Postclassical Rationality of Law in the Era of Postmodernity

Abstract

The paper provides for debatable issues of rationality as a general philosophical category and as a legal concept. The author argues for the transition in philosophy and science from classical rationality to postclassical. Classical rationality is based on the presumption of the knowability of the world and the possibility of its transformation in accordance with the reasonable goals of the progressive development of mankind. However, the 20th century demonstrated the limitations of the human mind, unpredictability of the consequences of applying scientific rationality. Hence, the paradox of classical rationality follows: its growth, associated (or manifested) with the development of technology and technology, turns into an increased risk in all spheres of life. Post-classical rationality (post-non-classical, according to V. S. Stepin’s terminology) not only postulates the limitations of our knowledge about an opaque and stochastic world where uncertainty reigns, but also it assumes the involvement of a person socialized in the corresponding culture in the process of cognition (more broadly, perception, nomination, classification and categorization of the world and its development), its historical, valuebased and socio-cultural contextuality. The most developed and elaborated variant of postclassical rationality is the communicative contextuality which, however, is not devoid of problematic issues. According to the author, postclassical rationality of law is dialogical and it includes a transcendent aspect — ensuring the normal reproduction of humanity -- and an immanent one — the legitimacy of the accepted norms of law also in the process of their reproduction. Postclassical rationality of the law norms construction is expressed in the struggle of the main social groups for the right to determine the significance (including legal) of various social problems. The rationality of the implementation of the norms of law is problematized by the paradox of «following the rule» elaboarted by by L. Wittgenstein that never contains the entirety of the prescriptions of its — rule — implementation. The author believes that in order to resolve the problems of rationality of law it is necessary to reconsider classical rationality of law as a postclassical rationality, rather than to reject this category and principle of law.