Police and Crime Commissioners: A Dislocated Expectation?

Simon Cooper

doi:10.1093/police/paab012

Abstract

AbstractThe calls in 2019 and 2020 for a Royal Commission, combined with the launch of The Strategic Review by The Police Foundation and the recommendation by Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services for ‘profound and far reaching police reform’, evidence a thirst for refinement, and potentially, significant change to the governance of policing. Using new empirical data obtained through elite research interviews with some of the most senior stakeholders in policing at a regional and national level, this article explores the ability of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to hold Chief Constables to account. Attention is drawn to how the accountability of Chief Constables to PCCs may have significant strengths, such as enhanced visibility, increased frequency, and improved scrutiny. However, the accountability of Chief Constables may also be frustrated and possibly compromised. Indeed, accountability might be exercised inconsistently, susceptible to significant variance and contingent on the calibre and vagaries of PCCs. As such, recommendations are made to strengthen governance arrangements to ensure Chief Constables are robustly held to account. Specifically, the Home Secretary is encouraged to review The Policing Protocol Order and issue an Accountability Code of Practice.

Highlights

This article examines the ability of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to hold Chief Constables to account in England and Wales
Given the failings of the tripartite structure, the criticisms made of ‘calculative and contractual’ accountability, New Public Management (NPM) and more recently the scandals and controversies surrounding PCCs and the reservations expressed at the mechanisms that PCCs use to hold Chief Constables to account, this study examined the ability of PCCs to hold Chief Constables to account
While this research shows that the accountability of Chief Constables to PCCs can have a number of significant strengths, the findings reported here draw attention to how the introduction of PCCs could have led the accountability of Chief Constables to be diminished

Summary

Introduction

This article examines the ability of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to hold Chief Constables to account in England and Wales. The research presented here shows that the accountability of Chief Constables to PCCs can have a number of significant strengths. The accountability of Chief Constables may be subject to the vagaries of PCCs, including their variable calibre. The governance of policing was until 2012 a responsibility shared between the Home Secretary, Chief Constables and the relevant Police Authority. This ‘tripartite structure’ was widely criticized (Lambert, 1986; Reiner, 1992; The Scarman Report, 1982; Home Office Report 38/02, 2003). One aspect that attracted strong criticism was the perceived expanding power of the Home Secretary and Chief Constables. Volume 00, Number 0, pp. 1–17 doi:10.1093/police/paab VC Crown copyright 2021

Policing Article

Methodology

Conclusions