Policies Of Perestroika Research Articles

Perestroika and public choice: The economics of autocratic succession in a rent-seeking society

Mikhail Gorbachev has been widely acclaimed in the West for his reform policies of perestroika and glasnost. Until quite recently, many pundits boldly declared that Gorbachev's USSR was actually embarked on an abandonment of the communist economic system, and would eventually embrace real democracy and a free market (see, for example, Muravchik, 1990: 25). While recent developments have rendered these forecasts obsolete, the Gorbachev round of reforms surely represents an interesting problem in public choice. For purposes of analysis, we propose to concentrate on the period from Gorbachev's succession as Chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985 until the end of 1989 (with occasional references to more recent events). This is the period during which both perestroika and glasnost grew to dominate the political scene in the USSR. Moreover, the first five years of Gorbachev's rule represented the period of purportedly dramatic "liberalization" within the Soviet system. Perestroika appeared to be a truly radical series of reforms, a triumph of ideals over rent-seeking. Our purpose in the present paper is to argue that, upon closer examination, the succession of Gorbachev in general and the perestroika/glasnost "reform" program in particular bear a close resemblance to other, earlier Soviet government policy adjustments which followed shifts in the top leadership. Gorbachev's behavior as a "reformer" over the period 1985 to 1989 can be ex-

The Democratic Revolution in the USSR: Can the System Cope with Pluralism?

Gorbachev's democratic revolution in the former Soviet Union fundamentally reshaped not only the political process of his nation but redefined the very nature of the nation itself. Begun as an attempt to implement guided reforms and to develop a political formula that would undercut conservative opposition, the interlocking policies of perestroika, glasnost, and demokratizatsiia acquired a life of their own, setting loose political and social forces that escaped the control of leadership at all levels. The abolition of the monopoly role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the creation of democratically elected legislatures at all levels, and the proliferation of political parties and interest groups have created a truly pluralistic political system. But with such pluralism comes the need to develop mechanisms that will mediate among newly empowered political forces, finding some common ground of compromise and adjustment. In the Soviet context, four such sources of mediational activity are possible: (1) a reformed Communist Party might transform itself into a broad pro-reform coalition; (2) the newly formed political parties and groups might form broad coalitions; (3) the legislature(s) might develop mechanisms fostering the emergence of consensus; and (4) coordination might be provided by the all-union and republic presidencies. Yet even before the coup attempt, little progress had been made in finding widespread consensus, and the post-coup dispersal of power to the republic level has made the system even less likely to produce such agreement.

No One Can Isolate Us, Save Ourselves. Self-Isolation is the Ultimate Danger

The politics of thinking is widespread in the world beyond the former USSR; but within the country, old stereotypes of behavior and consciousness are still at work. Covert and now overt resistance as well stifle reforms; ghosts of the internal and the external enemy have been reanimated; the dispute over a historical path, over a system of values, is turning into direct political confrontation, into struggles for power. In this atmosphere of disorder and discord, there are clashes and recourse to violence and lawlessness. Reactionary forces attack foreign policy and reject values common to all mankind: for principles they substitute postulates of class struggle. Long aware of increasing danger, I think that if extraordinary measures are not taken our newborn democracy with all the achievements of perestroika will be lost. And if that should happen, how could we speak of new thinking? No doubt I have made many mistakes in my life. In recent years, thinking over what I have lived through, I keep coming to the conclusion that I could have avoided many errors if I had adhered more consistently to my principles. For perhaps I had greater experience than any of my colleagues, greater knowledge of the real conditions in the republics, of popular sentiment, including national feelings. I know that ethnic stereotypes and misconceptions are powerful and attractive to many; politicians must reckon with them. In my former position I tried to do so; but in that capacity, I was captive of the enormity of my task and was not, I would say, consistent in implementing my views. I say this not because I wish to vindicate myself nor because I blame anyone else. I was responsible, regardless of whether this or that decision was or was not within my competence. After the events in Tbilisi, a parliamentary commission declared it unacceptable to use military force against the people in a society of democratization and glasnost'. But, although I agreed with the commission, others tried to refute it by essentially justifying violence and placing blame on the victims of punitive action. I consider such views a relapse to old ways, an attempt to curtail and replace the policies of perestroika. A state needs order, especially a state like ours which is now in severe crisis. But I am categorically opposed to the use of the army for

Antonio Gramsci: architect of a new politics

Dante Germino's biography of the Italian communist and political theorist Antonio Gramsci offers a major reassessment of this important twentieth-century thinker. Germino analyses Gramsci's remarkable life as well as his extensive oeuvre, from the early Turin articles to the meditative Prison Notebooks. Gramsci saw society as composed of a small but powerful political center and a large body of emarginati, marginalized people at the periphery of society who are denied access to traditional positions of power. That vision led Gramsci to concentrate on the significance of the common as he developed his theory of the political organisation of society. The persistent theme in Gramsci's work is how the ordinary man thinks, feels, and endures, and how the course of political institutions is shaped by the efforts of the marginalized to erode the boundaries of the center. Gramsci's approach is perhaps best expressed as a reunion of philosophy and experience and a revaluation of the quotidian. Gramsci's new politics of inclusion anticipated by well over a half-century the recent epoch-making developments in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. His antiauthoritarian leadership style as secretary of the Italian Communist party in the 1920s prefigured Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost. Gramsci's insistence on the international Communist movement's openness to new social formations at the grass roots is supremely relevant to developments in Romania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland, where forces hitherto kept at the margins of political life by ossified Communist-party structures have burst on the scene with unprecedented vitality. Gramsci refused to revere Marx as a shepherd with a crook. Equating history with the rhythm of liberty, he emerges as a prophetic voice in the desert of a bureaucratic and dogmatic communism. The dramatic recent changes in the Italian Communist party under Achille Ochetto also owe their ultimate inspiration to this diminutive, hunchbacked theorist-practitioner from Italy's periphery. Germino's compelling study of Gramsci's personal life and intellectual development offers fresh insights into Gramsci's work that will be of interest to all students of cultural and political theory. Of particular interest is his extensive consideration of the preprison writings both in their own right and for the light they cast on the Prison Notebooks.

Papers, Periodicals and Perestroika:

This article is divided into two sections which, when combined, provide an overview of issues and trends in Soviet serials publishing during the Gorbachev period. The first section identifies socio-political developments and the role of the media, specifically journals and newspapers, under the policies of perestroika and glasnost. This discussion provides the context for an analysis in the second section of publication figures and prices for a range of serials in the social sciences and humanities.

Perestroika and its implications for computer security in the U.S.S.R.

I n the Soviet Union today there is a confluence of profound political, economic and social change, largely set into motion by the ascendency of M&hail Gorbachev. His policies of perestroika and glasnost are supposed to propel the Soviet Union into a new age, one hopefully in which the Soviets will attain some semblance of economic parity with the West. In fact, however, the economic stagnation of the 1970s and 1980s not only lingers, but is worsening as change and the inevitable conflict to which change gives rise take their toll on the economic system. Most Soviets realize that there is no turning back from economic reform.

The Soviet Economic Role in Asia and the Pacific: A Business Perspective

The Soviet Union's attempts to develop new global relationships are not limited to arms control, Soviet-U.S., or Soviet-European relations. As an integral part of its global strategy, the USSR is working to expand its political and economic relationships in Asia and the Pacific. The question of the Soviet economic role in the Pacific needs to be seen against the backdrop of Soviet domestic policy. For the Soviet Union, economic and political issues are inextricably linked, with domestic economic pressures currently driving Gorbachev's twin policies of perestroika and glasnost. In particular, the widespread shortage of even the most basic consumer goods and the continued deterioration of the Soviet economy and standard of living now threaten the foundations of the Soviet state itself. Soviet economic problems are compounded by the comparative strength of the European, American, and Pacific economies, which are steadily widening the gap in relative economic capabilities. The USSR's urgent need for capital and technology from the West to support economic restructuring explains much of the Soviet interest in rebuilding its foreign economic relationships. Arguably, however, Gorbachev's vision goes further, embracing a new structure of international economic and political relationships beyond the ideological divisions of the Cold War. Gorbachev's policies of political and economic reform within the USSR therefore provide the critical foundation for present efforts to revitalize its commercial and economic relationships overseas. The foreign business community looks at economic relations with the Soviet Union pragmatically. The basic questions are (1) is there business

Social Pedagogy The Al'met'evsk Variant

Our life today is breaking up many dead schemes and stereotypes, demanding endeavors that are alive, based on the actual needs and possibilities of society. Fundamentally new approaches to extramural upbringing are being developed by the Shkola-mikroraion [microdistrict school] VNIK [Vremennyi nauchno-issledovatel'skii kollektiv; interim scientific research collective, set up to explore new approaches in education under the perestroika policy—Tr. Ed.] under the supervision of Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences Valentina Bocharova.

Regime considerations of the Soviet Union

Abstract Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost suggest that the Soviet Union is in the midst of significant change. Whether this change constitutes a transformation from tyranny, or rule above law, into a regime responsible to law remains a critical issue. In order to gain insight into the nature of change of tyrannical regimes in general, and the Soviet Union in particular, this article returns to the classical writings of Xenophon and Aristotle. Gorbachev's policies are examined in light of the observations about ancient tyrannies. The concern is how ancient tyrannies attempted to preserve themselves against both external and internal threats. This study was originally prepared for the National Defense University Symposium on National Security Policy, November 1989, Ft. McNair, Washington, DC. All views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government.

Third World Communism in Crisis: Castro's Last Stand

Third World Communism in CrisisCastro's Last Stand Carlos Alberto Montaner (bio) In October 1987, when no one was yet predicting the imminent collapse of the world's Marxist regimes, I spoke at a symposium in New York entitled "Will the Communist States Survive: The View from Within." My lecture assessed the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Castro regime at the time. I noted eight sources of weakness: 1) the general feeling of "temporariness" and need for change then current in Cuba; 2) the abysmal economic situation; 3) the government's patent exhaustion; 4) the African wars in which Castro had entangled his country; 5) the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev and his policy of perestroika; 6) the absence of a truly hegemonic communist party; 7) the devastating effect of Radio Martí; and 8) Cuba's geographical distance from the USSR. On the other side of the balance, I pointed out five things that were helping to reinforce Castro's position: 1) The USSR's continuing support; 2) what at that time still seemed like the irreversible character of communist revolutions; 3) the regime's highly efficient apparatus of repression; 4) the international perception of Cuban communism as an immovable phenomenon; and 5) the absence of a viable alternative in the opposition. That was my assessment in the autumn of 1987. Now, nearly three years later, it is interesting to observe that of the eight weaknesses, six have intensified, while only one (the African entanglement) is on the [End Page 71] way out and the other (the distance from the USSR) has, curiously, begun to militate in favor of Castro rather than against him. As for Castro's strengths, there is no doubt that they have all diminished somewhat since 1987. Soviet economic and political support have clearly declined and may dip still further; communism is in retreat over most of the world and in many places has collapsed forever; the Cuban state's repressive apparatus has been shaken following the July 1989 firing-squad executions of General Arnoldo Ochoa and eight high-ranking officers; and the notion that Castroism is somehow invulnerable has given way to precisely the opposite view. The question now being asked both within and without Cuba is not whether Castro will fall, but when he will fall. Finally, the opposition to Castro now has a visible head inside Cuba, the lawyer Gustavo Arcos Bergnes. A human rights activist who became a hero of the fight against the dictator Batista in the 1950s, Arcos remains one today for his brave battle against Castro's totalitarianism. No analysis of the situation in Cuba today can leave out the remarkable political developments that have recently occurred in Latin America. When the United States invaded Panama and overthrew General Manuel Noriega in December 1989, Castro lost a trading partner and ally who was most useful in three fundamental respects. Panama furnished the entrepôt through which Castro easily violated the U.S. embargo; the sanctuary from which he supplied the Colombian M-19 guerrillas; and the place where he conducted shady dealings aimed at smuggling illegal immigrants and narcotics into the United States. Politically, the Panama invasion could hardly have been worse for Castro. For more than a year, the Special Troops of the Cuban Interior Ministry had been training Noriega's "Dignity Battalions" to offer fierce resistance to the United States. The idea was to show the world the picture of a small but proud nation bravely defying a bullying empire. But things did not happen that way. Less than an hour after the invasion began, its crucial battles had gone in favor of the United States. This was a result, moreover, which the people of Panama heartily applauded: polls later confirmed that more than 90 percent of them endorsed the U.S. intervention. For Cuba, it was a military and political defeat of enormous proportions. It is also possible that the costs to Castro will mount as Noriega's trial for drug trafficking proceeds and the Cuban dictator's ties to this illicit commerce come to light. Two months later, Castroism suffered another severe blow with the defeat of Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas in the...

Soviet Agriculture under the Restructuring Policies

The agricultural sector has long been a serious weakness in the Soviet economy and has hitherto largely resisted all attempts at reform. Now, under Mr. Gorbachev's new policy of perestroika, a determined new attack is to be made. This article reviews the new policies and assesses their prospect of success. It acknowledges that the inertia of Soviet bureaucracy, the inbuilt resistance to change, and the popular demand for quick results without incurring painful penalties must be weighed in the balance against purely technological factors.

Reflections on Economic Aspects of Gorbachev's Book Perestroika: Wishful Thinking for a Make‐believe World?

Gorbachev′s book Perestroika is used to explain why the author believes the new policy of restructuring of the Soviet economy cannot and will not work. The policies of Perestroika are introduced and evaluated and the existing socio‐economic system presented. At the end of this sceptical Western analysis, it is concluded that the policy is cosmetic restructuring and Gorbachev′s downfall, like Khruschev′s, is assured.

Editor's Introduction

Since 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev began to define his policies of perestroika, or restructuring, for the comprehensive reform of Soviet society, much has been written in the USSR about the national educational system that could not have been written before. The earliest of these writings, dating to 1986 and '87, may be compared to what was published during the years of the Khrushchev thaw; factual information and critical analyses of educational practices were forthcoming in greater quantities and to greater extents than previously. The political events of 1988 that have taken place prior to the date of this writing—chiefly the Communist Party Central Committee Plenum of February 1988 and the Nineteenth Communist Party Conference of July—have made possible far greater openness, or glasnost', in discussions of educational issues. This new chapter in the history of the Soviet educational reform of the 1980s, which was initiated in 1983 and 1984 by the short-lived pre-Gorbachev governments of Iurii Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko and which has been extensively chronicled in this journal, has found its first written reflections in newspaper articles. The Soviet press is openly publishing the debates that are taking place about how to reformulate the educational reform.

Perestroika and International Law

Soviet positions on international law and organizations are changing sharply under the influence of the policy of perestroika (restructuring) introduced by General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev. This development was brought to the attention of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting in April 1988 by the noted Soviet international lawyer, G. I. Tunkin.

Problems of leisure and glasnost

The new liberalization in the USSR has created legal opportunities for the extreme right (as well as for liberals), opportunities which some young people are using to combat liberalization itself. With some young people there evidently exists a certain nostalgia for the past, for a strong master, for a mixture of patriarchal nationalism and totalitarian traditions. It is similar to what Erich Fromm once called the ‘flight from freedom’ whereby certain social groups see democracy as a threat to their set traditions, their way of life and security. The emergence of ultra-patriotic groups of ‘muscular socialists’ and neofascists in Soviet society within the last few years shows the complexity of social change in a society like the USSR, and the problems that Gorbachov has to face in implementing his policies of perestroika, glasnost and democratisation.

Three Years of Perestroika

Abstract The third year of Gorbachev's rule has come to an end. From the outset he proclaimed the policy of perestroika and proceeded to elaborate a strategy for restructuring Soviet society. Today this strategy is undergoing its third reformulation. Gorbachev launched his policies in a rather traditional fashion, stressing scientific and technological progress and a radical improvement in labor discipline and responsibility. On the one hand, he decided to reduce investment in new industrial plant construction, emphasizing instead the modernization of existing facilities. On the other, he attempted to resurrect the Stakhanovism of yore. In 1985 the mass media ran stories for months about workers setting production records or managers successfully implementing technological advances.