Populism and foreign aid

Yoshiharu Kobayashi,Edward Lawson,Tobias Heinrich

doi:10.1177/13540661211044202

Abstract

Pundits, development practitioners, and scholars worry that rising populism and international disengagement in developed countries have negative consequences on foreign aid. However, how populism and foreign aid go together is not well understood. This paper provides the first systematic examination of this relationship. We adopt the popular ideational definition of populism, unpack populism into its core “thin” elements, and examine them within a delegation model of aid policy—a prominent framework in the aid literature. In so doing, we identify specific domestic political processes through which the core components of populism may affect aid spending. We argue that increases in one component of populism—anti-elitism—and in nativist sentiments, an associated concept, in a donor country lead to a reduction in aid spending through a public opinion channel. We supply both micro- and macro-evidence for our arguments by fielding surveys in the United States and United Kingdom as well as by analyzing aid spending by a large number of OECD donors. Our findings show that nativism and anti-elitism, rather than populism per se, influence not only individual attitudes toward aid but also actual aid policy and generate important insights into how to address populist challenges to foreign aid. Beyond these, our study contributes to the broader International Relations literature by demonstrating one useful analytical approach to studying populism, nativism, and foreign policy.

Highlights

IntroductionIt is feared that populism brings with it more restrictive refugee policies, more isolationism, and similar inwardlooking policies
Populist attitudes have surged after financial and refugee crises
Pundits and scholars often draw a close connection between populism and foreign aid, theoretical and evidentiary bases for this link are thin

Summary

Introduction

It is feared that populism brings with it more restrictive refugee policies, more isolationism, and similar inwardlooking policies. Populists’ emphasis on narrow self-interest over international cooperation might suggest that less development assistance would be directed toward helping the poor in developing countries, a concern repeatedly voiced by development practitioners and scholars.. Populists’ emphasis on narrow self-interest over international cooperation might suggest that less development assistance would be directed toward helping the poor in developing countries, a concern repeatedly voiced by development practitioners and scholars.2 Despite these anticipated consequences, the theoretical and empirical foundations for a populism–aid relationship are thin. Armed with a theory directing our inquiry, we can provide insights into how to respond to the populist challenge to foreign aid effectively

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