Political Dissatisfaction Research Articles

Ideological voting for radical right parties in Europe

The aim of this research is to examine to what extent the electoral support for radical right parties (RRPs) is driven by ‘policy voting’ and to compare this support with that of centre-right parties. Using the European Election Study 2019, we focus on six party systems: Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom. Our analyses reveal that party preferences for RRPs are better explained by policy considerations than by other alternative explanations (e.g. by ‘globalization losers’ or ‘protest voting’). Additionally, the results show that although preferences for both party families are mainly rooted in ‘policy voting’, notable differences emerge when looking at the role of specific policy dimensions. Overall, these findings suggest that the support for RRPs cannot be understood fundamentally as a mere reaction against economic pauperization or political dissatisfaction but instead as an ideological decision based on rational choice models.

The Internet and the Limping Truth

Constitutional doctrine protects false speech and even lies in certain circumstances. The doctrine also endorses non-literal interpretation of speech that can cause statements implying factual assertions to be treated as non-factual, non-actionable opinion. These doctrines limit the degree to which laws may counteract falsity. Historically publishers exercised discretion, through ex ante review, that limited the dissemination of false statements, including those that would have been protected speech had they been published. As the Internet has lowered the cost of disseminating expression, speech has been democratized radically. Many more people say many more things, many of them untrue. 47 U.S.C. Section 230(c)(1) provides that social media outlets are not publishers of user-generated content, thus immunizing such outlets from, for example, tort liability such as for defamation. Outlets' terms of use typically grant them discretion to decline to post or to remove content. These outlets thus exercise ex post the sort of discretion formerly exercised ex ante by traditional media outlets. Political dissatisfaction with the exercise of such discretion has led to calls to treat social media outlets either as state actors or common carriers. Neither option is desirable. Social media outlets do not satisfy the legal criteria for state action, and misguided claims that Section 230 gives them a subsidy provides no logical basis for treating them as state actors. Nor is common carrier treatment warranted. If the relevant market is publicly available expression, as critics seem to assert, then even the largest outlets have no plausible claim to market power. Normatively, to treat social media outlets as either state actors or common carriers would subject them to falsity-protecting constitutional rules and thus lead to a net increase in harmful conduct--lies, among other things. Public discourse would be better served by allowing media outlets to continue to refine their content moderation practices, as private speech outlets historically have done.

The Rise of Populists and Decline of Others: Explanation of Changes in Party Support in the Czech Republic

ABSTRACT The paper analyzes long-term effects of changes in external conditions on the support for populist parties in the Czech Republic. The results confirmed importance of political dissatisfaction for the rise of populist parties but are limited by the presence of other protest parties. While the evidence of the effects of the economic context is mixed, results of our analysis indicate the importance of time and of election campaigns in particular. All in all, our results point to the importance of the campaign dynamics, the party system setting, and incumbency in assessing support for populist parties in Central Europe and elsewhere.

A new Iberian exceptionalism? Comparing the populist radical right electorate in Portugal and Spain

ABSTRACT Since their transition to democracy in the 1970s, Spain and Portugal have been ‘immune’ to the success of populist radical right (PRR) parties. This exceptional situation, however, came to an end: Chega’s leader, André Ventura, was elected in the Portuguese parliament, while VOX has become the third most voted political party of Spain. Using new online survey data from the Spanish and Portuguese national elections in 2019, we find that the Iberian PRR electorate is mostly in line with the characteristics of the PRR electorate in Western Europe when it comes to socio-demographics, political dissatisfaction, media diet, and the rejection of immigration and feminism. Interestingly, however, the support for Chega and VOX does not come from economic losers of globalization. Finally, both parties capitalize on country-specific issues —national unity in Spain and welfare in Portugal— but PRR parties might struggle to establish themselves within the party system of the two Iberian countries.

A insatisfação política e a ascensão do autoritarismo-populista: uma análise da América do Sul e da Europa

Nos últimos anos, observamos a ascensão de atores autoritário-populistas tanto em democracias consolidadas quanto naquelas ainda não bem estabelecidas. Neste artigo, analisamos se o aumento da insatisfação política explica o crescimento do apoio político ao autoritarismo-populista na América do Sul e na Europa. Nossa hipótese é que um ambiente de insatisfação política explica o fenômeno. Analisamos os casos da Alemanha, Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Espanha e Holanda. Utilizamos dados do World Values Survey e dos resultados eleitorais de 2005 a 2019. Verificamos que há uma desconexão entre o apoio à democracia e a insatisfação com o seu desempenho, o que favorece, em alguns casos, o crescimento do autoritarismo-populista. Além disso, os eleitores desses atores são os mais insatisfeitos. Porém, a hipótese é parcialmente confirmada, já que a insatisfação é insuficiente para explicar todos os casos, sendo outros fatores, como o conflito de valores e a cultura política, mais pertinentes.

ALMANYA'DA POPÜLİST ALTERNATİF: DIE LINKE ÖRNEĞİ

2007 – 2008 finansallaşmış kapitalist krizin patlak vermesinin ardından Avrupa’da ulusal hükümetlerin kemer sıkmaya yönelmesi, ağır sosyal sonuçlara yol açmıştır. Bu durum, birçok ülkede siyasi memnuniyetsizliği tetikleyerek güçlü radikal partilerin ortaya çıkmasına zemin hazırlamıştır. Ne var ki kemer sıkma çağında radikal aktörlerin eş zamanlı yükselişine rağmen siyasal partiler çalışmalarında radikal sol partilerin atılımı büyük oranda göz ardı edilmektedir. Bu boşluğun doldurulması için makalede, Almanya’da Die Linke örneklemi üzerinden radikal solun evrimi, yapısal politik ekonomik ve politik kurumsal koşullar, toplumsal protesto dinamikleri ve toplumsal hareketlilik açısından analiz edilmektedir. Die Linke’nin yükselişinde ülkede sosyal adalet talebinin temel temsilcisi haline gelerek parti sisteminde SPD’nin geleneksel olarak işgal ettiği yere kaymasının kritik bir rol oynadığı savunulmaktadır. Bununla birlikte 2013 sonrasında radikal sağ AfD’nin kamusal söylemi ve parti rekabetini belirleyen konuları tayin etmesiyle birlikte radikal solun atılım dönemi sona ermiştir

¿Quiénes cambiaron de partido durante la Gran Recesión? Un estudio de 12 países de Europa occidental

Los niveles de volatilidad electoral tras la Gran Recesión de 2008 fueron récord en la mayoría de los países de Europa occidental. Entre las principales causas de esta inestabilidad electoral destacan el desarrollo negativo de la economía, la crisis de los partidos tradicionales y el cambio de los temas de competición política. A nivel individual, se desconoce qué factores propiciaron que los electores cambiasen de preferencia partidista después de la Gran Recesión. Además, en general, se sabe poco sobre las diferencias entre un elector estable y uno volátil. Este estudio de 12 países de Europa occidental tras la crisis económica concluye que el modelo del votante económico no siempre explicó el cambio de preferencia partidista después de 2008, mientras que los sentimientos de desafección política se encuentran entre las principales razones para entender el cambio de partidos entre elecciones.

Las causas de las protestas pacíficas en América Latina

América Latina experimenta una creciente actividad en movimientos sociales. El artículo indaga las condiciones del contexto nacional y los factores individuales que explican las protestas pacíficas en la región. Tras examinar las teorías e investigaciones previas sobre las protestas en el mundo, el trabajo contrasta las principales hipótesis causales en el caso latinoamericano desarrollando modelos de regresión lineal jerárquica o multinivel a partir de datos de la encuesta Latinobarómetro y otros indicadores políticos, económicos y sociales de 18 países de la región. El principal impulsor individual del activismo pacífico es el interés por la política, seguido por un proxy de valores emancipatorios y el nivel educativo. Los niveles de desarrollo y democracia del país y el grado en que los valores mencionados están difundidos en la sociedad aumentan el activismo y amplifican el impacto de esos impulsores individuales. El uso de redes sociales ejerce un influjo relevante. Por sí sola, la insatisfacción personal y política tiene efectos débiles o no significativos. Las protestas pacíficas de los latinoamericanos reflejan el ascenso de ciudadanos empoderados y más exigentes, a medida que el desarrollo económico y humano avanza en la región. Lejos de perturbar la democracia, este proceso tiende a profundizarla.

Why and when do citizens support populist right-wing social movements? Development and test of an integrative theoretical model

ABSTRACT What are the microlevel mechanisms that explain citizens’ support of populist social movements? We address this question by focusing on the ‘PEGIDA’ (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident) protest groups in Germany, which became particularly prominent by attracting large numbers of attendees in street protests during the years 2015/16. We develop and test an integrative theoretical model that points to the key roles of anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction as mediators linking subjective socioeconomic deprivation with citizens’ support of the ‘Pegida’-movement. Equally important, this model holds that citizens’ political dissatisfaction moderates the nexus between anti-immigrant attitudes and support for ‘Pegida’. The results based on data from seven cross-sectional general population surveys provide clear support for these predictions. Combined, these efforts help to advance scholarly understanding of not only why, but also how and under what conditions non-activist citizens support anti-immigrant collective action as exemplified by the ‘Pegida’ movement.

Challenging complacency in construction management research: the case of PPPs

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are joint ventures in which the private sector works in partnership with government bodies to deliver public sector projects with the intention to deliver them more quickly, efficiently and with better value for money. They are also one of the most contentious project delivery mechanisms to have been mobilised in recent decades. Research has demonstrated the lack of realised value within many such projects, yet construction management academics continue to examine ways of increasing, implementing and optimising this approach in practice, even encouraging its adoption worldwide despite growing social and political dissatisfaction. Here, we go beyond what we see as myopic construction management perspectives, placing our body of work firmly within wider economic, political and social contexts. We challenge uncritical academic compliance with a process that demonstrably contributes to economic inequalities, opportunism and exploitation. We confront the lack of criticality in construction management research of PPPs, and call for construction management academics to broaden their research focus and engage in more robust critique and analysis of construction systems, as they are realised in practice.

Can’t change my political disaffection! The role of political disaffection, trust, and resistance to change in internet voting

PurposeThis paper aims to put the focus on political disaffection that the voters may have and its impact on their resistance to the changes, thereby influencing intention to adopt Internet voting. This study also examines the impact of perceived risk and technological skills on the trust of the Internet technology and informal networks, such as social influence and media influence on the trust of the government.Design/methodology/approachTo empirically test the model, an online survey is administered to 851 people who are eligible to vote.FindingsThe findings show that positive media influence and social influence also significantly impact trust in government but trust in government does not necessarily decrease resistance to change and positively impact intention to adopt eVoting. Also, the resistance to change was shown to significantly influence the intention to use Internet voting.Research limitations/implicationsA primary potential limitation of this study is the use of convenience sampling, which may lead to self-selection bias that limits the generalization of our research to all citizens.Practical implicationsGovernment institutions, as well as political parties, can use the findings of this research to understand how political dissatisfaction such as apathy and cynicism can increase trust in technology and lead to higher participation in online voting.Originality/valueWhile the focus on previous literature has been heavily on security and system requirements, this study expands existing research by exploring voting habits, political disaffection, the resistance of change and informal influence on intention to use online voting.

The Social Movement of Alexei Navalny

The article focuses on the major stages of development of Alexei Navalny’s social movement in 2017-2019 on the federal and regional levels. The movement aims to form and mobilize the supporters of Alexei Navalny in the movement’s structural elements to carry out opposition activities in large cities. In the long-term, the movement wants their activists to participate in regional and local elections. The movement is developing in the context of slowly growing socio-economic and political dissatisfaction in the country and the government’s aim to restrict public expression of concern. The conditions make the movement look for new formats of manifesting people’s discontent. The weakness of the movement is Alexei Navalny’s non-eligibility to hold the office and absence of Navalny’s political party. His image of a “fringe” and “protesting” politician created by the television media prevents him from becoming a respectable and worthy of support politician for the majority of Russians.

“He’s Not One of Them!” Antiestablishment Supporters of Populist Governments in Bolivia and Ecuador

Populist discourse is conceptually antiestablishment. Extensive research has found that political dissatisfaction is associated with populist support. However, most tests have been in cases with po...

Between strategy and protest: how policy demand, political dissatisfaction and strategic incentives matter for far-right voting

AbstractWhat attracts voters to far-right parties? Emphasizing the repercussions of far-right parties' past achievements on the mobilization of voters' electoral demand, this paper develops an argument of context-dependent strategic far-right voting. Far-right parties seek to mobilize on a combination of demand for nativist policies and anti-establishment protest sentiment. Their capacity of doing so, however, critically depends on the strategic incentives they supply. My findings from a comparative analysis based on six waves of the European Election Study show that far-right parties' past attainment of legislative strength boosts the credibility of their policy appeal and broadens the scope of their protest appeal whereas their participation in government jeopardizes their capacity to mobilize on popular discontent.

A Micro-Scale Approach to Ethnic Minority Concentration in the Residential Environment and Voting for the Radical Right in The Netherlands

Abstract Existing empirical research on the link between ethnic minority concentration in residential environments and voting for the radical right is inconclusive, mainly due to major differences between studies in the spatial scale at which minority concentration is measured. We examined whether the presence of non-western ethnic minorities in the residential environment, measured at four spatial scales, is related to individuals’ intention to vote for the Dutch Party for Freedom (Dutch acronym PVV). We combined individual level survey data and register data, and we used multi-level structural equation models to examine possible mediation by anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction. The models show different effects at different scales. At the micro scale (100 by 100 meter grids) we find a curvilinear effect: individuals with 30–50 per cent non-western minorities in their direct living environment are most likely to report to vote for the PVV. At higher spatial scales (up to municipal level) we find that the higher the proportion of non-western minorities, the more likely individuals are to report to vote for the PVV. These effects can however not be explained by anti-immigrant attitudes or political dissatisfaction. We even find that at the micro scale the presence of non-western minorities is related to less anti-immigrant attitudes.

Rejecting constitutional reform in the 2016 Italian referendum: analysing the effects of perceived discontent, incumbent performance and referendum-specific factors

ABSTRACT The rejection of constitutional reform in the 4 December 2016 referendum resulted in the resignation of Matteo Renzi. Numerous potential explanations could be offered for this result, reflecting political discontent, dissatisfaction with the governing coalition or disagreement with the specific referendum proposals. An analysis of the referendum results can thus serve to identify which of these aspects led to the ultimate rejection of the proposed constitutional changes and the incumbent prime minister. Secondary analysis of Italian Election Study (Itanes) data investigates the impact that interest in the referendum had on these factors. Results indicate that assessments of incumbent performance and referendum-specific factors had a stronger effect than political dissatisfaction. The evidence also suggests that assessments of incumbent performance and referendum-specific factors had even stronger effects among those particularly interested in the referendum.

Italy 2018: The Perfect Populist Storm?

The March 2018 Italian general elections caused a sea change in the political system. The article seeks to analyse the elements of novelty present in the vote and the subsequent political developments by focusing on the victorious parties, the Lega and the Five-Star Movement. Their ideological appeal is placed within the context of the Europe-wide surge of populist parties, but also traced back to the long-term determinants of political dissatisfaction characterising modern Italy. While emphasising the magnitude of the populist wave, the balance of the evidence from the first months of the populist coalition government suggests that the liberal democratic institutions are not under imminent threat.

Did Austerity Cause Brexit?

This paper documents a significant association between the exposure of an individual or area to the UK government’s austerity-induced welfare reforms begun in 2010, and the following: the subsequent rise in support for the UK Independence Party, an important correlate of Leave support in the 2016 UK referendum on European Union membership; broader individual-level measures of political dissatisfaction; and direct measures of support for Leave. Leveraging data from all UK electoral contests since 2000, along with detailed, individual-level panel data, the findings suggest that the EU referendum could have resulted in a Remain victory had it not been for austerity. (JEL D72, F15, F60, H53, I38)

Are the Supporters of Populist Parties Loyal Voters? Dissatisfaction and Stable Voting for Populist Parties

AbstractScholars of electoral behaviour regularly link political dissatisfaction to two types of behaviour: voting for populist parties and unstable voting behaviour. It is therefore not surprising that the electorates of populist parties are generally assumed to be rather volatile. In this article, we argue that this is not necessarily the case – in particular in a context of increasingly strong and viable populist parties. We make use of data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project to show that voters for populist parties are neither more nor less volatile than voters for mainstream parties. Political dissatisfaction among voters for populist parties even increases the likelihood of stable voting for populist parties. The supply of populist parties further conditions the stability of the populist vote, as voters in systems with established populist parties are more likely to vote stably for populist parties. Finally, we find that in a context of strong and stable populist parties, the effect of political satisfaction on vote switching is somewhat reduced.

La insatisfacción con la democracia en México (2014-2017)

Al evaluar el desempeño de la democracia, los ciudadanos le dan importancia a su experiencia con los resultados que proporciona el sistema. Sin embargo, como se argumenta en este artículo, un predictor igualmente importante de la satisfacción ciudadana con el régimen es la calidad de los procesos democráticos. Para probar esto, el presente estudio analiza el caso de México, un país en el que la insatisfacción con la democracia ha alcanzado uno de los niveles más altos en América Latina. El análisis aporta evidencia de que la insatisfacción política en México se explica solo en parte por una percepción desfavorable de la situación económica y de los servicios públicos. Para dar cuenta del descontento ciudadano en este país de una forma más completa y coherente, la opinión de los ciudadanos acerca de la efectividad de la legalidad y la calidad procedimental del régimen democrático resulta ser un factor crucial.