, whose influential text The Latin American Policy of the United States (excerpted in LaRosa and Mora) is almost painful to read for its paternalistic bent, particularly in its positive view of U.S. imperialism.1 Instead, the books under review here demonstrate how the study of U.S.–Latin American relations in the post–Cold War era has grown very diverse. It is, therefore, no easy task to tie together all the many threads of the topic, given the number of disciplinary and historical perspectives, the various audiences, and the aspirations of different analyses. Nevertheless, some things do not change much. In a book review essay published in Latin American Research Review in 1992, immediately after the end of the Cold War, Alyson Brysk wrote that the books that she examined "do not address each other directly and to a certain extent are aimed at different audiences."2 This is also the case with the publications now under review. We can, however, identify four distinct but intertwined goals set out in these books. First, there is the effort to characterize and summarize U.S. policy and its impact on, and response from, Latin America. Second, the authors seek to judge U.S. policy, especially in relation to its stated goals. Third, most of the authors analyze Latin America's reaction to U.S. policy. Fourth, a number of the books have an explicit pedagogical angle, while others could also easily be incorporated as class readings. For this, I will conclude by discussing how these publications could contribute collectively to theory building. The topic of U.S.–Latin American relations as a whole is unique because it has a wider undergraduate audience than many others; many universities and colleges teach it along with a general course on Latin American politics. Therefore, in addition to (or in conjunction with) theoretical and conceptual treatments, there is a steady stream of books aimed at the non-expert. Given the national debate in the United States on immigration, the rhetoric aimed at the Cuban and Venezuelan governments (including whether to talk to them at all), the continued flow of drugs and the associated [End Page 248] violence, and the discourse on free-trade agreements, just to name a few of the most prominent issues, there is a need for books intended for students at both the graduate level and the undergraduate level. One encouraging point is that the quality of writing in many of these...

Rafael Quintero, Cold War Warrior: From the Bay of Pigs to Iran—Contra

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsDon BohningDon Bohning, a veteran journalist, spent more than forty years as a reporter and editor for The Miami Herald of Florida before retiring in 2000. The last thirty-seven of those years were spent covering Latin America and the Caribbean. He has won numerous journalism and professional awards, among them the Overseas Press Club's 1983 Hal Boyle Award for the Best Daily Newspaper or Wire Service Reporting from Abroad; the Maria Moors Cabot Award from Columbia University in 1974; and the Knight-Ridder Newspapers Newspaper News/Editorial Excellence Award in 1987. Mr. Bohning is the author of The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Activities Against Cuba 1959–1965 (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005).

The Buccaneer’s Realm: Pirate Life on the Spanish Main, 1674–1688 (review)

Reviewed by: The Buccaneer’s Realm: Pirate Life on the Spanish Main, 1674–1688 Robert H. Berlin The Buccaneer’s Realm: Pirate Life on the Spanish Main, 1674–1688. By Benerson Little. Washington: Potomac Books, 2007. ISBN 978-1-59797-101-0. Maps. Illustrations. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xv, 342. $29.95. The Peace Treaty of 1674 ended the Third Anglo-Dutch War, brought peace between Spain and England, and turned privateers, legalized pirates operating with a letter of marque, into buccaneers. The name buccaneer has its origins with the boucaniers, originally cattle and pig hunters on the island of Hispaniola, former soldiers who survived the failed English attempt in 1655 to conquer Hispaniola. The name boucanier refers to the boucan, the grate on which meat was cured over a fire. The first boucaniers were essentially men who hunted pigs and cattle to barbecue the meat for immediate consumption or for drying in the sun to make jerky. Should you wish to prepare an authentic Boucanier barbecue, Appendix E in this book gives a detailed account, including the recipe for the rum punch required to accompany the barbecue. Indeed, there is little about the buccaneer’s life that is not covered in this detailed and informative book. The buccaneer’s activities, diet, dress, sex life, health, wealth, and society on the Spanish Main are explained with enthusiasm and excitement. The author reveals the buccaneer’s world through numerous first-person accounts and explains the buccaneer’s social life both on land and sea. The Buccaneer’s Realm is also a naval history, recreating numerous small sea battles between the buccaneers and the primarily Spanish ships, from treasure galleons to sloops, they attacked. Piracy proved far more rewarding than making and selling jerky! The author concurs with the debunkers of pirate myths such as buried treasure and treasure maps (buccaneers had neither time to nor interest in saving any wealth they stole). Little understands and explains the realities of life aboard a buccaneer sailing vessel where crews battled odors, vermin, poor rations, as well as the tempests of the sea and enemy men of war. [End Page 937] The buccaneers sailed the Spanish Main, referred to simply as the Main, which in 1674 ranged from Florida southward along the Central and South American coast until it was interrupted by the bulge of the Portuguese colony of Brazil. In a modern sense, the Main, Benerson points out, refers to the Caribbean, both sea and islands. The book’s geography encompasses both and readers are assisted by eight useful maps. Little claims that the return of war between the great powers in 1688 postponed the rise of unrestrained piracy. When the so-called “Golden Age of Piracy” did take place in the early 1700s the infamous Anglo American pirates like Blackbeard “preyed almost entirely on weak merchantmen at sea” and, unlike the buccaneers of the 1670s and 1680s, avoided attacking cities and men-of-war (p. 220). Benerson Little’s earlier book, The Sea Rover’s Practice: Pirate Tactics and Techniques, 1630–1730, displayed his masterful knowledge of the subject and he brings that perspective to the sea actions of the buccaneers. As a former U.S. Navy SEAL officer and an analyst for the Naval Special Warfare Center Strategy and Tactics Group, he understands maritime life and effectively recreates buccaneer chases and captures. Little relies on published sources, particularly Alexandre Exquemelin’s History of the Bouccaneers of America, first published in Amsterdam in 1678 and still the standard work, and the English buccaneer William Dampier’s three accounts of voyages published in 1697 and 1729, for much of his material. He does not cite in text or bibliography the most readable and authoritative book on pirates, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and Reality of Life Among the Pirates by David Cordingly. Though the writing and organization could be more reader friendly, The Buccaneer’s Realm: Pirate Life on the Spanish Main, 1674–1688 is a valuable source for understanding the buccaneer’s life on land and at sea. Robert H. Berlin Prescott, Arizona Copyright © 2008 The Society for Military History

A Soldier to the Last: Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler in Blue and Gray (review)

Reviewed by: A Soldier to the Last: Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler in Blue and Gray Derek W. Frisby A Soldier to the Last: Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler in Blue and Gray. By Edward G. Longacre. Washington: Potomac Books, 2007. ISBN 157-488-591-X. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi, 288. $29.95 (cloth). Joseph Wheeler seemingly possessed none of the desired qualities necessary to become a professional soldier. His impoverished background, wiry frame, genteel personality, and subpar achievement in martial, athletic, and academic subjects at West Point seemingly doomed any chance for a successful military career. Wheeler’s dutiful service, insatiable ambition, good fortune, and remarkable self-promotional skills, however, propelled him into the military pantheons of both the short-lived Confederacy and the reconstructed United States. Yet, few have undertaken a serious study of Wheeler’s remarkable career and legacy, perhaps because he served in the western theater or was not as “southern” or as “colorful” as Nathan B. Forrest and John Hunt Morgan. Edward Longacre, a U.S. Air Force historian and honorary director of the U.S. Cavalry Association, has remedied this oversight with the first Wheeler biography in over sixty-five years, attempting to fill out the marginal aspects of Wheeler’s Civil War operations and to explore the public memory of this astonishing figure. Longacre describes well how his unsoldierly appearance and dismal West Point record belied Wheeler’s brilliance and how his even-keeled, gentlemanly temperament hid a fiery spirit and addiction to battle. Many of his contemporaries admired his charm, perseverance, and attitude despite his less than stellar early career. Wheeler’s fortunes received a boost when his valiant efforts saved a family from an 1860 Apache attack (he even assisted in the birth of a child during the fray) and cemented his “Fightin’ Joe” nickname. He suddenly appeared the stereotypical American hero, but when the Civil War erupted, Wheeler had few qualms about serving his native Georgia and the Confederacy. The young Wheeler quickly earned his laurels and became one of Braxton Bragg’s most trusted officers. He became the Army of Tennessee’s Chief of Cavalry at twenty-five, earning him another unlikely moniker, “War Child.” However, he was a professional, [End Page 957] regular army officer in an army rife with unprofessional attitudes and in a theater that demanded an irregular approach. Longacre’s drums-and-trumpets narrative portrays Wheeler as a tactically sound, above-average field commander whose “hard work and quiet competence” was indicative of the conventional cavalry service rendered during the war that was “indispensable to his army” (p. 50). The author also details how the newly-promoted Wheeler’s barely adequate administrative abilities, raw skills as a staff officer, unabashed ambition, and undynamic strategic vision undermined his Civil War legacy. While not absolving Wheeler of the Army of Tennessee’s problems, Longacre definitely mitigates disputes or controversies in Wheeler’s favor. Feuds with other roughhewn types such as Forrest, his failures at Stones River and during the Tullahoma-Chickamauga-Chattanooga campaigns, and his inaccurate reports that led to several ill-advised operations beg for a more consistent, unbiased perspective. The last chapters on Wheeler’s equally extraordinary postwar activities are frustratingly brief and lack substantive analysis. Wheeler served nearly a decade in Congress, and at the age of sixty three, he became the only ex-Confederate to serve in a field command during the Spanish-American War. During this later period of his life, he wrote several works on military strategy and history, and authored numerous, often self-serving pieces for the Southern Historical Society Papers and other periodicals. His battles with the “Lost Cause” and his own failings might prove as or more compelling than those with the Yankees, Cubans, or Filipinos, but are given only a cursory treatment by Longacre. A Soldier to the Last is sure to reinvigorate studies of the Army of Tennessee’s frequently dysfunctional command and its strategic philosophies. It should also serve as a new platform to investigate Civil War historiography on the western theater, public memory, and reconciliation. Derek W. Frisby Middle Tennessee State University Murfreeesboro, Tennessee Copyright © 2008 The Society for Military History

The Korean War: The Essential Bibliography (review)

Reviewed by: The Korean War: The Essential Bibliography Paul M. Edwards The Korean War: The Essential Bibliography. By Allan Millett . Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007. ISBN 978-1-57488-976-5. Bibliography. Pp. xi, 234. $14.95. The "Essential Bibliography" series features works by recognized authors that combine a historiographical essay with a current bibliography on significant subjects. As such the series is an important resource for student and scholar alike. The selection of Dr. Allan Millett, distinguished teacher and author, for the period of the Korean War was an excellent one, and Dr. Millett has delivered as expected. If you are a follower of Millett's work, as I am, you will quickly note that a significant portion of this material has been provided elsewhere. The Korean War, however, presents it in a highly comprehensive and workable form. His historical description of the Korean War is insightful and well done, and is obviously the result of his many years of research and investigation. In the bibliographic essays he begins with a wide and informative resource on the Communist side of the war. He moves on to an analysis of the vast number of materials that deal with the political—both national and international—implications of the war. His consideration of the military aspect of the war is well constructed and as up to date as can be expected for an area where new materials are constantly being published. His final chapter, Looking for the Korean War, is well presented and comprehensive. The book ends with some excellent websites recommendations, notes, and a strong bibliography that cites references in English, Korean, Russian, and Chinese. For what it is intended to be, the book is excellent. It is clear and well written as the reader has come to expect from Dr. Millett. The positions taken reflect sound scholarship, careful consideration, and reasoned analysis. It is by far one of the best overviews available. If you are a serious student of the Korean War, then I suspect this book will not add a great deal to your collection. But for the many who are not so well versed, this is a good book to have available. Granted, Dr. Millet is often controversial and in the short work sometimes leaves us with powerful affirmations for which we have not been given a lot of evidence, but this is perhaps more the problem of such books than it is of the author. Despite its value in marketing, it is stretching it a bit to identify this book, and others like it, as being essential; fundamental might be a better word. This is an excellent narrative of the war and analysis of the literature, but there is neither the room, nor the breadth, to surpass the works of others, even those of Dr. Millett. Nevertheless, I had purchased the book long before being asked to review it, found it to be well written and highly useful, and recommend it to you as being well worth the thankfully small sum being asked for it. Paul M. Edwards Center for the Study of the Korean War Independence, Missouri Copyright © 2008 Society for Military History

Duffy's War: Fr. Francis Duffy, Wild Bill Donovan, and the Irish Fighting 69th in World War I (review)

Reviewed by: Duffy’s War: Fr. Francis Duffy, Wild Bill Donovan, and the Irish Fighting 69th in World War I Francis M. Carroll Duffy’s War: Fr. Francis Duffy, Wild Bill Donovan, and the Irish Fighting 69th in World War I, by Stephen L. Harris , pp. 434. Washington: Potomac Books, 2006. $29.95 (cloth). No American state militia or National Guard unit is so well known, or has had such a role in the national consciousness, as the old 69th New York Regiment. No doubt, the 1940 movie starring James Cagney and Pat O'Brien about the regiment's service in World War I, or the membership of the poet Joyce Kilmer, and the fact that it served as the home of the 1913 Armoury Show, partially explain its prominence. However, the reason the movie was made in the first place was the fame and stature achieved by the regiment and by its chaplain, Father Francis Patrick Duffy, and its leading officer, Colonel William J. Donovan. Part of its distinctiveness was also the long history of the regiment, and part was its Irishness. During the Civil War the 69th, including Thomas Francis Meagher, served gallantly in the famous Irish Brigade, distinguishing itself at Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. Indeed, the regiment earned its nickname, the "Fighting Sixty-ninth," from the Confederate commander, Robert E. Lee. So there is something special about the 69th. Father Duffy and William Donovan were instrumental in sustaining the Irish aura of the regiment in World War I. Stephen L. Harris, a military historian, begins with a powerful description of the funeral of Father Duffy at St. Patrick's Cathedral in 1932. Although ostensibly a simple parish priest, Father Duffy became a national figure through his heroic actions as chaplain to the regiment during the war; the priest himself acknowledged, "The war was the making of me." It certainly brought into public awareness his qualities as a pastor and shepherd of his flock, and that flock—the regiment—was completely devoted to him. But Duffy was also an intellectual, a reformer, a soldier, and something of a politician. The regiment went through eight colonels between 1917 and 1919; it was Father Duffy and the middle-rank officers who worked the regiment into an effective fighting unit, maintained its morale, and looked after its dead and wounded. Father Duffy was the sort of chaplain who could hold his own with generals over dinner and also give comfort to his men on the front line under fire. His men—Catholics, Protestants, and Jews—loved him for it and never forgot him. St. Patrick's was packed for his funeral, and 25,000 people filled Fifth Avenue outside. The 69th became the 165th United States Infantry Regiment when it was placed in the newly formed 42nd Division—the so-called "Rainbow Division," made up of National Guard regiments from across the country. The division was sent to France in late 1917, and went into the line during the winter, first in [End Page 159] the Champagne region, then in major battles at the Ourcq River, at St. Mihiel, and finally in the last days of the war, on the Romagne Heights in the Meuse-Argonne campaign. The regiment again distinguished itself, suffering 3,501 casualties—about as many as made up the unit in 1917—and losing 844, the highest proportion of any of the units in the division. Harris, working from a wealth of army records and private manuscripts, pieces together the operations of the three battalions. He traces the struggles to achieve their objectives and the costs involved in exact detail. Harris never loses track of the strategic problems of command, nor does he lose touch with the struggle in the trenches. And he does not forget the Irish connections of many of the members. Harris ends with the newly promoted Colonel Donovan taking command of the 69th in March of 1919, the culmination of the efforts of Father Duffy and the choice of the regiment. Donovan—a football hero at Columbia and a successful lawyer—had served in the National Guard on the Mexican border in 1916 and came to the 69th the following...

Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (review)

Reviewed by: Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win Joseph R. Fischer Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. By Jeffrey Record . Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2007. ISBN 978-1-59797-090-7. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 180. $24.95. Jeffrey Record sets out to explain the paradox of how weak insurgencies defeat major powers. With the American Revolution, Napoleon's campaigns in the Iberian Peninsula, the French Indochina War, the Vietnam War, the Soviet-Afghanistan War, Algeria and Iraq as supporting case studies, Record argues that no single issue explains outcomes, the most consistent factor in explaining David's success over Goliath is the role of outside support. Other factors such as selecting the right strategy and having the political will to accept the costs of war play their part as well. It also helps to have the right opponent. Western democracies tend to do counter-insurgency poorly due to the fleeting nature of political will when the reason for sacrifice is not readily apparent to the public. Democracies do successfully fight insurgencies, but the past suggests that the public must see the sacrifices as proportionate to the campaign aims. Record is at his best in his chapter on the US dilemma in Iraq. The insurgency in Iraq presents unique challenges for the United States and its Iraqi allies. Nationalism and tribalism exist side by side. Unlike Vietnam where the insurgency appeared as Maoist in nature with a central bureaucracy, class ideology, and clearly stated objectives, Iraq's insurgents share a common enemy but no common ideology or endstate. The insurgency is urban based using the culture itself as its camouflage. Western militaries built to fight symmetrical opponents find their strength negated by the ambiguity and fog such environments create. Outside support is important but not as important as in Vietnam. Iraq was, after all, full of weapons and munitions at the time of the American invasion and failure to secure them, along with the Bush administration's decision to disband the army, did much to insured their infusion into the insurgent effort. When the United States entered Iraq in March 2003, it did so with little concern for the requirements of what is known as Phase IV (stability) operations. Instead of the 350,000 soldiers Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki recommended, the National Command Authority never [End Page 303] deployed more than 160,000 soldiers. Although Phase III operations (the conventional attack), proved the Iraqi army hollow, the American manpower shortfall, Record notes, made it difficult to secure key installations, including ammunition depots, power plants, hospitals, and sewage treatment facilities at the perceived end of hostilities. This failure set the conditions to grow the insurgency amidst a sea of rising popular discontent. With little understanding of the forces it had unleashed, the United States military proved slow to recognize the nature of the threat and the challenges ahead. Record correctly notes that US success rests on two "daunting political challenges" namely that of setting up a functioning government and creating a viable police and military to protect the new institution. The insurgency has grown over time as has the US understanding of the challenges. Whether David beats Goliath along the Tigris-Euphrates remains undetermined. In nearly every respect, Record has given us a thoughtful, well-researched, historically based, look at a problem all too timely. There are few shortfalls in his coverage but two warrant comments. What Record presents to us is essentially a variation of Clausewitzian analysis with a great deal of effort spent on explaining the political nature of insurgency. In nearly every chapter, Record appears to be using the varying relationships between the corners of Clausewitz's "paradoxical" trinity as his reference point. He does this with barely a mention of Clausewitz. Secondly and more importantly, Record leaves almost without comment the role of the media in affecting popular opinion. Both sides in modern insurgencies leverage media with a talent unseen in wars past. The reality that conflict in the world's far off corners has potentially a world wide audience in near real time puts a great deal of strain on combatants to manage the message. These two shortcomings aside, Beating Goliath: Why Major Insurgencies...

Red Partisan: The Memoir of a Soviet Resistance Fighter On the Eastern Front (review)

Reviewed by: Red Partisan: The Memoir of a Soviet Resistance Fighter 0n the Eastern Front Walter S. Dunn Red Partisan: The Memoir of a Soviet Resistance Fighter 0n the Eastern Front. By Nikolai I. Obryn’ba . Washington: Potomac Books, 2007. ISBN 978-1-59797. Photographs. Drawings. Glossary. Index. Pp. xii, 256. $26.95. Red Partisan is a memoir by a well educated, intelligent, talented artist who volunteered to join the Red Army on the first day of the war. The book is a primary source rather than an historical work. The author loved his country and believed in Stalin. The book is not the usual propaganda-laced version of history that one encounters so often from Russia, but rather reflects the true unvarnished feelings of the author. The book is divided into two portions. The first part covers his brief period of combat and months as a prisoner of war. The second half relates his experience as a member of a partisan brigade in White Russia. The author's attempt to join the army was rejected because his status as an artist exempted him from military service, and Stalin initially rejected the idea of forming poorly trained and ill equipped divisions to beat the [End Page 275] highly trained German divisions. However, Stalin's political rival, the mayor of Leningrad, had great success with volunteer divisions and, as a result, Stalin was compelled to follow suit. As Stalin expected, the volunteer divisions from Moscow suffered heavy losses. The author was a member of the 18th Volunteer Division formed in July 1941. The division was renamed the 18th Rifle Division and later the 11th Guards Rifle Division. After less than two weeks training, the division began a march to the front still in civilian clothes and carrying obsolete rifles. In the course of the following weeks, trucks arrived carrying weapons and uniforms. In September the division was assigned to the 33rd Reserve Army in front of Moscow. After only a few days of actual combat, the division began to dissolve. The author was separated from the division and captured a short time later. When interrogated by the Germans, the author stated that he was an artist which impressed his German captors who demanded that he sketch their pictures. After the Germans informed their leaders, the author was ordered to paint a portrait of a general and was accorded privileges such as food and a place to sleep that were denied to other prisoners. After months of captivity, the author escaped with a group of other prisoners and joined the partisans. Because of his skills, the partisans used him to make maps and propaganda leaflets, and he saw very little combat. However, he was ordered to carry out executions of Russians who were aiding the Germans as a warning not to help them. He continued to paint portraits and scenes of partisan activity, some of which are reprinted in the book. In the spring of 1944, the Germans assembled a half dozen divisions and forced the partisans to flee across the front into Russian territory. The book is of special interest at this time because it presents the emotions, beliefs, and decisions faced by those who oppose an occupying army. Many of the actions were distasteful to the author, but he was forced to comply. These actions included shooting a female collaborator in one instance and refusing to execute another woman because she fraternized with a German soldier in order to obtain food for her two children. The Russian translator employs British English and uses unusual terms, for example fried pig fat rather than bacon. Far too many comments are inserted with the abbreviation trans. for Russian and German words that simply should have been translated, for example hauptman (German for captain, trans.). The translator was probably seeking to preserve the context of the comment by giving the German word but too many of these comments are irritating. This is not a book for the general reader or the World War II buff. However, it should be required reading for anyone concerned with our current problems with occupation of a country and an insurgency. The tactics, emotional conflicts...

The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations in Cuba, 1959–1965 (review)

Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations in Cuba, 1959-1965. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2006. 320pp.In this book, The Castro Obsession, the former Latin American editor of the Miami Herald, Don Bohning, provides a good, concise overview of the efforts by the United States to remove Fidel Castro from office in the period 1959-1965. While treading over ground covered by others such as Peter Wyden, Bohning nevertheless succeeds as an investigative reporter in writing a good synthesis of the efforts that began with the Eisenhower administration and finally subsided with the election of President Lyndon Johnson and the shifting of attention to southeast Asia.Bohning covers the traditional topics such as the Bay of Pigs, Operation Mongoose, and CIA activities in Miami, highlighting a cast of larger-than-life American and Cuban characters, ranging from those approximating James Bond to others more closely resembling Maxwell Smart. Ultimately, the United States spent hundreds of millions of dollars and, according to the author, instead of ridding the hemisphere of Castro, the covert campaign undoubtedly contributed to maintaining and consolidating his control over (1).The book opens with a review of the Bay of Pigs invasion and its spectacular failure. Immediately, President John Kennedy and Attorney General Robert Kennedy figure prominently in the narrative, especially the latter, though both shared the obsession with Castro. Chastised by those who argued against the Bay of Pigs as well as those within the military and Cuban American community who felt the president should have used U.S. forces to help the invasion, the Kennedy brothers made me feud with Castro personal. To underscore the point, Bohning incorporates materials from interviews with Americans such as Jake Esterline and Jack Hawkins as well as Cuban perspectives provided by Erneido Oliva, Rafael Quintero, and Carlos Obregon.The subsequent section deals with Operation Mongoose and efforts to destabilize the Castro government through operations ranging from intelligence gathering to sabotage and finally several botched assassination attempts. Characterizing many of the attempts as nutty schemes (93), the author uses long-disclosed sources including the Church Committee hearings and National Security Archive materials to tell the familiar story of the Mafia's efforts to assassinate Castro as well as CIA efforts to provide poison to close confidants of the Cuban leader. The Cuban Missile Crisis effectively eliminated many of the operations when Kennedy promised no invasion of Cuba in return for the removal of missiles.Despite the promises, the U.S. government remained active in trying to depose Castro, and Miami became a hot spot in the cold war. The CIA and other government agencies worked out of the University of Miami's South Campus in a series of front companies such as Zenith Technical Enterprises. …

Dian Olson Belanger. Deep Freeze: The United States, the International Geophysical Year, and the Origins of Antarctica’s Age of Science. xxix + 494 pp., illus., figs., index. Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2006. $29.95 (cloth).William F. Althoff. Drift Station: Arctic Outposts of Superpower Science. xiii + 355 pp., illus., figs., tables, apps., index. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2007. $39.95 (cloth).

Previous articleNext article No AccessRecent (1950– )Dian Olson Belanger. Deep Freeze: The United States, the International Geophysical Year, and the Origins of Antarctica’s Age of Science. xxix + 494 pp., illus., figs., index. Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2006. $29.95 (cloth). William F. Althoff. Drift Station: Arctic Outposts of Superpower Science. xiii + 355 pp., illus., figs., tables, apps., index. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2007. $39.95 (cloth).Ronald RaingerRonald Rainger Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Isis Volume 98, Number 4December 2007 Publication of the History of Science Society Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/529324 Views: 18Total views on this site PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Burying the Black Sox: How Baseball's Cover-Up of the 1919 World Series Fix Almost Succeeded (review)

Reviewed by: Burying the Black Sox: How Baseball’s Cover-Up of the 1919 World Series Fix Almost Succeeded Bill Swanson Gene Carney. Burying the Black Sox: How Baseball’s Cover-Up of the 1919 World Series Fix Almost Succeeded. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006. 303 pp. Cloth, $26.95. Whatever we know about the "Big Fix," author Gene Carney instructs us to leave at the door as we enter his treatment of this tragic baseball event. Having read numerous books and articles on the topic, I found this difficult to do. The instruction, however, has merit. Through his extensive research, Carney has determined that the Black Sox [End Page 143] scandal of 1919 was far more complicated than we have traditionally believed. The title of Eliot Asinof's 1963 book, Eight Men Out, is really a misnomer. True, eight members of the Chicago White Sox were banned from baseball for life by newly appointed commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis for throwing the 1919 World Series, but the fingers of guilt extended far beyond these eight ballplayers. Carney states, If baseball reflects America, then in this story we see corporate America, reflected in the White Sox and Major League Baseball, silencing whistle-blowers, keeping real investigators off the trail, controlling the damage and the spin, and finally, when the lid is blown, keeping the focus on eight employees, as if they alone had "guilty knowledge." (xv) This seems to be supported by the fact that only select parts of the accused players' testimonies were reported in the papers, which, in turn, were controlled by the owners. Carney's perspective is that the lords of baseball knew what was going on during and after the fact, yet tried desperately to cover it up and retain public favor so baseball would not go the way of boxing and horse racing. Even Landis's attribution of equal guilt to all eight players may have served to cover the roles of the owners in this sordid mess. The setting for the "Big Fix" was a different scene from today's. In 1919 baseball and gambling were strongly connected. It was not unusual to see Arnold Rothstein, a big-time New York City gambler, in the luxury box of Charles Stoneham, owner of the New York Giants. For years, baseball owners had closed their eyes to the gambling problems plaguing baseball. Carney states, Baseball was in the stranglehold of gamblers, and had been for some time. Gambling and cheating in baseball were not isolated . . . nor were these activities indulged in only by players. The Black Sox scandal was more like the tip of an iceberg. But Major League Baseball could not let that become widely known, or the sport would collapse. (237) Carney's book raises more questions than it answers. He presents conflicting testimony, confessions and subsequent denials, and the "disappearance" of grand jury testimonies. Carney states, There was too much monkey business—competing syndicates double-crossing each other, stiffing players, players stiffing players, players telling other players who's in and who's not, but lying, perhaps. Then there's the problem of the players who were in on the fix changing their minds—possibly at different times, maybe even during games. (270) Did some of the players who were initially in on the fix want out, but couldn't remove themselves for fear of reprisal from gamblers? And is it that obvious when a player isn't doing his best? Mistakes—errors and strikeouts, for instance—happen even when people are really trying. [End Page 144] Over the years, some have claimed that the idea of fixing the 1919 World Series came from one or more of the players on the White Sox. Others believe the plot was hatched by gamblers. Establishing exactly what happened more than eighty years after the fact is a very difficult, if not impossible, task. Carney quotes Louis Hegeman, an Illinois attorney, in a presentation on the case of Joe Jackson at the 1992 Convention of the Society for American Baseball Research: "No two historians have agreed on what occurred in the World Series of 1919 and its aftermath" (286). Rather than answering questions, Carney presents the evidence...

Does Counterinsurgency Theory Apply in Northeast India?

Does Counterinsurgency Theory Apply in Northeast India?

Envoy to the Terror: Gouverneur Morris and the French Revolution, and: Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815 (review)

Envoy to the Terror: Gouverneur Morris and the French Revolution. By Melanie Randolph Miller. (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005. Pp. 284. Cloth, $30.00.)Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815. By Peter P. Hill. (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005. Pp. 289. Cloth, $29.95.)Reviewed by Philipp ZiescheAs the most recent French-American quarrel subsides, the books under review offer wealth of material for revisiting the beginnings of the two nations' long-contentious relationship. Peter P. Hill's analysis of high-level diplomacy in the little-studied period between the Louisiana Purchase and the end of the Napoleonic Wars displays his profound knowledge of both American and French archival sources. Hill's former student Melanie Randolph Miller has mined Gouverneur Morris's remarkable diary and correspondence more thoroughly than anyone before to reconstruct his time in Paris from the first stirrings of the Revolution in 1789 to the height of the Terror in 1794. (She is now the editor of the new Gouverneur Morris Papers project.) Both books are deeply researched, persuasively argued, and clearly written; yet both miss the opportunity to place their respective subjects in the larger contexts of either the longer history of French-American relations or the age of transatlantic revolutions.Like her doctoral dissertation, completed in 2000, Miller's book straightforwardly declares her intention to rescue Morris from historical oblivion and reestablish his reputation as a great American statesman (xiv). Envoy to the Terror is particularly strong on Morris's tenure as American minister to from 1792 to 1794, when he patiently but determinedly struggled at great personal risk with French authorities for the release of imprisoned Americans and the restitution of seized property. Miller conclusively demonstrates that far from destroying the French-American alliance, as Alexander DeConde argued half century ago, Morris in fact prevented hostilities between the United States and France (240) by keeping open lines of communication during time when all other foreign representatives fled Paris.1However, Miller's book appears in historiographical context far different from the one in which she started her project. Over the past six years, no fewer than three adulatory biographies of Morris have appeared, including those by Richard Brookhiser, William Howard Adams (who acknowledged his extensive reliance on Miller's work), and James J. Kirschke, as well as biography for children.2 Miller provides richer account of Morris's efforts to influence the early French Revolution, his failed diplomatic mission to Britain, and his desperate attempts to preserve the constitutional monarchy in and help the royal family escape from Paris, than any of the other works. Yet the fact remains that Morris's reputation is no longer in dire need of rescuing, making Miller's tireless defense of him against both long-standing conventional wisdom (xiii) and detractors among Morris's contemporaries seem unnecessarily partisan. While Miller paints vivid portrait of Morris, those she calls his opponents or antagonists-from bigwigs Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and Thomas Paine, to minor figures like William Short, William Stephens Smith, and Stephen Sayre-serve largely as foils for Morris's superior character, skills as diplomat, and prescience as observer of the French Revolution.This is particularly regrettable in the case of Paine, who like Morris has been the subject of several recent biographies. For all their ideological differences and personal animosity, the two men shared cosmopolitan mindset that increasingly placed both of them on the margins of both American and French nationalist politics. Their nonconformity to the conventional U.S.-centric narrative of the early republic explains their long scholarly neglect as well as the recent surge in interest. …

Bunker Hill to Bastogne: Elite Forces and American Society (review)

Reviewed by: Bunker Hill to Bastogne: Elite Forces and American Society Joseph R. Fischer Bunker Hill to Bastogne: Elite Forces and American Society. By Briton Cooper Busch. Washington: Potomac Books, 2006. ISBN 1-57488-775-0. Photographs. Notes. Index. Pp. xiv, 305. $29.95. Briton Cooper Busch's chronicle of elite forces in American history takes a different direction from most previous scholarly works on this topic, which seek to examine first and foremost the accomplishments of such units under fire. Instead of drums and bugles, Busch examines the social constructs that surrounded the creation of these units and sustained them throughout their baptism of fire. He argues that the term "elite" is not so easy to define when one considers the historical record. Are elite units those deliberately selected for their skills in field craft, stealth, and endurance such as French and Indian War rangers? Does the degree to which senior leaders consider missions hazardous beyond the norm, such as those assigned to Army paratroops or Marine infantry, propel units to elite status? Or is the title "elite" awarded to common units who have consistently performed in uncommonly heroic ways such as the Iron Brigade of the Army of the Potomac or the Stonewall Brigade of the Army of Northern Virginia? Busch lays out his argument early. Physical stamina, intelligence, special skills, unit cohesion, and above all steadfastness characterize all of America's elites as it does the elites of other societies. However, American elites may have had a harder time achieving such status. American society generally feared its military until well into the twentieth century and has seldom been enamored of the idea of creating elite units in a society that sees itself, rightly or wrongly, as egalitarian in nature. Most military commanders until World War II had been reluctant to create elite units from within their ranks for some very sound reasons. Elite units have sometimes had checkered pasts. Rogers' Rangers, for example, had their successes against French and Indian foes but also earned a reputation for being disorderly while in camp. Furthermore, elite elements tend to draw away the best leaders from regular conventional units, particularly in the area of junior officers and NCOs, thereby undermining overall readiness. Nonetheless Busch argues elite units in one shape or another have been a part of American military history since before the Revolution. Much of the record shows their accolades well earned and in those instances in which performance has been less than desired, constructed myth has covered the gaps. Busch presents his material well and the research behind the work is solid although not complete, perhaps due to the author's untimely death. For example, nowhere in the book does Busch examine the exploits of the OSS units who laid the groundwork for the modern Special Operations community. Busch only barely touches on the problems units had in maintaining their quality. Once created, they generally lacked a stateside training base up to the task of providing honed replacements in adequate numbers. Busch also fails to take on the problem of doctrine and the lack thereof. Generally, elite units come into being for a particular need not satisfied by more conventional elements. Tactics tended to lag behind the generation of doctrine, leading senior commanders to misuse elites. Darby's rangers provide a case in point. Problems with replacements and misuse by senior commanders [End Page 554] markedly contributed to the debacle at Cisterno with an exasperated William Darby reportedly ordering his surviving elements to shoot Rangers attempting to surrender in order to stem the tide of collapse. Busch's final and perhaps most important problem is that the term "elite" becomes increasingly ill defined in the last several chapters as he labels ever more units elite because of discriminators not exclusively based on assumptions made prior to combat. Is a tank destroyer unit elite because it has the difficult task of destroying German Panther and Tiger tanks while outgunned and out armored? Despite some success, the Army quickly backed away from tank destroyers as the bitter test of battle proved that tanks are the proper answer to tanks. Are the Tuskegee airmen elite because of the number of German...

Hitler's Ambivalent Attaché: Lt. Gen. Friedrich von Boetticher in America, 1933-1941 (review)

Reviewed by: Hitler’s Ambivalent Attaché: Lt. Gen. Friedrich von Boetticher in America, 1933–1941 Uwe Lübken Hitler’s Ambivalent Attaché: Lt. Gen. Friedrich von Boetticher in America, 1933–1941. By Alfred M. Beck. Washington: Potomac Books, 2005. ISBN 1-57488-877-3. Photographs. Notes. Selected bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi, 322. $35.00. When Friedrich von Boetticher arrived in New York harbor on 14 April 1933, to assume his office as German military attaché in the United States, he was greeted not only by the local press but also by some members of the New York branch of the Stahlhelm. At the pier, the representatives of the German veterans' organization displayed two banners. One of them bore the American flag, the other one showed the swastika. This episode is telling of von Boetticher's time in the United States insofar as "the presence of the swastika itself," as Alfred M. Beck writes in his thoroughly researched and well-written book, "opened the question of how German representation in America was to proceed under the new political auspices of home" (p. 52). Von Boetticher had already spent thirty-three years in the army before he came to the New World. Born on 14 October 1881, in a small town near Dresden, he was the son of a physician and amateur historian father and an American-born mother who had been raised in Britain. After having received a classical education at a Gymnasium in Bautzen, he joined the 28th Saxon Field Artillery Regiment at Pirna in 1900. Ten years later, von Boetticher was accepted at the Prussian Kriegsakademie in Berlin. His first posting was to the Railway Directorate of the Great General Staff. After World War I, he became chief of T-3, the German army intelligence unit and, in 1929, head of the German Army's Artillery School at Jüterbog. As Nazi Germany's military attaché to the United States, von Boetticher was very successful in establishing good relations with members of the American military establishment. So close was von Boetticher to some U. S. generals that he even turned over secret operational material to them. Convinced of an "identity between the United States and Germany," he saw himself as a missionary and "as the bridge between the two" (p. 71). In a striking [End Page 251] contrast to his predecessors, von Boetticher refrained from promoting his cause by covert means. "His chosen method of influencing what opinion he could was entirely inconsistent with the risks of clandestine intelligence and espionage" (p. 70). Beck makes perfectly clear from the outset that von Boetticher was a "secondary figure" (p. x) and at no point in the book does he give in to the temptation to overestimate the influence of his subject. Von Boetticher was important, however, in contributing to the German perception of U.S. military strength and preparedness. He wrote home hundreds of reports on almost "everything from aerial signal flares and cavalry horses being readied for the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games to national defense strategy and industrial mobilization plans" (p. 72). These reports were also often full of anti-Semitic remarks and allusions. While von Boetticher recognized the vast military potential of the United States, he frequently reported to Berlin that American aid to the Allies would not and could not be a decisive factor in the European theatre before mid-1941. With this constant reminder as to the probable limits of U.S. intervention, he might even have influenced "timetables in Berlin" (p. 150). In sum, Beck's book can be read not only as a thoughtful political biography of Nazi Germany's military attaché in the United States, it also skillfully illuminates the major issues of military history in the interwar period. Uwe Lübken German Historical Institute Washington, D.C. Copyright © 2007 Society for Military History

Techno‐Cultural Evolution: Cycles of Creation and Conflict. By William McDonald Wallace. Washington (DC): Potomac Books. $26.95. xxvi + 267 p; ill.; index. ISBN: 1–57488–966–4. 2006.

Previous articleNext article No AccessHuman Biology & HealthTechno‐Cultural Evolution: Cycles of Creation and Conflict. By William McDonald Wallace. Washington (DC): Potomac Books. $26.95. xxvi + 267 p; ill.; index. ISBN: 1–57488–966–4. 2006.Joel SachsJoel SachsIntegrative Biology, University of California, Berkeley, California Search for more articles by this author Integrative Biology, University of California, Berkeley, CaliforniaPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Quarterly Review of Biology Volume 81, Number 4December 2006 Published in association with Stony Brook University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/511619 Views: 3Total views on this site Copyright © 2006 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America Since 1945. By Alan McPherson. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006. Pp. xv, 207. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. $21.95 paper.

Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America Since 1945. By Alan McPherson. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006. Pp. xv, 207. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. $21.95 paper. - Volume 63 Issue 2

Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America Since 1945. By Alan McPherson. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006. Pp. xv, 207. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. $21.95 paper.

Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America Since 1945. By Alan McPherson. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006. Pp. xv, 207. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. $21.95 paper.

Books Received

Books Received Blair P. Turner Compiler Virginia Military Institue General American Coastal Defenses 1885–1950. By T. McGovern and B. Smith. New York: Osprey Publishing, 2006. ISBN 1-84176-922-3. Maps. Photographs. Illustrations. Glossary. Index. Pp. 64. Paper. $16.95. No. 44 in the Fortress Series offers an introduction to the development of "modern era" coastal defense fortifications in the U.S. Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism. By Jeanne Guillemin. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-231-12943-2. Notes. Index. Pp. xii, 258. Paper. $18.95. The author examines the development of extensive biological weapons programs in the twentieth century in the U.S., Great Britain, Japan, and the U.S.S.R. and the consequences for the contemporary post–Cold War world, concluding with a call for increased U.S. action to increase security against bioterrorism. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: An Insider's Perspective. By Keith A. Hansen. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-8047-5303-2. Tables. Appendixes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xix, 232. $24.95. "The fascinating story of the multilateral negotiations that produced the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests, as told by a participant" and which the U.S. has yet to ratify. Europe and Iran: Perspectives on Non-Proliferation. Edited by Shannon N. Kile. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Oxford University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-19-929088-1. Notes. Appendixes. Index. Pp. ix, 152. Paper. SIRI Report No. 21 outlines the efforts of the European Union to combat the spread of WMD, focusing on its negotiations with Iran. A History of Modern Germany, 1800–2000. By Martin Kitchen. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. ISBN 1-4051-0041-9. Maps. Photographs. Illustrations. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xi, 455. Paper. This text offers a comprehensive history of Germany from its origins as a "ramshackle empire" in 1800, through the tempestuous 19th and 20th centuries to its current status as a reunified state. The Impact of Quarantine on Military Operations. By Robert I. Miller. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 2005. Notes. Pp. 47. Paper. The author of USAF Counterproliferation Paper No. 31 discusses the public-health strategy of quarantine and its potential impact on USAF operations. Military Cartridge Headstamps: Collector's Guide: Code Book. Compiled by Charles Conklin. Westminster, Md.: Heritage Books, 2006. ISBN 0-7884-4117-5. Illustrations. Tables. Index. Pp. 149. Paper. $35.00. An identification guide for collectors and analysts of international small arms ammunition. Osama's Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda. By Blake Ward. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 2005. Figure. Notes. Pp. 44. Paper. The author of this examination of the terrorist organization's replenishment efforts states that "ample Al Qaeda allies and sympathizers [End Page 1196] exist beyond the first generation to sustain a threat to U.S. interests:" USAF Counterproliferation Paper No. 32. Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century. Edited by Carnes Lord. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2006. Maps. Notes. Pp. 192. Paper. In Naval War College Newport Paper No. 26, six authorities offer an assessment of "the ongoing reconfiguration of America's military 'footprint' abroad." SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense. By Charles A. Stevenson. Washington: Potomac Books, 2006. ISBN 1-57488-794-7. Photographs. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 248. $24.95. The author has served in advisory capacities in the U.S. Senate and observed numerous Secretaries of Defense; his analysis of the position and its incumbents aims to discover why only half served more than eighteen months in the most difficult job in Washington. The US Military Profession in the Twenty-First Century: War, Peace and Politics. Second Edition. By Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr. New York: Routledge, 2006. ISBN 0-415-35851-5. Tables. Notes. Select bibliography. Index. Pp. 238. Originally published in 1999, this analysis of civil-military relations and military policy has...

Hemingway on the China Front: His WWII Spy Mission with Martha Gellhorn (review)

Reviewed by Kaimei Zheng University of Massachusetts Hemingway on the China Front: His WWII Spy Mission with Martha Gellhorn. By Peter Moreira. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006. 244 pp. $26.95. With more than five major Hemingway biographies in print, including Michael Reynolds's monumental work, Hemingway's life is more than an open book to the world. Therefore it's easy to dismiss any attempt to add to that life, let alone another book about Hemingway's three-month trip to China with Martha Gellhorn in 1941. Yet, when I thumbed through Moreira's book with its rich detail and copious references, both its depth and its style and tone drew my attention immediately. Moreira has obviously mined a significant chapter in Hemingway's life that all previous biographers have failed to probe. Hemingway on the China Front is neither a trip report nor a honeymoon journal; Moreira has extended Hemingway's biography significantly. Most of Hemingway's previous biographers used readily available resources such as Martha Gellhorn's book, Travels with Myself and Another, and Hemingway's PM articles collected in By-Line. Moreira, by contrast, sat in the New York Public Library and dug into Gellhorn's Collier's articles from the trip, which give a very different impression than the memories she recorded in Travels with Myself and Another thirty-seven years later. Over the course of ten years, Moreira went from library to library, box to box, from Asia to Europe, digging, weaving, and piecing together the puzzle. Meanwhile, the 2003 publication of Caroline Moorhead's biography of Martha Gellhorn opened another treasure box of information about Hemingway and Gellhorn's life together, including Gellhorn's miserable experience during their China trip and her correspondence about it. Moreira also dug into Hemingway's letters about the trip to Ralph Ingersoll, Maxwell Perkins, and other friends. A journalist by training who lived in Hong Kong for four years, Moreira has first-hand experience in the exact environment where Hemingway and Gellhorn spent a month fifty years earlier. Following Gellhorn's details, Moreira recreates the sensations and the images of the British Colony at the time—the smells, the light, the streets, the hotel itself—he even interviews [End Page 115] the hotel doorman from the period when Hemingway and Gellhorn stayed there. In China itself, Moreira recognizes the place where Hemingway stayed in Chengdu as the same place where Jung Chang, the author of Wild Swans, would live seventeen years later. Moreira not only paints a telling portrait of each person that Hemingway and Gellhorn met during the trip—whether British, Chinese, or American—but also includes a short biography that often leads to another significant figure or event in Sino-American history, wwii history, and/or Chinese modern history. Moreira's delightful, often provocative style carries the reader through the adventure of being in wartime China, and the action in the book is continuous. With his keen eye for details, Moreira takes readers with the Hemingways on a plane ride with a skilled American pilot over Japanese lines and on an unimaginably rough trip on the North River towards the front line. Moreira is the first one to read between the lines of Gellhorn's three publications about the trip, and he provides a telling judgment on her various revisions over time: the Collier's stories (1941), The Face of War (1959), and Travels with Myself and Another (1978). Working with Gellhorn's life and correspondence, Moreira analyzes the psychological path she traveled during those thirty-seven years. This is not only a book about a moment in Hemingway and Gellhorn's life together, it is also a book detailing Chinese history at the time. Moreira unravels several tangled aspects, including the Roosevelt administration's policy towards China during early wwii (particularly the roles of Harry Dexter White and Henry Morgenthau), the history of Chinese Communism and the anti-Communist policy of Chiang Kai-Shek, together...