Abstract
It has been argued that non-relativistic quantum mechanics is the best hunting ground for genuine examples of metaphysical indeterminacy. Approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy can be divided into two families: meta-level and object-level accounts. It has been shown (Darby in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88(2):27–245, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400903097786; Skow in Philosophical Quarterly 60(241):851–858, 2010) that the most popular version of the meta-level accounts, namely the metaphysical supervaluationism proposed by Barnes and Williams (Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 103–148, 2011), fails to deal with quantum indeterminacy. Such a fact has been taken by many as a challenge to adapt supervaluationism to quantum cases. In this paper, I will focus on the very last of these attempts, i.e. the situation semantics account proposed by Darby and Pickup (Synthese 1–26, 2019). After having shown where quantum indeterminacy arises and having surveyed the assumptions endorsed by the participants of the debate, I turn to Darby and Pickup’s proposal. I argue that, despite the machinery introduced, their account still fails to account for quantum indeterminacy. After considering some possible counterarguments, I suggest in the conclusion that one can plausibly extend the argument to those meta-level approaches that treat quantum indeterminacy as worldly indecision.
Highlights
Metaphysical indeterminacy ( ‘MI’) is the idea that indeterminacy is a feature of the world itself, rather than a feature imputable to the words we use (Fine 1975)Synthese or to our knowledge (Williamson 1994)
I focus on meta-level treatments of indeterminacy and how they deal with examples taken from non-relativistic quantum mechanics
That quantum mechanics offers a genuine example of MI is debatable
Summary
Metaphysical indeterminacy ( ‘MI’) is the idea that indeterminacy is a feature of the world itself, rather than a feature imputable to the words we use (Fine 1975). – Meta-level accounts: usually, these approaches consider MI as worldly ‘indecision’ between different possible, mutually incompatible, precise states of affairs. The details vary slightly across models, but the general idea remains the same: a state of affairs is metaphysically indeterminate when the world itself is unsettled between (at least) two possible determinate states. I focus on meta-level treatments of indeterminacy and how they deal with examples taken from non-relativistic quantum mechanics. 4 that this way of modelling metaphysical indeterminacy fails to account for quantum phenomena, even granting all the assumptions requested by Darby and Pickup’s view. 5), I draw what I take to be the moral of all of this, namely, that quantum superposition cannot be understood as worldly indecision between definite states of affairs After considering possible replies to the argument here presented (Sect. 5), I draw what I take to be the moral of all of this, namely, that quantum superposition cannot be understood as worldly indecision between definite states of affairs (Sect. 6)
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