Police And Crime Commissioners Research Articles

Power struggles: Police and crime commissioners, chief constables, and the battle over operational policing

Abstract This paper reviews the challenges that directly-elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) face in reforming controversial police tactics that are favoured by chief constables, but generate significant concerns among the electorate. Focusing on reforms to police-initiated stops, namely ‘stop and account’ and ‘stop and search’, the results suggest PCCs tend to achieve incremental changes, at best, as they struggle to overcome resistance from their chief constables and the legal constraints of ‘operational independence’. The results have significant implications because it suggests PCCs are not as powerful as has been assumed. However, PCCs can enhance the prospects of reform and better navigate resistance by exercising their rarely used soft powers, such as commissioning national regulatory bodies to review areas of concern or appealing to their local Police and Crime Panel for support in scrutiny. The results of this study are based on interviews with PCCs and chief constables, their deputies and assistants, local campaign groups and staff from national regulatory bodies, as well as participant observations across several police forces.

Police relational accountabilities: The paralysis of police accountability?

Abstract This article examines the new relational accountabilities of Chief Constables, Police, and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) in England and Wales. Referring to a number of recent reports and reviews, the discussion initially focuses on the effectiveness of these relationships and, in particular, the inefficiency of PCPs. Using new empirical data obtained through interviews with senior stakeholders in policing at regional and national levels, and relevant persons in Government, this research shows PCPs are impotent and ineffective. This article develops current understanding, showing that PCPs may cause a new unforeseen consequence. Namely, the exercise of accountability and the governance of policing may be unusually reactive to the ‘one-to-one’ accountability relationship between PCCs and Chief Constables. This research is all the more important in light of Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services finding in 2022 that there is an ‘atmosphere of mistrust and fear’ between PCCs and Chief Constables and The Police Foundation reporting ‘a crisis of confidence’, recommending ‘root and branch reform’ (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services 2022). Such recommendations are made to strengthen the exercise of accountability and the governance of policing. Specifically, the Home Secretary is encouraged to review the Policing Protocol Order (2011) and issue a Memorandum of Understanding to ensure ‘effective, constructive working relationships’ are not just a quixotic pursuit but a practical reality that safeguards the governance of policing.

Has the COVID-19 pandemic manoeuvred policing in England and Wales towards a single national police organisation?

In 2005, Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabularies, Sir Denis O'Connor, reported that structural change to the existing system of 43 forces in England and Wales was necessary, not just desirable (HMIC, 2005). He stated, “Re-configuring for better protection of, and connection with, the public, needs to be seen as part of a package of police reform for this century” (HMIC, 2005, p. 12). He was referring to the merging of smaller forces to make them “fit for purpose”. In 2006, following the recommendations of the report, Home Secretary Charles Clarke took steps to begin a process of merging forces to drive efficiency and effectiveness in protective security. This strategic approach would have seen the number of forces reduced from 43 to 17, but it encountered significant opposition from many of the existing Police Authorities, sufficient to stop it happening (BBC, 2006). In 2011, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 replaced existing Police Authorities with the current system of elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC), which enabled leadership, local priority setting and operational management of police, as well as new partnerships within many force areas. It also led to Home Office direction being largely limited to the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR). As the 43-force structure continues, a collaborative approach is ever more necessary, and efforts have been focused on sharing specialist capabilities across forces (Regional Organised Crime Units being one such example). But is this sufficient for policing to keep apace of the changes threatening the safety and security of the public? The COVID-19 pandemic has shone a light on the operational effectiveness of the 43-force structure. This paper will examine the challenge to a system, which the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) called “broken” in 2018 (HASC, 2018), through the lens of the COVID-19 pandemic, and discuss whether the public health crisis has accelerated the drive towards further policing reforms and even a national police organisation. The question will be considered within the context of national coordination arising from the pandemic, the impact on police legitimacy and lessons learnt from the unified policing models introduced in Scotland and the Netherlands in 2013.

Police and Crime Commissioners: A Dislocated Expectation?

AbstractThe calls in 2019 and 2020 for a Royal Commission, combined with the launch of The Strategic Review by The Police Foundation and the recommendation by Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services for ‘profound and far reaching police reform’, evidence a thirst for refinement, and potentially, significant change to the governance of policing. Using new empirical data obtained through elite research interviews with some of the most senior stakeholders in policing at a regional and national level, this article explores the ability of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to hold Chief Constables to account. Attention is drawn to how the accountability of Chief Constables to PCCs may have significant strengths, such as enhanced visibility, increased frequency, and improved scrutiny. However, the accountability of Chief Constables may also be frustrated and possibly compromised. Indeed, accountability might be exercised inconsistently, susceptible to significant variance and contingent on the calibre and vagaries of PCCs. As such, recommendations are made to strengthen governance arrangements to ensure Chief Constables are robustly held to account. Specifically, the Home Secretary is encouraged to review The Policing Protocol Order and issue an Accountability Code of Practice.

Post-conviction disclosure in England and Wales: Could conviction integrity units (CIUs) modelled on those in the USA be the way forward?

Conviction integrity units (CIUs) operate out of a small number of prosecutors' offices in the USA, and these have since 2007 contributed to several exonerations. In England and Wales, there are obstacles in place that prevent post-conviction disclosure for virtually anyone other than the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC), the body that in effect screens cases for the Court of Appeal. The article examines whether CIUs modelled on those in the USA could be the way forward to help those who have been wrongfully convicted. It is concluded that such units could be useful in England and Wales, and may benefit from being run by a publicly elected post similar to the Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) implemented in 2012, as this would ensure greater democratic governance and oversight. It is further concluded that improved third party access to post-conviction disclosure is urgently needed.

Democratic localism and the implementation of the Community Remedy in England and Wales

This article assesses the development and implementation of the Community Remedy anti-social behaviour policy by Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in England and Wales. The Community Remedy, introduced by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014), allows victims of ‘low-level’ anti-social behaviour to select an informal action for their offender from a list designed by their local PCC via consultation with the public. This article reports the results of a benchmarking exercise that investigates how PCCs have translated this policy into practice by examining: public consultation procedures; the contents of the Community Remedy documents; and police usage. The findings indicate an uneven implementation across regions with variable levels of engagement from PCCs, police forces and members of the public. We assess the enactment and adoption of this new power alongside its potential to stimulate democratic localism.

Who Needs Critical Friends? Independent Advisory Groups in the Age of the Police and Crime Commissioner

Abstract In the early 2000s, many police forces in England and Wales set up independent advisory groups (IAGs) following an inquiry into the flawed investigation of the murder of a black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, by London's Metropolitan Police. Members of IAGs were to act as critical friends of the police providing independent advice on policies, procedures and practices, thus ensuring that no section of their local community was disadvantaged through a lack of understanding, ignorance or mistaken beliefs. Based on a case study of an IAG in an English police force, this article reviews the operation of IAGs following the radical changes made to police governance by the introduction of directly elected police and crime commissioners (PCCs). Its main argument is that more thought needs to be given to the role of IAGs in this new landscape and urgent steps taken to clarify their relationships with police forces and PCCs.

Scrutinising the appeal of volunteer Community Speedwatch to policing leaders in England and Wales: Resources, responsivity and responsibilisation

ABSTRACTThis article focuses on ‘Community Speedwatch’ (CSW) – a particular volunteering approach that has apparently attracted the attention of senior police decision-makers in England and Wales over recent years. It considers the significance of decisions by many Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and Chief Constables to embrace CSW as a response to calls from the public for action against speeding motorists. CSW is apparently an option that ticks many boxes in a new era characterised by the increasing democratic accountability of the police. Whilst frequently promoted using the popular language of ‘empowerment’, ‘localism’, ‘self-help’ or ‘ownership’, and seemingly well-suited to current trends towards the increasing responsibilisation of the public, CSW should not be looked at as a straightforward example of a concerned public gifting their time to a grateful police. Rather than consider the road safety merits of the scheme, this paper views CSW as something of a tool which PCCs and Chief Constables can use to negotiate the often conflicting demands placed upon them in straightened economic circumstances. The paper draws on 22 interviews conducted with PCCs (during their first tenure) and Chief Constables in England and Wales.

The impact of local commissioning on victim services in England and Wales: An empirical study

This paper follows on from earlier work in which I discussed the potential impacts of the local commissioning of victim services by Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in England and Wales. The introduction of this elected role and the devolution of responsibility to local PCCs was said to raise a range of issues for both victims and the voluntary sector, given that agencies within this sector are major providers of support for those affected by crime. Before 2014 the approach to the funding of victim services was not particularly of concern, save for questions being asked in the ‘audit culture’ of the early 2000s, around the extent to which the government-funded agency Victim Support could be said to be providing ‘value for money’. However, these concerns gained momentum with the incoming Coalition government of 2010, and by 2014 local commissioning by PCCs had been implemented. This meant the previous mixed economy of victim services provision via the largely centrally funded organisation ‘Victim Support’ as a ‘national victims’ service’, and an array of smaller and more financially independent victim agencies who had to bid for pots of funding much more competitively, has given way to the political appeal of a free market for all. In order then to explore the reality of this shift, a piece of empirical research was undertaken with voluntary-sector agencies in the far southwest of England. Essentially the research provides evidence that the issues raised in my earlier work have indeed come to fruition.

Police and Crime Commissioners

This article considers the progress of the new system of police governance in England and Wales. It assesses the responsibilities and powers of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and examines local initiatives undertaken by some PCCs that have proved to have national ramifications. It evaluates the accountability of PCCs between elections and highlights the limited powers of Police and Crime Panels. It considers the convention of police operational independence in light of two controversial police investigations, and the potential need for PCC oversight of future publicly high-profile investigations. It provides an initial assessment of an important and recent High Court ruling (R v Police and Crime Commissioner for South Yorkshire, 2017) which, by making the PCC responsible for all police operational activity, questions the tradition of constabulary operational independence. It is argued that enabling the PCC to bring a chief officer to account for all police operations might mean that potentially challenging and fruitless investigations can be avoided in the future.

United Kingdom

United Kingdom

The 2016 Police and Crime Commissioner elections

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyse the 2016 elections for Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and to compare them with those that took place in 2012. It seeks to evaluate the background of the candidates who stood for office in 2016, the policies that they put forward, the results of the contests and the implications of the 2016 experience for future PCC elections.Design/methodology/approachThis paper is based around several key themes – the profile of candidates who stood for election, preparations conducted prior to the contests taking place, the election campaign and issues raised during the contests, the results and the profile of elected candidates. The paper is based upon documentary research, making particular use of primary source material.FindingsThe research establishes that affiliation to a political party became the main route for successful candidates in 2016 and that local issues related to low-level criminality will dominate the future policing agenda. It establishes that although turnout was higher than in 2012, it remains low and that further consideration needs to be devoted to initiatives to address this for future PCC election contests.Research limitations/implicationsThe research focusses on the 2016 elections and identifies a number of key issues that emerged during the campaign affecting the conduct of the contests which have a bearing on future PCC elections. It treats these elections as a bespoke topic and does not seek to place them within the broader context of the development of the office of PCC.Practical implicationsThe research suggests that in order to boost voter participation in future PCC election contests, PCCs need to consider further means to advertise the importance of the role they perform and that the government should play a larger financial role in funding publicity for these elections and consider changing the method of election.Social implicationsThe rationale for introducing PCCs was to empower the public in each police force area. However, issues that include the enhanced importance of political affiliation as a criteria for election in 2016 and the social unrepresentative nature of those who stood for election and those who secured election to this office in these contests coupled with shortcomings related to public awareness of both the role of PCCs and the timing of election contests threaten to undermine this objective.Originality/valueThe extensive use of primary source material ensures that the subject matter is original and its interpretation is informed by an academic perspective.

Rethinking the law and politics of democratic police accountability

This paper evaluates the work and impact of a number of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in England and Wales and attempts to refocus public discourse and scrutiny on their police and crime plans as a key prism through which their performance should be measured. Drawing upon the literature published by various PCCs, the Stevens Commission, the Home Affairs Committee and numerous academics, the paper will argue that a major reform of democratic police accountability in England and Wales is needed. Due to the often voluminous and piecemeal nature of the documents published on the PCCs’ websites, the textual analysis is limited to the police and crime plans for Greater Manchester, the West Midlands and the London Metropolitan area.

Civilian oversight of the police in England and Wales

The creation of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in England and Wales in November 2012 by the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government, replacing the former police authorities, introduced a new mechanism for civilian oversight of the police. However, the new structure has been heavily criticised, both for the election process and for the ways in which newly elected PCCs have operated. Despite these criticisms, PCCs were retained by the new Conservative government, and the scheduled round of new elections took place in May 2016. This article assesses these elections and compares them with those 2012, in terms of the election process and the attributes of the candidates and those successfully elected.

Victim Support in England and Wales

Victim Support in England and Wales emerged in the 1970s and spread throughout the UK. In doing so, it became established as the national victims’ service, offering support for victims of most types of crime. Valued under Conservative governments as an example of community-based support, it became more professionalised and better funded under New Labour. However, in the age of austerity the coalition government sought to restrict growth and adopt greater competition for government grants, and a move towards contracting services locally through Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) has meant a further readjustment of provisions for crime victims, with significant implications for the future of Victim Support. This paper speculates on whether this spells the end of an era for Victim Support, or indeed a case of ‘back to the future’, ending the distinctive generic service that Victim Support has established. This may provide lessons for the future of victim services in other countries where developments came rather later.

Police and crime commissioners: emerging “drug policy actors”?

Purpose – In 2013, the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) for Durham, Ron Hogg, initiated a debate around the future of British drug policy. In June 2015, the Derbyshire PCC, Alan Charles, opened a similar debate with representatives from policing, third party support agencies, national advocates and academics to discuss the possibilities for change. This short paper presents the views and actions of senior figures in the police service and discusses motivations for pursuing change. The purpose of this paper is to introduce police and crime commissioners as “drug policy actors” (Seddon, 2011) and to highlight key areas for further academic enquiry. Design/methodology/approach – This paper is based on press releases and media accounts of the recent activity of the PCCs in relation to national drug policy. This paper provides an academic viewpoint on recent events, supported by theoretical literature critiquing drug policy and contemporary policing. Findings – This viewpoint articulates that motivations for pursuing a change in drug policy are based on both economic and ideological agendas of some PCCs. Irrespective of the motivation, pressure from PCCs and renowned Chief Constables may be more effective in initiating change than high-profile national campaigns and political debates. Originality/value – This paper is the first of its kind to discuss the relationship between PCCs/local constabularies and drug policy reform. It provides a foundation for future research which could investigate views on alternatives to prohibition, specifically within the wider police force.

Where next for victim services in England and Wales?

Purpose – At a time when funding arrangements are under review, the purpose of this paper is to come to a better understanding of victim needs and to inform future developments of services in England and Wales. Design/methodology/approach – This paper is based on qualitative data gathered from a series of interviews with 33 individuals working with victims of crime in one police area in England and Wales. Findings – Better practice and outcomes were associated in respondent’s accounts with the multi-agency working and end to end case management of needs associated with some victims of rape and domestic abuse assessed as high risk of harm. Research limitations/implications – Small-scale qualitative study. Practical implications – It is argued Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) should explore mechanisms for extending such services to more victims of crime and ensuring better co-ordination of service delivery. Originality/value – From October 2014 onwards PCCs are set to take over responsibility for funding victim services in England and Wales. Though not an uncontroversial development, this sets the context for practice with victims to be considered afresh and accordingly this paper explores the needs of victims and how they are met in one police and crime area.

Policing the Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs): An Examination of the Current Statutory and Political Frameworks for Holding PCCs to Account—A Case Study of the Surrey Police and Crime Panel

Purpose. The purpose of this article is to focus critically on how Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) hold Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to account. It is an attempt to explore the various factors which appeared to limit the Surrey PCP's ability to hold the PCC to account, of which politics was just one of many relevant factors. Design/methodology/approach. Using a mixed methods approach, employing both qualitative and quantitative tools, Surrey PCP was selected as a case study. Findings. This article presents a critical evaluation of the relationship between one PCP and its PCC. It seeks to explore the role and powers of the PCP in relation to the PCC and the nature of that relationship. While it was not possible to test fully the impact of party politics, the findings support the claim that PCPs lack the authority to hold PCCs to account. Originality/value. Building on the work of Lister (2014), this article is the first to explore the scrutiny role of a PCP with a large political majority where there is an ‘independent’ PCC.

PCC Elections as a ‘Failed Experiment’: What Lessons can be Learned?

AbstractThe low turnout of the 2012 police and crime commissioner (PCC) elections have led to questions surrounding their legitimacy and have even led to the former Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg describing the elections—elections his party helped to introduce—as a ‘failed experiment’. Despite this, the election of a majority Conservative government in May 2015 appears to offer some longevity to the role of police and crime commissioners and cements next year's PCC elections in the political diary. Concerns in the immediate aftermath of the elections focused upon the costs of the elections. In this article I offer some suggestions as to what lessons could be learned from this experiment and, through exploring the attitudes of voters, political parties and the media, suggest that we can learn four lessons: (1) that spoilt ballots cannot be ignored; that (2) political parties and (3) the media's attitudes toward elections are important in encouraging people to vote; and (4) that high numbers of independent candidates cannot simply be welcomed at times of elections.

The importance of liberal values within policing: police and crime commissioners, police independence and the spectre of illiberal democracy

The introduction of police and crime commissioners (PCC) in England and Wales has reignited discussions about police governance. This paper contributes to these debates by focusing on the role liberal values play within liberal democratic ideals of policing. It suggests, policing principles historically have been informed primarily by liberal goals; that is to say these principles are liberal before they are democratic. Policing in England and Wales today, however, is increasingly informed by democratic values at the expense of liberal principles. The spectre of illiberal democracy is considered here as a warning in light of this development. The paper argues that there is a growing disparity between the rhetoric of liberal policing principles, historically rooted in pre-democratic times, and the reality of contemporary policing in societies that are increasingly sensitive to democratic expectations. Police independence is used to illustrate this argument. Police independence is still revered in rhetoric today, but the liberal origin of this concept is not recognised. But the idea that the police should retain a degree of freedom from political interference makes sense from a liberal perspective, one that is increasingly difficult to defend as liberal values decline in importance, and democratic aspirations come to the fore. The paper concludes by suggesting that liberal values are, on the one hand, increasingly difficult to accommodate within contemporary ideas of policing, but are at the same time becoming more necessary, especially following the introduction of PCCs.