Challenges Of Population Research Articles

The Populist Challenge to U.S. Democracy: Renewing American Political Development's Comparative Perspective

AbstractRegarding the implications of the political developments of the last five years for the study of American political development (APD), this article argues that the unprecedented Trump phenomenon and its problematic repercussions for U.S. democracy have greatly enhanced the value of a comparative perspective, which can draw instructive lessons from the fate of attacks on liberal democracy by populist leaders in other countries. Comparativists examining the contemporary United States initially highlighted the risks of populist leadership (i.e., political agency), stressed the possibilities of democratic backsliding, and examined how popularly elected chief executives can undermine democracy from the inside—all of which fueled grave concerns. Yet for a more realistic assessment of populism's actual danger for U.S. democracy, one must analyze the probability of such a deleterious outcome. Therefore, researchers need to embed agency in contextual conditions and investigate what institutional, structural, cultural, and conjunctural factors empowered populist leaders to destroy democracy in some countries, whereas other constellations of these factors have impeded democratic backsliding in many other nations. With this move beyond a primary focus on agency, comparative analyses align with APD's longstanding attention to complex context factors. Interestingly, such a comparative perspective corroborates the distinctive institutional strengths and relative resilience of U.S. democracy.

ПОПУЛІЗМ У США: ЯК ДЕМОКРАТІЯ ДОЛАЄ ВИКЛИК

The article considers populism as a threat to democracy in the USA. It explains the causes and consequences of populism spread. The article describes the economic and cultural factors of the growth of populism, as well as analyzes approaches to the study of modern populism based on examples of political rhetoric in the United States. Left-wing and right-wing populism, as well as its main characteristics, are defined. The article describes how the populist political identity was formed in the United States by the efforts of both the Democratic and Republican parties. The populist political rhetoric of US Presidents F. Roosevelt, R. Reagan, D. Trump and other members of the American establishment is analyzed. The reason for the attractiveness of populism is explained, and its anti-pluralist and anti-liberal approaches are described in detail. In addition, the article notes that populism is part of the strategy of political forces to manipulate the electorate, and explains how democracy in the United States overcomes the populist challenge.

Political Comedy as Fuel for Populist Rhetoric?

In popular culture, politics are frequently framed with negative stereotypes, and there is some overlap between the anti-establishment rhetoric of political humor and populist challengers. This article probes similarities shared by politicians as presented in the television comedies Eichwald MdB (about a backbencher in the Bundestag) and Ellerbeck (about a kindergarten teacher turned mayor) and supporters of the (right-)populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD). The analysis of the storylines uncovers representations of self-serving and incompetent politicians that align with the fundamental critique expressed by the AfD. However, the negative depictions in the shows are interwoven with positive elements that speak to a responsiveness of democratic institutions. The two case studies help us better understand the specific form of German political satire produced by a public broadcaster and how satirical entertainment oscillates between negativity and meaningful critique of political power.

Urban justice and the populist challenge

Urban justice and the populist challenge

The challenge populist governments pose for the process and theory of European integration

Although populists in government have already frustrated the common interest projects, curbed the institutional progress, and questioned the fundamental values of the European Union, integration theories have so far failed to address the question: what explains populist governments’ actions within the EU? This article claims that existing accounts either downplay the relevance or fail to grasp the complexity of populist governments, because populism disputes the democratic models and state-societal relations projected by these theories. Merging the literature on populism and theories of European integration, it is argued that populism in government exerts a transformative impact on both the democratic institutions and the society within a member state, which could have important ramifications for future integration. Highlighting the anti-plural and anti-democratic nature of populism, and the emergence of a ‘constraining consensus’ between populist governments and ‘the people’, the article proposes a complementary approach in addressing the populist challenge for European integration. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: 10.1080/01402382.2021.1988388

From Brexit to VOX: Populist Policy Narratives about Rurality in Europe and the Populist Challenges for the Rural‐Urban Divide*

AbstractThe spread of radical‐right populist movements across Europe in recent years have been explained from a geographical perspective by a differentiated political behavior in rural areas, rooted in socio‐economic differences and a theory of a “revenge of the places that do not matter”. The objective of the article is to contribute to the characterization of the current populist narratives on rurality and potential new rural‐urban cleavages. Using the “Narrative Policy Framework”, the article explores two complementary case studies through a qualitative analysis of media pieces. The first case study explores narratives on rurality across the European Union between 2015 and 2019, giving an overview of how rural areas are depicted in policy narratives and the role and potential for discourses rooted in perceptions of “left‐behind places.” The second case study explores in depth how the Spanish radical‐right party VOX articulates its policy narrative on rurality. The analysis of both cases illustrates the existence of a complex narrative fabric on rurality across rural areas in Europe and how radical‐right populism reproduces a narrow concept of rurality, anchored in the idea of abandonment that may be contributing to the creation of a new rural‐urban cleavage.

Populism and foreign aid

Pundits, development practitioners, and scholars worry that rising populism and international disengagement in developed countries have negative consequences on foreign aid. However, how populism and foreign aid go together is not well understood. This paper provides the first systematic examination of this relationship. We adopt the popular ideational definition of populism, unpack populism into its core “thin” elements, and examine them within a delegation model of aid policy—a prominent framework in the aid literature. In so doing, we identify specific domestic political processes through which the core components of populism may affect aid spending. We argue that increases in one component of populism—anti-elitism—and in nativist sentiments, an associated concept, in a donor country lead to a reduction in aid spending through a public opinion channel. We supply both micro- and macro-evidence for our arguments by fielding surveys in the United States and United Kingdom as well as by analyzing aid spending by a large number of OECD donors. Our findings show that nativism and anti-elitism, rather than populism per se, influence not only individual attitudes toward aid but also actual aid policy and generate important insights into how to address populist challenges to foreign aid. Beyond these, our study contributes to the broader International Relations literature by demonstrating one useful analytical approach to studying populism, nativism, and foreign policy.

Between hyperglobalization and national policy. Is there a way to mitigate populist risks for global economic governance in the post-Covid-19 world?

Some scholars of global governance advocate rebalancing from global to national governance. They underline the incompatibility of global economic governance with democracies, which have the right to protect their social arrangements. They discern the fact that global (economic) governance is under heavy fire from a new vox populi, underscoring the socio-economic and cultural sources of their resentment and opposition to the liberal international order. While pointing at the timeliness of such argumentation, this article examines the fundamental problem with a sovereignty-related solution to the populist challenge. It lies in the fact that reconstituting global economic steering with a stronger emphasis on sovereignty may open the door for pursuing distinct national policies, which have blossomed during the Covid-19 pandemic and which not only overlap with populism but dismantle the benefits of international cooperation in the post-Covid-19 world. By asking about the role of the fragmented system of economic governance in inspiring populist resentment, this article creates an opportunity not only to address the challenges to global economic governance, but more specifically to reflect upon: the justification of decisive shifts toward national governance; risks which remain hidden for those discontented with economic globalization; and drafting an alternative solution, namely taking the middle way between hyper globalization and a more national policy.

Democratic Theory and the Empirical Study of Popular Vote Processes

Altman, David. 2018.Citizenship and Contemporary Direct Democracy.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Dyck, Joshua, and Edward Lascher. 2019.Initiatives without Engagement: A Realistic Appraisal of Direct Democracy’s Secondary Effects.Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Hollander, Saskia. 2019.The Politics of Referendum Use in European Democracies.London: Palgrave MacMillan.Matsusaka, John G. 2020.Let the People Rule: How Direct Democracy Can Meet the Populist Challenge.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Public scholarship in the platform university: social media and the challenge of populism

ABSTRACT Social media has figured prominently in two literatures in recent years: the rise of authoritarian populism and the desirability of publicly engaged scholarship. This paper connects these two usually isolated areas of study through comparison of the role social media plays in each, identifying a tendency to avoid the complexity of this influence by failing to treat these services as platform infrastructures. It argues for a framework of platform literacy to support public scholarship through digital platforms in the face of the populist challenge which can now be found across the most prominent social media platforms.

Do Coalition Governments with Populist Parties Attempt to Rationalise Law-Making in Parliaments? Evidence from the Czech Chamber of Deputies

Abstract Populism might be a threat to parliamentary democracy but does not automatically signal its demise. First, not all populist parties seek illiberal goals. Second, in Europe most populist parties entering governments have done so as coalitions with mainstream parties. Yet, almost all populists, including the non-extremist and ‘integrated’ ones, call for more efficient governance. We assume that once in the executive, that objective will also manifest itself in the rationalisation of law-making in legislatures. By applying a more assertive strategy and exploiting existing rules, cabinets will attempt to streamline their legislative agendas. We test this theoretical framework on empirical evidence from the Czech Chamber of Deputies, which can serve as prototypical case. Since 2010, three coalition governments have ruled. In the last two, the influence of populist parties (represented by ANO under the leadership of Andrej Babiš) gradually increased. By tracking the legislative performance of cabinets in the Chamber, we found that executives with a populist presence actually fared worse than their non-populist predecessor (baseline) in almost all proceedings and outcomes of law-making. The bills submitted by the last government, where ANO dominated, even suffered the most. Contrary to our assumption, a strategy of rationalisation has therefore not succeeded. The findings open interesting questions about how effective cabinets with populists are in law-making in parliaments, and about the future of legislatures as resilient safeguards against the populist challenge.

How to Save Democracy

Previous articleNext article No AccessReview EssayHow to Save Democracy The Price of Democracy: How Money Shapes Politics and What to Do about It. By Julia Cagé. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020. Presidents, Populism, and the Crisis of Democracy. By William G. Howell and Terry Moe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020. Let the People Rule: How Direct Democracy Can Meet the Populist Challenge. By John G. Matsusaka. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020.Alexandra CironeAlexandra CironeCornell University Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 83, Number 2April 2021 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/713150 Views: 477Total views on this site HistoryPublished online March 12, 2021 © 2021 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

The populist challenge to European defense

ABSTRACT This article assesses the consequences and implications of the rise of European populist parties for European defense cooperation. Focusing on six of the most prominent populist parties in Europe today, we examine their positions along three important defense-related issues: recommended national force posture; integrated military forces; and main national security threats. To determine their position on these three issues, we examine every party manifesto and, if available, official party document on security and defense policy since 2010. We argue that the rise of populism in Europe does not represent an inflection point for the future of European defense cooperation. Instead, our analysis reveals the following three findings: European defense cooperation will continue to be essentially ad hoc, functionally driven, and issue specific; populist parties’ attitudes and preferences regarding European defense cooperation both overlap with and diverge from those of other populists and non-populists in the EU; and populism over time may contribute to a shift in domestic preferences toward a Europe that more readily embraces military power.

The Populist Challenge of Common EU Policies - The Case of (Im)migration

The Populist Challenge of Common EU Policies - The Case of (Im)migration

Multilateralism and Nationalism in an Era of Disruption: the Great Pandemic and International Politics

The Great Pandemic of 2020 has caused a shock to international politics. But has it forced a radical restructuring of the international system and a change in the way international actors behave? a survey of the effects of the pandemic demonstrates that it has sped up existing trends, but has not brought about any transformation. The three-tier international system established after 1945 survives, but the struggle between two contesting models of global order (the Atlantic power system and the associated liberal international order and the alignment of sovereign internationalist powers) has intensified to consolidate a nascent new bipolarity in international affairs. Multilateralism has long been under threat, but its degradation has accelerated as bodies such as the World Health Organization have been challenged over their handling of the coronavirus pandemic, and the dangers of distant supply chains and the recrudescence of nationalism have accelerated deglobalisation. The legitimacy of state action has been revalidated as the only effective actor in handling the crisis. But this has been accompanied by the intensification of national populist challenges not only to liberal universalism, but also to sovereign internationalism. The return of great power politics entails the accelerated erosion of the dense structures of the international community developed in the post-war years, and signals a return to the period when a previous international system (the Vienna order established in 1815) came to an end in the early years of the 20t h century. Attacks on the UN and other multilateral institutions of the Yalta era means that the struggle between the rival models of world order will be less constrained by the guardrails of the international system, and thus the Second Cold War may well be more dangerous than the first.

Technocratic Populism à la Française? The Roots and Mechanisms of Emmanuel Macron’s Success

This article focuses on the roots and mechanisms of Macron’s success, arguing that in 2017 two conditions were essential in Macron’s rise—the implosion of the established system of the French Fifth Republic in which the two main parties were alternating in power; and the rise of anti-establishment populist challengers on the right and on the left (cf. Stockemer, 2017; Zulianello, 2020). It was anti-establishment appeal that put Macron on the map, but the appeal to technocratic competence that won him the presidency. Technocratic populism transcends the left–right cleavage and, as a result, has a broader appeal than its left- and right-wing counterparts. Emmanuel Macron was an insider taking on the (crumbling) system and positioning himself as an outsider—refusing the traditional labels, including centrism, elite recruitment patterns, and mediated politics. Instead, Macron and <em>La Republique en Marche</em> attempted to create new forms of responsiveness by ‘giving voice to the people,’ while relying on technocratic competence as a legitimation mechanism. In power Emmanuel Macron attempts to balance responsiveness and responsibility (cf. Guasti & Buštíková, 2020).

Advancing a transformative social contract for the environmental sciences: From public engagement to justice

Taking as a starting point Jane Lubchenco’s call for a renewed social contract for environmental science, this paper advances a framework for science’s place in society in which justice is central. A social contract is a desired vision of social order that distributes rights, responsibilities, and obligations among political actors. The magnitude of global ecological change, our collective inability to address ecological crises, and populist challenges to science have renewed interest in debates about existing social contracts with science. While Lubchenco’s vision of a social contract focuses on practical ways to improve the engagement of scientists with decision-makers and citizens, we argue that to achieve the objectives laid out by Lubchenco, justice—encompassing representation, distribution, and recognition—must be at the core of science-society relations. A justice-centred social contract with science requires acknowledgement on the part of scientists, administrators, decision-makers, and citizens of the biases, inequalities and inequities contained within and advanced by academic institutions. Orienting science towards justice provides a starting point for a more diverse, inclusive, and equitable culture of publicly-funded research.

The populist challenge to the European Court of Human Rights

Abstract This article analyzes the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) from the perspective of the recent extraordinary wave of populism in Europe. It argues that populism poses a serious and distinctive challenge to the ECtHR since supranational judicial review is at odds with the populist ideology. What makes the populist challenge distinctive is the combination of the ideological basis of populism, its wide appeal and capacity to reach ordinary people, and populists’ tendency to remove limitations on their power. With respect to the last point, the article introduces a categorization of anti-court techniques and takes stock of the ECtHR’s institutional setting. It concludes that although the situation is not perfect—the budget and judicial selection are especially problematic—the ECtHR is rather well insulated from eventual attacks targeting its structural features or the judicial personnel. However, including the ECtHR in the “narrative of blame,” populism is very strong in another anti-court strategy—achieving gradual erosion of a court through delegitimization. That is particularly threatening for the ECtHR due to its vulnerability to legitimacy challenges manifested in the past decade. As a result, the populist challenge will likely require careful management of the ECtHR’s social legitimacy.

Democracy Versus Democracy: The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy

The current populist challenges in western liberal democracies should not be seen as evidence of their decline, but as a constituent part. The history of democracy shows us that such challenges enable democracy’s growth and evolution. As these modern conflicts and crises see populists seek to capitalise on the discontent of the people, it is evident that much of the conflict comes from tensions between the rule of law and majority rule. Elites seeking to preserve the liberal democratic system need to make their arguments in defence of the rule of law and democratic values, rather than assuming them to be self-evident. We should only become concerned over the fate of liberal democracy when the conflict moves from dialogue into physical violence, or as in Hungary, where the executive has dismantled counter-majoritarian checks. It is only then that the departure from democracy truly begins.

Financial Crisis Management and the Rise of Authoritarian Populism: What Makes Hungary Different from Latvia and Romania?

Within the context of the debates on the worldwide rise of populism, this article aims to uncover factors that may reduce the vulnerability of a system to populist challenges. Based on existing theories, Hungary, Latvia and Romania are all susceptible to populism but authoritarian populism has emerged only in Hungary. This puzzle is addressed through examining the process of financial crisis management in the three cases and its impact on the political system. Comparative analysis shows that paternalistic expectations of the state and the government’s willingness to accept Russian support distinguish Hungary from Latvia and Romania.