Philosophy Of Science Research Articles

Balancing realist review outputs with the needs of policymakers and practitioners.

A realist review is a theory-driven approach to synthesizing evidence based on the realist philosophy of science. Realist reviews are conducted to provide the policy and practice community with a rich, detailed, and practical understanding of complex social interventions that will likely be of much more use to them when planning and implementing programs. Robust realist reviews must balance philosophical engagement, methodological rigor, and relevance to practice. Nevertheless, they have been criticized for being more philosophically inclined and less methodologically robust, with findings that have little implication for practice. Using the philosophy/Epistemology→methodology→theory→practice concept flow, we report how we balanced philosophical principles and practical insights in a recently conducted realist review on participatory practices that impact the benefits of non-communicable disease research and interventions in low- and middle-income countries. If realist review reviews are not comprehensible enough for these practitioners, their utility and relevance may suffer from being limited to a specialist cohort of academics. We propose that realist review findings and outputs must be framed and communicated to meaningfully engage practitioners without undertaking translational efforts.

On the Knowledge of Neural Networks: The Genesis, Characterization, and Justification

This paper systematically analyzes the knowledge generation process of neural networks through the lens of Philosophy for Science and Epistemology. This paper first argues that for neural network’s knowledge to be possible, it is necessary that the truth of the world can be represented by mathematics, since neural networks are, by their first nature, a mathematical model, and this paper provides few arguments that support the mathematical nature of truth. For a central characterization of neural network’s knowledge, this paper argues that neural networks bypass the three inherent limits of traditional sciences, such as physics and chemistry, suggested by Eugene P. Wigner (1995). The three limits are: 1) Traditional sciences are inevitably approximations of the transcendental truth; 2) Scientists will never stop pursuing deeper, more profound scientific theories that encompass more information than previous theories, despite every theory being an approximation; 3) The increasing complexity and depth of the successive scientific theories poses a significant challenge to human intellect. Neural networks bypass these limits by adaptively learning any underlying function to the given data space, without creating any fundamental hypothesis, which are inevitably not transcendental, like that of traditional sciences. This is also another distinction that supports the differentiation between “machine knowledge” and “human knowledge”, as first proposed by Wheller (2016). This paper argues that the only way humans can justify machine knowledge is through Reliabilism, the epistemic justification through trust in the knowledge generation process. Although reliabilism may currently seem unacceptable, this paper predicts that scientists will take control over machine knowledge in the future, as testified by scientists exploring the chemical world, which is similarly beyond direct comprehension. In the end, this paper suggests the necessity of discussing how AI can justify its own knowledge as conscious beings.

Surprise in Science: A qualitative study

AbstractA growing literature in philosophy of science focuses on the role of surprise in scientific practice. The aesthetic dimension of science is also gaining momentum in very recent discussions. While surprising results have been recognised as playing an important epistemic role in science, the literature so far has primarily focused on establishing the power of simulations and thought experiments as compared to experiments and the epistemic superiority of novel predictions over accommodations. In this paper we offer the first empirical analysis of the role of surprise as an aesthetic response, drawing from in-depth interviews with 215 scientists in four countries. We identify what roles scientists assign to surprising results, show that surprise is often experienced as an aesthetic response and identify properties, triggers, and outcomes of surprise in science.

Epistemology and History of Science in the reflections of Evandro Agazzi

The merit of Evandro Agazzi’s epistemological reflection can be found in the following proposal: the history of science should be understood and studied as a meeting point between philosophical reflection and scientific research. Science and philosophy are thus closely united. In the words of Kant, science without philosophy is blind and philosophy without science is empty. Not only that: for Agazzi, the philosophy of science helps society as a whole to better understand the cultural (and human) value of science. Conversely, the history of science helps us to understand the perennially progressive nature of our knowledge. Why is this so? Because we can never disregard the intrinsic historicity of scientific knowledge.The historical approach to science also helps us to understand how scientific development always takes place within different choices. Conversely, epistemological reflection also helps historical research to better understand the development of our cognitive and technical heritage. On this basis, Agazzi worked - in collaboration with Ludovico Geymonat - to spread the institutional presence of the philosophy of science and the history of science (as well as mathematical logic) in universities, especially in Italy. Today, all of us are like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants, since we can better understand the connections between science and philosophy precisely because we can avail ourselves of Evandro Agazzi’s historical contributions.

Operationalism, Science and Technology

Bridgman’s operationalism incurred serious difficulties, and this fact induced many authors to dismiss operationalism per se. Developed beginning in the late 1960s, Agazzi’s operationalism escaped these difficulties from the beginning, but the persistence in it of a traditional primacy attributed to theory over experiment led him to pose an opposition between science and technique that was inconsistent with the general operationalist framework of his philosophy of science. Later, Agazzi sought to make his operationalism more coherent by moving toward a closer relationship between science and technology, that is, toward an intermediate solution which sees them as interacting with one another. However, in order to coherently defend an intermediate solution, it is not enough to find a certain set of properties that would be peculiar to science but not to technique, or vice versa. Rather, it is necessary to specify two distinct (but also complementary) points of view, from which science and technique can appear, at the same time but without contradiction, both as conceptually distinct and as indistinguishable as historical-empirical realities: in one sense, science is irreducible from technology, but in the other sense, they coincide completely.

Drowning in Hegel or the Baptism of Philosophy

Abstract In this contribution, I will focus on Hegel’s presentation of the practice of baptism as found in his work, The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate. First, I contextualize the motif of baptism in its variegated forms in the New Testament and especially in Paul’s theology (Rom 6:4). Subsequently, I situate Hegel’s engagement with baptism in his early philosophy of religion, demonstrating how he refers to biblical accounts of baptism and then transforms them. My thesis is that Hegel transformed baptism from a biblical motif in his Early Theological Writings into an entrance into philosophical thought, as can be observed repeatedly in several of his later works such as the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences and the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Wittgenstein and Toulmin’s Model of Argument: The Riddle Explained Away

AbstractThe article undertakes the problem of a Wittgensteinian background of Toulmin’s model of argument. While appreciating the original character of the investigations set out by Toulmin in The Uses of Argument, Wittgenstein’s ideas taken to be forerunners of both Toulmin’s philosophical method and the particular elements of the model of substantial argument are traced backward, to Toulmin’s earlier books: The Philosophy of Science (Toulmin, The philosophy of science. An introduction, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1953) and An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Toulmin, An examination of the place of reason in ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1950). The technique of pinpointing the constituents of that model in the books preceding The Uses of Argument is superposing the layout of Toulmin’s model on the crucial arguments concerning the earlier books: the scientific one based on Newtonian optics and the moral one concerning keeping promises. Such a procedure allows identifying backing for warrants and argument fields with the methods of representation in The Philosophy of Science and with modes of reasoning in An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics. The former is traced to passages 6.3 ff of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, while the latter—to the concept of word-games (the later Wittgenstein’s language games). The claim regarding Wittgenstein’s background is that in Toulmin’s view of Wittgenstein, some parts of Tractatus concerning representing are in line with Wittgenstein’s later reflections on language games; as well as that the overall method of The Uses of Argument goes along with Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach to philosophical problems that have to be placed in the context of their ordinary use.

Emphasizing “Integrationism” in Twenty-First Century Science: Another Useful Tool to Generate Better Scientific Paradigms Better Quality Science

The core objective of this paper is to emphasize the importance of “integrationism” as a core and a central method, and as a core philosophy of science, social sciences included, and one that can naturally and reliably be used to generate much better paradigms, better frameworks, and better concepts in science, and higher quality and higher order science as well. We also believe and propose that this technique become vital to scientific endeavour as a whole. In order to better perform the task of laying down the bare essentials of this paper, we review our earlier papers on scientific method of which there have indeed been many published over the last couple of years or so, including our much more recent paper on foundationalism. We also then go on to explain and elucidate why inductivism, including methodological inductivism and nomothetic approaches provide the epistemological basis for this paper, and stand us in very good stead. We also examine and explore other essential prerequisites of this approach including the need and necessity of dogma and ideology-free science, coherentism, reliabilism, internal and external validity, accuracy, rigour, precision, and also explain how this approach can be used to integrate and synthesize paradigms, frameworks, methods, and methodologies as well across a broad spectrum.

Is it time for a unified forensic science taxonomy?

Prompted by disparate data highlighted in responses to a Sydney Declaration survey, this paper examines how forensic science ‘disciplines’ are defined and described by various professional organizations. A considerable degree of disagreement in taxonomic organization of forensic science ‘disciplines’ was uncovered. This paper suggests that the global forensic science community come together to develop and implement a standard taxonomic system for defining, describing and classifying the disciplines/subdisciplines within forensic science. Such uniform taxonomic structure could serve to align education and awareness while at the same time contributing to the goal of professionalization. This taxonomy should be built on a foundation based on underlying forensic science philosophies and principles, such as those delineated in the Sydney Declaration.

Building Upon “Foundationalism” to Achieve the Objectives of Contemporary Science: How this can Lead to Faster Scientific Progress and Inclusive Science

This paper is one of our most important ones in the core philosophy of science, and one that we expect to stand science in extremely good stead as well. We believe this can move the needle and push the envelope as well, and lead us to what we have always called “scientific progress at the speed of light”. We naturally commence this paper by tracing the history of the term “foundationalism” itself, right from the time of the Ancient Greeks, renaissance and enlightenment thinkers, and finally to the modern and contemporary ones. Types of foundationalism such as strong and weak foundationalism, modest foundationalism, and then finally anti-foundationalism, internalism and externalism are also discussed and dissected threadbare along with allied and related concepts such as circular logic and reasoning, regress and infinite regress, all of which form a part of epistemology. The core concepts forming a part of this paper such as forward linkages, backward linkages, and traceability matrices are also discussed. We follow this up with the core principles of this paper, and discuss the ideal and recommended direction of research, including the ideal nature of research, primary research, secondary research, basic and applied research, and cross-cultural collaboration including vertical and horizontal collaboration as well. This paper is also much more importantly linked to our papers on sociocultural change, pedagogy, scientific methods, and other papers in the social sciences for maximum impact and efficacy. It is therefore an important part and parcel of our globalization of science movement, and one that will help realize our overall goals and mission greatly.

How to Make Your African Ecology Paper Stand Out to a Global Audience

ABSTRACTThe discovery of the South East Africa Montane Archipelago has unveiled a biologically significant ecoregion with a high level of endemism, showcasing at least 127 endemic plants and 45 endemic vertebrates, including unique genera of both plants and reptiles. This remarkable find highlights Africa's ongoing contributions to global ecological knowledge, despite often being underrepresented in the international research sphere due to biases and marginalisation. To address these issues and enhance the visibility and impact of African ecological research, this Editorial outlines several key strategies. First, it emphasises the importance of making hypothesis‐driven research in ecological studies, following Popper's philosophy of science. Second, it advocates for generalising research findings to broader contexts rather than focusing narrowly on local specifics. Additionally, it underscores the need use clear, generalised terminology and producing detailed, context‐rich maps, so that the authors can enhance the comprehensibility and appeal of their research. Finally, the Editorial highlights the growing influence of African ecology, as evidenced by that the difference in impact factor between AJE and major international general ecology journals has decreased greatly. The Editorial also suggests that by adopting the strategies highlighted herein, African ecologists can further elevate their global presence and contribute more substantially to the field.

Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi: Two 20th century philosophers of science and their present-day importance

Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi: Two 20th century philosophers of science and their present-day importance Ute Deichmann, Director of the Jacques Loeb Centre for the History and Philosophy of Science at the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, discusses two prominent 20th-century philosophers and their distinctive but equally significant approaches to science. Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi shared important aspects of their biographies. Originating from intellectual circles in the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy (Vienna and Budapest) around 1900, they were expelled from their positions in Austria and Germany during the Nazi era as Jews and finally settled in the UK. Similarities can be found in their resentment of communism and their convictions that personal freedom is essential for the conduct of science. However, their philosophies concerning science differ widely.

Minimal metaphysics in moral and political philosophy

The aim of this paper is to apply the methodology of minimal ontological commitments to moral and political philosophy. As minimal metaphysics in the philosophy of science endorses scientific realism, so we subscribe to moral realism, arguing that the presumption of liberty is the fundamental assumption defining a person. What needs to be justified then are restrictions to liberty and, in particular, the application of coercion upon persons. In examining knowledge claims about normative facts going beyond the presumption of liberty, such as, for instance, facts about a common good, we show that an ontological commitment to such normative facts is at odds with minimal metaphysics. We thus show how minimal metaphysics vindicates a Kantian deontological stance in moral and political philosophy: moral realism is limited to the obligations that follow from extending the presumption of liberty to all human beings in virtue of them being rational animals, hence to respect every person as an end in itself.

Suggested metatheory for positive psychology: The organismic systems theory

Positive psychology has been criticized among other things for its lack of a metatheory that would explicate its underlying philosophical assumptions and epistemology as well as give direction for methodology and the forming of constructs, models and theories. This article sets out to suggest a metatheory for positive psychology, combining the systems approach (systems-informed positive psychology, Kern et al., 2019) together with the organismic theory inherent in philosophy of science, biology, neurology and psychology. The suggested metatheory is called organismic systems theory (OST), explicating the following assumptions for PP: 1) active individual (actualizing tendency), 2) functional tendency, 3) integration, 4) emergence, 5) dynamism, 6) self-organization, 7) interconnectedness, 8) holism, 9) subjectivity, 10) boundaries, and 11) adaptation. The systems approach is considered compatible with the organismic approach with their combination suggested to provide the field with a good theory that combines psychological-level inquiry with more general systems-level inquiry. The epistemology and implications of this metatheory for positive psychology are discussed.

Философские идеи Н.Н. Страхова в контексте современных проблем исторической памяти

Historical memory is one of the key problems in contemporary philosophy of his­tory, political philosophy, and social philosophy. Philosophers and humanities scholars discuss its possible specific characteristics based on the contexts of their fields of knowledge, but the contentiousness of this phenomenon persists despite their intellectual efforts. To identify new contexts for interpreting historical me­mory and to reveal new perspectives for understanding its modes of existence in culture and society, the authors turn to the history of Russian philosophy, within which a unique attitude towards history as a fundamental basis of humani­tarian knowledge was formulated (unlike the Western tradition of the philosophy of science, where history is generally treated as a relativizing factor). The focus of the authors is on the intellectual legacy of the Russian philosopher Nikolai Nikolaevich Strakhov, whose concept of the philosophy of science and under­standing opens up new opportunities for interpreting “historical memory”. The authors immerse the problem of historical memory in the following contexts of Strakhov’s philosophy: 1) science as a cultural phenomenon, 2) ethnic psycho­logy, and 3) existential themes that reveal the specificity of communication among 19th-century Russian philosophers, their methods of preserving histo­rical memory, and transmitting its meanings to future generations. Special at­tention is given to two different interpretations of the concept of “experience” in N.N. Strakhov’s philosophy (as the empirical basis of scientific research and as “life experience” aimed at expanding the horizon of understanding reality)

Should psychology adopt Bhaskar’s critical realist philosophy of science?

Robert Archer argues that psychology should abandon its use of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. He recommends that psychology ought to adopt the philosophy of critical realism in its place. I put Archer’s concern with Popper to one side and provide a selective critique of mainstream critical realism, in the light of some developments in contemporary philosophy of science. I express some misgivings about the ontological commitments of Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism, and comment on the limitations of his DREI(C) model of scientific inquiry. In doing so, I also respond to a number of critical remarks Archer makes about replication in psychology.

There’s plenty of room in the middle: The unsung revolution of the renormalization group

The remarkable technical contributions of Michael E. Fisher to statistical physics and the development of the renormalization group are widely known and deeply influential. But less well known is his early and profound appreciation of the way in which renormalization group created a revolution in our understanding of how physics — in fact, all science — is practiced and the concomitant adjustment that needs to be made to our conception of the purpose and philosophy of science. In this chapter, I attempt to redress this imbalance, with examples from Fisher’s writings and my own work. It is my hope that this tribute will help remove some of the confusion that surrounds the scientific usage of minimal models and renormalization group concepts, as well as their limitations, in the ongoing effort to understand emergence in complex systems.

Filozofia nauki w twórczości Izydory Dąmbskiej

In the paper, I present the achievements of the outstanding female representative of the Lvov‑Warsaw School Izydora Dąmbska in the field of philosophy of science. The following issues are analysed: the concept of the philosophy of science, the question of irrationalism in scientific cognition, the problem of scientific laws, and the meaning and role of analogy in science. Following the development of the issues classified as the philosophy of science in Dąmbska’s works, it is easy to notice that she takes a realistic view as far as the concept of knowledge is concerned. However, she also has a tendency to emphasize the importance of subjective factors and the role of so‑called operators in scientific cognition.

QURANIC VERSES RELATED TO HALAL SCIENCE: A STUDY APPLYING THE TAFSIR AL-MAWDUIYMETHOD

To achieve success in the science and technology of halal, numerous kinds of stakeholders, including academics, industry players, and governmental entities, are making a major contribution. Simultaneously, there exists an interest in the discipline of philosophy that includes the discourse on epistemology, ontology, and axiology. This aims to inhibit the publics comprehension of halal science, which is fundamentally factual and scientific. As a result, the fundamental framework for comprehending halal science is through the study of the Quran. This paper analyzes the concept of halal science as presented in the Quran. This literature study employs a systematic approach of Tafsir al-Mawduiyto delineate and then examine the terminology of halal science in the Quran. The study identified three principal topics of halal science terminology in the Quran: first, the truth of the natural worlds creation second, revelation as the foundation of knowledge and third, human ethics and values. These three themes are the philosophy of Islamic science that are the basic paradigm in facing the theoretical issues of the halal science industry.

Referees for Philosophy of Science

Referees for Philosophy of Science