Abstract
Robert Archer argues that psychology should abandon its use of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. He recommends that psychology ought to adopt the philosophy of critical realism in its place. I put Archer’s concern with Popper to one side and provide a selective critique of mainstream critical realism, in the light of some developments in contemporary philosophy of science. I express some misgivings about the ontological commitments of Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism, and comment on the limitations of his DREI(C) model of scientific inquiry. In doing so, I also respond to a number of critical remarks Archer makes about replication in psychology.
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