Post-2003 Iraq Research Articles

Toward an Understanding of Economic Development in Post-2003 Iraq

Citizen inclusion in politics and voluntary organizations, a vibrant press and media, regular elections, or greater “political inclusion” more generally are often presented—both by international organizations as well as some researchers—as elements likely, even necessary, to promote “economic inclusion” and a more equitable distribution of material benefits. We avoid structural approaches that emphasize oil and instead utilize institutional analysis to understand Iraq’s post-2003 economic and social trajectory. Specifically, we analyze how Iraq’s post-2003 political settlement along with its already deteriorating economic institutions and unfavorable economic and social conditions have combined to shape poor economic outcomes. We show, using the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators as well as other data that the more inclusive political institutions that were established in Iraq post-2003 have worked to impede economic development and inclusion. That is, increased political openness and inclusion has not resulted in greater economic inclusion; instead, Iraq’s political institutions have worked to constrain economic inclusion and a more egalitarian distribution of oil income. This revisits a classic debate in development economics and casts doubt on the reliability of the often-promoted relationship between political pluralism and economic development.

Motivation for the development of China-Kurdistan relations

The relationship between China and the Kurdistan Region is relatively new, as it started after the fall of the Ba'ath regime in post-2003 Iraq. The main question of this study is, what are the main motivations of China in its relations with the Kurdistan Region? For the sake of answering this question through a theoretical approach, this paper relies on the concepts of soft power and development. Both concepts are argued to guide and construct the Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East. Methodologically, this research is a qualitative one, benefitting from qualitative data and analysis. This research puts forward the argument that China's relations with the Kurdistan Region are based on soft power calculations relying on economic and commercial means. China refrains from political interference as it perceives and handles the relations with the Kurdistan Region from the perspective of China’s Iraq policy. This study has concluded that trade and economic factors are steering the China-Kurdistan Region’s relationship, and so far relations have not reached the political or strategic level. Two factors are hindering the development of relations into the political sphere. First, China prefers establishing relations with states, rather than non-state entities like Kurdistan Region, as it struggles with a similar problem at home. Second, the Kurdistan Region is politically and militarily affiliated with the United States, which makes China-Kurdistan's relations stop on economic and trade levels and do not proceed to the political level.

Peacebuilding, Patronage-Building, and Post-Conflict NGO Corruption: Barriers to Democratization in Anbar, Iraq

Promoting civil society has been a standard component of post-conflict democratic peacebuilding. In post-2003 Iraq, however, the international coalition's introduction of the muhasasa system (apportionment) inhibited local nongovernmental organizations' ability to hold the government to account and made many NGOs into vehicles of state capture. Substantiated by an interview-based study of Anbar Governorate following the 2017 defeat of the Islamic State organization (ISIS), we argue that modeling Iraq as a "limited access order" — in which ruling elites manage society and the economy — largely explains the muhasasa's effects on local NGOs and the widespread perception that the sector is mired in corruption.

The Problem of Performance and Efficiency in the Evaluation Department of Civil Society Organizations in Iraq After the Year 2003: An Analytical Study

The increasing number of civil society organizations, or what is known as "non-governmental organizations," and the diversification of their fields of work and roles are prominent phenomena in post-2003 Iraq. The transformation that occurred during this period, especially on the political level, and the initiation of a new state-building project based on democratic parliamentary foundations have contributed to internal and external support for these organizations. They are gaining constitutional legitimacy as they become a fundamental component facilitating the promotion of civic values on one hand and supporting the state's democratic transition efforts on the other. However, the reality of the achievements of civil society organizations in Iraq after 2003, measured by their large numbers and extensive institutions spread across most Iraqi provinces, along with the modest level of internal and external support they receive, seems to fall short of the aspirations and goals these organizations have set. This research attempts, through a critical analytical perspective, to evaluate the work, activities, and programs of civil society organizations in Iraq after 2003. It relies on performance and functional efficiency criteria, whether regarding their staff or the strategies, plans, and goals that consequently determine the trajectories, tasks, roles, and effectiveness of such organizations.

The Rise of Extremism in post-2003 Iraq A root-cause approach to why violent actors emerges in the Middle East

هدف هذا البحث إلى تقديم لمحة شاملة حول القضايا الأكاديمية المثارة في محاولة فهم العنف الذي يندلع في الشرق الأوسط. سعى هذا البحث إلى فتح الطريق نحو توضيح الفروق الجوهرية في النهج البحثي المستخدم والسياق الذي تم استخدامه. نتج عن ذلك تسليط الضوء على أن البحث الواسع والحيوي ضروري جدًا للنظر في الأسباب الجذرية للعنف في "البيئات القمعية"، حيث يمكن أن يوفر رؤى هامة حول العوامل المحفزة والمتغيرات الأخرى المؤثرة في عملية التطرف نحو الراديكالية العنيفة، في حين استكشفنا فائدة مفهوم التطرف في فهم ظاهرة الإرهاب المحلي في إعدادات أوروبية، تم التعرف على أن المفهوم موجه بشكل رئيسي نحو فهم الإرهاب المحلي في السياق الأوروبي، وهو يختلف كثيرًا عن الإعدادات الشرقية الأوسط. يلقي تحليلنا الضوء على الطبيعة المتنوعة لهذا الموضوع من خلال الاستفادة من نظريات متنوعة في العلوم السياسية والعلاقات الدولية والقانون وعلم النفس سلط الضوء على أهمية السياق التاريخي، مع التأكيد على نداء Mundy لفحص دقيق للترتيبات والممارسات والعمليات التاريخية لفهم العلاقة بين العنف المنظم والشرق الأوسط. أظهر استكشافنا لهوية الطائفة كإطار دورها كأداة سياسية بدلاً من السبب الجذري للعنف. إسهامًا محوريًا هو تحديد هشاشة الدولة كمتغير حاسم في النموذج السببي لظهور الجهات العنيفة، مما يفسر التباين في حدوث الإرهاب عبر الدول التي تشترك في الخلفيات التاريخية والدينية من خلال استكشاف المسارات نحو العنف، نسلط الضوء على الجوانب الزمنية وبروز النماذج المفضلة للتوجهات الإدراكية أو السلوكية، حيث تظهر نماذج الخطوة/المرحلة كأدوات قيمة للتعامل مع سؤال كيفية حدوث التطرف. من خلال تحليل مستويات مختلفة - الميكرو والميزو والماكرو - نكشف عن العوامل البيئية التي تسهم في الإرهاب. تقدم نظرية تحليل الثلاثة مستويات في العلاقات الدولية إطارًا منهجيًا، يغطي المستوى الدولي والمستوى الداخلي والفردي. في جوهره، يوفر هذا البحث مسارًا وإطارًا يمكن للباحثين اعتماده في سعيهم لتحليل عمليات العنف، وظهورها، وتقديم رؤى حول كيفية مناقشتها في سياق المنطقة.

Evaluation of successive Iraqi governments after 2003


 
 
 
 Initiating the evaluation of the performance and achievements of any government in a country facing numerous internal crises, inconsistencies in its foreign policies, and a complex political system, such as post-2003 Iraq, presents a challenging task. The Iraqi political system that emerged after 2003 saw significant developments, defining its institutions within a specific framework blending parliamentary, federal, and decentralized elements since 2005. However, it witnessed a trajectory of disappointments for the Iraqi people due to the adoption of patronage and deals in managing the political process, illustrating the weakness in the performance of specific governments, notably those under the State of Law Coalition formed by the Islamic Dawa Party and other coexisting political forces. Successive governments, led by former Prime Ministers Ibrahim al-Jaafari (2005-2006), Nouri al-Maliki (2006-2010), Haider al-Abadi, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, and Mustafa al-Kadhimi, grappled with an inability to fulfill their promised agendas, culminating in crises as each administration concluded, compounding the existing challenges. This reality contradicts the true objectives of the political process in Iraq, aiming to achieve genuine representation of the Iraqi people and form governments that genuinely reflect and serve them.
 
 
 

Divided Opposition, Fragmented Statebuilding: Elite Bargaining in Pre- and Post-2003 Iraq

ABSTRACT Elite cohesion structures interethnic bargaining and institutional design in post-conflict divided societies. Although works have explored how interethnic elite bargaining affects institutional design and conflict and cooperation in multiethnic states, less attention has been paid to historical antecedents that precondition bargaining strategies and outcomes in post-conflict spaces. This article explores elite bargaining dynamics among Iraqi dissident and exiled elites prior to 2003 to explain fractionalization and incongruent institutional design following regime change. Treating elite interactions as antecedent conditions for explaining statebuilding outcomes, it situates Iraq’s informal consociational power-sharing institutional design, muhassasa, within preceding patterns of interethnic fragmentation of the anti-Ba‘thist opposition movement prior to 2003. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with dissident elites from Iraq’s pre-2003 opposition and exiled groups and American policymakers, this paper illustrates how ethnic elite competition for control and state capture impeded the adoption and design of consensual and durable power-sharing institutions following regime change. Thus, although collective grievances with Ba‘thist-era exclusion and repression facilitated interethnic mobilization among disparate elite, expedient statebuilding and the reliance on fractionalized opposition groups obstructed the development and evolution of a cohesive, durable, and inclusive conflict mitigating institutional design after 2003.

Conflict Mitigation versus Governance: The Case of Consociation in Iraq

Consociational power sharing has become one of the leading mechanisms of governance introduced in deeply divided post-conflict societies. When communal divisions seem intractable, it is seen as a way to use these very divisions to reach an agreement and form a post-conflict government. Using post-2003 Iraq as a case study, this article critically examines consociation in practice. It argues that consociational power sharing is extremely valuable to reach an agreement, mitigate conflict, and form a post-conflict government. However, in Iraq, consociational power sharing has failed to meet the governance needs of the population, and although governments are formed, they do not necessarily govern. In a post-conflict society like Iraq with considerable development needs, failure of consociational governance has substantial negative impacts on the population. What this teaches us about consociation in Iraq is that it has a shelf life, because the governance needs continuously grow as a repercussion of them not being met and eventually reach the level where they outweigh the conflict-mitigating benefits of consociation.

The Collective Neglect of Southern Iraq: Missed Opportunities for Development and Good Governance

ABSTRACT One of the enduring puzzles of post-2003 Iraq is why southern Iraq, a relatively homogenous, wealthy, stable, and politically represented area suffers from poverty, unemployment, and a dire lack of services. In this paper, we conceptualize southern Iraq as an imagined region, whose identity has been shaped by the collective neglect it has suffered from both internal and external actors. We argue that its situation is partially explained by a lower developmental baseline in 2003, caused by the predatory policies of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In addition, the preoccupation of its Shia leaders with ruling a centralized Iraq post-2003, rather than investing in local leadership has contributed to the neglect. The continued reliance on oil – which predominantly comes from the south – contributes to citizens’ sense of plunder and exploitation. Finally, the south’s perceived closeness to Iran has dissuaded the international community and regional investors from engaging with the region, which has contributed to the perception of neglect.

Impact of Humanitarian Crises on Diabetes Care in Iraq and Syria—IDF-MENA Region

This short review tried to discuss the factors that affect diabetes care during humanitarian crises after the political and military conflicts in post-2003 Iraq and post-2011 Syria. The pattern of the devastating effect of the conflicts on the suboptimal healthcare system and infrastructure is quite similar. Both countries’ long-term and continuous geopolitical instability and security concerns were barriers to applying any disaster preparedness plans. They had markedly exhausted diabetes care in these countries with similar mixed public and private healthcare systems. The influx of huge numbers of refugees with chronic diseases, especially diabetes, in the neighboring host countries created pressure on the healthcare systems. It urged some changes in the national policies with the needed help from the aid organizations to an extent. The internal displacement problem for huge nationals in their country exhausted the already exhausted healthcare facilities, with more burdens on the effective equal provision of diabetes-related medication and management tools. Still, diabetes care is not included as a vital part of the mitigation plans during crises in both countries, with the main concern the communicable rather than non-communicable diseases. Type 1 diabetes mellitus received less care during the crisis in both countries, with the insulin shortage being their major concern. The availability and affordability of diabetes medications in camp and non-camp settings were suboptimal and unsatisfactory. More active planning is needed to build a well-prepared healthcare system with diabetes care as an integral part.

Dynamics of Saudi Arabia–KRG Relations: From 2003 Iraq War to 2017 Referendum and Beyond

Numerous studies have examined the decades-old Saudi-Iranian rivalry, which has played out in various regional arenas, notably Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and the Gulf. This article explores the place that Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq occupies within this rivalry. As the KRG’s foreign relations have attracted scholarly attention since the late 1990s, the article examines the Saudi Arabia–KRG relations in the post-2003 Iraq War, with a special focus on growing Iranian influence in Iraq. The end of Saddam Hussein’s rule and the subsequent rise of Shiite-dominated governments in Baghdad has shaken the regional balance, bringing out Iran as an influential actor in the Middle East. This laid the foundation for new understandings in the Saudi regional policy as Riyadh emphasized its relations with Iraq and the KRG, which became a crucial factor that can balance and imbalance power in the Middle East. It argues that common concerns for security and relative gains paved the way for a closer relationship between Riyadh and Erbil to counter threats emanating from both Iran and ISIS. Through case-specific information to those interested in Kurdish politics and the Middle East, it not only delves into the driving forces behind Riyadh-Erbil relations but also aims to present the Saudi interpretation of the 2017 Kurdish referendum.

Evaluating the Pitfalls of External Statebuilding in Post-2003 Iraq (2003–2021)

ABSTRACT Peacebuilding and transitional justice are viewed as integral components of statebuilding in post-conflict spaces. This Special Issue critically evaluates statebuilding and peacebuilding in Iraq through macro and micro-level analyses of Iraq's political development following foreign-imposed regime change. In line with the articles in the Special Issue, this introduction critically examines Iraq's post-2003 trajectory as an outcome of the failure of securitized statebuilding and the absence of legitimacy in externally-imposed democratization. It concludes by highlighting the impact of expedient and exogenous statebuilding on transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Storytelling: Restorative Approaches to Post-2003 Iraq Peacebuilding

ABSTRACT Top-down national reconciliation initiatives overlook the significance of, and connection between, story and culture in social conflict resolution. They have thus failed to emerge in post-2003 Iraq. This article draws on the theoretical insights from social constructionism to examine the potential of centreing storytelling within a bottom-up restorative peacebuilding process. It posits that integrating storytelling-based practices, such as restorative justice dialogue and restorative education, within Iraq's legal and educations systems can promote an inclusive, cross-communal public discourse and facilitate bottom-up and inclusive peacebuilding practices.

Religious Peacebuilding in Iraq: Prospects and Challenges from the Hawza

ABSTRACT This article examines the potential for Shiʿa clerics to engage in religious peacebuilding in post-2003 Iraq. By drawing upon theoretical insights from other post-conflict settings and interviews with clerics, I demonstrate that there are two key challenges facing clerics who seek to engage in peacebuilding. First, the association of the Shiʿa religious establishment with political actors has created a crisis of legitimacy for clerics. Secondly, the structure of authority within the religious establishment has made it difficult for activist clerics to introduce theological reforms to aid peacebuilding efforts. I argue that these challenges are neither insurmountable nor unique.

Conflict Dynamics in Post-2003 Iraq: A Security Dilemma Perspective

A decade and a half since the U.S. invasion, Iraq remains affected by complicated and increasingly changing uncertainties. Intrastate division and lack of social stability are expressed in ethnic and sectarian hostilities. In view of different reasons, 16 years after establishing the new Iraq, this paper asks: why has Iraq been marked by instability, transformation, and inability to maintain stability and peace? This paper explains the ethno-sectarian interactions in Iraq with the help of the theory of security dilemma and explores the derailment of Iraq's transformation process and the beginning of a new period of confrontation from a security dilemma viewpoint. The findings suggest that the security dilemma and ethno-sectarian conflict are further intensified by Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni groups attempting to assess the threats posed not only by enemy militias but also by the presence of all groups in close proximity.

Civil Society in Hybrid Regimes: Trade Union Activism in Post-2003 Iraq

This article explores the relationship between hybrid regimes and civil society. It examines the extant debate between ‘neo-Tocquevilleans’ and their opponents over whether or not a robust civil society portends democratic transition and consolidation. It demonstrates the limits of these two models by arguing that civil society in hybrid regimes can in fact agitate against the state, advocate for democratic freedoms and achieve significant political reforms even when these do not lead to broader democratization. To demonstrate, this article documents the case of the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions through 15 years of complex Iraqi politics, from the 2003 US-led intervention and during the incumbency of Prime Minister’s Maliki (2006–2014) and Abadi (2014–2018). By analysing primary materials produced by and about the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions, it finds that this case holds important lessons for those seeking to understand the complex interface between civil society and the state in hybrid regimes.

Power politics: Armed non-state actors and the capture of public electricity in post-invasion Baghdad

Scholars observe that armed non-state actors (NSAs) often provide social services to reinforce their popular support and legitimacy as guarantors of local order. On the other hand, NSAs usually face funding constraints that make the independent provision of distributive goods difficult. This article argues that armed NSAs employ an alternative, more cost-effective tactic to deliver services. It argues that militant groups can leverage their armed capacity to capture control of and monopolize access to state-sponsored services. As an example, it documents the capture of public electricity infrastructure that took place in post-invasion Baghdad under the Sadrist Movement, an armed group formed shortly after the ouster of the Ba’athist state. Using local-level information about the location of Sadrist offices and remote sensing data, it estimates that Sadrist-affiliated neighborhoods in Baghdad saw an average increase in access to electricity between 2003 and 2006 that was significantly greater than in other areas of the city. The article concludes by addressing threats to inference, showing that these differences are not alternatively explained by demographic differences or changes therein due to ongoing conflict. It also discusses how this NSA strategy might contribute to an equilibrium of low state legitimacy and weak capacity in fragile contexts like that of post-2003 Iraq.

Women and Gender in Iraq: Between Nation-Building and Fragmentation

Women and Gender in Iraq: Between Nation-Building and Fragmentation

KRG and Arab Gulf Countries: Undifined Relations

The relationship between Kurdistan Region and Gulf countries started only after 2003. These relations have been influenced by Iraq’s place in the political and security calculations of the Gulf countries. After the collapse of Saddam’s regime in 2003, the GCC countries tensions in the region even further increased, due to the imbalance of power against GCC and crisis of government in post 2003 Iraq, as well as the hegemony of Shi’a groups on the Iraqi state. It can be argued that the Gulf countries’ Kurdish card has been linked with two main goals of GCC foreign policy in Iraq. The first goal is related to Saudi Arabia’s objective of playing a major role in the region’s politics and in post-2003 Iraq, in particular as a reaction to increasing role of Iran and Turkey in the regional scene. The second goal is related to Saudi Arabia’s policy of countering Shiite’s domination over Iraqi state, through creating a balance among Iraq’s major components. So far, the KRG and GCC relations are more tactical and reactional rather than strategic, and are linked to Iraq’s negative attitude towards the Gulf Countries. The GCC has approached KRG mostly during the political developments and political crisis in Iraq in order to benefit from the Kurdish weight in Baghdad and play a role in Iraqi domestic policies.

From Existential Struggle to Political Banality: The Politics of Sect in Post-2003 Iraq

This article focuses on the case of post-2003 Iraq to chart the evolution of the politics of sect between 2003 and 2018 particularly with reference to Sunni and Shi’a identity categories. More specifically it examines the shifts in the social divisiveness, political utility, and perceived depth of the Sunni-Shi’a cleavage. What emerges is a gradually altered enabling environment with a changing set of incentive structures that have diminished the political salience of sectarian identity between 2003 and 2018. This is chiefly evidenced in the transformation of the parameters of political contestation, the parameters of populism and, by extension, the parameters of electoral politics.