Political Opponents Research Articles

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIETS FROM THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION TO THE ADOPTION OF THE USSR CONSTITUTION OF 1936

The article examines the history of the formation of representative power in Russia: the emergence and development of Soviets of workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’ deputies and the highest representative institution - the State Duma. The following shows the activities of the State Duma, the range of interests of their deputies, their attention to the problem of whether the Duma is a parliament or not. The process of formation of Soviets since February 1917 as an All-Russian representative authority is shown. The problem of correlation between the theory of Marxism and the practice of its application in the RSFSR is considered. It is shown that the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1918 never mentioned the classical formula of Marxism “dictatorship of the proletariat”, blurring it with the dictatorship of workers. However, during the Civil War, in order to retain power, there is a transition to the de facto dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party. The article draws attention to the moral and political level of the members of the CPSU (b), I. V. Stalin’s personnel policy in both party and Soviet organizations. The institute of purges of party and Soviet workers is considered as a way to get rid of both political opponents and embezzlers, thieves, drunkards, etc. of the public. The new Constitution of the USSR of 1936 was to ful ll the task of nally purging the state from the party dictatorship and ensuring the union of party members and non - party members

Discovering Politeness Strategy in Vladimir Putin’s Speech on the Russian-Ukraine War 2022

The implementation of politeness strategy can be found in social interactions, such as in political speech. On February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin delivered a speech that justified a “special military operation” in Ukraine. Putin’s communication often fails to adhere to or intentionally deviates from typical norms of politeness. The study aims to analyze politeness strategies in Vladimir Putin’s speech on the Russian-Ukraine conflict in 2022. It employed a qualitative approach and applies politeness theory for analysis. The results revealed that Vladimir Putin employed bald-on-record, positive, negative, and off-record politeness strategies, which are divided into several variations of specific strategies. Bald-on-record is the most frequently used, followed by positive and negative, with off-record politeness being the least frequently used strategy. The bald-on-record strategy dominated Putin’s speech because he wanted to increase his efficiency in communicating rather than being long-winded and minimizing face-threatening acts (FTAs). He also had much higher power than his audience, which allowed him to give orders, commands, decisions, and even threats to his audience or political opponents.

The Political Psychology of Cancel Culture: Value Framing or Group Identity?

“Cancel culture” has become a prominent phrase in US political commentary, with supporters and opponents relying on different value-based arguments to express their views. At the same time, these camps often fall along predictable partisan political lines. What, then, are the real motivations for promoting and opposing behaviors sometimes labeled as “canceling” in contemporary American politics? We explore this question through survey data from Pew in 2020 and two original survey experiments, conducted on the 2021 CES and a 2023 online sample. We examine how Americans define the term “cancel culture,” to what extent cancel culture is linked to both a range of core democratic values, and the role of partisanship in shaping support or opposition to specific behaviors. We observe a significant range of views about cancel culture and document connections to various political values. From our experiments, we find that partisanship is a potent driver of support for and understanding of cancel culture and that value-based framing has a weaker impact as compared to partisanship. Cancel culture provides an important case study of how Americans process conflicting norms and values, including free speech and political accountability, beyond the typical constraints of the formal political system.

Marketing and Personal Branding of Anies Baswedan as Presidential Candidate by NasDem Party in Digital Space

The purpose of this study is to see the phenomenon of political marketing, especially how the online mass media builds Anies Baswedan’s branding as a presidential candidate. The branding of presidential candidate serves as a phenomenon of Indonesian national politics particularly when NasDem Party declared Anies Baswedan as a presidential candidate on October 3, 2022. The methodology of this study uses qualifiers, and the technique of analysis and data analysis uses Nvivo12 plus mainly in online media reporting in Indonesia (CNN, Kompas, Media Indonesia, and Detik.com). The results of this study showed that the four media outlets were actively reporting on the nomination of Anies as a presidential candidate. The massive reporting put Anies' personal electability ahead of other political opponents. The identification is based on the analysis of content about Anies in the four online media outlets. In terms of quantity, Media Indonesia more actively reported on Anes’ candidacy than the other three media outlets. This is because of power polarization relationship in terms of ownership relationship between NasDem Party and Media Indonesia. Thus, the news frame leans towards Anies and indirectly it can be used for marketing and branding politics.

Managing an Unorthodox Society by Orthodox Psychiatry: The Pitfalls

Any unorthodox activity by an individual person is looked upon by society as a symbol of deranged activity until and unless the motive behind that breach is clear and acceptable to society. No country is immune from the allegation where undue advantage has been taken on many occasions to label political opponents as suffering from mental derangement and have been diagnosed, treated, confined, and may be sterilized or killed by government agencies for their political gain. Wikipedia even lists the Government of India for enlisting the help of a renowned institute in relation to some agitation by a community in the year 2012. We all are aware of such atrocities committed in various big countries, like Germany, the USA, China, Europe, Russia and many more.

Reputational costs of receptiveness: When and why being receptive to opposing political views backfires.

A fast-growing body of research finds that receptiveness to opposing political views carries reputational benefits. A different body of research finds that opposing political views and the people who hold them are seen as repugnant. How could it be that people receptive to opposing political ideas are viewed positively when the political opponents they are receptive to are seen negatively? In seven main (N = 5,286) and nine supplemental studies (N = 3,983 participants in online studies; N = 124,493 observations in field data), we reconcile this tension by arguing that the identity of the person one is receptive to determines whether receptiveness carries reputational benefits or costs. When the information source belongs to the opposing party, receptiveness to opposing political views often carries reputational costs. We find these reputational costs across both strong and weak signals of receptiveness, eight different political and social issues, and multiple types of prototypical out-party sources. We argue that these costs arise because members of the opposing party are frequently stereotyped as immoral, and thus receptiveness to their ideas is seen negatively. As a boundary condition, we find that the costs of receptiveness are pronounced for sources who are prototypical of the out-party and attenuate (or even reverse) for sources who are nonprototypical. These findings resolve a seeming contradiction between two distinct literatures in psychology, contribute to a rapidly expanding literature on the interpersonal consequences of receptiveness, and lay the groundwork for understanding novel barriers to, and ultimately solutions for, the lack of cross-party openness and political polarization. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

المعتزلة ودورها في شرعنة الدولة العباسية ومواجهة الطوائف المعارضة

The Mu'tazila scientist provided a great and important service to the Abbasid state, as the Mu'tazila participated in the revolution against the Umayyads, and the summit of their political, military and intellectual activity against the Umayyad authority was represented in their contribution with the Shiites in overthrowing the Umayyad rule, which led to the stability of power in the hands of the Abbasids. This activity has reached an extent of clarity and effectiveness, as during the last period of the Umayyad state, "Wasel" and his followers were actively working in the service of the Abbasid cause. and that the doctrine of "Wasel" and the doctrine of the early Mu'tazila were the two official theological doctrines of the Abbasid movement. In addition, the Abbasid rulers were able to pass their political ideas through Mu'tazili thought, which they found the best way to legitimize their authority, liquidate their political and religious opponents, and justify their actions. Therefore, during the time of al-Ma'mun, the Abbasid state adopted retirement as an official principle of the state.

A question of truth: accusations of untruthfulness by populist and non-populist politicians on Facebook during the COVID-19 crisis

ABSTRACT Online environments can foster opportunities for political engagement but can also hinder democratic deliberation by promoting hostile and polarizing communication. A prominent concern revolves around the attacks on political actors’ truthfulness in public discourse. Such discourse is expressed through anti-elite and antagonistic attacks on perceived (un)truthfulness employed by some politicians toward political opponents in public debates, and it is argued to maintain a close affinity with populist politics. During crises, when people seek guidance from elites, discourses of untruthfulness can lead to further uncertainty by eroding trust in political leadership. Relying on the extensive claims analysis of 7,109 Facebook posts published by political party leaders between March 2020 and February 2021, this study investigates how accusations of untruthfulness unfold in the social media posts of populist and non-populist political leaders in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, and Poland during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our findings show that populist leaders are generally more prone to utilize accusations of untruthfulness in their social media posts than non-populist politicians, but the extent of attacks is context-dependent.

‘Where there is a will there is a way’: figurative language use and its pragmatic functions in political discourse

Abstract Although political discourse is essentially expected to be fact-based and objective, both practice and research show that literal language in political discourse is very often compounded with figurative language. The paper at hand tackles figurative language use in political interviews. For the purposes of this research, we conducted a critical discourse analysis of a corpus of political interviews given by a former Macedonian female politician – Radmila Shekerinska. The corpus consists of six interviews (with a total duration of about 3 h) in which she answers questions about the political climate and the challenges of North Macedonia in the last couple of decades. The selected interviews are all conducted in English as they are aimed at international audiences and they all fit into the time frame from 2017 to 2021, which practically overlaps with the final years of Shekerinska’s long-standing political career. This study uses a descriptive qualitative research design and focuses, first, on ascertaining the presence of different types of figures of speech in her answers (e.g. metaphors, simile, metonymy, synecdoche, personification, rhetorical questions, idiomatic expressions, proverbs, etc.); then, on identifying the pragmatic functions they perform in the context in which they are used, and finally, on establishing an interface between the figurative language use and the political ideology propagated by this politician. The results point to an extraordinarily resourceful use of a wide spectrum of figurative devices, skillfully intertwined with fact-based political discourse, primarily for addressing highly sensitive political issues, but also for driving important political points home; also, for gaining support from both the domestic and international community regarding the political ideology of this political figure as well as for enhancing the criticism addressed to political adversaries with an additional layer of creative flourish.

Psychological responses to political hostility: a study on aggression, bullying, and well-being in Qatar

ABSTRACT In 2017, the Gulf crisis led to a blockade that severely restricted Qatar’s air, land, and sea access. This political crisis had far-reaching consequences, particularly affecting cross-national families and children. This qualitative analysis explores the effects of the blockade’s political instability on individuals and families, specifically for Qatari citizens married to non-Qatari spouses and their cross-national children. Applying the General Aggression Model and Social Learning Theory, we interviewed 24 individuals residing in Qatar from nations directly affected by the crisis (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). Two main themes emerged: first, the characteristics of aggressive and bullying behaviour, and second, the impacts on the well-being of cross-national families. The results showed that Qatari women and their children suffered disproportionately due to gender-based citizenship rights issues. The impacts on their well-being included heightened anxiety, depression, feelings of danger, uncertainty, and division within individuals, families, and communities. Recommendations include increasing collaborative efforts between governments, educational institutions, and community-based organizations, which are crucial to addressing aggressive and bullying behaviour across all age groups fostering a more harmonious and resilient society.

Efekt mrożący

The chilling effect is a real threat to freedom of expression and unfettered public debate. It occurs when, as a result of the conduct of public authorities, an individual decides to refrain from freely exercising his or her rights, even though they have not been formally restricted or taken away. This self-restraint is caused by fear of the negative consequences of freely exercising one’s rights, which leads the individual to calculate whether the action in question, although formally lawful, is cost-effective. Such a fear should be real and therefore at least substantiated by objective factors. The account is less obvious if the renunciation of the exercise of rights is based on a threat that is unreal or vague. In legal discourse, the chilling effect is also identified, not necessarily correctly, in different contexts. First, it is sometimes recognised in cases of pressure by political authorities on independent judges. Second, it is claimed in relations between non-state actors, especially between government-sponsored private agencies that launch smear campaigns against political opponents, or between internet platforms and their users. Such use of the chilling effect doctrine may be intellectually appealing, but ultimately dilutes its meaning. It is much easier to identify a chilling effect when it is assumed to be the consequence of a flaw in the design of a legal provision than when it is alleged to result from acts of application of the law. In the latter case, the concept of chilling effect seems to serve two main purposes: the criticism of bad practices on the part of public actors, and the strengthening of the persuasiveness of judicial decisions that employ the concept. Its usefulness for legal analysis is therefore limited.

Stitch incoming: political engagement and aggression on TikTok

ABSTRACT This study examined how TikTok use relates to political engagement and aggression. Due to different imagined audiences , we expected TikTok use to be more strongly related with contentious political engagement than use of other social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. In order to test these expectations, we conducted a survey with 700 U.S. adults. Results show that TikTok, Facebook, and Twitter use is positively related to online political engagement, but the nature of this engagement is very different. Facebook use is related to talking politics with friends and family, while TikTok use is related to talking with those who hold opposing views. Further, Facebook use is negatively related to agreeing that it is acceptable to be aggressive in political conversations, while TikTok use is positively related to believing that it is acceptable to be aggressive and to holding feelings of hatred for political opponents. Twitter use is unrelated to these outcome variables. These results suggest that TikTok users are more likely to partake in derisive and contentious political engagement.

How warm are political interactions? A new measure of affective fractionalization.

Affective polarization measures account for partisans' feelings towards their own party versus its opponent(s), but not for how likely partisans are to encounter co-partisans versus out-partisans. However, the intensity of out-party dislike and the probability with which this comes into play both determine the social impact of cross-party hostility. We develop an affective fractionalization measure that accounts for both factors, and apply it to longitudinal survey data from 20 Western publics. From this perspective, countries with fewer dominant parties may be more harmonious because partisans have lower probabilities of interacting with political opponents. At the party level, partisans of smaller, more radical parties are particularly troubled because they strongly dislike out-partisans and have few co-partisans. Affective fractionalization has increased in most Western publics over time, primarily because of growing party-system fragmentation.

Hate Speech in American Political Discourse: A Functional-Linguistic Analysis

The aim of this paper is to analyse how the concept of hatred is represented in American political discourse. The problem of intensified hate speech requires thorough linguistic investigation as political discourse is becoming more openly conflictual. The empirical material of this study comprises public speeches by American politicians, politically themed analytical articles in the press, and posts and statements of politicians in social networks. The main method used in the analysis is the functionallinguistic analysis of discourse. The author analyses confrontational communicative tactics, e.g. discrediting, scorn, insult, accusation, mockery, etc. The objects (or victims) of such rhetoric are political opponents of the subject of speech, who may have different points of view, religious beliefs, cultural backgrounds and social status. Hate speech, which is an extreme form of how the concept of hatred can be verbalized, may be directed against confessional and ethnical groups. The paper places a special emphasis on the communicative goals and intentions of discourse participants who resort to hate speech. Usually it is the desire of the subject of speech to publicly demonstrate disrespect, mock, belittle the authority of opponents and favourably represent oneself in the eyes of the audience. The rhetoric of hatred comprises such typical means as negative and offensive epithets and metaphors; hyperbolic, comparative, rhetorical and lexical constructions with the pragmatical meaning of irony. In situations when the subjects of speech emphasize the difference between them and their opponents (national, religious, social etc.), the functional fields of the concept of hatred and the “in-group/out-group” concept may overlap. In these cases, the communicative goal of the speaker is to alienate political opponents and emphasize their dissidence in a negative way.

Is intellectual humility polarized too? A systematic examination of intellectual humility, political orientation, and strength of political belief

ABSTRACT Intellectual humility (IH) appears to offer one solution to political hostility. However, research on how IH associates with political orientation and the strength of their political belief is mixed, leaving open the possibility of two potential confounds in research on the benefits of intellectual humility: people who are high in intellectual humility might have different ideological beliefs or might be less polarized than those who are lower in intellectual humility. In the current research, we address this concern in a large, pre-registered, and systematic analysis of nine samples (N = 3,248). We find that IH is generally unassociated with the strength of people’s political belief but is reliably associated with a more liberal political orientation. We discuss implications of these findings for research in this domain.

USAID Democracy Promotion as a Possible Predictor of Revolutionary Destabilization

Abstract USAID democracy promotion programs might not only influence the democracy levels, but also increase the likelihood of revolutionary uprisings in the recipient states. Democracy promotion can strengthen political opponents of the incumbent regime via support for alternative media, civil society groups and political parties, on one hand, and, on the other, support democratic institutions that in contrast to autocracies are more tolerable towards political opponents and thus allow more room for expressing political will on the streets. Since democracy aid targets “democrats” who are less prone to exert armed violence, the authors expect it to be associated with unarmed uprisings. Using logit regression models, they find that the volume of the USAID financial democracy assistance appears to be a significant predictor of unarmed revolutionary destabilization, but its effect is relatively weak. Some particular sub-sectors of democracy assistance have an impact on revolutionary destabilization, namely: civil society, elections, human rights and media assistance. These correlations might be partly explained by the fact that USAID assistance goes disproportionately to anocracies. This aid tends to increase the probability of revolutionary destabilization in two ways – directly (through strengthening political opponents of the regime) and indirectly (through increasing the number of anocracies in the world).

Populism Unveiled: Mechanisms and Triggers of Political Violence

In recent decades, there has been a widespread surge of populism worldwide. Populists strategically utilize media platforms to highlight the suppression of ordinary citizens by political authorities and the perceived unethical behaviors of political elites. Populists, who employ political slogans advocating for the interests of the common masses and eliminating corrupt elites, have swiftly garnered widespread support. However, the ascent of populists to positions of authority has coincided with a notable increase in political violence. While scholars have extensively elucidated definitions and classifications of populism, and numerous theoretical studies have analyzed factors contributing to the emergence of populism in different geographical areas, there remains a shortage of unified comprehension regarding the mechanisms through which populism incites political violence. This paper investigates the various trajectories of political violence triggered by populism through a comprehensive literature review and comparative analysis. The study contends that political violence is incited by populism through two distinct pathways, as evidenced by an analysis of incidents occurring in various regions under populist regimes. The first pathway sees political violence initially prompted by the consolidation of power and the repression of political adversaries by populist leaders. The second pathway involves the xenophobic ideology of populism intensifies conflicts between native citizens and foreign immigrants, thereby heightening the likelihood of political violence.

Роль Наркомнаца в организации национально-государственного устройства РСФСР в 1917–1923 гг.

The article deals with the activities of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities of the RSFSR in 1917–1923. The prerequisites for the creation of the body, its organizational structure, goals and objectives of activities, powers are studied. It is concluded that this commissariat played a significant role in shaping the national-state structure of the RSFSR. It is noted that his work is traditionally highly valued in science. As a result of the analysis of the reasons for the effectiveness of the work of the People's Commissariat for National Affairs, it is concluded that such results were achieved, largely due to the well-thought-out policy of the Soviet government in relation to the peoples of the RSFSR. The proclamation and implementation of the principles of self-determination and equality of nations within the framework of the new federation made it possible to provide the Bolsheviks with significant support from numerous ethnic groups and lead them to victory over their political opponents.

‘Law and (dis)Order’: security rhetoric in the Irish Free State, 1922–1937

ABSTRACT This article examines the use of ‘law and order’ rhetoric by governing parties in the Irish Free State. In the post-Civil War period, Cumann na nGaedheal governments devised and implemented a series of public safety measures to combat real or perceived security threats, accompanying each with robust and repeated justificatory rhetoric. As this article illustrates, such rhetoric was also utilised as a means by which to burnish Cumann na nGaedheal’s image as the protectors of ‘stability’, and to cast doubt on the commitment of political opponents to the maintenance of order should they ever achieve power. In addition, the article counters the often implied view that whereas Cumann na nGaedheal (and later Fine Gael) embraced a reputation as the party of ‘law-and-order’, Fianna Fáil eschewed such nomenclature. Rather, it shall be demonstrated that despite variations in tone, once in power, Fianna Fáil adopted a broadly similar approach to the utilisation of ‘law-and-order’ rhetoric.

This Is Not About Nex Benedict

ABSTRACT Drawing connections between the social and political antagonisms of anti-trans violence, racism, and colonialism, this intimate and reflective piece considers the impact that the death of Nex Benedict has had on the author as well as on some of the author’s patients. Nex’s death and the hostile context in which they died both sparked and evoked multiple mournings, anxieties, and grief processes, illustrated here through clinical vignette and personal disclosure and grounded in psychoanalytic theory.