Voter Position Research Articles

Finding inequality in an unlikely place: Differences in policy congruence between social groups in Belgium

This paper seeks to develop and test an issue-level determinants model of opinion congruence inequality between the privileged and the underprivileged social groups. Current theories on congruence inequality and representation focus on country-level factors such as the interest group system or campaign finance. The existing literature focuses far less on variation in inequality in preference representation in a single context. To fill this void in the literature, we develop an issue-level model of opinion congruence inequality between the privileged and the underprivileged groups in terms of education and income. Based on an integrated dataset containing the policy positions of parties and voters in Belgium on 229 policy statements, we find that when social groups have different policy positions, preferences in the legislature align more with the preferences of the privileged social groups. In addition, opinion congruence inequality also depends on the importance of the issues to groups: the difference in opinion congruence is larger for economic and tax policies, vital to the privileged groups, but smaller on issues related to social welfare, crucial to the underprivileged groups. Finally, the results show that when voters of a group disagree with their party’s position on an issue, their preferences regarding that issue are less well represented in the legislature.

The predictive power of the left-right self-placement scale for the policy positions of voters and parties

The left-right self-placement scale is often used in political science as a proxy for the policy positions of voters and parties. Yet studies have suggested that, for voters, this relation is dependent on education level. These studies were, however, hampered by data limitations and restricted statistical analyses. In addition, the extent to which the relation between the left-right self-placement scale and policy positions differs for parties and voters has not been explored. This article looks at the differential relation between left-right self-placement and policy positions for voters with different education levels on an integrated dataset containing over 50 voter and party policy positions. It is found that the left-right self-placement scale is a much better predictor for the policy positions of parties than it is for the policy preferences of voters. Robustness checks show that neither the saliency of the policy positions nor their complexity moderates these findings.

Income inequality, redistribution and the position of the decisive voter

A large literature explaining patterns of redistribution makes use of the median voter theorem. Using a novel approach, this contribution shows that in OECD countries the decisive voter, determined by the earner who sees her preferred tax rate being implemented, on average sits around the 50th percentile in the income distribution, although significant within and between country differences exist. Under the assumption of a lognormal distribution of gross income, we derive the required tax rate to align the observed gross and net Gini coefficients in OECD countries. This estimated tax rate is compared to the tax rate preferred by the median income earner, which gives a new index capturing a nation’s deviation from the median voter position, measured as the difference between the estimated percentile position of the decisive voter and the 50th percentile position of the median voter. We provide a comparative overview of this index over time and between countries. We also locate the positions of alternative versions of the decisive voter, among which following the ‘one dollar, one vote’ rule, in a Lorenz curve diagram.

Analysis of Candidate-level Proximity Voting with Comparable Positions of Voters, Politicians, and Parties

Analysis of Candidate-level Proximity Voting with Comparable Positions of Voters, Politicians, and Parties

When Political Parties Want to Be Ambiguous But They Can't

We present a Downsian model of political competition in which parties have a taste for ambiguous strategies. We show that office-seeking incentives discard those equilibria with ambiguous strategies even when ambiguity is attractive for the parties. Equilibrium fails to exist when ambiguity is highly rewarding and, in every other case, parties converge to the median voter position. Our result pinpoints to the uncertainty about voters' preferences or to voters' risk-acceptance attitudes as key factors to induce ambiguous strategies.

THE BALANCED US PRESS

We measure the relative ideological positions of newspapers, voters, interest groups, and political parties, using data on ballot propositions. We exploit the fact that newspapers, parties, and interest groups take positions on these propositions, and the fact that citizens ultimately vote on them. We find that, on average, newspapers in the United States are located almost exactly at the median voter in their states—that is, they are balanced around the median voter. Still, there is a significant amount of ideological heterogeneity across newspapers, which is smaller than the one found for interest groups. However, when we group propositions by issue area, we find a sizable amount of ideological imbalance: broadly speaking, newspapers are to the left of the state-level median voter on many social issues, and to the right on many economic issues. To complete the picture, we use two existing methods of measuring bias and show that the news and editorial sections of newspapers have almost identical partisan positions.

Responding to Voters or Responding to Markets? Political Parties and Public Opinion in an Era of Globalization

Conventional wisdom has it that political parties have incentives to respond to public opinion. It is also conventional wisdom that in open economies, policymakers must also “respond” to markets. Research on representation has provided ample evidence in support of the first claim. Research on the political economy of globalization has not, however, provided evidence for the second. This article examines the effects of globalization on how parties respond to voters. We argue that while elections motivate parties to respond to public sentiment, economic interdependence distracts political elites from their electorates and toward market actors, reducing party responsiveness to the mean voter. Evidence from a pair of distinct data sources spanning elections in twenty advanced capitalist democracies from the 1970s to 2010 shows that while parties have incentives to respond to left-right shifts in the mean voter position, they only do so when the national economy is sufficiently sheltered from the world economy. These findings have implications for party strategies, for representation, and for the broader effects of market integration.

When Extremism Pays: Policy Positions, Voter Certainty, and Party Support in Postcommunist Europe

We argue that extreme positioning benefits parties in new democracies, because—given the lack of other reliable cues such as party histories—the distinctiveness of their left-right policy positions increases voter certainty about parties’ identities and intentions in office. Cross-sectional analyses provide evidence that, in the new democracies of postcommunist Europe, parties that are farther away from the mean voter position gain more popular support than those moderately positioned along a policy continuum. In established democracies, by contrast, policy moderation increases popular support. We also find empirical support for the proposed causal mechanism that links policy positions to popular support via voter certainty. These findings have implications for party strategies, spatial theories, and our understanding of political representation in new democracies.

The article is dedicated to analyzing and systematization of political perception of immigration processes in the countries of the Visegrad group. It is argued that the positions of parties and voters regarding immigration in the countries of the Visegrad group are essentially ideologically structured. The author found that the region enjoys different approaches to understanding national issues and immigration processes,

The article is dedicated to analyzing and systematization of political perception of immigration processes in the countries of the Visegrad group. It is argued that the positions of parties and voters regarding immigration in the countries of the Visegrad group are essentially ideologically structured. The author found that the region enjoys different approaches to understanding national issues and immigration processes, but traditionally revolves around the nationalist, liberal, exceptional, national-conservative approaches and rhetoric of the “greater nation” approach. It is motivated that the immigration problem in the countries of the region depends on the conceptualization of party approaches to nationalism and related/contextual issues. In general, it is noted that the political perception of the problems of immigration processes in the countries of the region is nationally (i.e. in each country) and regionally (i.e. in the region in general) determined and oriented, and the political process is much radicalized and activated, in particular by anti-immigrant and (as an accommodation) mainstream parties.

A Common Left-Right Scale for Voters and Parties in Europe

This article presents a scaling approach to jointly estimate the locations of voters, parties, and European political groups on a common left-right scale. Although most comparative research assumes that cross-national comparisons of voters and parties are possible, few correct for systematic biases commonly known to exist in surveys or examine whether survey data are comparable across countries. Our scaling method addresses scale perception in surveys and links cross-national surveys through new bridging observations. We apply our approach to the 2009 European Election Survey and demonstrate that the improvement in party estimates that one gains from fixing various survey bias issues is significant. Our scaling strategy provides left-right positions of voters and of 162 political parties, and we demonstrate that variables based on rescaled voter and party positions on the left-right dimension significantly improve the fit of a cross-national vote choice model.

Expected utility or learned familiarity? The formation of voters' coalition preferences

In most modern parliamentary democracies, it is unlikely that single party governments will be formed, meaning that a voter's preferred party presumably has to share cabinet offices and negotiate policy compromises in a coalition government. This raises the question of how voters evaluate potential (coalition) governments, especially since recent studies have shown that coalition preferences influence voting behaviour. In this paper, we combine theories of voting behaviour, government formation and political learning to derive expectations regarding the factors that may impact voters' coalition preferences. We test our hypotheses by analysing survey data from the German federal and state levels. The results of a mixed logit regression analysis support our arguments: Voters' coalition preferences not only depend on the perceived policy distance between the positions of voters and the most distant party within combinations of parties, but also on predominant patterns of government formation.

The variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 Canadian election

Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties should locate at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain non-convergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including a competence and sociodemographic valance in a country where regional and national parties compete in the election. That is, the model allows voters to face different sets of parties in different regions. We introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient, c for regional and national parties and show that when c is high there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties. An electoral survey of the 2004 election in Canada is used to construct a stochastic electoral model of the election with two regions: Quebec and the rest of Canada. The survey allows us to estimate voter positions in the policy space. The variable choice set logit model is used to built a relationship between party position and vote share. We find that in the local Nash equilibrium for the election the two main parties with high competence valence, the Liberals and Conservatives, locate at the national electoral mean and the Bloc Quebecois, with the highest competence valence, locates at the Quebec electoral mean. The New Democratic Party has a low competence valence but remains at the national mean. The Greens, with lowest competence valence, locate away from the national mean to increase its vote share.

The Variable Choice Set Logit Model Applied to the 2004 Canadian Election

Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties should locate at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain non-convergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including a competence and sociodemographic valance in a country where regional and national parties compete in the election. That is, the model allows voters to face different sets of parties in different regions. We introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient, c for regional and national parties and show that when c is high there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties. An electoral survey of the 2004 election in Canada is used to construct a stochastic electoral model of the election with two regions: Quebec and the rest of Canada. The survey allows us to estimate voter positions in the policy space. The variable choice set logit model is used to built a relationship between party position and vote share. We find that in the local Nash equilibrium for the election the two main parties with high competence valence, the Liberals and Conservatives, locate at the national electoral mean and the Bloc Quebecois, with the highest competence valence, locates at the Quebec electoral mean. The New Democratic Party has a low competence valence but remains at the national mean. The Greens, with lowest competence valence, locate away from the national mean to increase its vote share.

Does the Ideological Dispersion of Parties Mediate the Electoral Impact of Valence? A Cross-National Study of Party Support in Nine Western European Democracies

Previous empirical research has found evidence suggesting that the character-based valence attributes of parties, such as competence and integrity, can have notable effects of levels of electoral support (Clark, 2009; Mondak, 1995). A related strand of literature analyzes the importance of parties’ policy positions. In this study, we bring together research on valence and party dispersion to examine whether the ideological dispersion of parties in a party system mediates the electoral impact of valence. We perform empirical analyses covering nine Western European countries over the period 1976 to 2003, and test the hypothesis that when parties are more ideologically proximate to the mean voter position, character-based valence attributes will be of greater significance in determining parties’ electoral fortunes. Surprisingly, we find no support for this hypothesis. Instead, our analyses suggest that the more ideologically dispersed parties are, the more likely it is that character-based valence attributes will affect parties’ vote shares.

When does the left do the right thing? A study of party position change on welfare policies

Why did pro-welfare Social Democrats and Christian Democrats cease to support the welfare state in the 1980s and 1990s, and support measures such as tighter welfare programme conditionality rules and lower social security benefits instead? Building on the party position change literature, I argue and empirically demonstrate that parties with an activist-dominated party organization adapt their position to shifts in the party voter position. Parties with a leadership-dominated party organization adapt their position to shifts in the median voter position. Parties in which neither leaders nor activists dictate party policy shift in the opposite direction of the previous policy shift if they are excluded from office. Using a cross-sectional time-series regression analysis of 181 position shifts of European Socialist, Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties in the period 1977–2003, I find strong evidence that party organization is a crucial mediating variable in explaining when these parties shift to the right or left. Demonstrating that differences in party organizations motivate parties to respond to different incentives, this study has implications for the relationship between party behaviour and welfare state policy-making.

Intra-Party Democracy and Party Responsiveness

This study examines whether parties respond to their supporters or to the median voter position. Party leaders require the support of the ‘selectorate’, which is defined as the group that has influence in party leadership selection. Inclusive parties, which rely on rank-and-file membership to select their leaders, will respond to their members. Exclusive parties, which rely on office-seeking members for leadership selection, will respond to the median voter position. Thus, intra-party institutions that (dis)enfranchise party members are crucial for understanding whether a party responds to their supporters (or to the median voter position). Using data from 1975–2003 for six West European countries, this article reports findings that inclusive parties respond to the mean party supporter position. While there is evidence that exclusive parties respond to the median voter position in two-party systems, this finding does not extend to multiparty systems. This study has implications for the understanding of intra-party institutions and political representation.

Measuring “Correct Voting” Using Comparative Manifestos Project Data

The extent to which citizens vote in accordance with their own principles and priorities has been proposed as an important measure of a democracy's health. This article introduces a new method of evaluating the ability of individuals to vote for the political party with policy positions closest to their own – to vote “correctly”. Following Lau and Redlawsk (1997), a “correct vote” is defined as the vote choice individuals would make under conditions of perfect information. In other words, a vote is “correct” if it is cast for the party that a voter should vote for, based upon a fully informed comparison of his or her policy positions with those of the parties contesting an election. Voters' policy preferences are estimated here using election study data, and the positions of parties are derived through data from the Comparative Manifestos Project. For illustrative purposes, this new method is applied to the 2004 Canadian federal election. Correct voting rates are calculated by comparing voter and party positions in seven dimensions of political competition, accounting for the relative importance of each dimension. While this study's data are exclusively Canadian, the approach introduced is applicable to other settings.

Do voter preferences matter between elections? Democratic performance in Western Democracies

Over the years, several studies have examined government responsiveness and congruence in Western democracies by examining the relationship between the ideological positions of voters and governments. Although these studies generally find high levels of responsiveness and congruence, this research is limited by the fact that it has focused exclusively on governments that formed immediately after an election, thus implicitly ignoring governments that form between elections. This is an important omission, we argue, owing to both the number of governments that form between elections (nearly half in our sample of Western democracies) and theoretical expectations that suggest that responsiveness and congruence may look quite different in the absence of an election. In this paper, we reassess levels of democratic performance across 22 Western democracies utilizing data for all governments formed during the postwar period. For governments formed immediately after an election, we confirm the results of past studies that found high levels of congruence and responsiveness. However, extending the analysis to governments formed between elections, the level of government responsiveness appears to diminish over time with each new government. Our findings concerning levels of voter–government congruence are mixed, yet we do find some evidence of declining congruence as well. In sum, since many studies of postwar governments in Western democracies have been based on elections and the resulting governments, our analysis demonstrates the need to include those governments that form between elections.

Living Under the ‘Right’ Government: Does Political Ideology Matter to Trust in Political Institutions?

This paper asks whether trust in political institutions depends on individual’s political leaning and the political ideology of the national government. We employ information on 140,000 individuals in 30 democratic OECD countries from the World Values Survey, 1981-2007, and estimate so-called micro-based pseudo-panel two-way fixed effects models. Distinguishing between extreme and moderate versions of leftist and rightist political leaning, our estimates reveal that political trust increases non-linearly in the degree of individual’s conservatism. We also find that political leaning is not instrumental to improving one's own socio-economic situation, thus rather constituting an expressive behavior. If government ideology matches individual’s political preferences, trust in political institutions is increased. In contrast, the ‘apolitical’ appears to distrust the political system as such. We also find evidence for a symmetric, but incomplete convergence of party ideologies to the median voter position. Implications for vote abstention are discussed.

On the performance of voting systems in spatial voting simulations

We study the performance of voting systems in terms of minimizing the overall social disutility of making a collective choice in an univariate voting space with ideological voting and perfect information. In order to obtain a distribution of the performance indicator for each of the 12 systems chosen for this study—Baldwin’s Method, Black’s Method, The Borda Count, Bucklin’s Grand Junction System, Coombs’ Method, Dodgson’s System, Instant Run-Off Voting, Plurality, Simpson’s MinMax, Tideman’s Ranked Pairs, Schulze’s Beatpath Method, and Two-Round Majority—we simulate elections using an Agent-Based Computational approach under several different distributions for voters and candidates positioning, with up to 15 available candidates. At each iteration, voters generate complete and strict ordinal utility functions over the set of available candidates, based on which each voting system computes a winner. We define the performance of a system in terms of its capability of choosing among the available candidates the one that minimizes aggregate voter disutility. As expected, the results show an overall dominance of Condorcet completion methods over the traditional and more widely used voting systems, regardless of the distributions of voter and candidate positions.