The subject of the study is the cognitive relationship between the concept of responsibility and the idea of freedom. The objects of research are the philosophical categories of responsibility and freedom. The author examines in detail such aspects of the topic as the epistemological disparity of these categories, the difference in their specificity as concepts, as well as the features of responsibility and freedom in the role of effective phenomena. Particular attention is paid to the problem of the possibility of defining or objectifying freedom through the concept of responsibility in those areas where such interaction is most evident, namely: at the intellectual, metaphysical, social levels and in the field of personal being. The main conclusion of the study is: responsibility is a psychological modification of the category of necessity, which returns to the classical antinomy "necessity-freedom" and does not allow making responsibility an epistemological correlate of freedom. This theoretical conclusion is supported by an analysis of the effect of responsibility on freedom in all spheres of human existence considered in the study, where responsibility does not define freedom, but, on the contrary, levels it. The main contribution of the author to the study is that responsibility is considered not as a moral category, but as a structural phenomenon defined through the concept of "whole". The novelty of the research lies in the author's attempt, being in the field of ethics, to separate responsibility and freedom as essentially different and not having a linear cognitive connection concepts.