Plato's Apology Research Articles

ПРОБЛЕМА ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОЙ И СОЗЕРЦАТЕЛЬНОЙ ЖИЗНИ В РЕЧАХ МАКСИМА ТИРСКОГО

The paper deals with two speeches of Maximus of Tyre, dedicated to active and contemplative life (XV–XVI). Parallels with other authors (Apuleius, Alcinoos) show that this theme became popular in the Platonic tradition. Maximus takes up well-developed material but uses a new form for its presentation – double speeches (disputatio in utramque partem). This article gives a brief overview of the problem of the active and contemplative life in order to outline the context relevant for Maximus' philosophical speeches. Although there are no original ideas in the orations, it seems interesting to examine the use of Platonic material and the choice of dialogues, which were used to argue the thesis and the antithesis. The analysis of the speeches shows the ways in which Maximus uses the dialogues the Gorgias and the Republic, i.e. borrowing some images and thematic passages. Plato's Apology of Socrates occupies a special position in the composition of the XVI speech. Using Plato's work as a model, Maximus writes a speech that Anaxagoras could have held in front of the citizens of Clazomenoi, defending his way of life.

Faith and Freedom: Contexts, Choices, and Crises in Religious Commitments

Faith and Freedom: Contexts, Choices, and Crises in Religious Commitments

Socrates and the Voice that Says No: Listening to Plato's Apology

Socrates and the Voice that Says No:Listening to Plato's Apology Sarah Nooter (bio) In Plato's Apology, Socrates describes himself as being guided by a voice (phônê) that prevents him from doing the wrong thing. This voice is also a "sign" (sêmeion), whose absence is "proof" (tekmêrion) of correct action. Moreover, it is a "divine" (theion) and "spiritual" (daimonion) phenomenon (see Apology in Fowler, 1966, 31c–d, 40a–b).1 In contrast to scholars who refer to this phenomenon as Socrates's daimonion ("spiritual thing") or as a "sign" that implicitly signifies something else, in this article I suggest that it is not truly a signifier, but is rather better understood as a sign that resists symbolization.2 In other words, I aim to take this "voice" seriously as a voice: one that is irreducible to language (it says nothing), representative of no one (its speaker is not identified), non-dialogic, acousmatic, and unknowable except by the act of negation or the nonperformance of this act. In these features, it resembles the negative capability of Jacques Lacan's object a, and, in a similar way, dwells almost outside of social existence, the symbolic order, a trace of the Real, as defined here: The Real is essentially that which resists symbolization and thus resists the dialectization characteristic of the symbolic order, in which one thing can be substituted for another. Not everything is fungible; certain things are not interchangeable for the simple reason that they cannot be "signiferized." They cannot be found elsewhere, as they have a Thing-like quality, requiring the subject to come back to them over and over again. (Fink, 1995, p. 92) Like the Real, this voice is embodied as unique, its own Thing, repeatedly present to and constitutive of Socrates, heard only as it frees him from the symbolic structures of language, law, [End Page 413] and Athens, despite the attempts of Socrates's many accusers and his still more numerous interpreters (including himself) to assign it a fixed meaning. It is only through its strange (dis) embodiment of (as) voice that we can understand how it is constituted by and in opposition to the other voices in the Apology.3 Socrates's daimonion has been the object of copious studies, not least because it appears frequently—in several dialogues of Plato, works of Xenophon, and again in later but still ancient authors, such as Plutarch and Cicero.4 Thus, we have a protracted chain of overlapping but never quite (quiet) equivalent signifiers (each a "sign," sêmeion), with its meaning always shifting just a touch from one text to the next, with implications ever newly revealed or occluded.5 Many studies of the daimonion attempt to piece together clues from several dialogues (or authors) to construct an interpretation of its meaning or provenance. In this article, I suggest a different approach, namely, to read the daimonion in the Apology alone, not only in accordance with the precise words used there to denote it—first and primarily "voice"—but also in the context of the other voices that populate this dialogue. There are several justifications for this approach. One is that so literary a writer as Plato (however paradoxically) is likely to construct a careful work like the Apology in such a way that the parts bear meaningfully upon each other, whether intentionally or otherwise. Another is to adopt a more broadly structuralist perspective, which also calls for a psychoanalytic one: each piece of the Apology gains its meaning only in relation or opposition to the other pieces. However generally this may apply to language or texts, I try to show here that this form of reading is particularly, even preternaturally, appropriate to the Apology, whose entire raison d'être is to acknowledge, answer, respond to, fend off, diminish, refute, and even invalidate, but ultimately to exist in relation to accusation. Every voice in the Apology accuses, every voice but one. Yet very few voices can be heard, inasmuch as the dialogue poses the courtroom as a space that does not provide time for emphatic listening, the kind of listening that can affect a process of thought and (re) evaluation, such...

Bibliographia Dystopia, Volume 1: John Steinbeck's The Moon Is Downx

<i>Bibliographia Dystopia, Volume 1: John Steinbeck's</i> The Moon Is Downx

Textual Keys to Understand Socrates' Profession of Ignorance in the Apology (21a-23c)

In the present paper I analyze some relevant textual keys of Plato's Apology (21a-23c) to show the many strands underlying Socrates' claims of ignorance. I advocate a position that seeks to reevaluate the use of epistemic lexica by considering other evidence, such as cultural and dramatic context, the use of hypothetical clauses, the comparative and the rhetoric of the pair real/apparent. From this approach, I hope to show that there are good reasons to interpret Socrates' claims of ignorance in the light of amiable irony, whereby the use of language and other literary devices create layers of meaning to express the full sense of Socratic wisdom for the audience without resorting to the charge of contradiction or insincerity. Against a position that reduces Socrates' message to the use of epistemic lexica to interpret it either by synonymy, equivocity or low/high cognitive grading, I propose to read Socrates' claims of ignorance, always in comparison to others' claim of wisdom, as a sort of cultural appropriation and revaluation of the traditional title σοφία/σοφός.

Prvi srpski prevod Platonove Odbrane Sokratove

In this paper, we will critically assess the philosophical and linguistic aspects of the first Serbian translation of Plato's Apology, that has been recently discovered. The Apology was translated by Kosta J. Lozanić in 1904. First, we will analyze the philosophical terminology of this translation, taking into account some important passages of the dialogue. By comparing and contrasting Lozanić's translation with the most prominent translations of the Apology of his time, we explicate the uniqueness of his translation, that rests on the translator's own understanding of both the Greek text and Plato's philosophy.

Tragédia e antitragédia na Apologia de Sócrates: uma análise retórica

Um dos assuntos mais caros a qualquer intérprete da Apologia de Sócrates de Platão é o problema da relação entre Sócrates e a arte retórica, que a personagem ao mesmo tempo emprega e censura. Quase todas as estratégias discursivas contidas na fala de Sócrates podem ser analisadas sob essa perspectiva. Neste artigo, dedico-me ao exame de uma dessas estratégias, que desempenha importante papel dentro da construção do discurso socrático: trata-se do exemplo de Aquiles que, no trecho da Ilíada citado na obra, vai deliberadamente ao encontro da morte para vingar Pátroclo. Comparando a sua própria situação à do herói e tomando como foco a pena de morte proposta por seus acusadores, o filósofo reflete acerca do risco a que se expõe naquela ocasião; justificando-se, ele relembra a situação do herói épico que preferiu evitar a desonra a evitar a morte. A partir de uma análise detalhada do trecho em questão, bem como de uma confrontação com o texto homérico ali citado, pretendo extrair as consequências que esse exemplo pode ter para a leitura do diálogo como um todo.

Gandhi and Socrates

Gandhi composed his ‘translation’ of Plato's Apology while he was in South Africa. Gandhi was responding to political restrictions against the Indian community and was also influenced by John Ruskin's Unto This Last. Interestingly, the translation was banned by the British authorities in India. This article explores the background to Gandhi's translation and examines the role of Plato's work in the development of his idea of satyagraha.

Socrates and the Gods: How to Read Plato's Euthyphro, Apology and Crito. By Nalin Ranasinghe

Socrates and the Gods: How to Read Plato's Euthyphro, Apology and Crito. By Nalin Ranasinghe

Book Review: Political Theory: The Ironic Defense of Socrates: Plato's Apology

Book Review: Political Theory: The Ironic Defense of Socrates: Plato's Apology

Socratic lessons in excellence for our postmodern world

When precious pieces of Socratic wisdom in action are collected from Plato's Apology and other Platonic Dialogues and are compared with similar findings in the works of Xenophon, especially in his Apology, Symposium and Memorabilia, a clear and coherent picture of Socrates emerges as an ethical teacher of hellenic Aretē (~virtue): he can inspire others to excellence by following his example of living his simple life and facing his tragic death calmly. In this sense, Socrates emerges as something more substantial philosophically than the ironist and skilful practitioner of the Socratic method, as has been presented by many scholars. As an ethical philosopher, the platonic Socrates was very different from Aristotle and John Rawls, and as a Hellenic philosopher in practice, he would appear to be closer to the ancient Indian Gurus than to contemporary analytical philosophers. This aspect of Socratic ethical philosophy is relevant and needed today more than ever before, as it provides an antidote to moral relativism and other sorts of sophistry in the vital processes of transformation and societal change.

Plato and the Talmud (review)

Reviewed by: Plato and the Talmud David Janssens Plato and the Talmud, by Jacob Howland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 282 pp. $68.00. The most important word in this book's title is in (or near) the middle. Indeed, many would argue that it should be "or" instead of "and," since there is an unbridgeable gulf between the theoretical life of free inquiry as exemplified by Plato's Socrates and the practical life of faithful obedience to divine authority as embodied by the Talmudic rabbis. Indeed, the notion of a fundamental incompatibility and even animosity between "Athens" and "Jerusalem" appears to find support in both traditions. Thus, the second-century philosopher Celsus rejects the tenets of both Judaism and Christianity as obscure fables, while asserting that "things are stated much better among the Greeks" (quoted in Origen, Against Celsus, VI.1). Conversely, according to the Babylonian Talmud's famous assertion, "Cursed be the individual who raises pigs, and cursed be the father who teaches his son Greek wisdom" (Tractate Sotah, 49a, quoted [End Page 152] on p. 8). Finally, even the apostle Paul points out the difference, albeit only to stress Christianity's own distinctiveness vis-à-vis the two opponents: "For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness" (1 Corinthians 1:22-23). While the author of the book acknowledges the relative truth of this view, he makes a compelling and well-documented case for not resting satisfied with it. Generally speaking, his approach consists in calling into question the differences and exploring the affinities between the putative contenders. Thus, he argues that the religious faith of the Talmudic rabbis, far from precluding rational enquiry, actually requires and fosters it. And similarly, Socratic dialectic proves to be based on a specific piety that includes an acute awareness of the limits of human reason. In both cases, the critical application of the intellect to the relationship between the human and the divine is an indispensable ingredient to living the good life: "Plato and the rabbis, I maintain, regard thinking that is in the broadest sense theological—that reflects on our relationship to God or the gods, and to human beings in the light of this relationship—as an activity no less sacred than traditional rituals of prayer and sacrifice" (p. 19). And in both cases, what is at stake is promoting an ethos, a way of life that is exemplary, both theoretically and practically. In fact, the clear-cut distinction between the theoretical and the practical dissolves. As the book argues, Plato and the Talmud teach by example: they not only depict distinctive and exemplary figures—Socrates and the prophets—in action, but they also deploy a number of literary devices designed to puzzle and provoke their readers to carefully examine the text, as well as their own lives, in light of the examples. To make this point, the author, who is equally at home in the labyrinth of the Platonic dialogues and in the intricacies of the Gemara, develops a careful and fascinating comparative interpretation of Plato's Apology and Euthyphro and the stories of Honi HaMe'aggel and Elazar in Ta'anit 3. From the latter, it appears that the Talmud accords an important role to prophetic outsiders whose greater intimacy with the divine puts them at odds with the community as well as with the emerging rabbinical tradition. However, this intimacy also enables them both to test, challenge, and criticize divine power and authority and to save the community in times of emergency. In his reading of Plato, on the other hand, the author ably argues that Socrates's philosophizing cannot be properly understood without taking seriously his claim that it is a specific form of piety. His attempt to refute the Delphic oracle's famous assertion springs from a fundamental trust in the veracity of the god: "In brief, Socrates makes it clear that the Delphic oracle arouses, authorizes, and focuses his desire for wisdom, and that it is able to do so only because he [End Page 153] is prepared from the outset to acknowledge...

The ironic defense of Socrates: Plato's Apology

Introduction 1. Title and preliminary considerations 2. Prooemium 3. Prothesis 4. Defense against the charges of the first accusers 5. Defense against the present accusers 6. Digression on nobility and death 7. Epilogue 8. Penalty section 9. Final speech 10. Conclusion: Socrates' human wisdom and knowledge of virtue.

O cidadão Sócrates e o filosofar numa democracia

Examinando o julgamento de Sócrates (470-399 a.C.) por Atenas, no contexto da Guerra do Peloponeso (431-404 a.C.), este texto busca as raízes, as razões e os significados de sua condenação nas críticas relações entre o filósofo e seus concidadãos. Neste caso - justamente no que podemos chamar de ''o caso Sócrates'' - o filósofo aparece (de conformidade com a Apologia escrita por Platão) como um cidadão-filósofo que desafia o Estado ateniense e incomoda seus concidadãos na medida em que exerce a cidadania como uma forma de filosofar e pratica a filosofia como um direito e um dever de cidadania.

Socratic Irony, Plato's Apology, and Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony

Socratic Irony, Plato's Apology, and Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony

Socrates and the Moral Limits of Legal Obligation

This article presents a critical analysis of Plato's Apology and Crito — focusing on the moral limits of legal obligation that ground both Socrates' resistance to state injustice and his acceptance of his unjust sentence. It does so by juxtaposing Socrates' advocacy of the priority of right action in the Apology to his equally ardent rationalization of legal obligation in the Crito, thereby placing him at a critical juncture in the evolution of western legal thought. Throughout this work, a particularly Heideggerian perspective is used to manifest this transition as clearly as possible. This article proceeds in four distinct stages. Part one presents the contextual background of Socrates' trial as depicted in the Apology. Part two develops the primacy of justice set forth in the first half of the Crito, and upon this basis recreates the genealogy of legal obligation that crowns this work. Part three raises two paradoxes that haunt these works — those of the apparently contradictory alternatives of “persuade or obey” and the dichotomy of “doing versus suffering injustice.” Part four projects the insights so gained onto modern legal positivism and back to ancient Greek tragedy.

The Relation between Politics and Philosophy in Plato’s Apology of Socrates

In Plato's Apology of Socrates, Socrates claims that any just person who becomes involved in politics will be destroyed by the multitude and that the philosopher must therefore lead a private life. I argue that Socrates' elaboration of his relation to the political community, especially in the trial of the generals of Arginusae and the arrest of Leon, raises more questions than a cursory reading can answer both with respect to the logical structure of the argument in the Apology and in comparison with other Socratic formulations of the relation of philosophy and the city. Far from demonstrating the incompatibility of philosophy and politics, Socrates in the Apology and other dialogues limns the features of a conception of political life that incorporates philosophical principles of moderation and dialectical examination into an understanding of politics directed towards the moral and intellectual development of the citizens.

THE EXAMINED LIFE?

An introductory course in philosophy begins with Plato's Apology. Here Socrates famously states that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living for man’. The professor lingers on the idea. In this first week of the course they have already struck upon a justification for all of the torturous analyzing, arguing, and thought-experimenting that will follow in the next few months. Without these vehicles of ‘examination’, our lives are not worth living! The students may have experienced enthusiastic defenses of the value of academic disciplines from other professors, but this guy is selling the idea that philosophy is necessary for a meaningful life.

WISDOM, MODERATION, AND ELENCHUS IN PLATO'S APOLOGY

Abstract: This article contends that Socratic wisdom (sophia) in Plato's Apology should be understood in relation to moderation (sophrosune), not knowledge (episteme). This stance is exemplified in an interpretation of Socrates' disavowal of knowledge. The god calls Socrates wise. Socrates holds both that he is wise in nothing great or small and that the god does not lie. These apparently inconsistent claims are resolved in an interpretation of elenchus. This interpretion says that Socrates is wise insofar as he does not believe himself to know what he does not know. Whether one knows is demonstrated through elenchus, which moderates between knowledge claims. Thus, elenchus is productive of a kind of wisdom even if it does not produce knowledge. This claim, if true, forms a suitable basis for Socrates' defense of himself. That it does so serves as further evidence for the interpretation of sophia as sophrosune.

Philosophy as an Art of Dying

This essay proposes a close look at the tradition of martyr-philosophers in the Western world (Socrates, Hypatia, Giordano Bruno, Edith Stein, Jan Patočka) and advances the claim that the death of these people has a distinct philosophical significance. For various reasons, these philosophers place themselves in limit-situations where they cannot use words anymore to express themselves, but have to turn their own flesh into a radical means of expression. Their dying thus becomes an extension of their work, and the image of their violent deaths comes to be regarded as an inseparable part of their heritage. First, I discuss Socrates as the founder of the tradition of “philosophical deaths” in the West; his gradual “taming” of death in Plato's Apology is discussed in some detail. I then introduce a modern case of “Socratic death,” that of Jan Patočka (1907–77). Finally, I map out the cultural and social mechanisms, as well as some of the phenomenological preconditions, presupposed by the notion of “philosophy as an art of dying.”