Platform Work Research Articles

Digital platform workers and the conundrum of the definition of an ‘employee’ in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution

There have been many levels of digital transformation from the First, Second and Third Industrial Revolutions. The most advanced level of technology, known as the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), is currently being encountered. The 4IR introduces technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data, robotics, etc. These 4IR transformational technologies also brought the emergence of the gig economy, which enjoyed enhancement by technologies of the 4IR such as big data, that improved the lives of both digital platform workers and consumers worldwide. The gig economy relies on two key role players, namely the consumer, and the digital platform worker. This is evident as there is outsourcing of work done through Internet-based platforms such as Uber Eats, Mr Delivery, Bolt and Airbnb. The Covid-19 outbreak significantly impacted the growth of the digital economy and increased the number of digital platform workers. However, digital platform workers are not protected by labour and social security laws in South Africa. This is because these workers do not qualify to be regarded as ‘employees’ within the labour law framework. For example, s 213 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 and s 1 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 provide for a definition of an employee to the exclusion of independent contractors and, unfortunately, digital platform workers are categorised as independent contractors. This article notes that this exclusionary definition does not accord with the intent and purposes of s 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The article further notes that the limited definition of an employee exposes digital platform workers to challenges such as unfair labour practices and unconducive working conditions, which are also unsafe and unhealthy sometimes. Owing to digital platform workers not being regarded as employees, they also do not enjoy social protection and can therefore not receive social security benefits such as unemployment benefits when they lose their jobs. As it stands, digital platform workers are independent contractors. The introduction of 4IR and the Covid-19 outbreak have made the world dependent on the gig economy and therefore this article argues that this frequent use of the gig economy necessitates the extension of the definition of ‘employee’ to include digital platform workers. This will ensure a definition that encapsulates the changing times in the workplace as a result of technology.

The right of a platform worker to decide whether and when to work: An obstacle to their employee status?

The employment status of platform workers has been vividly discussed in recent years. Digital platforms often argue that the workers’ freedom to decide whether and when to work speaks to their self-employment. The scarce case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as well as the new proposal for a Directive on platform work appears to indicate that opinion is shared. However, the Member States can guarantee better protection to platform workers. The working arrangements of platform workers are similar to zero-hours work in which the worker also has the right to refuse offered tasks. In some countries, such as Finland, zero-hours workers are explicitly considered as employees. Nevertheless, the general definition of the employment contract requires the commitment on behalf of the employee to perform work. This contradiction makes the employment status of zero-hours workers as well as platform workers unclear. In this article I analyse whether and how the right to decide whether and when to work affects the employment status of food delivery couriers working through digital platforms. I use Wolt and Foodora as examples. The issue is analysed in the light of Finnish regulation and European Union law. I argue that even though the case law of the CJEU and the proposal for a Directive on platform work regard the right of a food delivery courier to decide whether and when to work as evidence against their employee status, the couriers can obtain this status through the regulation of zero-hours contracts. Regardless of the fact that generally the conclusion of an employment contract requires the commitment on behalf of the worker to perform work, zero-hours workers are explicitly and exceptionally exempted from this requirement. As the couriers can be classified as zero-hours workers, their freedom to choose whether and when to work does not preclude their classification as employees.

Resisting algorithmic control: Understanding the rise and variety of platform worker mobilisations

AbstractAlgorithms are seen as effective for managing workers. Literature focuses mainly on the functioning and impact of algorithmic control on workers' experiences and conditions. The ways in which platform workers have organised collectively to regain control have received far less scholarly attention. This paper addresses this gap by making sense of the mobilisation dynamics of two platform‐work categories: crowdwork (Amazon Mechanical Turk) and work on‐demand (food‐delivery couriers). These are salient mobilisation cases, as these workers have resisted algorithmic control by adopting specific organising modes, action repertoires and collective solidarities. By analysing a combination of extant literature and policy reports concerning each category of mobilisation forms at a global level over 5 years, the study elucidates why and how these workers were able to act without the involvement of traditional trade unions by showing that specific supportive communities and political activism traditions were crucial in the rise and variety of mobilisation.

Perceived COVID-19 health and job risks faced by digital platform drivers and measures in place to protect them: A qualitative study.

IntroductionAs they deliver food, packages, and people across cities, digital platform drivers (gig workers) are in a key position to become infected with COVID‐19 and transmit it to many others. The aim of this study is to identify perceived COVID‐19 exposure and job risks faced by workers and document the measures in place to protect their health, and how workers responded to these measures.MethodsIn 2020–2021, in‐depth interviews were conducted in Ontario, Canada, with 33 digital platform drivers and managers across nine platforms that delivered food, packages, or people. Interviews focused on perceived COVID‐19 risks and mitigation strategies. Audio recordings were transcribed verbatim and uploaded to NVivo software for coding by varied dual pairs of researchers. A Stakeholder Advisory Committee played an instrumental role in the study.ResultsAs self‐employed workers were without the protection of employment and occupational health standards, platform workers absorbed most of the occupational risks related to COVID‐19. Despite safety measures (e.g., contactless delivery) and financial support for COVID‐19 illnesses introduced by platform companies, perceived COVID‐19 risks remained high because of platform‐related work pressures, including rating systems. We identify five key COVID‐19 related risks faced by the digital platform drivers.ConclusionWe situate platform drivers within the broad context of precarious employment and recommend organizational‐ and government‐level interventions to prevent digital platform worker COVID‐19 risks and to assist workers ill with COVID‐19. Measures to protect the health of platform workers would benefit public health aims by reducing transmission by drivers to families, customers, and consequently, the greater population.

A Third Employment Category for Platform Workers in China: A Tough Start

Abstract In China, labour providers can be classified as employees or as independent contractors. Although platform workers have a certain freedom to decide when and where to work, they are nonetheless subordinate to their employers to a greater degree than independent contractors. However, because they are generally classified as independent contractors rather than employees, they cannot obtain any of the rights accorded to employees. Since platform workers are also unlike employees and have their own distinct characteristics, the mere extension of the labour rights an employee owes to the platform worker cannot solve this problem. A third employment category—an intermediate one between the employee and the independent contractor—may be a viable option that provides platform workers with partial labour rights. The Chinese government has been reluctant to create such a category but changed its stance on 16 July 2021, when it issued the Guiding Opinions on Protecting Workers in the New Form of Employment. This regulation creates a third employment category for workers ‘who do not meet the employee status standard but are subject to some degree of control from the company’. This regulation also grants the group many, but not all, employee rights, such as minimum wage. Given the particular needs of third category workers, occupational injury insurance and other issues should be redesigned to meet these needs.

플랫폼 비즈니스에서의 정보 흐름 모델 개발

This study aims to develop an information flow model for the platform business to provide basic data that helps the social protection of platform labor. To this end, we defined the meanings of platform business and platform labor through literature review in the social welfare and labor economics fields and derived various stakeholders in the platform business such as ‘service client’, ‘platform firm’, ‘operator’ and ‘platform worker’. We also surveyed seven types of brokerage in the food delivery industry. We proposed an information flow model for the platform business by integrating the types surveyed. To verify the proposed model, we designed the quantitative and qualitative questions and conducted a case study on a representative company of the platform business. We modified the former model based on the case study results and finally developed a more generalized information flow model for the platform business.

Corrigendum to “Bottom-up strategies, platform worker power and local action: Learning from ridehailing drivers”

Corrigendum to “Bottom-up strategies, platform worker power and local action: Learning from ridehailing drivers”

Platform Worker Organising at Deliveroo in the UK: From Wildcat Strikes to Building Power

Abstract It has been five years since the first strikes of Deliveroo workers in London in 2016. Since then, workers have continued to organise. The campaigns have involved five different aspects: first, wildcat strike action; second, networks and internationalisation; third, union organising with the Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (iwgb); fourth, legal campaigning; and fifth, wider leverage campaigns. What is less understood so far is the different strengths and weaknesses of these aspects, and how they have contributed to the build of workers’ self-organisation and power at Deliveroo. This article explores the different aspects and considers the effectiveness of each. It concludes by considering what can be learned from these struggles for the understanding of platform work and trade union organising today.

Data Subject Rights as a Tool for Platform Worker Resistance: Lessons from the Uber/Ola Judgments

Data Subject Rights as a Tool for Platform Worker Resistance: Lessons from the Uber/Ola Judgments

Algorithmic pricing: A concern for platform workers?

Technological developments have been bringing about changes in the field of work since time immemorial. Recently, the emergence of platform work has brought up all kind questions. For instance, in the field of labour law, where the questions seem to focus mostly on the topic legal status of platform workers contract: is the platform worker an employee? At the same time, it is also interesting to examine what it means if it turns out the platform worker is not an employee. In that case, other issues arise, albeit in the area of competition law. In particular, one can think of the consequences of the use of algorithms in determining the tariff of the service. In this article, I examine the consequences competition law has for the platform and individual platform workers. These consequences are nuanced and depend on the specific business model. However, it does not seem to be excluded those involved could face sanctions for a breach of competition law.

Bridging the gap between critical algorithm studies and the social sciences

Since the mid-2000s platforms and platform work have greatly proliferated. Although also research on platforms and platforms has expanded, there seems to be a great gulf between IT- and social research on these issues. In this article, I show, using sociologist Maurizio Lazzarato’s concepts, that the technical infrastructure of the platform, in particular the algorithm, has a direct impact on work and the agency of the platform worker. From this perspective, it is possible to ask critical questions about platforms and platform work from a multidisciplinary viewpoint. Methodologically, an ethnographic approach that sees algorithms as part of culture, with its own institutions, impact on people and intersection with different contexts, could support co-operation between different disciplines. When such an approach is combined with insights from algorithm studies, research is also relevant for existing political questions regarding platform workers’ labour market status and the functioning of platform firms.

Accommodating platform work as a new form of work in Dutch social security law: New work, same rules?

AbstractIn the Netherlands, the social security rights of platform workers have still not been formally defined. At present, the level of social security protection accorded to all workers is derived directly from the labour law qualification. In the continuing absence in the Netherlands of specific legislation for platform workers, specifically as regards labour law and social security law, the existing legislation is steering. This means that the platform worker is either included using the status of employee with the corresponding extensive protection package, or the status of self‐employed with limited social protection. For the majority of platform workers, this second option is applied to date. Nevertheless, recent developments point to possible improvements in the social security position of platform workers in the Netherlands.

Bottom-up strategies, platform worker power and local action: Learning from ridehailing drivers

In the digital gig economy, workers generally have limited power and are disadvantaged compared to platform operators, who are usually large technology firms. Workers are often independent contractors rather than employees in this emerging form of work. While beneficial to platform companies, these arrangements place considerable risk on workers. Moreover, the structure of the gig economy presents challenges to traditional labor organizing strategies. To identify strategies used by ridehailing drivers to improve their working conditions and highlight points of intervention for policy makers and labor organizers, we draw upon an analysis of interviews and videos posted by YouTube diarists working for Uber. We find that ridehailing drivers improve their working conditions through business planning, leveraging competition between platforms, building solidarity through social media, and using technology to manage the workplace. We find that drivers favor individualistic strategies and often lack the institutional support and knowledge to benefit more fully from these strategies. We argue that local governments and labor market intermediaries offer the potential to empower ridehailing drivers and reinvigorate interest in collective action through workforce development tools if they build on the strategies these gig workers already use.

Mapping themes for the well-being of low-skilled gig workers: Implications for digital platform design

Platform-based work and corresponding business models are redefining the work landscape. The rapid growth in digital platforms has prospered since the start of the pandemic, enabling various service-based gig work tasks such as Amazon, Uber and Deliveroo. Currently, there is scant literature that examines the well-being of gig workers in the platform economy. In this article, we reflect on the well-being of one category of gig workers, low-skilled service-based gig workers. These workers are often migrants or transient workers who face barriers to enter the job market in a foreign country, need a job to generate an income for the family, often transition between jobs or wish to conduct flexible, temporary gigs afforded by many digital platforms. Informed by an overview of the literature and the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) definition of well-being, our study supports the notion that precarity leads to compromised worker well-being. As a consequence, we identify four themes for gig worker well-being that can be incorporated in the design of platforms to improve the well-being of low-skilled service-based workers: (1) regulatory aspects and contracts to protect the worker, (2) job-related appraisal and reward systems, (3) feeling connected in a work-related social network and (4) algorithmic control and organization of tasks and work. Our study opens discourse on digital platform worker well-being, suggesting improvements to digital platform design to support worker well-being for service-based gig workers and potentially all forms of gig work.

There is a crack, a crack in everything … How European courts counter bogus self-employment in the platform economy

14 | International Union Rights | 28/1 REPORT | PLATFORM WORK IN EUROPE There is a crack, a crack in everything … How European courts counter bogus self-employment in the platform economy The opportunities that come with platform work are great – but so are the potential downsides of low pay, long hours, and precarious conditions. And at the basis of this was and still is issue of the legal status of those working in the platform economy: Are they self-employed as most of the platforms claim or are they actually employees and therefore misclassified? As lawmakers in Europe have mostly taken a laissezfaire approach it is on the courts to deal with this question. In the last years more and more cases have been brought before them and very recently the supreme courts have decided in a number of countries. And it looks that the once solid narrative promoted by the platforms that they are only helping small entrepreneurs to link up with their customers is showing more and more cracks. And as Leonard Cohen sang, ‘that’s how the light gets in’ for those working in the platform economy. In the absence of specific legislation, platform work in Europe is legally assessed using the existing general legal framework and its concept of employee defining the personal scope of labour and employment law. The burden is thus on the courts to adapt the received concept by way of interpretation to the changed working environment in times of digitalisation. There are now numerous decisions, some of which, however, have not yet been decided in the last instance. Two central areas of platform work are particularly affected by legal disputes: passenger transport services and food delivery. Issues connected with other forms of platform work have seldom been raised in the courts. The brief comparison of the rulings below reveals clear differences, but one trend can be detected – platform workers are increasingly re-classified employees although the arguments for this are often different. France The French Cour de Cassation in 2018 ruled that bicycle couriers using the Take Eat Easy platform for food delivery are considered to be employees1. The combination of real-time geo-tracking applications and disciplinary sanctions amounted to a degree of direction and control that warranted the establishment of employment status. The same court also handed down the first national supreme court decision in Europe on the employee status of Uber drivers in 2020. It ruled that in the case at hand there was subordination and that accordingly, the platform employees were not to be qualified as selfemployed but as employees2. The court reasoned that it is not the theoretical possibility to freely choose working time and place of work that excludes a relationship of subordination. Rather, what is decisive is whether the platform worker has economic and financial room to manoeuvre. The United Kingdom In the United Kingdom, the Employment Tribunal qualified Uber drivers as ‘workers’ (in the sense of the British legal understanding) and not as self-employed3. The findings were upheld in the Employment Appeal Tribunal and by a majority in the Court of Appeal4. Uber’s final appeal to the Supreme Court was unanimously dismissed on 21 February 20215. The final judgment emphasises five aspects which justified its conclusion that the claimants were considered workers working for Uber. First, Uber that sets the fare and drivers are not permitted to charge more Second, the contract terms on which drivers perform their services are imposed by Uber and drivers have no say in them. Third, once a driver has logged onto the Uber app, the driver’s choice about whether to accept requests for rides is constrained by Uber. Fourth, Uber also exercises significant control over the way in which drivers deliver their services especially by the rating system and the sanctions resulting from low ratings. And a fifth significant factor is that Uber restricts communications between passenger and driver. Taking these factors together, drivers are in a position of subordination and dependency in relation to Uber and were therefore found to be ‘workers’. Thus they are entitled to a small number of core rights attaching to worker status, including, importantly, those guaranteed by the National Minimum...

Demystifying Flexibility, Exposing the Algorithmic Boss: A Note on the First Italian Case Classifying a (Food-Delivery) Platform Worker as an Employee

In November 2020, the Palermo Tribunal reinstated a Glovo rider and reclassified him as a full-time, permanent employee, to be remunerated according to the applicable sectoral collective bargaining agreement (for the service sector), on the grounds that his autonomy was merely notional, since the platform could organize the execution of work and discipline noncompliance with rigorous instructions issued through the internal booking system. The judge ordered compensation for wage differentials and reimbursement for the unpaid time the worker spent waiting for orders. This case is groundbreaking for two main reasons. First, it results in direct, full recognition of the existence of an employment relationship, proving that current legal categories and concepts have not been superseded by allegedly modern business models. Second, this case reinforces a trend towards the Europeanization of social issues, particularly as regards jurisprudential methods for determining who is an employee and, more broadly, as regards the uniform and effective application of EU policy. This dispatch is organized as follows. After a brief introduction, Section II describes the main facts underlying the legal dispute, as presented by the claimant and ascertained by the judge. Section III is aimed at disentangling the judge’s multi-layered reasoning. It covers four main topics: (i) the legal nature of the service rendered by the platform, (ii) the complementary techniques for classifying working relationships, (iii) the emergence of an adaptable notion of subordination, and (iv) the pervasive role played by management by algorithms. Section IV summarizes the key elements of the ruling and discusses its weaknesses.

Social Protection of Digital Platform Workers under Norwegian Law

The main aim of this article is to investigate some encounters between the Norwegian system of economic risk-pooling for labour engaging individuals, and the emerging digital platform economy. The author argues that Norwegian labour and employment law, as well as social insurance law, may fall short in alleviating the economic strains of the typical digital platform worker in cases of loss of income. This is partly due to legal classification: Where Norwegian labour and employment law operates with two categories of labour engaging individuals: employees and non-employees, Norwegian social insurance law includes three categories: employees, freelancers, and self-employed persons. Employees are entitled to the most comprehensive and high-level coverage of income losses. The legal status of digital platform workers is basically unclear, and they may belong to each of the three categories, depending on contract terms. It is also argued that the Covid 19-pandemic has reinforced the differences between salaried, full-time, employees, and atypical workers such as digital platform workers. The compensation measures issued by the Norwegian state to cover income losses in relation to the pandemic did not meet the needs of the typical –freelance –digital platform worker to the same extent as those of undertakings and ‘traditional’ employees. The article suggests some measures to clarify the legal position and to give a better coverage for digital platform workers in cases of loss of income.

지금 왜 다시 사용자인가?: 플랫폼 노동관계에서 사용자 찾기

This paper is aimed to answer the question who the employer is in platform labor, especially the food delivery labor using digital platforms. The term, platform labor in this paper means “the tasks assigned by the platform and performed by workers in person.” People says we can’t apply labor law to platform labor relations because of its high intermittency and non-exclusiveness. High intermittency of platform labor creates non-exclusiveness of platform worker. Non-exclusiveness of platform worker makes the term “employment without employer.” But those distinct features of platform labor make no logical basis for the reason why we shouldn’t apply the labor law to the platform labor. They do not mean we can’t apply the labor law to the platform labor, but we only have some difficulties to apply the labor law to the platform labor. Then who is the employer in platform labor relations? This paper focused on the disparity in labor market and labor contract. Subornination of employee to employer is not the cause but the effect of that disparity between employee and employer. This paper discussed that disparity based on the followings: ① who makes the decision of the price of the task?, ② who holds the task?, ③ who directs and controls the task?, ④ who assigns the task?, ⑤ who has the opportunity to make interests and the risk of losses? Who corresponds to the ‘who’s in the above ①~⑤ should be regarded as the employer in platform labor relations.

Rediscovering the cash nexus, again: Subsumption and the labour–capital relation in platform work

This article proposes a re-theorisation of the main social relations of platform work, based on two concepts drawn from Marx: subsumption of labour and the cash nexus. Platform work research to date is heavily empirical in character, with little theoretical development. As a result, the social relations of platform work are treated descriptively, using ad hoc or common-sense categories, or platforms’ own terminology. This under-theorisation leads to over-estimation of platform work’s novelty, decentring of capital in accounts of its development, incipient technological determinism and problematic generalisation from emergent trends. In place of the commonly assumed ‘triangle’ of platform work relations, this article argues that platform work is best understood in terms of an emerging labour–capital relation, which establishes a cash nexus between platform and worker as a result of a process of subsumption. This re-theorisation, in turn, helps to understand the rapid emergence of platform worker organisation and resistance, and the similarity of its demands with worker resistance in other, more established areas of paid work under capitalist relations of production.

A Global Struggle: Worker Protest in the Platform Economy

The newly developed Leeds Index of Platform Labour Protest provides an overview of the developments in platform worker organisation and mobilisation on a global scale. Its findings so far reveal that: - The main cause globally for labour protest is pay, with considerable geographical variation when it comes to other causes for dispute. - Types of platform labour protest appear to vary more substantially between regions than between industries. - Mainstream unions play a vital role in defending platform workers’ interests, especially in western Europe, while in the global South, protests are much more likely to be led by grassroots unions. - Mainstream unions rely more frequently on legal challenges, while unofficial unions rely more frequently on strike actions.