North Korean Politics Research Articles

Suryong’s Direct Rule and the Political Regime in North Korea under Kim Jong IL

The political in North Korea has been characterized as a Dominant Party-State System. Since mid-1980s, however, its political has displayed two interesting aspects. Formally, broad System has been maintained; in practice, however, Workers' Party of Korea, Korean People's Army, and government have come to acquire respectively different and considerably strengthened roles. Under this new regime, Kim Jong Il (Suryong) directly rules over party, government, and military. Meanwhile, political-ideological base, military base, and economic base are administered respectively by party, army, and government. Interestingly, while power of party still overwhelms that of military and government, party's means of influence has changed from giving direct orders to providing provisions or encouraging policy outlines. Key words: North Korea, Communist parties, East Asian politics Introduction The political in Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has experienced significant changes since death of its longstanding leader, Kim Il Sung, in 1994. No plenary meeting of party's Central Committee (PCC), highest leadership body of North Korea, has been held since December 1993. In addition, two significant political institutions, presidency and Central People's Committee (CPC), were abolished by constitutional revision that took place in 1998. Specifically, abolishment of CPC weakened consulting channel between Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and government. These changes, in turn, reinforced roles of cabinet and Korean People's Army (KPA), both previously controlled by WPK. In other words, under rule of Kim Jong Il, the cabinet responsibility system on which administrative-economic apparatus is concentrated, is actively operating, and politics, or Songun policy, has become central theme of North Korean politics. This makes KPA driving force of economic development and national security. Previous literature on political in North Korea has shown different findings regarding Suryong (great leader) system, Suryong's direct rule, party-government relations and party-military relations in eras of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Specifically, most studies are divided into two perspectives regarding core issue of socialist political systems, party control. Some scholars argue that similar to era of Kim Il Sung's rule, WPK under Kim Jong Il exercises guidance and leadership over government and KPA. This is so even though he has bolstered status of KPA and autonomy of cabinet.1 Meanwhile, other scholars point out that because of development of military-first politics and cabinet responsibility system, previous relations among party, government, and KPA have significantly changed, or at very least, formerly direct control WPK once had has been weakened during Kim Jong Il era.2 If so, why were previous studies on socialist political systems concentrated on relations between communist party, government, and military? According to Schurmann's seminal study,3 socialist political systems, especially Chinese communist in 1960s, can be analyzed by focusing on hierarchical structure among Chinese Communist Party, People's Liberation Army, and government. That is, power structure in socialist countries is characterized by communistparty dominant pattern within a strict power triangle that consists of communist party, government, and military.4 Thus, Schurmann's study implies that for analysis of socialist political systems, we need to scrutinize identity of supreme power and its relations with other actors. In this regard, North Korea is not so different from other socialist political systems. …

Kim Takes Control: The "Great Purge" in North Korea, 1956-1960

The unsuccessful attempt to oust Kim Il Sung in 1956 triggered signiÞcant changes in North Korean politics and society. North Korea began to drift away from the Soviet patterns, slowly developing its own brand of "national Stalinism." North Korean relations with the Soviet Union and China also underwent deep transformation. These changes met resistance, but all dissenters were wiped out during large-scale purges, reminiscent ofStalin's "Great Purge" of 1937. This article, based on previously unknown material from Soviet archives, traces the history ofthis purge as well as the social, political, and cultural changes ofthe late 1950s.

War and Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Peloponnesian War

I. Democracy: Bellicose, Imperial, or Idealistic? Democratic Warfare, Ancient and Modern, Victor Hanson The American Imperium, Ronald Steel The American Empire: A Case of Mistaken Identity, Robert Kagan II. Categorizing Wars: Civil or Hegemonic, Decisive or Cyclical? When Sparta Is Sparta but Athens Isn't Athens: Democracy and the Korean War, Bruce Cumings Stalin and the Decision for War in Korea, Kathryn Weathersby The Effects of the Peloponnesian (Athenian) War on Athenian and Spartan Societies, Paul Cartledge III. Third Forces, or Shrimps between Whales The Case of Plataea: Small States and the (Re-)Invention of Political Realism, Gregory Crane The Korean War and North Korean Politics, Dae-Suk Suh The Korean War and South Korean Politics, Kongdan Oh IV. Demagogues? or Domestic Politics in Democracies at War? McCarthyism and the Korean War, Ellen Schrecker Korea, the Cold War, and American Democracy, Stephen Whitfield Warfare, Democracy, and the Cult of Personality, Jennifer Roberts V. Realism, Militarism, and the Culture of Democracies at War Thucydides Theoretikos/Thucydides Histor: Realist Theory and the Challenge of History, Josiah Ober Father of All - Destroyer of All: War in Late Fifth-Century Athenian Discourse and Ideology, Kurt Raaflaub Characters and Characteristics of Korean War Novels, Dong-wook Shin

The North and South Korean Political Systems: a Comparative Analysis. By Sung Chul Yang. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, and Seoul: Seoul Press, 1994. 983 pp., appendices, index. Hardcover, $64.95 or 49,500 Won.

Part 1 The Korean political heritage: a historical overview political culture and traditions nativistic resilience, nationalism, and beyond. Part 2 Contemporary political settings: politics of partition ideology and the Korean experiments. Part 3 The North Korean political system - a totalitarian political order: the North Korean political framework formal political structures and their evolution the ruling elites and their political vicissitudes Kim Il Sung's rise and retention of power. Part 3 The South Korean political system - a democratizing political order: the South Korean political framework formal governmental structures and political process the ruling elites and their modal characteristics legitimacy crisis - from Rhee to Roh. Part 4 North and South Korean economic orientation - mobilization versus motivation: resource endowments and natural condition economic systems, policies and strategies performance in comparison. Part 5 Critical issues and problems: the seizure of power in North and South Korean politics arms race and the twin fortifications of the Korean Peninsula a socialist man versus a universal man - education in North and South Korean politics reunification of policy models. Conclusion: North and South Korea as two living political laboratories.

The North and South Korean political systems: a comparative analysis

Part 1 The Korean political heritage: a historical overview political culture and traditions nativistic resilience, nationalism, and beyond. Part 2 Contemporary political settings: politics of partition ideology and the Korean experiments. Part 3 The North Korean political system - a totalitarian political order: the North Korean political framework formal political structures and their evolution the ruling elites and their political vicissitudes Kim Il Sung's rise and retention of power. Part 3 The South Korean political system - a democratizing political order: the South Korean political framework formal governmental structures and political process the ruling elites and their modal characteristics legitimacy crisis - from Rhee to Roh. Part 4 North and South Korean economic orientation - mobilization versus motivation: resource endowments and natural condition economic systems, policies and strategies performance in comparison. Part 5 Critical issues and problems: the seizure of power in North and South Korean politics arms race and the twin fortifications of the Korean Peninsula a socialist man versus a universal man - education in North and South Korean politics reunification of policy models. Conclusion: North and South Korea as two living political laboratories.

Centering the Periphery: Manchurian Exile(s) and the North Korean State

Kim Il sung and other Manchurian guerrilla veterans who came to dominate North Korean politics after 1945 were profoundly influenced by the experience of their antiJapanese struggle in exile. This influence has shaped the ideology, historiography, and domestic and external policies of the DPRK to the present. At the same time, this exile experience has been given a mythical status in North Korean history, centered on the personality and activities of Kim Il Sung, but reflective of earlier attempts to draw Manchuria into the mainstream of Korean history. The "mythification" of Manchuria has grown steadily over time, and since the early 1970s Kim Jong Il has been closely associated with his father's Manchurian guerrilla struggle, in particular with the image of Mt. Paektu.

梁性喆 지음, 『The North and South Korean Political Systems』

梁性喆 지음, 『The North and South Korean Political Systems』

Arms Control and Great-power Interests in the Korean Peninsula

S 275 external pressures. In consequence, the use of force to reunify Korea has now probably been all but ruled out. While North Korea is looking for new options to break out of what has clearly become an untenable position, some analysts have concluded that this may prompt North Korea to develop nuclear weapons. Such a course may be part of the hidden agenda of unknown elements in North Korea. If confirmed, it would be very destabilizing for the region. There is therefore strong incentive for the USSR, the US, China and Japan to work together to solve the problem of North Korea’s insecurity. The aim of other regional countries, including Australia, should be to recognize North Korea’s predicament, albeit a largely self-created one, and work to encourage stability and transparency on the Korean peninsula while simultaneously encouraging confidence in Pyongyang about the benefits of change and of joining the rest of the Asia-Pacific community. This will be difficult in view of the rigidities that have been built into North Korean politics over the last 40 years. There would however appear to be few alternatives other than to work with the existing leadership in Pyongyang.

Succession Politics in North Korea: Implications for Policy and Political Stability

In modern political discourse the of hereditary succession is dated. In both the Marxist and Capitalist scholarly traditions, such a practice is considered a reactionary custom reminiscent of the feudal period. (North Korea was no exception up to the 1970 edition of the Dictionary of Political Terminologies, published by its Academy of Social Sciences.) This view notwithstanding, recent cases of such succession exist. For example, in Taiwan Chiang Ching-kuo was groomed and eventually formally succeeded his father in 1978. Also, the accession of Rajiv Gandhi as India's prime minister after the assassination of his mother in 1984 and the current succession talk in Singapore smack of the of dynastic succession. Following these precedents is North Korea, which on June 1, 1986, reconfirmed the status of Kim Chong-il as heir apparent to his father, Kim Il-song. North Korea has become in principle the first Communist dynasty. The Sixth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party, which legitimized the succession in 1980, elicited both ideological support from Kimists and criticisms from outsiders. But the pertinent questions remain: Will the mechanism and potential political implications of this father-son succession process in North Korea resemble the smooth transfer and political tranquillity that characterized the aforementioned Taiwan succession event? Will the succeeding regime modify the revolutionary goals of Kim

Succession Politics in North Korea: Implications for Policy and Political Stability

Succession Politics in North Korea: Implications for Policy and Political Stability

Kim Chong-il in the North Korean Mass Media: A Study of Semi-Esoteric Communication

To UNDERSTAND NORTH KOREA TODAY it is of crucial importance to understand the succession issue and the place of Kim Chongil-Kim Il-song's son and putative successor-in the political process, for without a clear grasp of who and what motivated certain policies, movements, and campaigns, it is virtually impossible to apprehend the one consistent theme that has pervaded North Korean politics for the past eight years. Yet in order to study Kim Chong-il it is necessary first to penetrate the system of cryptic, semi-esoteric communication that was used by the North Korean mass media to refer to him during this period. The name of Kim Chong-il had been mentioned only rarely in the North Korean media until the announcement of his name and party positions at the Sixth Congress of the Korean Workers (KWP) in October 1980. Still, while outsiders searched in vain for some mention of his name and clues to his existence and status, KWP members and members of the Youth League-and perhaps much of the literate population of the country-were able to follow Kim Chong-il's ascendancy in North Korean politics with relative ease in the media. The key to the North Korean's ability to follow young Kim's career was a subtle system of code words, slogans, and symbols which were used to refer to Kim Chong-il and his achievements. Starting with the term Party Center, the system rapidly expanded to include more cryptic and stylized phrases to refer to him. By studying the use of these terms it is possible to follow the buildup for Kim Chong-il and his career.

Research on Korean Communism: Promise versus Performance

Research on Korean communism is clearly subsumed under a new field of inquiry known as “comparative study of communism” or “studies of comparative communism.” Developed in the wake of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the comparative study of communism claims greater conceptual and methodological potency through the use of “value-neutral” models and theories developed in the social and behavioral sciences. The author critically examines the performance of current scholarship on North Korean politics in light of the promise of the comparative study of communism. Specifically, he first identifies key normative, conceptual, and methodological problems that plague the current lines of inquiry in the field. He then probes the areas of substantive strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in our present knowledge about the North Korean political system, focusing on two issues of normative and policy importance to both domestic and foreign policy—legitimacy and chuch'e. The author suggests several alternative methods and approaches for liberating the field from its intellectual isolationism and for charting a path toward a cumulative, orderly, and systematic way of building a body of knowledge about Korean communism.

North Korea

ERHAPS THE most striking feature of North Korean politics today is the bizarre effort being made by Il-sung, for three decades the unchallenged ruler of his country, to establish a family dynasty with his 36-year-old son, Chong-il, as his chosen political heir. If he brings it off, the aging dictator (he is 64) will have turned Marxist doctrine upside down with a vengeance, and succeeded in doing what no other Communist leader has ever done before, or even attempted to do. This dynastic program is already well advanced. It was reported in late February that the Politburo of the ruling North Korean Workers Party had recently recommended Chong-il as his father's successor, and that his formal designation as such will probably be announced on the elder Kim's 65th birthday (April 15) or at the Sixth Party Congress, expected to be held later in the year.1 Il-sung has long been surrounded by perhaps the most extravagant personality cult to be found anywhere in the world. The North Korean media almost invariably refer to him in such terms as the respected and beloved fatherly leader of the Korean people, peerless patriot and ever-victorious, iron-willed brilliant commander, the greatest military strategist the has ever known, and so forth. He is acclaimed as the most profound revolutionary genius of all time, without precedent in the West or East, in all ages, the sun of the nation, and adored by all world revolutionary people. His birthplace at Mangyongdae is said to be the cradle of the revolution, and the country's leading university is named after him. The word communism has been eliminated from all official publications in North Korea, and replaced by the term Kim Il-sung ideology. The country erected a massive 23-meter-high statue of President in Pyongyang, the capital, in celebration of his 60th birthday in 1972.

The Characteristic Functioning of the North Korean Political System: Persistence of Charisma and Monolithic Structure

The Characteristic Functioning of the North Korean Political System: Persistence of Charisma and Monolithic Structure

The Analytical Model of the North Korean Politics and Administration

The Analytical Model of the North Korean Politics and Administration

Communist Politics in North Korea.

Communist Politics in North Korea.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1975

THROUGHOUT 1975, the North Korean leadership has been preoccupied with two overriding objectives. The first of these was the intensification of diplomatic activities to strengthen solidarity with anti-imperialist revolutionary forces, considered one of the prerequisites for a successful revolution leading to the reunification of Korea. The second objective, pursued relentlessly by North Korean leaders, was the early fulfillment of the major production goals embodied in the sixyear plan before October 10th, the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Worker's Party. The entire citizenry has lived in what could be called a state of high mobilization, and was subjected to incessant exhortations of party and government organs for harder work in the glorious task of pre-schedule completion of the six-year plan. This article is a brief review of selected aspects of North Korea's diplomacy and internal developments in 1975. Two sources of data were utilized: North Korean publications, and interviews which the author had with party and government officials during a three-week stay in Pyongyang in August. Toward achieving the first objective, a major North Korean diplomatic undertaking was a visit to Peking in April by a ten-member delegation of top leaders in North Korean political, military, and economic fields headed by President Kim Il Sung. Coming just after the fall of Phnom Penh and the rapid disintegration of the Thieu regime in South Vietnam, the visit provoked intense speculation on the significance and implication of the presence of this high-ranking delegation in China. In a speech delivered at a banquet on April 18, President Kim engendered a feeling of crisis when he said:

The Russian Faction in North Korea

Research Article| April 01 1968 The Russian Faction in North Korea Chong-Sik Lee; Chong-Sik Lee Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Ki-Wan Oh Ki-Wan Oh Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1939) 8 (4): 270–288. https://doi.org/10.2307/2642202 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Chong-Sik Lee, Ki-Wan Oh; The Russian Faction in North Korea. Far Eastern Survey 15 February 1939; 8 (4): 270–288. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2642202 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies 1950–1965

Since the April 1960 student-led revolution there, debate in South Korea on the peaceful unification of the two Koreas has increased in frequency, intensity, and popularity among students, intellectuals, political parties, and other social groups. Popular support for independent and peaceful unification is rapidly mounting. This changing mood may be due to more effective North Korean propaganda as well as to the unhappy economic conditions in South Korea. In response to North Korea's aggressive unification campaign, the ROK (Republic of Korea) government has found it necessary to set up a research organization dedicated solely to the study of problems of unification.

Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean War Stage

If one were to believe the official histories written in North Korea during the past few years, political developments in North Korea after 1945 and even the entire history of the Korean Communist movement would seem to have been relatively simple. According to North Korean historians, the new proletariat took over the leadership of the struggle for national liberation after the bourgeois-led March First Movement of 1919 had failed. The Korean Communist Party, first organised in 1925, ceased to operate in 1928 because the sectarians in the Party leadership failed to establish a link with the surging movement of the workers and peasants. The national liberation movement recovered its vigour and direction in the 1930s only because Kim D-song, whose strategy and tactics were the most scientific and most in accord with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, provided leadership. Kim Il-song became the “beacon” of the revolutionary movement, and the Korean People's Revolutionary Army under him fought against the Japanese “shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Army.”