Policy Of Non-recognition Research Articles

Implementation of Non-Recognition Policy in the Post-Soviet Space: Cases of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova

The author analyzes the policy of non-recognition implemented by Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova in relation to the separatist con fl ict territories. The policy of non-recognition designates both the refusal to recognize de facto existing political entities, and other measures that accompany it and are associated with the need to build relations with self-proclaimed states. Comparative analysis of the three depicted models shows that, despite the permanent essence of the non- recognition policy, there are signi fi cant di ff erences in its practical implementation. Although the policy of non-recognition does not bring the parent states closer to resolving the con fl ict, in its various manifestations it can both contribute to the gradual disappearance of enmity and intensify existing contradictions. Factors that in fl uence non-recognition politics include political narratives surrounding the con fl ict, dominant state-building patterns, patron state policies, perceived identity threats, experience of historical trauma and war.

Partnership Distributions: Options for Reform

The rise of new forms of limited liability business entities, coupled with changes in the federal tax rules for classifying such entities, has precipitated an influx of businesses that are treated as partnerships for federal tax purposes. Some commentators welcome what they perceive as a process of de facto integration that promises eventually to make an elective regime of pass-through taxation available for all nonpublicly-traded businesses. To the extent that the partnership model, as currently embodied in Subchapter K, represents a coherent and well-functioning body of law, such a sanguine view may be justified. However, as the preliminary work of the American Law Institute (ALI) project on pass-through entities suggests, the intricate provisions of Subchapter K may be "dysfunctional" in important respects.Indeed, Subchapter K may have reached an important turning point. The 1954 Code drafters stressed simplicity and flexibility while allowing partners considerable latitude in allocating tax benefits and burdens among themselves. With the benefit of hindsight, this tolerant attitude toward shifting tax consequences among partners appears to undermine broader tax policy goals. Concern about the flexibility of partnership taxation-particularly the ease of entry and exit-has led some partnership reformers to veer in the opposite direction. Recent legislative attempts to confine the broad nonrecognition policy of section 72 1-especially with respect to contributions of property with built-in gain or loss, disguised sales, and distributions of previously contributed property-signal Congressional ambivalence about Subchapter K's unrivaled flexibility.

Domestic and international sovereignty: the disputes over the status of Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus, and Taiwan

Sovereignty is a key concept in discourses regarding the disputes over the status of Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus, and Taiwan. It helps the conflicting parties to communicate their positions regarding their preferred status of the contested territory and indicates the limits that negotiations are not permitted to transgress. It frames a parent state’s policy of nonrecognition, intended to prevent permanent separation, and a contested state’s policy of recognition to prevent its own subordination. In defending their claims, the conflicting parties do not enjoy equal conditions. The contested state’s lack of recognition weakens its position in the international order. The parent state will make use of this asymmetry at the international level to weaken the contested state’s claims to sovereignty. The contested state, by contrast, will try to achieve legal recognition through international agreements. This is possible with regard to competences that it exercises as a de facto territorial authority. This means that the control a contested state exercises at the domestic level is transferred to the international level, to strengthen its claims to sovereignty. The distinction between domestic and international sovereignty is useful for analyzing these strategies and conflict dynamics. This article analyzes disputes over the status of a breakaway territory in terms of these two categories. In particular, it explores how nonrecognition policies by parent states and recognition policies by contested states at the international level affect the latter’s sovereignty at the domestic level.

A Struggle over Recognition and Nonrecognition: The Internationalization of the Abkhaz State University

AbstractThe Abkhaz State University (ASU) is internationally isolated, despite its cooperation with universities in Russia. Georgia combines its refusal to recognize Abkhaz statehood with a policy of nonrecognition of its university, which sets the direction for other countries. But the Abkhaz policies of nonrecognition are also to be taken into account. Abkhazia opposes any form of internationalization of the ASU generating closer ties with Georgia. The article examines how the Georgian and Abkhaz policies of nonrecognition hamper the internationalization of the ASU within the European educational space. It explores a conflict on recognition and nonrecognition of status and identity, where status does not refer exclusively to statehood. In the field of higher education, European integration involves a large number of state and nonstate actors in 49 countries and a wide variety of forms of recognition and nonrecognition, ranging from the certification of individual qualifications and the publication of lists of unrecognized universities, to the setting up of joint educational programs. This integration process is largely state driven but based on the principle of the institutional autonomy of universities. Using the ASU as a case study, the way that policies on nonrecognition affect status in the field of higher education is examined.

Comparative Analysis of Indonesia and Turkey’s Foreign Policy Toward The Middle East: A Case of Palestine Issue

This paper aims to perform a comparative analysis of Turkey and Indonesia's foreign policy on Palestine Issue. It applies neoclassical realism as one of foreign policy theory. It discusses changing dynamics and influential factors shaping Turkey and Indonesia’s Palestine policies at the unit and systemic level of analysis. It summarises that the factors of leaders' perceptions upon international systemic changing trends and pressures, state power have become influential factors. During AK Party's eras in Turkey, its domestic politics has undergone domestic transformations namely public opinion and civil society's roles that influence to the foreign policy, the emergence of civilian leader as a new actor of foreign policy, leader factors, an increase of Islamist factor, the Israel-Palestine conflict perceived as the heart of regional instability resulted in Proactive Foreign policy including in the settlement of Palestine issue. Meanwhile, after reform eras in Indonesia, anti-colonialism spirit of 1945 Constitution has been continued as the historical background of Indonesia's engagement. Besides, an increase of Islamist factor in domestic politics namely Islamist-oriented aspirations in domestic public opinion, muslim groups as a moral force, an increasingly role of Islamist parties, and new Indonesia's international orientation and identity at SBY's tenure have affected a continuity of non-recognition policy towards Israel and supporting Palestine in accordance with two-state solution. As well as Indonesia's democratised foreign policy has been conducted through various diplomatic efforts.

State and Public Diplomacy of the RSFSR / USSR in 1917-1925: Principles of Interaction

The article discusses the main goals and principles of Soviet public diplomacy in 1917-1925 in the RSFSR / USSR. The main directions, forms and methods of cooperation with foreign countries in the context of the policy of recognition and non-recognition of the RSFSR / USSR are highlighted. The article analyzes the cooperation of the state with various public and governmental organizations, as well as individuals.

The US refusal to recognize China (1949-1979)

This paper scrutinizes why the United States (US) refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for three decades after its foundation by Mao Zedong in 1949. The traditional national character influenced the position of the US toward the PRC, especially in light of its abhorrence of communism and its doctrine to contain its spread. For both domestic and foreign reasons, the US argued that China was not a responsible member of the world community, and thus deserved no recognition. For more than two decades, the US applied political, economic and diplomatic pressure on the United Nations to refuse the PRC the right to represent China. The situation only began to change when the Nixon administration realized how its non-recognition policy was becoming increasingly outdated and self-defeating, given China’s growing importance in international affairs. This paper will use a variety of primary and secondary sources to analyze the US policy of non-recognition of the PRC, providing the background for a better comprehension of contemporary Sino-American relations.

Refugees from the Baltic states in the camps of Central and Western Europe in the context of the American «non-recognition policy» in the second half of the 1940’s

The article covers one of the problematic aspects of US-Soviet relations in the first post-war years - the issue of «the controversial refugees», appeared due to non-recognition by the United States of Soviet annexation of the Baltic States and the conduct of forced repatriation by the USSR. American diplomacy during the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt adhered to the «non-recognition policy», concluded in the Stimson Doctrine (January 7, 1932) and the Welles Declaration (July 23, 1940). However, declared foreign policy acts did not lead to a decrease of the level of official relations with the aggressor state. At the same time, the official Washington did not consider the Balts as citizens of the USSR and retained the diplomatic missions of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the United States. Under the administration of President Harry Truman, the course of non-recognition of the «voluntary entry of the three Baltic republics into the USSR» continued.It was researched that after the end of the Second World War, refugees and displaced persons from the Baltic-occupied Soviet Union were located in Austria, Italy, France and Switzerland. The large contingent was within the limits of the American occupation zone in Germany, the vast majority were immigrants from Lithuania. The attention was paid to the factors that led to the mass exodus of Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians from 1943 to 1944. It is outlined the special place of American diaspora civic organizations in collecting of financial assistance and coordination of their activities with the US State Department. It is also defined the role of representatives of the Catholic and Protestant national churches.The researched paper contains an analysis of correspondence between the leaders of the American diplomatic missions of Lithuania (Povilas Žadeikis), Latvia (Alfrēds Bīlmanis) and Estonia (Johannes Kaiv) with the US Department of State. Baltic diplomats constantly emphasized the need to confront the Soviet propaganda machine with regard to the denial of the «voluntary Sovietization of the Baltic» and the practice of sweeping accusation of refugees in «betrayal» and «cooperation with the Germans». In turn, they pointed to the need to extend the jurisdiction and mandate of international organizations on Baltic refugees, to determine their legal status and to prevent their recognition as the Soviet citizens in some European countries.The article deals with the documental potential of the diplomatic correspondence of the US foreign policy department. Attention is drawn to the analysis of this issue in the research works of foreign historians.During the first post-war years in matter of refugees’ problem and displaced persons, it was found that American diplomacy was in search of consensus between humanitarian reasons for ensuring human rights to asylum and the fulfillment of allied obligations in course of the activities of Soviet repatriation missions. However, «Baltic refugees» were a separate category, which Americans tried not to extradite from their occupied territory to the USSR cause of their non-recognition policy of Soviet annexation of Baltic states.

Proclaiming Principles: The Logic of the Nonrecognition of the Spoils of War

Starting with the Stimson Doctrine in the early 1930s, the international community has adopted, on numerous occasions, a policy of nonrecognition in response to international boundary changes gained through the use of force. Why? This article uses an investigation of the Manchurian Crisis to reconceptualize nonrecognition as a symbolic sanction against a norm violation. Existing accounts often view symbolic sanctions like nonrecognition as either failed attempts at coercion or mere posturing for domestic audiences. Against this view, this article explains how collective symbolic sanctions create or recreate common knowledge of what the rules of international behavior are in the face of a lack of effective rule enforcement. This common knowledge, or intersubjective understanding, shapes future expectations and interpretations. Nonrecognition of the spoils of war is thus a means to reinforce the norm of nonaggression within international society by reestablishing a shared valuation of the rule.

Not-recognizing policy within the minority EU members - Challenge for Kosovo’s Integration and Regional Peace-building

Act of Recognition is the matter regulated by international law. After declaration of independence, Kosovo’s path toward EU integration is going to be problematic for Kosovo institutions and challenging for EU foreign policy. Even though Kosovo was recognized by major international actors as sui generis case, some of them see this case as precedent and harmful for supposed developments within their jurisdictions, especially by 5 EU not recognizing countries. The article aims to justify the proclamation of independence by Kosovo institutions and to analyze the possible negative effects deriving from non-recognition policy for Kosovo and its new fragile democracy, hampering the democratic peace. The policy of minor EU member states, contesting Kosovo’s statehood based on the assumption that the act of recognition will open a dangerous path for secession-minded national minorities in their own countries, taking into account that through (non)recognition, states attempt to continue or change the existing order at international relations. Postponing Kosovo’s recognition by the rest of EU members will accumulate negative potentials within the new state, with possible consequences for the region.

United States policy toward Estonia and the Baltic states 1918–1920 and 1989–1991 [Kokkuvõte: Ameerika Ühendriikide välispoliitika Eesti ja Balti riikide suhtes 1918–1920 ja 1989–1991

The following paper deals with US policy toward the Baltic states at two different time periods (1918–20 and 1989–91) and by two very different presidents (Woodrow F. Wilson and George H. W. Bush). The first period represented the time that saw the emergence of the United States on the world stage. Woodrow Wilson seemingly advocated self-determination as was understood by a number of his advisers at the Peace Conference, but eventually decided to support the unity of Russia as part of an anti-Bolshevik policy. During the second period, George H. W. Bush negotiated a settlement to end another conflict, the Cold War. While self-determination of the Baltic states (on the basis of the US non-recognition policy) was not of prime importance for the US, it nevertheless was brought up at very summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and came to be linked to the resolution of economic issues between the two major powers.
 Ultimately the restoration of independence was decided by developments in the Soviet Union, but US policy made the Baltic question an international issue and helped resolve it peacefully.

Principled Pragmatism: The Eastern Committee of German Economy and West German–Chinese relations during the early Cold War, 1949–1958

AbstractThis article focuses on the interplay between the political authorities and economic actors in the Federal Republic of Germany in the process of establishing relations with the People's Republic of China after 1949. Within this framework, the article will assess the role played by the Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft (Eastern Committee of German Economy), a semi-official organization recognized by the West German government. Both the ability of German economic actors and China's urgent need for economic contact with the West caused German-Chinese trade relations to circumvent the strict non-recognition policy followed by the West German government. The article also argues that, while economic relations heralded official recognition of the People's Republic of China by other Western European countries, in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany a division between the two spheres was finally accepted by the major actors involved, and ended only after the change of attitude imparted by the Nixon presidency in the United States during the early 1970s.

Valstybių pripažinimo ir valstybių teisių perėmimo sąveika

The first question arising once a new international law subject appears (or declares to be appeared) in international community is the question of recognition, and the question of succession of states is in some instances dependent on the former and comes afterwards. It is obvious that these two institutes of international law are closely interrelated, and in some cases the undertaking to solve the questions of succession has been considered as one of the recognition prerequisites.Recognition plays a major role when solving questions of succession, especially depending on the type of creation of a new state. Once the creation of a new state is peaceful and agreed, in most cases the recognition follows shortly, and the questions of succession are being agreed upon afterwards without problems. If the creation of the state is not agreed with a predecessor state (usually in cases of secession), it might take time to solve the questions of recognition as well as those of succession, therefore, the recognition of a predecessor state plays a major role. In cases of continuity of the predecessor state (which is not a form of succession, but rather the further existence of the predecessor state), recognition – initially by other subjects of a certain legal relation – successor states – has a constitutive meaning. It must be noted that if an entity declares itself to be independent or incorporated into another country on the basis of a breach of international law, other subjects of international law usually use the non-recognition policy. In this case, no state succession should take place.

No Lost Chance in China: The False Realism of American Foreign Service Officers, 1943-1945

AbstractThis article reexamines the question of whether a chance was lost for the U.S. government to develop relations with Mao's China in the 1940s. I focus on John S. Service and John Paton Davies, seeking along the way to illuminate the ideological roots of the Truman administration's nonrecognition policy toward China. I argue that proponents of the “lost chance” thesis have misapplied the concept of realism in diplomacy, since realism is primarily concerned with power and security, not ideology such as democracy. These proponents overlook the assumptions on which American diplomats and leaders operated. The China Hands assumed that the Chinese Communists were social democrats, not revolutionaries controlled by Stalin. Dean Acheson embraced Davies's assumption that Mao would reassert nationalism upon assuming power and might still be drawn away from Moscow toward Washington. Far from being realists, they were deeply ideological. They disagreed with their domestic rivals within a liberal consensus. None of them had the intention of recognizing a Communist government in China. This study reveals how unspoken shared assumptions shaped not only the dynamics of American policymaking toward China during World War II and in its aftermath, but also the work of many historians who have written about the “lost chance.”

China in International Society Since 1949: Alienation and Beyond (review)

Reviewed by: China in International Society Since 1949: Alienation and Beyond Yafeng Xia (bio) Yongjin Zhang . China in International Society Since 1949: Alienation and Beyond. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998. viii, 345 pp. Hardcover $69.95 , ISBN 0-312-21540-1. Since the early 1980s, scholars have been introducing different approaches to the study of Chinese foreign policy. Utilizing the "international society" model associated with the English school as his theoretical framework, Yongjin Zhang has written a fine book on the international relations of the People's Republic of China (PRC). This is a continuation of his endeavor to interpret China's international behavior in the tumultuous world of twentieth-century politics, begun in his 1991 book China in the International System, 1918-1920: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery. "The central argument of this study," Zhang declares of the work under review here, "is essentially a simple one. The international relations of the People's Republic of China is a saga of the isolation-alienation-socialisation-integration of China in international society since 1949. This saga is the continuation of a historical search by both China and the wider world for mutual accommodation" (p. 244 ). Zhang challenges the conventional wisdom that China was in isolation from the international system during much of the Cold War. He contends that China did not isolate itself, but rather was alienated from international society. To Zhang, "alienation" means that cordial relations between states "have been broken and friendly feelings toward each other have been turned into bitterness and hostility" (p. 44). "Alienation," therefore, is often accompanied by "violent confrontations and conflicts" (p. 45). Zhang advances a clear thesis that he develops consistently throughout his analysis. He discusses in detail the five stages of China's gradual alienation from international society, starting in 1949, when the PRC, as a revolutionary state, was mistrusted by the United States, which took measures to alienate the emerging new regime in Beijing from the international community. The United States adopted a policy of nonrecognition of "Red China" and urged its Western allies to take the same position. The second phase was dominated by the Korean War, which "created lasting enmity and apprehension between the two nations." The United States instituted a full trade embargo against the PRC and blocked its membership in the United Nations. The PRC was further alienated from an international society dominated by the United States. The third phase was "marked by crises and border wars in and around the PRC" (p. 53). The two Taiwan Strait crises in 1954-1955 and 1958, the Tibetan rebellion in 1959, and the Sino-Indian border war in 1962 only served to alienate the Beijing regime further from international society at a time when many regarded the PRC as an expansionist power. The fourth phase was dominated by the Sino-Soviet [End Page 495] polemics of the 1960s, which ended with the PRC's alienation from the Soviet bloc. This process came to a climax in the late 1960s during the Chinese Cultural Revolution when the PRC "called for and set out to establish an international united front against both superpowers, urging revolutionary changes to the international system" (p. 57). Thus, the author argues, the period from 1949-1970 "was characterized by the exclusion, more than seclusion, of China from the universal international organisations and international institutions" (p. 57). As international society refused to accord the PRC legitimacy as a normal player in the system of states, Beijing constantly posed itself as a challenge to the existing international system. Just as Zhang attributes China's alienation largely to "systemic factors," he claims that the de-alienation of China in international society since the early 1970s has depended "as much on the systemic changes as on the changing orientation of China's international policies" (p. 58). As the international system became more accommodating to the adversarial relationships between ideologically hostile power blocs, China's perception of changes in the international system led China to reconsider its international strategy. Structural change at the United Nations brought China into the world organization, thus beginning the acceptance of China into international society. China's de...

A ‘sort’ of self-denial: United States policy toward the Antarctic, 1950–59

AbstractUnited States policy toward the Antarctic in the 1950s culminated in the treaty that bears the continent's name — the same treaty that continues to govern relations in the far south. Washington succeeded in promoting the admirable objectives of scientific advancement and international cooperation. In doing so, it also forfeited what many officials believed to be the more important objective of formalizing a national sovereignty claim to halt further erosion of the rights associated with its mammoth expeditions. Trapped by having repeated their non-claimancy, nonrecognition policy, which Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes had announced in 1924, US officials scrambled for alternatives. They finally chose to formalize their policy-making paralysis, rather than a claim, by proposing a treaty that called for a political status quo moratorium, in accord with the Chilean Escudero Plan. That decision impressed some experts as unwise, but it was sufficiently expedient to win the signatures needed for ratification.

Het Belgisch beleid inzake de erkenning van China

On the basis of a chronological approach of the decision-making process with regard to the recognition of the PRC we concluded in an analytical part that the decision-making process was merely of the "hypo-institutional" type. Afterwards, we examined the effectivity of the Belgian policy in comparison with the international scientific literature on recognition and with the practice of other small European states. We concluded the non-recognition policy had been ineffective. The relation between "hypo-institutional" decision-making on the one hand and ineffective public policy on the other hand is just one element within a broader research-project : "The effectivity of public policy according to type of decisionmaking".

The Policy and Politics of Non-Recognition

The Policy and Politics of Non-Recognition

The United States and the Chinese People's Republic

Journal Article The United States and the Chinese People's Republic: The Non-Recognition Policy Reviewed Get access Michael A. Guhin Michael A. Guhin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 45, Issue 1, January 1969, Pages 44–63, https://doi.org/10.2307/2612620 Published: 01 January 1969

Woodrow Wilson's Use of the Non-Recognition Policy in Costa Rica

Of all Woodrow Wilson's foreign policies, none is more deserving of criticism than his non-recognition policy. This policy, initiated by the President within a week after his accession to office on March 4, 1913, in response to the news of violent revolutionary disturbances in Mexico and Nicaragua, was primarily predicated on Wilson's assumption that the best way to prevent the recurrence of revolutions in Caribbean nations would be to warn all would-be revolutionists that they could expect no political or financial support from the United States. Ultimately he hoped that he could end the threat of revolution and induce all Latin American nations to abide by constitutional and democratic forms of government.