Policy Disagreements Research Articles

Ready for Their Close-Up? Ideological Cues and Strategic Televising in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Federal judges offer several stated purposes for pursuing greater publicity in the judicial process, including improving the quality of reporting and educating the public. They are less candid about other goals that influence steps they take as they shape how they are perceived, including strategically using publicity to secure others’ compliance, neutralize policy disagreement, or build legitimacy. Despite these judicial goals, scholars of American politics know little about how federal judges shape the public’s perceptions. We leverage a notable exception to federal judges’ aversion to publicizing their proceedings by analyzing how Ninth Circuit appellate judges respond to media requests to televise oral arguments. We find that the televised representation these judges present to the public is a selective one: decisions to televise appear to be motivated by portraying unanimity, while at the same time avoiding the spread of perceived politicization among the public. These results shed much-needed light on how federal judges navigate a publicity-politicization tradeoff through their strategic use of televising.

Breaking the Barriers to Innovation in Kidney Care: The Time is Now.

Breaking the Barriers to Innovation in Kidney Care: The Time is Now.

The 2021 Norwegian election

The Storting election of September 2021 signalled the end of eight years in office for of the centre-right government led by Premier Erna Solberg. During this period, different constellations of parties had been in power: first the Conservatives and the Progress Party, later the Liberal Party and finally the Christian Democrats joined the coalition. However, due to policy disagreements, particularly with the Liberals and the Christian Democrats, the Progress Party left the coalition in 2020, just a year ahead of the election. Climate and immigration policies were at the core of the disagreements. At the 2021 election, the five centre-left (or red-green) parties won the majority of seats and votes, but did not succeed in establishing a majority government. Instead, the Labour Party and the Centre Party formed a minority government, supported by the Socialist Left Party. The overriding issue at the election was climate and environmental concerns. Somewhat unexpectedly, the Green Party did not fare particularly well at the election, and fell short of the four percent threshold for adjustment seats by the tiniest margin. Data from the Norwegian National Election Study shows that the Greens only received 11 per cent of the climate vote, while more than 60 per cent voted for other red-green parties. Social inequality was also high on the agenda, in particular by left of centre voters. The number of effective parties rose from 5.5 to 6.4, increasing the fractionalisation of the party system, which may be worrying if it continues.

Factional Model-making in China: Party Elites’ Open Political Contention in the Policy Process

AbstractThis article introduces the analytical framework of “factional model-making” to describe and explain the open political contention of Chinese Communist Party elites in the policy process. Party elites undertake factional model-making to express policy disagreements and to signal their power to the regime: by flouting the Party line publicly without punishment, they show that they can influence the Party line and therefore pressurize the regime into acknowledging their position in the opaque power structure. This article chronicles the history of factional model-making from the 1960s to 2012 and examines in detail the making of Henan's Nanjie Village into a re-collectivization model by the Party's left. The process began in the 1990s and ended soon after Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, which prompted Nanjie's patrons to recast the village as a Party model trumpeting Xi's line. The suppression of factional model-making under Xi is discussed in the conclusion.

Intergroup threat and affective polarization in a multi-party system

What explains affective polarization among voters and societal groups? Much of the existing literature focusing on mass political polarization in modern democracies originates in the US, where studies have shown that, while ideological separation has grown, political conflict increasingly reflects social identity divisions rather than policy disagreements, resulting in affective polarization. We focus on explaining such polarization in a multi-party context. Drawing on social identity theory and intergroup threat theory, we hypothesize that individuals who perceive an intergroup threat show stronger intergroup differentiation and increased affective polarization. We analyze the influence of perceived threat on affective polarization drawing on two large-scale representative surveys in Sweden (N = 1429 and 1343). We show that individual-level affective polarization is related to perceived intergroup threats among the voters in both studies, measuring affective polarization using social distance, negative trait attribution, and party like-dislike ratings.

Evaluating diffuse support for state high courts among individuals with varying levels of policy agreement

AbstractBackgroundCourts are unusually vulnerable governing institutions that rely upon deeply seated public support and notions of institutional legitimacy to flourish and remain policy‐relevant. This diffuse support allows courts to be viable policy entities while simultaneously issuing edicts that are counter‐majoritarian. A recent debate centers on whether policy disagreement affects members of the public's diffuse support stores for the nation's High Court.ObjectiveHere, we investigate whether policy disagreement between citizens and their state courts influences public perceptions of state court legitimacy (diffuse support). We also examine how those who disagree with state court policy making (policy “losers”) assay the legitimacy of their state courts differently than those who feel that their policy preferences are promoted by state courts (policy “winners”).MethodsWe draw data from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), where researcher‐specific content for 1000 respondents allowed us to ask a number of questions about citizens’ perspectives on their state high courts. We employ Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to analyze these citizen views of state legal institutions.ResultsWe find that policy agreement is quite relevant to citizens’ levels of diffuse support for their state courts and that the relative drivers of policy “winners” and “losers” assessments of their courts’ legitimacy do evince overlap but in important ways are distinct.ConclusionOur findings provide important insight on how citizens view courts and the law. Our investigation also sheds light on the dynamics of citizen disagreement with government outcomes and perceptions of institutional legitimacy.

The imaginary of a modern city: Post-politics and Myanmar’s urban development

Theories of ‘post-politics’ provide a lens through which to analyse contemporary urban development. Yet empirical studies examining this ‘age of post-politics’ are few, especially outside of Europe and North America. This article examines the promise and limits of notions of post-politics through the case of planning for New Yangon City, a multi-billion dollar urban development in Myanmar (Burma). While the 2021 military coup has now made the future of the project uncertain, our research conducted in 2019 revealed similar dynamics at play to those described more broadly in the literature on post-politics. We highlight familiar processes of delegation of decision-making, a proliferation of governance actors and an individualisation of policy issues. What is distinctive in Myanmar is the way a coalition of elite decision-makers have diluted and defused policy disagreements through the construction of a utopian vision of a modern international city. We see this imaginary of the modern city as a tactic to support the broader efforts of depoliticisation. This diverges from arguments that the imagination of social change is curtailed through the pragmatic post-political notion that ‘there is no alternative’. Instead, in the context of New Yangon City, utopian vision is integral to depoliticisation and limiting dissent. We conclude that attention to processes of depoliticisation is crucial in relation to mega project planning in Asia, and that a productive way forward for studies of urban development is not wholesale acceptance or dismissal of the notion of post-politics, but robust engagement with its critiques and promise.

The Ideological Structure of Municipal Non-Ideology.

This paper explores the structure of elite disagreement about the ideological or nonideological character of municipal politics. I propose two possible relationships between a representative's own ideology and their beliefs about the character of municipal politics: an "ends-against-the-middle" pattern, in which ideologues on the left and right embrace an ideological vision of municipal politics, whereas moderates insist that municipal politics is not ideological; and an "asymmetric visions" pattern, in which individuals on the left endorse an ideological view of municipal politics and those on the right oppose it. I use new survey data from more than 800 mayors and councillors in Canada to assess these possible relationships. While both are supported by the data, the asymmetric visions pattern is the stronger of the two: the nonideological view of municipal politics is most firmly embraced by municipal politicians of the moderate right, while the ideological vision is most common among representatives on the left. This pattern, I argue, is in keeping with a century of municipal political history and should be incorporated into our theories of municipal elections, representation, and policy disagreement.

Concentrating in a Loud Crowd: Sonographer Perceptions of Policies to Limit Distractions in Obstetric Sonography Examinations

Objective The objective was to identify sonographer perceptions of distractions and policies for improving obstetric sonography examinations (OBUS). Materials and Methods A survey, with closed- and open-ended questions, was sent to OBUS practicing members of the Society of Diagnostic Medical Sonography (SDMS). Descriptive analyses, including frequency distributions overall and by various groups, were performed. Chi-square analyses were used to examine the relationships between categorical variables, including level of perceived distraction, and concordance with policies. Results Of the 3525 accessed e-mails, 807 responses were eligible for analysis. Over half (62%) of the respondents reported no observer policy. Sonographers reported strong agreement with observer policies and desired limits on observers. Policy disagreement themes included number of observers, children observers, patient satisfaction, and patient truthfulness. Most sonographers reported existence of (85%) and strong agreement (97%) with recording policies. Disagreements centered around the strictness of policies, policy enforcement and notification, distraction of recording, medico-legal issues, and finding anomalies while being recorded. Conclusion Discrepancies existed between policies regarding observers and recording in OBUS. Sonographers both desired and agreed with protocols to limit distractions. However, there were concerns regarding stringency, notification, and enforcement of policies. Further research is needed to determine if policies help limit distractions during OBUS.

The Nature of Affective Polarization: Disentangling Policy Disagreement from Partisan Identity

AbstractDemocrats and Republicans clearly dislike one another. Yet, scholars debate whether policy disagreement or partisan identity, per se, drives interparty animus. Past studies suggest the relationship between partisanship and interpersonal affect is spurious, driven by inferred policy preferences. We argue, instead, that policy preferences signal partisan identity when the parties' stances on an issue are well‐known. Using a nationally representative survey and four preregistered experiments, we disentangle the effects of policy disagreement and partisan identity on interpersonal affect. Our findings suggest that partisan identity is the principal mechanism of affective polarization, and that policy preferences factor into affective polarization largely by signaling partisan identity. However, our results also affirm that policy disagreement in itself drives interpersonal affect. This provides evidence that partisanship reflects an emotional attachment to a political party, not merely a running tally of rational considerations.

No effect of partisan framing on opinions about the COVID-19 pandemic

ABSTRACT Media critics frequently complain about the tendency of reporters to cover political news using partisan conflict or partisan game frames, which describe policy disagreement as sites of partisan conflict where the parties can score “wins” or “losses.” Such frames, thought to decrease trust and increase partisan polarization, may be particularly dangerous when used in the coverage of public health crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic. We report a survey experiment where 2,455 respondents were assigned to read coverage of the pandemic that was framed in non-partisan terms, in terms of partisan conflict, or as a game where one party was winning and the other losing. Contrary to expectations, we find no effect of these frames across a broad range of opinions about and actions related to the pandemic, with the exception of a small negative effect of partisan game-framed coverage on the desire to consume news about the pandemic. These results suggest that partisan framing may not have negative effects during a public health crisis or, alternately, that such effects are difficult to detect in real-time using traditional survey experiments.

When the potted plants are missing: how justice attendance at the State of the Union influences the solicitor general

ABSTRACT Among all the institutions or organizations who give file briefs or petition the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Solicitor General (SG) may be the most powerful. It is well documented that petitions with the support of the SG are much more likely to be granted certiorari, and, if the SG advocates a decision, the Court is likely to decide in a likeminded manner. We examine what influence judicial attendance at the State of the Union (SOTU) may have on the activity of the SG Others have explored the motivating factors for justice attendance; these studies have found policy disagreements and public opinion play a role. We argue and find that the SOTU is a valid public announcement of the president’s agenda and when there are fewer justices in attendance, the SG is motivated to file more amicus briefs. Our findings line up with these expectations.

Politics, audience costs, and signalling: Britain and the 1863–4 Schleswig-Holstein crisis

AbstractAudience costs theory posits that domestic audiences punish political leaders who make foreign threats but fail to follow through, and that anticipation of audience costs gives more accountable leaders greater leverage in crisis bargaining. We argue, contrary to the theory, that leaders are often unaware of audience costs and their impact on crisis bargaining. We emphasise the role of domestic opposition in undermining a foreign threat, note that opposition can emerge from policy disagreements within the governing party as well as from partisan oppositions, and argue that the resulting costs differ from audience costs. We argue that a leader's experience of audience costs can trigger learning about audience costs dynamics and alter future behaviour. We demonstrate the plausibility of these arguments through a case study of the 1863–4 Schleswig-Holstein crisis. Prime Minister Palmerston's threat against German intervention in the Danish dispute triggered a major domestic debate, which undercut the credibility of the British threat and contributed to both the failure of deterrence and to subsequent British inaction. Parliament formally censured Palmerston, contributing to a learning-driven reorientation in British foreign policy.

Keeping America: Wealth Concentration and the Need for Repaired Revenues and Basic Income

This paper comes from a place of deep concern about wealth concentration in the United States of America, but also from a place of hopeful expectation. When I started my research in mid-2019, I did not imagine preparing the final draft during a global pandemic which has already killed nearly half a million people. Unfortunately, the spread of COVID-19 exposed the fragility of the U.S. economy. While necessary, shelter in place orders suspended the livelihoods of millions without savings for unexpected expenses, and caused weekly unemployment claims to jump 1,068%. In a strong demonstration of its legal and moral duty to ensure the wellbeing of the American people during times of crisis, the U.S. federal government quickly passed the $2.2 trillion “CARES” Act, the largest appropriations bill in its history. Despite longstanding policy disagreements over using public funds for public welfare, a crisis compelled Congress and the White House towards unprecedented compromise on multiple stimulus bills in only a few weeks.The same resolve will be necessary to combat wealth concentration. Deconcentrating wealth will not be easy. Effective solutions will require engaging unpopular topics like tax policy, estate planning and trust provisions, property law, and tedious readings of 18th century political theory. While few are qualified to propose solutions at this intersection, and even fewer are willing to undertake this Sisyphean task, it is as necessary as it is difficult. The federal government must find the political courage to reverse half a century of policies creating unsustainable levels of wealth concentration by repairing revenues and guaranteeing Americans a basic income. The estate planning and private client bar should help.

Congressional Oversight Revisited: Politics and Procedure in Agency Rulemaking

Scholars have long acknowledged that legislators strategically employ procedure to advance policy preferences. But evidence for this view is confined to the lawmaking process, omitting an essential function of elected representatives: oversight of executive policy making. We argue that ex post procedural oversight is also driven by policy disagreement. We demonstrate this by analyzing congressional participation in US Environmental Protection Agency rulemaking from 2007 to 2017. Using the content of public comments and commenters’ political contributions, our study is the first to locate the spatial position of rulemaking proposals. We find that the more ideologically distant the agency proposal, the more likely a request for documents, additional hearings, or more time for public participation. Moreover, these requests are likely to parallel substantive criticisms and be concentrated among members with experienced staff. These findings imply that—beyond setting the baseline rules of bureaucratic policy making—well-resourced elected officials leverage procedure during policy implementation.

How do regional parties influence foreign policy? Insights from multilevel coalitional bargaining in India

When and how do regional parties influence foreign policy in federal democracies with multiparty coalition governments? The existing literature has focused on situations of foreign policy disagreements between subnational parties and the central government in multinational states. By contrast, we argue that under varying conditions, central governments either decide to accommodate the preferences of small regional parties when designing foreign policies, or co-opt these regional parties to push their own foreign policy agenda. Some scholars looked at the role of decentralization and federal power arrangements in providing more control to political sub-units over the external affairs of a state. Other studies showed that certain coalition-building configurations facilitated the inclusion of the concerns of small parties in the foreign policy debate. Bridging these two literatures, we argue that both structural and agential conditions behind regional and national coalition building processes—visible in federal settings—affect foreign policy-making in different ways, and not necessarily toward disagreement and obstruction. To illustrate these hypothesized mechanisms, we look at two case studies in the Indian context: the role of regional parties in the debate over the US–India nuclear deal of 2008 and the role of regional parties in shaping India’s Sri Lanka policy from 2009 to 2014.

Legislative Constraints, Ideological Conflict, and the Timing of Executive Unilateralism

Whether unilateral actions are used to circumvent legislative policy preferences is a central question in separated systems. Although executives have incentives to engage in this behavior, US policymaking studies offer little evidence of it. We explore how intervals between legislative sessions can create such opportunities, depending on interbranch policy disagreement and legislatures' special session powers. During intersession breaks, executives issue more executive orders under divided government relative to unified, but only when legislatures lack control over special sessions. Executives facing legislatures with such powers cannot exploit these breaks. We demonstrate these dynamics in the US states. Additionally, we find governors “wait out” legislatures without special session powers, engaging in more unilateral activity following the adjournment of sessions. This study has implications for understanding the conditions under which legislatures can constrain executive power and the balance of power in separated systems.

Gulliver at the Crossroads: America’s Strategy During the Global Transition

The article discusses the modern stage of international relations as a transition from the US-centric to another, polycentric world order. America has many opportunities to infl uence the formation of the future world order, which it uses for maintaining a dominant role in the world. However, America also has severe weaknesses for making the global transition; the main one considers the psychological unpreparedness of the country’s establishment for a change in the global role of the United States. The country’s transitional situation gives rise to an identity crisis, accompanied by the most heated debates in the political class regarding the development of foreign policy and strategy. In the variety of positions and narratives of the American strategy, one can distinguish (1) proponents of the liberal globalization and maintaining America’s dominant position, (2) advocates of superpower status and resource dominance by coercion and (3) realists or those who call for building a new global balance of power and coordinating the US interests with other powers. This identity crisis is associated with the globally changing position of the country that has been at the center of the international system for the past 75 years. The American political class was never monolithic before and even during the Cold War, representing a range of diff erent foreign policy ideas and positions. However, foreign policy disagreements previously did not question the national identity and fundamental value of the country. For America, these values were associated with a global role in promoting the ideals of freedom and liberal democracy, previously underpinned by confrontation with the USSR. The disappearance of the Soviet power strengthened the position of liberal globalists and enhanced the strategic narrative of the global promotion of American values. The diff erence of the contemporary period is that nationalists and realists no longer accept the arguments of liberal globalists, resulting in a deepening of ideological polarization in the political class and society. The domestic ideational and political crisis splits the elites, delays the transition to a new world order, and makes it impossible to pursue a sound international strategy. Such a strategy will be the result of both an internal political struggle and a response of the country’s leadership to the processes of pluralization and polycentrism developing in the world.

Start Small and Think Big to Rebuild the U.S.-Turkish Relationship

The U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship has been key to the success of NATO and the transatlantic community. However, due to various policy disagreements U.S.-Turkey relations are at a new low. As with all relationships in life, the U.S.-Turkey relationship ebbs and flows and requires hard work, patience, and understanding. This is why policymakers from both sides should not be ready to throw away seven decades of close cooperation for seven or so challenging years in the bilateral relationship. Instead of looking for the silver bullet to solve the major problems, policymakers need to focus more on smaller confidence building measures to rebuild the relationship.

The Federal Judiciary’s Role in Drug Law Reform in an Era of Congressional Dysfunction

While state drug law reform is moving apace, federal drug law reform has moved much more slowly. Many, including the Judicial Conference of the United States and the United States Sentencing Commission, have urged Congress to enact substantive federal drug law reform for years. But Congress has not acted. As a result, the federal system continues to single out drug offenses for harsh treatment at the bail stage and the sentencing stage—the front end and back end of the federal mass incarceration crisis. In this paper, we argue that federal judges have a critical role to play in future federal drug law reform in light of Congress’ long-standing failures to meaningfully change the laws. At the front end, judges should encourage the release of more people on bail by closely scrutinizing prosecutors’ motions for temporary detention and giving little weight to the Bail Reform Act’s presumption of detention. Data shows that the statutory drug presumption is overbroad and does a poor job of determining who is a risk of flight or a danger to the community. At the back end, judges should issue categorical policy disagreements with the drug sentencing guidelines and the career offender sentencing guideline using the Supreme Court’s blueprint in Kimbrough v. United States. Judges should issue sentences below these guidelines because they are not based on empirical evidence, over-punish drug offenses, and result in racial disparities. At both ends, judges should rest their decisions on the evidence that the drug presumption, the drug sentencing guidelines, and the career offender sentencing guideline are flawed. While judicial action is not a cure for Congressional inaction, it would send a clear message from one co-equal branch of government to another that substantive reform is urgently needed.