Plato's Phaedo Research Articles

XII-FORM-PARTICULAR RESEMBLANCE IN PLATO'SPHAEDO

This paper is a critical re-examination of the argument in Plato's Phaedo for the thesis that all learning is recollection of prenatal knowledge. Plato's speaker Socrates concentrates on the case of ‘equal sticks and stones’, viewed as striving without complete success to resemble a Form, the Equal itself. The paper argues that (a) this is a rather special case, focused on geometry; (b) Plato is at pains to emphasize that the Form- particular relation need not be one of resemblance at all, a concession which he insists would not, if made, damage his theory of recollection; (c) even if resemblance is assumed to be the correct account of that relationship, the 'striving to be like’ gloss is not an integral component of Plato's metaphysics.

Myths of the underworld journey: Plato, Aristophanes, and the "Orphic" gold tablets

1. Introduction: the start of the journey 2. Roadmaps of deviance: the 'Orphic' gold tablets 3. Descent into the depths of comedy: The Frogs of Aristophanes 4. The upward path of philosophy: the myth in Plato's Phaedo 5. Conclusions: the end of the road.

Logic and Music in Plato's Phaedo

AbstractThis paper aims to achieve a better understanding of what Socrates means by "συμϕωνɛiν" in the sections of the Phaedo in which he uses the word, and how its use contributes both to the articulation of the hypothetical method and the proof of the soul's immortality. Section I sets out the well-known problems for the most obvious readings of the relation, while Sections II and III argue against two remedies for these problems, the first an interpretation of what the συμϕωνɛiν relation consists in, the second an interpretation of what sorts of thing the relation is meant to relate. My positive account in Section IV argues that we should take the musical connotations of the term seriously, and that Plato was thinking of a robust analogy between the way pitches form unities when related by certain intervals, and the way theoretical claims form unities when related by explanatory co-dependence. Section V surveys the work of IV from the point of view of the initial difficulties and suggests further consequences for the hypothetical method, including the logical relation between the συμϕωνɛiν and διαϕωνɛiν relations, and the need for care in ordering the results of a hypothesis."But anyhow I proceeded in this way: on each occasion hypothesising the λóγoς which I judged to be strongest, I put down as true the things that seem to me to συμϕωνɛiν with it – both about a causal account and any of the other things that are – but those things that did not I put down as false." (Phaedo 100a3-7). "But if someone clung to the hypothesis itself, you would bid him goodbye and wouldn't answer him until you had examined its results, whether according to you they συμϕωνɛi or διαϕωνɛi with one another." (Phaedo 101d3-5)

Socrates in the Phaedo

No, is the only person who solved the problem: he took everything, everything, with him to the grave. Marvelous ... you kept the highest enthusiasm closed up airtight in the most eminent reflection and sagacity, kept it for eternity-you took everything along. Therefore the professors are disparagingly saying of you now-O, Socrates!-that, after all, you were only a personality, that you did not even have a system. Kierkegaard, Journals and Paper (IV 4303, 224) There are indeed, as those concerned with the mysteries say, many who carry the thyrsus but the Bacchants are few. in the Phaedo (69c-d) In this essay I seek to capture an image of Socrates, the single individual, as he exists in Plato's Phaedo. This existing Socrates, I shall conclude unconcludingly, is existentially analogous to the Abraham of Fear and Trembling, authored by Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes de Silentio; thus I hope to reveal in the Phaedo as a of To this end I shall first consider the picture of rendered by Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus in Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. In fact these two works present two, existentially distinct Socrateses. In the former represents an orthodox rendering of Plato's epistemology of recollection; this is a Knight of Infinite Resignation but not of Faith. In the latter, however, Climacus presents as an exemplar of A-pagan or Socratic faith-as distinct from B, which refers to Christian faith. The pagan faith of Religiousness A is also the faith of Abraham, Fear and Trembling's, of Faith, and, as I hope to indicate, of in the Phaedo.1 Thus I shall first give a brief account of Johannes Climacus's characterization of the and religious Socrateses, as set forth, respectively, in Fragments and Postscript. Second I shall observe Socrates' unconcluding argumentation in the Phaedo, from which we can infer the presence not of a systematizer but of an existing philosopher. Third I shall extend my consideration of the Phaedo to include its more poetic elements in order to flesh out this existing Socrates. Finally, I shall compare the existential postures of and Abraham in order to justify each as a Knight of Faith. Climacus's Socrateses In Fragments, Climacus invokes the Platonic as merely the for knowledge, as distinct from the appearance of the eternal in time which alone gives the of faith and truth-that is untruth. The significance of this is not that of radical doubt or presuppositionlessness, a logically necessary point of departure which dispels all deception in order to assure the rational certainty of the philosophical system; rather, this condition is the transcendent telos of human existence and the truth of subjectivity. In Fragments himself is merely the occasion for the awareness of subjective untruth, but this is not the decisive is untruth of Postscript because in Fragments is the occasion for the recollective recovery of objective truth, which entirely swallows subjectivity: recollection presupposes that only by gathering the soul to itself and out of the bodily world-a radical subjective withdrawal-can one achieve truth. Recollection thus tempts one toward speculative and away from the truth that subjectivity is untruth-the truth of subjectivity itself. The Socratic of Postscript, however, though still shadowed by recollection, resists the temptation of recollection's speculative solace rather to exist: Socrates essentially emphasizes existing, whereas Plato, forgetting this, loses himself in speculative thought (CUP 205). lacks both the condition of the historical God in time and the decisive category of sin, which together would block all recourse to the speculative path back to objective truth; thus it must be the vocation of this existing continually to annul recollection in order to actualize himself. …

Recollection and Philosophical Reflection in Plato's Phaedo

AbstractInterpretations of recollection in the Phaedo are divided between ordinary interpretations, on which recollection explains a kind of learning accomplished by all, and sophisticated interpretations, which restrict recollection to philosophers. A sophisticated interpretation is supported by the prominence of philosophical understanding and reflection in the argument. Recollection is supposed to explain the advanced understanding displayed by Socrates and Simmias (74b2-4). Furthermore, it seems to be a necessary condition on recollection that one who recollects also perform a comparison of sensible particulars to Forms (74a5-7). I provide a new ordinary interpretation which explains these features of the argument. First, we must clearly distinguish the philosophical reflection which constitutes the argument for the Theory of Recollection from the ordinary learning which is its subject. The comparison of sensibles to Forms is the reasoning by which we see, as philosophers, that we must recollect. At the same time, we must also appreciate the continuity of ordinary and philosophical learning. Plato wants to explain the capacity for ordinary discourse, but with an eye to its role as the origin of philosophical reflection and learning. In the Phaedo, recollection has ordinary learning as its immediate explanandum, and philosophical learning as its ultimate explanandum.

Unity of Plato's Phaedo

Unity of Plato's Phaedo

Five Forms of Philosophical Therapy

Philosophy as has become a buzzword these days. If I were old enough, it might remind me of the catchiness of logical positivism in days of yore. The mere mention of the term instills in one some sense of what the disciplinary community of philosophy all about-some sense of the significance (or purported significance) surrounding all the spilled ink. But much like older buzzwords, the notion of philosophy as a slippery one-and for this very reason should probably be held at arm's length until some clarity can be attached to the notion in question. The aim of this essay to articulate five distinct versions of philosophical therapy, each of which in some way implied by utterances concerning the role of philosophical reflection when the term therapy used in a rough and ready way. My aim here twofold: on the one hand, I will suggest, via exegesis, that there no explanatorily significant unifying strand which unites therapeutic perspectives: we have only family resemblance. On the other hand, I will suggest that the notion of philosophical can still be a fruitful one, provided we construe the therapeutic as an interpretive strategy instead of a philosophical position one maintains. My argumentative strategy in this essay can, in a certain sense, be seen along therapeutic lines as well. My aim will be to provide a genealogical account of versions of philosophical that litter the academic landscape in order to better understand what we might have in mind when we call a philosophical project therapeutic. The point of juxtaposing differing therapeutic models itself a therapeutic one: by representing the often vastly divergent approaches to philosophical therapy, I will suggest that we should understand the current cash-value of this notion as an approach to texts and problems rather than as a philosophical position one maintains. Therapy in the Ancient World In one sense, philosophy was construed as from its very beginnings. Socrates aimed at a practice that would effectively rid one of a delusional fear of death-a fear that for too long had led his fellow Athenians to misconstrue their own lives and the roles they might play within Athenian society. The gadfly Socrates aimed to correct the false views of his philosophical interlocutors through a practice which would throw into relief the fact that death was nothing to be feared. Philosophical for the midwife Socrates turned out to be a preparation of the soul for death. Thus in Plato's Phaedo Socrates, in giving an account of the immortality of the soul and the need to detach from bodily concerns, claims that the avoidance of bodily concerns is no other than practicing philosophy in the right way, [it is] in fact, training to die easily (Plato, 80e). Socratic thus the acquisition of the right attitude towards death-an acquisition which made possible by paying proper attention to those things which matter most: namely, matters of the soul. Indeed, the ancient world littered with those whose thought hinged on the practical side of philosophical reflection-on its ability to allow one to cope in the appropriate way with daily matters. One thinks of the Cynics defecating in the street as a means of revealing the emptiness of social practices, or of the original skeptics before the bastardization made possible by epistemologically-centered post-Cartesian thought: a plea for ignorance belied by the thought that commitments can do nothing but harm. The Stoics are perhaps the paradigm case for philosophy as in the ancient world: slaves and emperors who made their primary concern an understanding of the world which would relieve the pain of everyday life. Cicero provides an interesting synthesis of several ancient schools, and hence provides an ideal source for an exposition of the role of the therapeutic in ancient philosophy. His eclecticism allows him to integrate very diverse doctrines in Hellenistic philosophy while still maintaining the view that the fundamental role of the philosophical endeavor a therapeutic one. …

The Deathbed Dream of Reason: Socrates' Dream in the Phaedo

The Deathbed Dream of Reason:Socrates' Dream in the Phaedo David Roochnik In this paper, I discuss the dream that Socrates, as depicted in Plato's Phaedo, reports he had while in prison the night before his execution. I do so hoping that, in addition to illuminating Plato's conception of dreams, my discussion will provoke some thoughts about Platonic philosophy in general. Specifically, I hope to show how reflection on Socrates' deathbed dream leads to a fruitful discussion of one of the central issues pervading the dialogues, namely the relationship between philosophical (rational account) and poetic (myth, story).1 I While Socrates was in prison awaiting the ship from Delos to return to Athens, and thus for the city's ban against execution to end (58b), the rumor had circulated that he had been composing poetry. Specifically, Cebes has heard that Socrates had been setting the tales ( 60d1) of Aesop into a metrical scheme and doing the same with the hymn to Apollo.2 Naturally, this puzzles those who know Socrates; after all, the philosopher, the champion of rationality, seems to have been the dire enemy of poetry throughout his career. As "recently" as the Apology, Socrates had condemned [End Page 239] the poets for not being able to give an account of the meaning of their beautiful poems. They had, he concluded, composed their works not by any rational expertise, but, like prophets and seers, by some natural gift and inspiration. As a result, they could not explain what their own compositions actually meant (), and thus did not know what they claimed to know (22b-c). Why, then, would Socrates himself be composing poetry in prison? Because, he explains, he wished to (60e2-61b1), test what certain dreams () mean and, in order to purify myself, see if perhaps they had been ordering me to make this music () For the dreams were like this—in my past life, frequently the same dream came to me, appearing at different times in different visages (), but saying the same thing: "Socrates, make music and practice it." And I, in the past, assumed I was doing the very thing that they were exhorting and ordering me to do. Just like those men who urge on runners, so the dream was ordering me to do the very thing I was doing, namely making music, because philosophy is the greatest music and I was doing it. But now, since the verdict came in and the festival of the god delayed my dying, it seemed necessary, in case the dream was perhaps ordering me to make music in the ordinary sense (), not to disobey it but to make it. For it seemed to be safer not to depart before purifying myself by making poems in obedience to the dream. In response to his dream, Socrates had composed music in honor of Apollo, and then, since it is incumbent upon a poet to make rather than (61b4), and since Socrates himself says he is no (61b5), no "storyteller," he also put some of Aesop's stories to music. He was concerned lest he had misinterpreted these dreams and the "music" he had been practicing—and please recall the much wider scope of the Greek , which comes closer to meaning "culture" than to our word "music "—ought not to have been philosophy.3 Perhaps he should have been making run-of-the-mill music, poetry in its conventional sense. [End Page 240] With these comments from the Apology and the Phaedo at hand, a workable, even if somewhat crude, distinction begins to emerge. Philosophical rationality, or simply , is the ability to explain what something means in a self-sufficient manner, that is, without relying on any non-rational source such as divine inspiration, and without employing any non-rational devices, such as a narrative. Poetry, or simply , is a broad term meant to encompass all kinds of storytelling, as well as the much more specific sense of verse. As this paper develops, this distinction will be progressively refined. To return to Socrates' dream: it has several features that distinguish it from a typical prophetic dream or from a dream of, as I will shortly describe it, the "standard...

The Limits of Radical Openness

To what extent can the structure of dialogue be used to ground a theory of human understanding? In this paper, I examine Plato's Phaedo, Republic, and Philebus with an eye toward challenging Gadamer's thesis that Socratic dialogue grounds a theory of hermeneutics that characterizes understanding as afactor within experience as radical openness. I contend that there is a basic problem in Gadamer's historical appropriation of the dialectic. This is that the elenchtic ideal of most of the early dialogues of Plato, which underlies Gadamer's notion of privileging process over result in conversation, is fundamentally in tension with reaching an understanding of concepts, and ultimately reaching toward the Good.

Dramatic Frame and Philosophic Idea in Plato

Dramatic Frame and Philosophic Idea in Plato William A. Johnson In a minority of plato's dialogues the central philosophic discourse is presented indirectly, refracted through the lens of a dramatic frame of more or less complexity.1 Scholars typically divorce the question of the dramatic frame from the philosophy of the dialogues: the frame is often simply set to one side by analytic philosophers, and tends to be considered in terms of characterization, narrative technique, intratextual associations and the like by students of the "literary Plato."2 I here consider the four dialogues that mark Plato's most ambitious experiments in construction of a complex narrative frame: Phaedo, Symposium, Parmenides, and Theaetetus. By focusing on the effect that the indirect narration has on the reader, I construct a view of these narrative experiments that puts them together with the philosophic program of the dialogues. Baldly stated: I argue that the elaborate indirectness of the dramatic frame means to reflect, and to make vivid for the reader, not only the remove between written representation and the doing of philosophy, but also the remove between perceptible and Ideal world as suggested in Plato's vision of the Ideas. Phaedo At the beginning of Plato's Phaedo, Echecrates asks Phaedo to tell him about the last hours of Socrates' life. He points out, "None of the people in Phlius go to Athens much these days, and it is a long time since we had any visitor from there who could give us any definite information, except that he was executed by drinking hemlock" (57a–b).3 The reader thereby comes to realize: (1) the conversation is situated in Phlius, a somewhat remote town on the Peloponnesus far from Athens (and far from anyone who might be able to correct or verify Phaedo's account); (2) since "no Phliasian goes to Athens much these days" and "it is a long time since we had any visitor from Athens who could give us any definite information," Phaedo's arrival in Phlius comes at a significant temporal distance from Socrates' death; (3) on the same grounds, the reader is led to wonder how long a time might have lapsed between this conversation and its report to Plato back in Athens (if indeed this is based on a report, on which see below); (4) on the other hand, Phaedo, as an intimate of Socrates, is presumed to be able to provide "definite information" (σαφές τι). Echecrates goes on to ask Phaedo to "be kind enough to give us a really detailed account" (σαφέστατα, 58d2) of Socrates' last day. When Phaedo says that he is willing, Echecrates urges again: "Now try to describe every detail as carefully as you can" (, 58d8). The bulk of Phaedo will be this account, told by Phaedo to Echecrates. The desire for accurate detail is emphasized. But Echecrates' insistence on accuracy sits uneasily with the spatial and temporal remove introduced at the beginning. How accurate, really, is Phaedo's account? The answer to this question—is the account accurate?—is, however, not at issue here. What is more interesting, or at least what interests me, is the fact that the dramatic frame seems designed to bring such questions into play. Bald historical questions (Did Socrates really say that? How does Plato know? Is Phaedo's memory accurate?) may seem unsophisticated, but they are natural questions for the reader to pose—as generations of readers and commentators attest. The questions are natural only in the sense that the text is constructed so as to prompt [End Page 578] them. Questions of historicity arise almost inevitably from the tension in the dramatic frame between, on the one hand, the repeated emphasis on the desire for accuracy, and, on the other hand, the strained relationship—elaborately indirect and distant both spatially and temporally—between the words of the text and the words of Socrates. A further, telling detail appears directly before Phaedo's narrative begins. In response to a question by Echecrates, Phaedo lists the friends of Socrates who were present. In the course of this list, Phaedo famously remarks, "I believe that Plato was ill" or perhaps better (Jowett) "but Plato, if I am not mistaken, was...

The Phaedo - C. J. Rowe: Plato, Phaedo (Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics). Pp. xi + 301. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Cased, £40 (Paper, £15.95). ISBN: 0-521-30796-1 (0-521-31318-X pbk). - P. Stern: Socratic Rationalism and Political Philosophy: An Interpretation of Plato's Phaedo. Pp. x + 240. New York: State University of New York Press, 1993. Cased.

The Phaedo - C. J. Rowe: <i>Plato</i>, Phaedo (Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics). Pp. xi + 301. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Cased, £40 (Paper, £15.95). ISBN: 0-521-30796-1 (0-521-31318-X pbk). - P. Stern: Socratic Rationalism and Political Philosophy: An Interpretation of Plato's Phaedo. Pp. x + 240. New York: State University of New York Press, 1993. Cased.

The death of Socrates and the life of philosophy: an interpretation of Plato's Phaedo

The death of Socrates and the life of philosophy: an interpretation of Plato's Phaedo

Socratic rationalism and political philosophy: an interpretation of Plato's Phaedo

Socratic rationalism and political philosophy: an interpretation of Plato's Phaedo

Death‐contemplation and contemplative living: Socrates and theKatha Upanishad

This paper seeks to argue that Socrates’ thought on the connection between death‐contemplation and genuine philosophising as reported in Plato's Phaedo, is comparable in many ways to the insight on...

Myth and Metaphysics in Plato's Phaedo.

Myth and Metaphysics in Plato's Phaedo.

REVIEWS

Book reviewed in this article: Philosophy and the Philosophic Life: A Study in Plato's Phaedo by Ilham Dilman Wittgenstein's Published Writings in Electronic Form, Alastair McKinnon and Hans Kaal

On the Location of Socrates' Feet or the Immanence of Transcendence

Abstract The following analysis attempts to make several interrelated points. The first is to interpret a line in Plato's Phaedo as a response to Aristophanes' ancient conservative view, i.e., that philosophy undermines traditional views and, a fortiori, morality and esthetics as well. The second is that the line is doubly ironic such that the second turn of the irony is Plato's reply to the ancient liberal view represented by the Sophists — the view that reality, morality and esthetics are only matters of opinion since mere are no transcendent points of reference. Protagoras' dictum that man is the measure of all things means that only immanence is possible.

Myth and Metaphysics in Plato’s Phaedo by David A. White

726 BOOK REVIEWS does not see that the christological options are not exhausted by the relatively crude positions taken by Hick and Knitter on the one hand, and a naively literalistic reading of the New Testament on the other. And this, I think, is because his own arguments as to what is required for faithful Christians rest upon a one-dimensional reading of the New Testament, a reading whose basic assumptions are themselves nonbiblical . But here too, as with the question of truth, the issues are enormously complex, the literature is vast, and Netland can do no more than gesture at the nature of the problem. Of special ethnographic interest is Netland's survey in chapter 7 of the range of current evangelical opinion on the difficult question (dif• ficult, that is, for a Christian exclusivist) of what happens at death to those who have not accepted the gospel of Jesus Christ, either because they are "informationally B.C." (i.e., they have not heard it), or because they were "chronologically B.C." (i.e., they lived before the gospel was proclaimed). Such discussions have a flavor of solemn absurdity to those outside the evangelical fold; their very occurrence should call into question some of the commitments that give rise to them, and they make apparent the severe ·difficulties inherent in the kind of nonbiblical reading of the biblical materials referred to in the pre· ceding paragraph. In all, Professor Netland's book deserves wide reading and discussion . It covers too much ground too quickly, hut it has the great virtue of showing both what must he argued if Christian exclusivism is to he held true, and that these arguments are not yet resolved. University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois PAUL J. GRIFFITHS Myeh and Metaphysics in Plato's Phaedo. By DAVID A. WHITE. Selins· grove, Pennsylvania: Susquehanna Univ. Press, 1989. 316 pp. $45. David White has written a commentary to the Phaedo in order to make clear the purposes its myths serve. There has been a tendency among some interpreters to brush aside this question in their exclusive attention to the arguments of the Phaedo. One of the principal virtues of White's book is to demonstrate that a proper philosophical understanding of the Phaedo cannot so ignore its myths. His demonstration gains support from his insight that the Phaedo is Socrates' swan song. To those who wonder that he does not regard his imminent death a misfortune, Socrates replies by comparing him· self to swans in the following ways: BOOK REVIEWS 727 You probably think that in prophetic skill I am inferior to swans. They, when they perceive that they must die, although having sung their whole life, do then sing mightiest and best (pleista kai kallista), rejoicing that they are about to go away into the presence of the god whose servants they are.... Because they belong to Apollo, they have prophetic powers; and foreseeing the good things in Hades they on that day above all others sing and are glad. But I suppose myself to be in the same service as the swans, dedicated to the same god, to have the prophetic skill from our master no less than swans, and to be released from life no less dispirited (84e4-85b7). The Phaedo, then, expresses Socrates' joy, and though he has sung mightily and well his whole life, on this day he sings pleista kai kallista. White draws attention to this feature of swan song, that the death day's is best, and goes on to predict the same feature within the death day: " as an agent of Apollo, Socrates will speak longer and better the closer he gets to death" (127). The structure of the Phaedo confirms to some extent this prediction. As White notes, " the final proof is the longest of the arguments demonstrating the immortality of soul and . . . the concluding eschatological myth is the longest of the various attempts to depict the afterlife; presumably then both the final proof and the eschatological myth are also the ' best ' of their respective types of discourse" (127). I find White's application of the swan song convincing, with one qualification. He translates pleista kai kallista as " most...

Platonic and Pauline Elements in the Ascent of the Soul in Gregory of Nyssa's Dialogue On the Soul and Resurrection

Nyssa attempts to present the doctrine of the resurrection of the body in terms of the Platonic philosophical tradition but also in accord with the biblical revelation. There are those who believe that he failed to integrate his philosophy with his Christianity. Harold Cherniss in particular claims that Gregory was a Platonist in his heart, and that it was an intellectually dishonest concession to his overbearing older sister Macrina which made him insert Christian doctrine into his writings.2 Charalambos Apostolopoulos considers Gregory to be a Greek philosopher of notable originality who, because he feared the ecclesiastical authorities, disguised the boldness of his thought with pious formulas and biblical citations.3 Jean Danielou, on the other hand, believes that Gregory's thought is wholly Christian, though expressed in Platonic terminology.4 I hope by studying the literary form of this dialogue to come to some conclusions about its unity or disunity. In this paper I shall deal with a short passage which appears especially indebted to Plato, and show how Gregory has woven words and themes from St. Paul into a Platonic warp. I shall consider what message is conveyed by the interaction of Gregory's two languages, the biblical and the philosophical.5 First of all, something should be said about the overall form of the treatise. The choice of a dialogue form in itself shows that Gregory wanted to be recognized as a follower of Plato. It has often been pointed out that his dialogue shows many parallels with Plato's Phaedo.6 In both dialogues the death of a beloved teacher gives occasion to a discussion of the nature of the soul and its possible continuance after the death of the body. Phaedo reports the conversation which Socrates purportedly had with his friends on his last day, and the dialogue concludes by describing the death of Socrates. Gregory's

Myth and metaphysics in Plato's Phaedo

This study intends principally to isolate and describe the function of myth in the Phaedo in order to show its effect on the complex metaphysics developed throughout the dialogue. It further illustrates how these metaphysical concepts structure the dialogue's concluding eschatological myth.