Keep your enemies safer: technical cooperation and transferring nuclear safety and security technologies

Abstract

Even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated on nuclear safety and security. Since accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonations anywhere threaten peace everywhere, it seems straightforward that states more experienced in developing nuclear safety and security technologies would transfer such methods to other states. Yet, the historical record is mixed. Why? While existing explanations focus on the political costs and proliferation risks faced by the transferring state, this article argues that specific technological features condition the feasibility of assistance. For more complex nuclear safety and security technologies, robust technical cooperation is crucial to build the necessary trust for scientists to transfer tacit knowledge without divulging sensitive information. Leveraging elite interviews and archival evidence, my theory is supported by four case studies: US sharing of basic nuclear safety and security technologies with the Soviet Union (1961–1963); US withholding of complex nuclear safety and security technologies from China (1990–1999) and Pakistan (1998–2003); and US sharing of complex nuclear safety and security technologies with Russia (1994–2007). My findings suggest the need to examine not only the motivations behind nuclear assistance but also the process by which it occurs and the features of the technologies involved, with implications for how states cooperate to manage the global risks of emerging technologies.