Abstract
This paper deals with (critical) realism as a contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences. In the first section, critical realism is introduced. Differences from other philosophies of sciences (espicially positivism and falsificationism) are discussed. In the second section, critical realism is criticised: first for failing as a normative philosophy of science, second for relying upon an impoverished notion of knowledge-acquistion, and finally for its unsuitablity as a contribution to social theory.
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