Philosophical Quarterly Research Articles

American Philosophical Quarterly

American Philosophical Quarterly

A Lewisian regularity theory

In this paper, we develop a non-reductive variant of the regularity theory of causation proposed in Andreas and Günther (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105: 2–32, 2024). The variant is motivated as a refinement of Lewis’s (Journal of Philosophy 70:556–567, 1973) regularity theory. We do not pursue a reductive theory here because we found a challenge for Baumgartner's (Erkenntnis 78:85–109, 2013) regularity theory which applies to our previous theory as well. The challenge is sidestepped by a framework of law-like propositions resembling structural equations. We furthermore improve the deviancy condition of our previous theory. Finally, we show that the present theory can compete with the most advanced regularity and counterfactual accounts.

Moral responsibility and general ability

ABSTRACT It is widely believed that an agent can be morally responsible for something only if they were able to do otherwise. But what kind of ability to do otherwise is needed? Despite the obvious disagreements, incompatibilist and compatibilist leeway theorists tend to agree that, at the very least, an agent needs the ‘general’ ability to do otherwise. Cyr and Swenson [Cyr, T. W., and P. Swenson. 2019. “Moral Responsibility Without General Ability.” The Philosophical Quarterly 69/274: 22–40. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy034.] offer a series of putative counterexamples to this thesis. Using their discussion as a jumping off point, I distinguish between two ways in which an ability can be general. I argue that these two types of generality – and the corresponding types of non-generality – are orthogonal and that therefore the question ‘Does moral responsibility require the general ability to do otherwise?’ needs precisifying. In failing to distinguish the two types of generality, Cyr and Swenson’s discussion comes to erroneous conclusions. I show that the ability to do otherwise only needs to be general in one of the ways identified. I also argue that the granularity of description employed in characterising the ability to do otherwise and the granularity of description employed in ascribing responsibility need not match in order for an agent to be morally responsible.

Don’t imagine junk! Positive conceivability and modal illusion in mereology

There is a widespread practice of using evidence obtained from conceiving/imagining for establishing possibility claims. As a case study. I offer a critical reconstruction of an influential conceivability argument, Bohn’s (Philosophical Quarterly 59:193-201, 2009a, Analysis 70:296–298, 2009b, Analysis 70:296-298, 2010) argument for junk (there are proper parts forming wholes, but there is no whole that is not a proper part itself). The most influential scenario used by Bohn and his successors is purported to be junk but not ensured to be junk. This finding calls for an explanation. I distinguish ways of conceiving/imagining that are insufficient to establish modal claims from positive conceiving/imagining, which is more promising. Positive conceiving/imagining often works by a partial structural isomorphy to its target, and it is sufficiently detailed. In order to be sufficiently detailed, it has to properly integrate theoretical considerations. I outline a concern about extant ways of conceiving/imagining junk: they do not yet include a metaphysical understanding of what it takes for there to be proper parts and wholes without a whole that is not a proper part itself, for instance in terms of a non-gerrymandered principle of composition.

Question-relative knowledge for minimally rational agents

ABSTRACT Agents know some but not all logical consequences of what they know. Agents seem to be neither logically omniscient nor logically incompetent. Yet finding an intermediate standard of minimal rationality has proven difficult. In this paper, I take suggestions found in the literature [Lewis, D. 1988. Relevant Implication. Theoria 54 (3): 161174. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.1988.54.issue-3; Hawke, P., A. Özgün, and F. Berto. 2020. The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience. Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4): 727766. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09536-6; Plebani, M., and G. Spolaore. 2021. Subject Matter: A Modest Proposal. The Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3): 605622. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa054] and join the forces of subject matter and impossible worlds approaches to devise a new solution to this quandary. I do so by combining a space of FDE worlds [Berto, F., and M. Jago. 2019. Impossible Worlds. Oxford University Press.] with a Lewisian (1988) understanding of subject matters as partitions. By doing so, I show how subject matters impose some order in the anarchic space of FDE worlds, while the worlds allow for distinctions between contents which would not otherwise be available. Combining the two approaches, then, brings us closer to the desired closure principles for knowledge of minimally rational agents.

The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence: exacerbated problems, renewed problems, unprecedented problems - Introduction to the Special Issue of the American Philosophical Quarterly dedicated to The Ethics of AI

The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence: exacerbated problems, renewed problems, unprecedented problems - Introduction to the Special Issue of the American Philosophical Quarterly dedicated to The Ethics of AI

Quineanism, Noneism and Metaphysical Equivalence

In this paper we propose and defend the Synonymy account, a novel account of metaphysical equivalence which draws on the idea (Rayo in The Construction of Logical Space, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) that part of what it is to formulate a theory is to lay down a theoretical hypothesis concerning logical space. Roughly, two theories are synonymous—and so, in our view, equivalent—just in case (i) they take the same propositions to stand in the same entailment relations, and (ii) they are committed to the truth of the same propositions. Furthermore, we put our proposal to work by showing that it affords a better and more nuanced understanding of the debate between Quineans and noneists. Finally we show how the Synonymy account fares better than some of its competitors, specifically, McSweeney’s (Philosophical Perspectives 30(1):270–293, 2016) epistemic account and Miller’s (Philosophical Quarterly 67(269):772–793, 2017) hyperintensional account.

American Philosophical Quarterly

American Philosophical Quarterly

Orthodox Mysticism and Asceticism: Philosophy and Theology in St Gregory Palamas’ Work

Journal Article Orthodox Mysticism and Asceticism: Philosophy and Theology in St Gregory Palamas’ Work Get access Orthodox Mysticism and Asceticism: Philosophy and Theology in St Gregory Palamas’ Work. Edited By Constantinos Athanasopoulos. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2020. Pp. xliii + 199. Price £61.99.) David Bradshaw David Bradshaw University of Kentucky Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad063, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad063 Published: 21 June 2023

Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress

Journal Article Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress Get access Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress. By Thomas Nagel. (Oxford: OUP Press, 2023. Pp. ix + 70. Price $24.95.) David Gordon David Gordon Ludwig von Mises Institute, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad060, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad060 Published: 13 June 2023

Review: Horror Film and Otherness, by Adam Lowenstein

Book Review| June 01 2023 Review: Horror Film and Otherness, by Adam Lowenstein Horror Film and Otherness, by Adam Lowenstein M. Sellers Johnson M. Sellers Johnson M. SELLERS JOHNSON serves as Citation Ethics editor for Film Matters. His published work has appeared in Film-Philosophy, The Philosophical Quarterly, and the Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television. Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar BOOK DATA Adam Lowenstein, Horror Film and Otherness. New York: Columbia University Press, 2022. $140.00 cloth; $35 paper; $34.99 e-book. 248 pages. Film Quarterly (2023) 76 (4): 105–106. https://doi.org/10.1525/fq.2023.76.4.105 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation M. Sellers Johnson; Review: Horror Film and Otherness, by Adam Lowenstein. Film Quarterly 1 June 2023; 76 (4): 105–106. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/fq.2023.76.4.105 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentFilm Quarterly Search BOOK DATA Adam Lowenstein, Horror Film and Otherness. New York: Columbia University Press, 2022. $140.00 cloth; $35 paper; $34.99 e-book. 248 pages. In Horror Film and Otherness, Adam Lowenstein situates the impetus for the book in the social context of contemporary Pittsburgh in the wake of the shooting massacre that occurred at the Tree of Life synagogue in November 2018 and the death of local horror auteur George Romero the previous year. Lowenstein asks, “What happens when horror comes home?” He proposes that horror films may be a surprisingly profound avenue for addressing and reconciling the social horrors of the real world (1). In fact, fictional horror narratives and their historical contexts can function as a catalyst in rousing social consciousness. Lowenstein challenges the binary self/other distinctions typical of conventional conceptualizations of horror, arguing that the genre instead affords an experience of “transformative otherness.” Throughout this text, Lowenstein... You do not currently have access to this content.

Reason and Ethics: The Case Against Objective Value

Journal Article Reason and Ethics: The Case Against Objective Value Get access Reason and Ethics: The Case Against Objective Value. By Joel Marks. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2020. Pp. 226. Price £38.99 paperback, £130.00 hardback.) Thomas Pölzler Thomas Pölzler University of Graz, Austria Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad057, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad057 Published: 30 May 2023

Introduction, Summary, Questions for the Future

Introduction, Summary, Questions for the Future

Alien technology, conjunction and ergodicity

AbstractIn a recent refreshing paper, Cowie (2022, The Philosophical Quarterly) analyses the hypothesis of artificial origin of the mysterious interstellar object 1I/2017 U1 ʻOumuamua, as well as the wider question of justification of the artefactual origin explanation for anomalous astronomical phenomena. This highly commendable philosophical project should be further developed in order to establish more general methodology for dealing with traces and manifestations of extraterrestrial intentional actors. In the present note, I demonstrate a couple of weaknesses of the standard account, mainly dealing with philosophy of technology, and suggest ways of improving upon it.

Critically Appraising Pragmatist Critiques of Evidence-Based Medicine: Is EBM Defensible on Pragmatist Grounds?

Significant contributions to debates in the philosophy of evidence-based medicine (EBM) have come from a variety of different philosophical quarters, yet mainstream discourse in the field has been largely devoid of contributions from scholars working in the pragmatist tradition. This is a particularly conspicuous omission, given pragmatism's commitment to the melioristic view that philosophy both can, and should, be about the business of concretely bettering the human estate. Two exceptions to this oversight come from Brian Walsh and Maya Goldenberg. Unfortunately, in both cases, the misapplication of pragmatist thinking leads to the mistaken view that EBM is committed to some form of pernicious objectivism. This article aims to revise these pragmatist critiques in order to bring them more consistently in line with pragmatist values and commitments. Doing so shows that EBM is defensible on pragmatist grounds against objectivist attacks.

American Philosophical Quarterly

American Philosophical Quarterly

Animalists on the run

ABSTRACT The animalist population has swelled since they introduced their thesis – we are animals – within the personal identity debate a few decades ago. Now they’re a dominant force in the debate. However, more recently, their thesis has fallen prey to attacks. For example, I [Duncan, Matt. 2021. “Animalism is Either False or Uninteresting (Perhaps Both).” American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (no. 2): 187–200.] argue that, depending on how it is understood, animalism is either false or uninteresting. If it is merely the thesis that we are identical to animals (‘Animalism Light’), then it is uninteresting, because it doesn’t address the philosophical question it was supposed to address. If, instead, it is a stronger thesis – i.e., that we are essentially or fundamentally animals (‘Robust Animalism’) – then it is false. Even more recently, Andrew M. Bailey, Allison Krile Thornton, and Peter van Elswyk [2021. “Why Animalism Matters.” Philosophical Studies 178 (9): 2929–2942.] attempt to defend animalism against each of my two claims. They argue that Animalism Light holds considerable interest and that Robust Animalism can be defended against my arguments. In this article, I contribute to this exchange by defending my claims about animalism against Bailey et al.’s criticisms.

Shareability of thought and Frege's constraint: a reply to Onofri

ABSTRACT Onofri [Onofri, A. 2018. ‘The Publicity of Thought.’ Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272): 521–541.] proposes an individuation criterion for thoughts that purports to satisfy both shareability (the notion that different thinkers, or a single thinker at different times, can and generally do think type-identical thoughts) and Frege's constraint (according to which two thoughts are different if it is possible for a rational subject to endorse one while rejecting the other). I argue that his proposal fails to satisfy Frege's constraint. Then I propose a modification to Onofri's proposal to fix the problem.

Radical Existentialist Exercise

Radical Existentialist Exercise

Yet again, quantum indeterminacy is not worldly indecision

It has been argued that non-relativistic quantum mechanics is the best hunting ground for genuine examples of metaphysical indeterminacy. Approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy can be divided into two families: meta-level and object-level accounts. It has been shown (Darby in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88(2):27–245, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400903097786; Skow in Philosophical Quarterly 60(241):851–858, 2010) that the most popular version of the meta-level accounts, namely the metaphysical supervaluationism proposed by Barnes and Williams (Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 103–148, 2011), fails to deal with quantum indeterminacy. Such a fact has been taken by many as a challenge to adapt supervaluationism to quantum cases. In this paper, I will focus on the very last of these attempts, i.e. the situation semantics account proposed by Darby and Pickup (Synthese 1–26, 2019). After having shown where quantum indeterminacy arises and having surveyed the assumptions endorsed by the participants of the debate, I turn to Darby and Pickup’s proposal. I argue that, despite the machinery introduced, their account still fails to account for quantum indeterminacy. After considering some possible counterarguments, I suggest in the conclusion that one can plausibly extend the argument to those meta-level approaches that treat quantum indeterminacy as worldly indecision.