Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. On the weakness of the Russian state under Yeltsin, see Neil Robinson, Russia: A State of Uncertainty (Routledge, 2002). On Russian oligarchy, see Peter Rutland, ‘Introduction: Business and State in Russia’, in Peter Rutland (ed.), Business and the State in Contemporary Russia (Westview, 2001), pp. 1–32. 2. For the causes of the August 1998 crisis, see Neil Robinson, ‘The Global Economy, Reform and Crisis in Russia’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1999), pp. 531–64. For the political turmoil at the end of the Yeltsin era, see Lilia Shevtsova, Putin's Russia (Carnegie Endowment, 2005), chs 1 & 2. 3. Archie Brown, ‘Introduction’, in Archie Brown & Lilia Shevtsova (eds), Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin. Political Leadership in Russia's Transition (Carnegie Endowment, 2001), p. 4. 4. Central Bank of Russia, http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/credit_statistics/print.asp? file = liquidity_e.htm (accessed 13 November 2007). 5. On the collapse of political opposition and the centralisation of power in Russia, see Vladimir Gel'man, ‘Political Opposition in Russia. A Dying Species?’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2005), pp. 226–46, and ‘Vozrashchenie Leviafana? (Politka retsentralizatsii v sovremennoi Rossii)’, Polis, No. 2 (2006), pp. 90–109. 6. The most comprehensive review of Russian politics under Putin can be found in Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, 2nd edn (Routledge, 2008). 7. For arguments that Putin is building a form of state capitalism, see A. Radygin, ‘Rossiya v 2000–2004: na puti k gosudarstvennomu kapitalizmu?’, Voprosy ekonomki, No. 4 (2004), pp. 42–65; Vladimir Shlapentokh, ‘Wealth versus Political Power: The Russian Case’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2004), pp. 135–60; Andrei Illarionov, Press conference, 21 December 2005, www.fednews.ru/ (accessed 5 January 2006). 8. OECD, Russian Federation (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006), p. 32; Philip Hanson, ‘The Russian Economic Puzzle: Going Forwards, Backwards or Sideways?’, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5 (2007), pp. 869–89. 9. Growth in 1999 and 2000 was prompted by devaluation of the ruble, but thereafter it was driven by oil price rises, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly through energy revenues raising consumer good demand. See Hanson, ‘The Russian Economic Puzzle’. The precise degree to which changing oil prices affects Russian GDP is hard to pin down, but there is consensus that its influence is considerable. For example, a recent study estimates that Russia's GDP would be 12 per cent lower if oil prices had remained at their 2001 levels and that, without the impact of oil prices on domestic demand, GDP growth for 2006 might have been as low as 1 per cent, that is, 6 points lower than it actually was. See Paavo Suni, ‘Oil Prices and the Russian Economy. Some Simulation Studies with NiGEM’, ETLA Discussion Papers, No. 1088 (2007), p. 6. It is easier to see how dependent the Russian budget is on oil revenue: without oil revenue the budget would consistently be in deficit. See the figures in IMF, Russian Federation: 2007 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report; Staff Statement; and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion (International Monetary Fund, 2007), p. 27. 10. Neil Robinson, ‘So What Changed? The 1998 Economic Crisis in Russia and Russia's Economic and Political Development’, Demokratizatsiya. A Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2007), pp. 245–59; Julian Cooper, ‘Can Russia Compete in the Global Economy?’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2006), pp. 407–26. Additional informationNotes on contributorsNeil RobinsonNeil Robinson, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland.
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Apr 17, 2024
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