Abstract
We present a Downsian model of political competition in which parties have a taste for ambiguous strategies. We show that office-seeking incentives discard those equilibria with ambiguous strategies even when ambiguity is attractive for the parties. Equilibrium fails to exist when ambiguity is highly rewarding and, in every other case, parties converge to the median voter position. Our result pinpoints to the uncertainty about voters' preferences or to voters' risk-acceptance attitudes as key factors to induce ambiguous strategies.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
