Populist Leaders Research Articles

Where there’s a will, there’s a way: Border walls and refugees

Over the last decade, there has been a notable surge in the movement of refugees across international borders, posing significant challenges for the international community. In response, various policy measures have been implemented, including the construction of border walls, with the aim of impeding refugee influx. However, scholars have expressed doubts regarding the effectiveness of these fortifications, suggesting that walls merely redirect migrants to alternative routes, discourage return migration, or alter migrants’ cost–benefit calculations. Despite these concerns, there has been a lack of rigorous testing to support or refute these claims beyond case-specific evidence. This article addresses this research gap by thoroughly examining the arguments surrounding the impact of border fencing on refugee flows. We conduct a systematic, cross-national test of these arguments with a two-way fixed-effects estimator, an equivalence test, and a recently developed matching estimator designed for use on time-series cross-sectional data. Our results strongly support those who are skeptical of the impact of walls. We consistently demonstrate either that border fencing has not had any causal impact on refugee flows between 1970 and 2017 or that the statistical state-of-the-art is incapable of discerning that true effect. In either scenario, the evidence suggests that border fences fail to deliver the anticipated outcomes. These findings hold significant implications as violence-driven refugee flows persist, underscoring that while walls may serve as politically attractive tools for populist leaders, their actual deterrent effects are highly questionable at best.

Populist Leaders and the Economy

Populism at the country level is at an all-time high, with more than 25 percent of nations currently governed by populists. How do economies perform under populist leaders? We build a new long-run cross-country database to study the macroeconomic history of populism. We identify 51 populist presidents and prime ministers from 1900 to 2020 and show that the economic cost of populism is high. After 15 years, GDP per capita is 10 percent lower compared to a plausible nonpopulist counterfactual. Economic disintegration, decreasing macroeconomic stability, and the erosion of institutions typically go hand in hand with populist rule. (JEL D72, E23, N10, N40, O43)

‘Rocking the establishment’: Subculture, authenticity and the populist radical right in Sweden

This article uses the recent rise of populist radical right discourses in society as a cultural and political phenomenon to explore the role of popular music in constructing these discourses, with a focus on the Sweden Democrats (SD) and musician Peter Jezewski. By examining Jezewski’s direct collaborations with the SD and his song ‘My Land’, the article uncovers how popular music culture participates in the construction of populist discourses of ‘the people’ in nativist terms. The article contends that certain subcultural styles in popular music resonate strongly with populist discourses of a ‘silenced majority’ in need of a strong populist leader and as such contribute to the construction of the ‘people’ versus ‘elite’ antagonism beyond the political realm. The case study of Jezewski’s song and music video emphasises how nostalgic rock culture enables populist articulations by aligning with populist radical right anti-establishment, preservationist−nativist discourses and the performative construction of ‘the people’. Drawing on cultural studies resources, the article hence investigates the practices that bring ‘a people’ into existence through cultural tropes and mechanisms to better comprehend the links between articulations of populism, popular culture and subcultural performances of counter-hegemonic resistance.

Digital media, democracy and civil society in Central and Eastern Europe

ABSTRACT CEE countries faced significant political, economic, social, and technological transformations over the last four decades. Democratic processes, after relative stabilization, tremble again around polarizing values, populist leaders, or nationalistic ideologies. Online communication, especially social media platforms, play a vital role in shaping how citizens interact with the state, political actors, media, and other citizens. The collection of manuscripts focuses on some of the challenges democratic institutions in the region face, in transforming and sustaining civil society and attempts to capture how the digital media environments mitigate or exacerbate those challenges. Included manuscripts focus on the role that online platforms play in the satisfaction with democracy in the CEE region, the interactions between journalists and political actors, the strategic media coverage of elections, affective polarization and political antagonism, and discursive attempts to discourage young people from civic engagement.

Youth Democratic Political Identity and Disaffection: Active Citizenship and Participation to Counteract Populism and Polarization in Barcelona

Globally, youth satisfaction with democracy is declining—not only in absolute terms, but also relative to how older generations felt at the same stage in their lives. Young people’s democratic political identity is lower than any other age group. One can point to concrete factors to explain such declines—ranging from the growth of youth unemployment to the persistence of corruption and poverty in new democracies. Growing discontent with living conditions is taken advantage of by populist leaders. This populist rule—whether from the right or the left—has a highly negative effect on democratic political identities (especially on youth) and can lead to a significant risk of democratic erosion. Our research aims to explore the significance of youth identification with democracy, and their participation approaches as an alternative to the decline in democratic quality in Barcelona, Spain. Using quantitative data collection and analysis, in this article we present the first results of our research and suggest a path for further investigation.

The spirit of populism: sacred, charismatic, redemptive, and apocalyptic dimensions

ABSTRACT Populism is a global phenomenon with a power and resilience that frequently surprises political observers. This article builds from the theoretical work of Margaret Canovan and others to investigate the “spirit” of populism in terms of its quasi-religious and post-rational dimensions. It puts forward a theoretical account of four spiritual dimensions of populism: the sacred, charismatic, redemptive, and apocalyptic. Each of these dimensions is underpinned by previous research from political science, sociology, and the study of New Religious Movements, and is explained with various international case examples of populist leaders and movements ranging from India to the United States. The four dimensions are brought together in a shared analysis here for the first time. It is argued that these dimensions together amount to emotionally powerful dynamics that give the meaning-orientation and motivation that propel populist movements forward and hasten democratic backsliding.

“Long Live Freedom!”: Digital Communication of Argentina’s Emerging Libertarian Populism

Social networks have become the ideal platform for populist leaders to directly engage with their followers, facilitating the dissemination of polarizing narratives. Populist actors have gained electoral momentum in different parts of the world by importing populist content from diverse national contexts. Argentina’s legislative elections in 2021 are a case in point. The main objective of this study is to examine the communication strategy employed by Javier Milei, an anarcho-capitalist politician, on Instagram during this electoral campaign. Through a quantitative content analysis, we identify the thematic and populist elements present in Milei’s Instagram posts. Our findings reveal a new style of ‘libertarian’ populism, which employs discursive components previously used by populist parties from various ideologies and the strategic alignment of political communication with opportunistic themes and contextual dynamics. Milei focuses on positioning himself as the leader of the electoral campaign, with minimal emphasis on concrete policy proposals. His populist strategy revolves around attacking ideological adversaries (such as communism and feminism) and denouncing the corrupt political ‘caste’. Unlike other rightwing populist politicians, Milei’s discourse does not particularly focus on the issue of immigration.

Civil-Military Relations in the Age of Populist Nationalism: The Case of Israel

Abstract One underplayed aspect of the current populist zeitgeist is the politicization of the military, adding to the growing list of dangers that democracies face today. Israel, which has experienced its own nationalistic populism since 2010, represents a deviant case with regard to the civil–military dimension. In contrast to the typical pattern of populist leaders enhancing the military's influence to bolster their own power, in Israel, populist politicians have sought to restrain the military top brass from the decision-making process, going as far as delegitimizing them by portraying them as part of the “leftist” out-of-touch elite. In a country in which the lines between the military and civilian spheres have traditionally been blurred and where security officials have played a significant role in decision-making, this has been a noteworthy development in the era of Benjamin Netanyahu. This article advances two causal claims pertaining to the Israeli case. First, perceived military setbacks and political-diplomatic moves associated with the military have diminished the once-hallowed reputation of the Israel Defense Forces. Second, right-wing politicians often view the military top brass as potential political rivals, given the standard practice in Israel of high-ranking generals entering politics upon retirement. The generals’ declining status in Israeli society has opened up the political space for populist nationalists to assault both active and retired security officials whose assessments often clash with the worldview of right-wing politicians.

The conspiracy narrative “The Big Lie”—Psychoanalytical considerations on the development of susceptibility to an “alternative reality”

AbstractUsing the narrative “The Big Lie,” which is placed in the socio‐political context, and based on data gathered from social media, clinical material, interviews and documentaries, the author examines from a psychoanalytic perspective the effective power and dynamics of conspiracy narratives that create an “alternative reality” with “conviction capsules,” using lies and distortions of reality consciously employed as means of agitation on the breeding ground of unconscious relational and regression processes. To sketch the emergence and development of this willingness, the author combines the explanations of Wilfred Bion, Susan Isaacs and Herbert Rosenfeld and develops the hypothesis, including the concept of “perverted containing,” that due to unsuccessful containing processes in the earliest relationship experiences, defensively inflexible, sealed “conviction capsules” develop, permeated by fears of confusion and annihilation, by hatred as well as phantasies of powerlessness and superiority. Underlying these, experienced as existentially threatening, are panic about change and excessive identification with a hard, alleged omnipotent object, linked to an unconscious longing for symbiosis with a “savior”—a conglomerate that breeds susceptibility to conspiracy narratives and totalitarian, destructive populist leaders. As one example, the destructive‐symbiotic relationship dynamic between Donald Trump and his supporters is outlined with the escalation of violence.

The Devil and Democracy in the Global South: Hugo Chávez's Transnational Populism

AbstractIn this article, we argue that the speeches and policy documents from the later period of Hugo Chávez's presidency exemplify ‘transnational populism’, a form of populist discourse that defies the close association between populism and nationalism that frames the scholarly literatures on both populism and Chávez. We explain why Chávez's populism took this distinctive form by reference to the history of international political thought in Latin America and the political context surrounding the creation of the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, ALBA). We suggest that while transnational populism may actually amplify the threat that other scholars have argued populist leaders pose to democratic institutions, it also offers an important corrective to how scholars think about the relationship between populism, democracy and international politics, suggesting that international institutions capable of restraining powerful states are essential to stabilising democracies in the Global South.

Populism and State Capture: Evidence from Latin America

This paper shows that, on average, populism in power produces a decrease in state capture. However, (unconstrained) populism in power that reduces existing levels of rule of law generates greater state capture than (contained) populism that has no negative effects on rule of law. The moderating effect we theorize is that the strength of the rule of law on state capture will show decreased effects at controlling state capture when a country is populist relative to non-populist. Populist leaders may seek to rid the old corruption networks, but once they aggrandize their power and weaken the rule of law, they have incentives to establish corrupt linkages with opportunistic economic elites who are willing to work with them, increasing state capture as a result. To test this theory, the paper employs a random effects model with 6 different specifications across 18 different Latin American countries, throughout the time period 1996-2017.

Elite Universities as Populist Scapegoats: Evidence from Hungary and Turkey

This article explores the reasons for the recent populist assault against elite academic institutions in Hungary and Turkey. After exploring the literature on populism, social mobility, and social pluralism, it focuses on the modalities of the attack against two elite academic institutions established upon the U.S. liberal arts college tradition, the Central European University (CEU) and Boğaziçi University, respectively, and its implications for Hungarian and Turkish politics. Two arguments are put forward: First, such attacks have emerged in the context of a populist narrative against institutions facilitating social mobility. Social mobility undermines the “us versus them” populist narrative where the masses are permanently placed on the “losers” side and therefore depend on the charismatic populist leader. With social mobility facilitated through high-quality academic institutions, these “losers” have the chance to improve their material and non-material well-being through education. Second, these institutions promote social pluralism and critical thinking, cultivating a mode of reflection that contradicts the simplistic populist dichotomies and opposes democratic backsliding.

Need for cognitive closure and desire for cultural tightness mediate the effect of concern about ecological threats on the need for strong leadership

The present research utilizes an evolutionary framework to investigate the process underlying the recent rise of several populist, “strongmen” leaders. Specifically, we propose that when people experience contingent (i.e., impending) ecological threats, their need for cognitive closure is activated, making them desire strong rules (i.e., a tight society) and to be guided by a strong leader. Further, we hypothesize that desire for cultural tightness, once activated by need for cognitive closure, augments peoples’ need for strong leaders. In two studies, we tested our hypotheses with respect to two of the most salient ecological threats currently affecting Europeans, namely COVID-19 (Study 1) and the war in Ukraine (Study 2). Results supported all our hypotheses, thereby shedding light on psycho-motivational underpinnings (i.e., need for cognitive closure and desire cultural for tightness) of the rise of populist leaders. Results thus corroborate the idea that populist leaders can use ecological threats-related uncertainty to maintain or gain power, and that ecological threats could bring to an alignment with right-wing ideas of people’s political attitudes.

Draining the Swamp? Populist leadership and corruption

AbstractThe resurgence of populism has presented a grave threat to democratic governance across the globe. Drawing on a cross‐national dataset of 155 countries from 1960 to 2020, we leverage the leadership turnovers within countries and use fixed effects models to estimate the effect of populist leadership on corruption. We find that populist leadership is associated with a substantial increase in executive corruption, but not other types of corruption. We also provide evidence that populist leaders are more likely to undermine judicial and legislative constraints, which in turn opens the door for massive executive corruption. We further show that whereas affluent resources exacerbate populist leaders' corruption, high‐quality bureaucracies, strong opposition parties, vigorous civil society organizations, and critical media work to mitigate the effect of populist leadership on corruption. This study contributes to the understanding of the nexus between populism and corruption and, more broadly, coping strategies for democratic backsliding.

Recenzja/Review: Ofer Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric: Dissing Opponents, Journalists, and Minorities in Populist Leadership, Springer 2023 and Ofer Feldman (ed.), Political Debasement: Incivility, Contempt, and Humiliation in Parliamentary and Public Discourse, Springer 2023

Recenzja/Review: Ofer Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric: Dissing Opponents, Journalists, and Minorities in Populist Leadership, Springer 2023 and Ofer Feldman (ed.), Political Debasement: Incivility, Contempt, and Humiliation in Parliamentary and Public Discourse, Springer 2023

Post-Truth Çağda Popülist Liderler: ABD, Çekya, Macaristan ve Venezuela Liderleri Üzerinden Bir İnceleme

Bu çalışmada, “Post-Truth” kavramının 2016’da yılın kelimesi seçilmesi ile ön plana çıkması ve son dönemlerde yaşamımıza entegre olmasına değinilmektedir. Öncelikle post-truth kavramı ontolojik olarak irdelenmiş, ekonomik, toplumsal ve kültürel konularda post-truth yaklaşımları ele alınsa da daha çok popülist siyasi liderler bağlamında açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Teknolojideki hızlı değişimler ve medya üzerinden bilgiye kolay bir şekilde ulaşılması ve bilginin hızlı tüketilmesi post-truth kavramını besleyen faktörler olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bununla birlikte, post-truth çağda toplumun gerçeklik ile bağının koparılması rasyonel bireyleri evrensel doğrulardan uzaklaştırmaktadır. Rasyonel bilgiler yerine duyguların yoğun olarak kullanıldığı bu çağda popülist liderler halkı kolay bir şekilde manipüle ederek yönlendirmektedir. Stratejik olarak konumlandırılan gerçeklerin halka yansıtılması aşamasında liderlerin popülist politikalara yöneldiği görülmektedir. Hakikat, yalan ve siyaset arasında doğrudan bağlantı kuran post-truth, dezenformasyon ile popülizmin ivme kazanması sonucunda toplumsal kutuplaşmaya neden olmaktadır. Bununla birlikte neoliberal politikaların başarısızlığı ve yaşanan küresel finansal krizler popülist liderler için büyük bir fırsat olmuştur. Ülkelerde yoksulluk ve gelir adaletsizliğindeki artışlar halk kitlelerini yeni popülist liderlere yöneltmiştir. Bu makalede post-truth dönemde seçilen liderlerin ürettiği popülist politikalar sonucunda toplum ile ilişkisinin nasıl boyut değiştirdiği ele alınacaktır.

The Impact of Covid-19 on the Move towards Authoritarianism: The Case of Hungary

As the Freedom House Report 2023 shows, there has been a global trend from democracy to
 authoritarianism over the past 17 years. This gained further momentum in late 2019 with the outbreak
 of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in Wuhan, China. In the fight against this virus, which has
 resulted in the deaths of millions of people, governments implemented several significant measures,
 including closures, curfews, and mandatory vaccinations. Under the pretense of combatting the virus,
 populist politicians, who already had authoritarian inclinations before the pandemic, disregarded
 important democratic principles, such as free and fair elections, separation of powers, political liberties,
 and civil rights. The violations of these principles by populist leaders accelerated global democratic
 backsliding. In this context, in March 2020, in response to the coronavirus pandemic, Hungary’s Prime
 Minister Viktor Orban, who has used every political crisis to find excuses to pursue undemocratic
 policies and strengthen his hold on power, pushed the Hungarian parliament to grant him extraordinary
 emergency powers. He used coronavirus precautions to establish one-man rule in Hungary by
 bypassing parliament. His government devised a legislative framework to suppress critics of its policies
 in the media, civil society, and the opposition. Orban also implemented restrictions violating judicial
 independence, minority rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly through constitutional
 amendments. In other words, Orban utilized the coronavirus outbreak to further weaken Hungary’s
 democratic structures and principles. Human rights organizations and the European Union have
 criticized Hungary’s slow erosion of democracy under Orban’s administration. This article analyzes
 the impact of COVID-19 on the acceleration of democratic backsliding in Hungary, under the rule of
 Prime Minister Viktor Orban, in terms of Wolfgang Merkel’s (2004) four conditions for democratic
 consolidation: electoral regimes, civil rights, political freedoms, and separation of powers.

In Search of a New Model of Political Governance in Southeast Asia; Democracy's Decline, Populism's Rise, and Globalization's Retreat

This article examines the challenges facing democracy in Southeast Asia, including the decline of the liberal democratic model, the rise of populism, and the retreat of globalization. It identifies five key trends that have led to the deterioration of the democratic ethos in the region and highlight the emergence of strong populist leaders who promise change through radical reforms. The article argues that it is necessary to explore the emergence of new political governance models that are uniquely Asian and lie outside the perceived colonial shadows of North America and Western Europe. This study focuses on four emerging market countries in Southeast Asia. It uses qualitative research methods to examine how these countries are coping with the decline of liberal democratic principles and institutions in the region. The study aims to provide an overview of the possible outcomes of new political governance models as the area moves forward. The review highlights that while the decline of liberal democratic principles and institutions in Southeast Asia has hurt social and economic progress in the region, emerging market countries in the region have taken steps to address the decline by strengthening democratic institutions, increasing investment and trade, and strengthening vital economic sectors such as tourism and information technology. In addition, the review also discusses the potential for a new political governance model to emerge that is distinctly Asian and in keeping with the culture and history of each country in the region.
 Keywords: globalization, political governance model, democratic decline, representative democracy. How

Neoliberal Populism in Ontario: Premier Doug Ford’s Strategic Politics

The 2018 election of Premier Doug Ford and the Progressive Conservative (PC) government ushered in a new era of neoliberal populism in Ontario, Canada. Ford’s election platform, titled a “Plan for the People,” resonated with the business elite who supported his free-market reforms but also with middle-class and blue-collar workers living in suburban and northern areas of the province. The article examines how Ford positioned his rivals as “out of touch” members of the political and cultural urban elite, responsible for a spiralling deficit that would economi-cally burden hard-working people. Unlike many other right-wing populist leaders, who have relied on xenophobic or anti-immigrant narratives, we argue that Ford’s populist stance is dema-gogic and pragmatic. This enabled him to pivot and shift his political strategy to amass support from a diverse range of economic, racial, ethnic, and religious groups, including new immigrants. We draw on newspaper articles, public documents and reports, as well as thirteen interviews with politicians, teachers and civil servants. The article highlights how Ford’s government operated to weaken democratic institutions through measures such as “strong mayor powers,” invoking the notwithstanding clause, as well as undermining the public sector. We trace how Ford’s populism undermined public education through overt and subtle measures that weaken school boards and unions while advancing privatization. We show how Ford bypassed intermediaries, in this case, school boards and teachers’ unions, and appealed directly to “the parents” through the media and employed cli-entelist strategies such as cash transfers under the guise of “parental choice” to hollow out public education. The analysis demonstrates how Ontario stands out as a unique case study for exam-ining neoliberal populism in Canada and North America.

Strategies of (De)Legitimation of COVID-19 Vaccines in Tanzanian Political Speeches

The COVID-19 pandemic sparked worldwide efforts to combat the health crisis, including vaccine development and distribution. However, varying political responses to vaccination policies complicated public discourse and influenced vaccine acceptance. This research paper employs critical discourse analysis (CDA) to compare (de)legitimation strategies used in Tanzanian political speeches by two presidents: late President Magufuli and current President Samia Suluhu Hassan. The study focuses on their approaches to legitimizing or delegitimizing COVID-19 vaccines in 2021. Two speeches were purposefully selected based on their relevance to vaccination decisions. President Magufuli employed strategies such as discrediting experts, discrediting others, denial, conspiracy theories, and making accusations to delegitimize vaccines. In contrast, President Samia justified vaccine acceptance using strategies such as authorization, moral evaluation, emotional appeals, and rationalization. These differences in approach can be attributed to their respective ideologies. President Magufuli, a populist leader, displayed scepticism towards Western medicine and promoted local solutions, while President Samia presented herself as a pragmatic leader who prioritizes scientific solutions and international cooperation in addressing health crises. The findings shed light on the complexities of public health communication and vaccine acceptance in Tanzania.