Socratic Philosophy Research Articles

Plato’s Socrates and a new interpretation of the kosmos

One of the most common problems encountered in present-day research into ancient natural philosophy is the question of when the term kosmos (κόσμος) began to be used not only for order, but also for the meaning of world order. This article attempts to argue that this new interpretation of kosmos is connected with Socratic thought and asserts that the Socratic anthropological turn can only be meaningfully discussed due to changes in the field of natural philosophy. This anthropological turn is best expressed by Roman orator and philosopher Cicero in his well-known work Tusculan Disputations. The article attempts to offer an interpretation based on the belief that the collocation world order presumes a philosophical turn towards a focus on humans and their internal world experiences. For the author’s interpretation, the specific concept of koinonia (κοινωνία) as it is found first in Empedocles’ fragments and later in Plato’s philosophy is important. The article consists of three parts: the first part deals with several traditional meanings of kosmos (Homer, Hesiod, Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Pythagoreans etc.), the second part with meanings that Socratic philosophy (especially Plato, partly Xenophon) assigns to the term, and the final part attempts to argue that it is explicitly Plato who first began using kosmos with the meaning of world or world order.

Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy: The Nature, Method, and Aims of Philosophy ed. by Paul S. Loeb and Matthew Meyer

Reviewed by: Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy: The Nature, Method, and Aims of Philosophy ed. by Paul S. Loeb and Matthew Meyer Melanie Shepherd Paul S. Loeb and Matthew Meyer, editors. Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy: The Nature, Method, and Aims of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. xiv + 284. Cloth, $99.99. This volume brings together well-established Nietzsche scholars working within diverse philosophical and stylistic frameworks to address the question of how Nietzsche understands philosophy. Specifically, Loeb and Meyer aim to investigate Nietzsche's answers to the following three questions: "What should philosophy be? How should philosophy be done? Why, or to what end, should philosophy be practiced?" (2–3). The question of what philosophy means for Nietzsche is arguably central to a great deal of existing secondary literature, from French interpreters of the 1960s and 1970s to the numerous contemporary volumes that take Nietzsche's style seriously as illuminating, rather than obfuscating, his philosophical project. This volume advances that conversation by raising the question of Nietzsche's metaphilosophy directly and in the context of a greatly expanded field of Nietzsche studies characterized by methodological pluralism. Given the wide range of philosophical debates animating contemporary Nietzsche studies, this book delivers a welcome reflective pause, allowing readers to consider contemporary debates in light of Nietzsche's own aims. Though argumentative moves are made a bit quickly in places, often because authors are drawing on arguments they have developed in detail elsewhere, on the whole the essays are well researched, interesting, and intelligent. Meyer's essay tackles the problem of the variety of metaphilosophies espoused by Nietzsche throughout his career, unifying them around a dialectic between the will to truth and art. He offers a compelling explanation for why Nietzsche's early antithesis between Socratic philosophy and art bears such similarity to his later work while differing substantively from his attitudes in the free spirit works, explaining the more positivistic bent of those texts as part of Nietzsche's self-conscious strategy for demonstrating how philosophy overcomes the will to truth and becomes a form of art. This tension between truth and art is explored in several other essays. João Constâncio contrasts Nietzsche's interest in value creation with Spencerian positivism, arguing that Nietzsche's philosophy is an aesthetic activity requiring reflective taste, understood in a Kantian sense. Rebecca Bamford explores how the idea of experimentation in the free spirit works informs Nietzsche's philosophical project, and she argues that Nietzsche's naturalism, rather than being entirely consistent with the sciences, instead incorporates both truth and error as essential for human development. Both Loeb and Marco Brusotti begin with Nietzsche's mature conception of the philosopher in Beyond Good and Evil §211 to show that Nietzsche's metaphilosophy hinges on the notion of the philosopher as a creator of values. Brusotti argues that BGE provides a natural history of the philosopher and associated figures such as the scholar, and he concludes by suggesting, without quite developing, the provocative idea that Nietzsche's autobiographical turn toward the end of his career represents an implosion of his metaphilosophy. Similarly, Loeb differentiates among the types related to the philosopher [End Page 337] in BGE, but he advances an idiosyncratic interpretation of Zarathustra that will be familiar to many readers, arguing that the philosopher's new values are the organizing force pointing superior human beings toward self-sacrifice. Robert Pippin also focuses on the philosopher in BGE in order to consider the religious dimensions of Nietzschean philosophy. While Pippin's meditative style often enables novel insights, his essay here winds without reaching a clearing, and is thus not his strongest example of that style. Antoine Panaïoti uses Nietzsche's metaphilosophy to critique the significant trend in Nietzsche scholarship of forcing Nietzschean ideas into the language of analytic philosophy and its attendant assumptions. Using two key metaphors from Nietzsche's early work, Panaïoti argues that philosophy, as an affirmative task, must guide the sciences rather than follow their lead. His broad critique of analytic interpreters of Nietzsche receives an implicit reply from other essays in the volume. Paul Katsafanas, for instance, pulls a compelling moral methodology out of Nietzsche's work in an essay...

Meditatio mortis meditating on death, philosophy and gender in late antique hagioraphy

According to Socrates, as he is described in Plato?s Phaedo, the definition of a true philosopher is a wise man who is continuously practicing dying and being dead. Already in this life, the philosopher tries to free his soul from the body in order to acquire true knowledge as the soul is progressively becoming detached from the body. Centuries after it was written, Plato?s Phaedo continued to play a role for some early Christian authors, and this article focuses on three instances where Christian women mirror Socrates and/or his definition of philosophy. We find these instances in hagiographical literature from the fourth and fifth centuries at different locations in the Roman Empire - in the Lives of Macrina, Marcella and Syncletica. These texts are all to varying degrees impacted by Platonic philosophy and by the ideal of the male philosopher Socrates. As women mastering philosophy, they widened common cultural expectations for women, revealing how Christian authors in certain contexts ascribed authority to female figures.

Mortal Democracy and Plato’s Apology

The Apology is often read as showing a conflict between democracy and philosophy. I argue here that Socrates’s defense critically engages deeply political Athenian conventions of death, showing a mutual entanglement between Socratic philosophy and democratic practice. I suggest that Socrates’s aporetic insistence within the Apology that we “do not know if death is a good or a bad thing” structures a critical space of inquiry that I term “mortal ignorance;” a space from which Socrates reapproaches settled questions of death’s appropriate place in political life, ultimately prompting a partial transformation of Athenian democracy. I argue here that Socratic mortal ignorance supports a self-reflective politics of death, one which produces many potential responses and accepts the impossibility of closing off death’s meaning in any final sense—an aporia suitable for the unending, precarious work of democratic politics.

“They declared war and made their decision to prefer might to right”: Thucydides on the use of force among states

When we think of the contributions made by the ancient Greek, the philosophy of Socrates and Plato, the plays by Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, or the historical thinking of Herodotus and Thucydides may come to or minds. Between the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, Athens set the stage for unprecedented cultural developments in the history of humankind. However, we sometimes forget that the historical period in which these authors lived and produced their masterpieces was also a time of war and plague. Some way or other, all these authors participated in the Peloponnesian War. And the Athenians, who were a major power at the beginning of the conflict, emerged as the defeated party in the end.The main source of information we have about the Peloponnesian War is Thucydides’ work known as the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides took an active part in the war as a general on the Athenian side. But after failing to protect a city, of strategic value for the Athenians, he lost his position as a general and was forced into exile. It is in the exile, then, that Thucydides writes the Peloponnesian War, seeking to take into consideration the accounts provided by all parties involved in the conflict. The text, though, remained unfinished. And it is unclear whether the order of chapters, as displayed in most modern editions, matches Thucydides’ original plan. It is not my intention here to examine the structure of the Peloponnesian War as a whole. My goal is far more modest: I intend to focus only on a few specific passages in which Thucydides discusses the causes of war and the reasons for violent conflict among human beings.

What can Socratic philosophy achieve? Plato’s conception of care in the light of Christine Korsgaard’s self-constitution

ABSTRACT Can rational arguments convince a person to change from a commitment to living an unvirtuous life into striving after virtue? Or can rationality, even in the best cases, only help preserve an already existing commitment to virtue? Our paper throws light on this question through a discussion of the form of care for the self that Plato thinks is practiced through the engagement in Socratic philosophy, the practice of giving and asking for reasons. First, the Platonic conception of the soul as the object of care is described. Secondly, we consider what care of the soul is meant to accomplish. Thirdly, we consider the pedagogical role that can be attributed to Socratic philosophy in stimulating such care. This is discussed through a critical analysis of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Plato which we draw upon in our previous reconstruction. The conclusion is that the engagement in rational discourse can at best function as a way of preserving the virtue of already virtuous souls, and not as a way of transforming the unvirtuous by rationally motivating them to pursue virtue for its own sake.

As contribuições do pensamento socrático para o ensino de filosofia

Diante do desafio ou da problemática existente na questão do ensino de filosofia, este artigo, tem como objetivo destacar algumas das principais contribuições socráticas para a filosofia e para o ensino de filosofia. Para isso, afirma-se em primeiro lugar, a importância da educação e do ensino para o ser humano. A fundamentação teórica acerca do problema abordado é encontrada na história da educação brasileira, em que se percebe uma forte influência das ideias pedagógicas conhecidas como tradicionalismo e tecnicismo. Depois, apresenta as características da filosofia socrática por meio da maiêutica na busca da virtude e do bem viver. E a conclusão é feita na percepção de como o pensamento socrático se atualiza e na aplicabilidade dos ensinamentos socráticos para o ensino de filosofia nos dias atuais.

The Shortage of Malaysian Stem Cell Ethics in Mainstream Database: a Preliminary Study.

Ethics is a philosophical branch of inquiry that reasons between what is right and wrong. The moral philosophy of Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato from ancient Greek became the basis of most of the western ethics. These days, ethics can be divided based on its inquiries for example, normative, descriptive, metaethics, and applied ethics or based on its theories like utilitarianism, emotivism, and universal ethics. In context with applied ethics that examines issues involving emerging technologies, this study will look into the ethics of Malaysian stem cell technology based on written literature. It was mainly to identify Malaysian literature on stem cell ethics through conventional search since the mainstream international database indicated an obvious shortage. The critical review of this literature will facilitate in the understanding of unique position of Malaysia towards stem cell and its ethics in reference to the limited number. Despite the limitation, this can be a preliminary study urging for more inquiries and exploration to fulfil the multiple perspectives in ethics such as the diversity of Malaysian ethics, the impact of ethics in stem cell regulation in Malaysia, and if western contemporary ethics influences Malaysian ethics particularly involving stem cell technology.

Pojęcie „troski” w filozofii Sokratesa i Platona. Epimeleia i melete

Celem artykułu jest analiza pojęcia „troski” na gruncie filozofii Sokratesa i Platona. Niniejszy tekst stanowi przyczynek do pojawiających się w dialogach Platona dwóch określeń troski: epimeleia heautou oraz melete thanatou. W celu opisania pojęć i ukazania relacji między nimi w pracy badawczej wykorzystano teksty autorstwa Platona, teksty domniemanego autorstwa Platona oraz współczesne opracowania myśli Sokratesa i Platona.

Heidegger’s Socrates: “Pure Thinking” on Method, Truth, and Learning

This speculative essay develops a unique understanding of Socrates by reading Heidegger in relation to contemporary Platonic scholarship arising from the Continental tradition, which embraces Plato’s Socrates as a non-doctrinal philosopher. The portrait of Heidegger’s Socrates that emerges is related to contemporary education and its drive toward emphasizing an academic focus on Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) at the exclusion of the Liberal Arts, with the goal of showing that other forms of “knowledge,” such as the philosophical “truth” emerging from the relationship between the human and the unfolding of Being, while stifled or neglected in STEM curricula, are also crucial to our continued development as human beings. Ultimately, the essay seeks to draw out an authentic vision of paideia by turning to the valuable, albeit limited, writings of Heidegger focused specifically on the historical philosopher Socrates, as opposed to Plato.

Socrates, Democracy, and the End of History

ABSTRACTThis article explores the importance of the Socratic turn to Hegel’s conception of reason in the Philosophy of History. In the “Introduction” to his work, Hegel initially argues that Socrates advanced beyond Anaxagoras, attempting to connect universal reason to concrete human particulars by means of his theory of ideas or forms. Socrates thus turns from the study of material nature to the rational human soul as it is drawn to the good. In addition, Socrates believed that provided one philosophized, one could grasp the ideas in any place at any time. Hegel himself, however, must advance beyond Socrates because the latter failed to understand that the universal manifested itself slowly in successive stages in the historical process, only becoming fully actualized at the end of history. Philosophy, therefore, is only possible in modernity. Moreover, universal reason takes concrete form, according to Hegel, in the modern liberal state, and an individual, having his or her end in this state, achieves her highest potential by obeying and thereby internalizing the state’s laws. For Hegel, I argue, Socratic philosophy—which questions the laws and authoritative opinions of the political community on behalf of gods or ideas that are higher or independent of it—having no grounds in liberal modernity must come to an end. Yet, when we turn to analyzing Hegel’s suggestion near the end of the “Introduction” that Socrates is a philosophic World-historical individual—a type of individual who undermines his or her society to bring forth a new order—we can see that Hegel nonetheless considers Socrates as possessing greatness. I conclude by turning to John Stuart Mill’s portrayal in On Liberty of Socratic philosophy. I argue that for Mill Socratic philosophy should not cease, as Hegel implies, but rather that it is crucial to ensure the flourishing of freedom in the modern, liberal democratic order. Mill’s conception of Socratic philosophy, I argue, is a model of the individualism and free expression that Mill advocates and that we have come to associate with liberal democratic practice today.

What Rules and Laws does Socrates Obey?

Socrates´ thought of justice and obedience to laws is motivated by a will to avoid the destructive effects of Sophistic criticisms and theories of laws. He thus requires–against theories of natural law–an almost absolute obedience to the law, as far as this law respects the legal system of the city. But, against legal positivism, Socrates would not admit that a law is just simply because it is a law: he is looking for the true Just. However, as often in Socratic philosophy, Socrates cannot accept that two equally justified and legitimate rights or moral values conflict.

Isocrates’ Pragmatic Reflective Life at Euthydemus 304d–306e

ABSTRACT This article explores the role of Isocrates in Plato’s Euthydemus, with special attention given to M.M. McCabe’s defense of Socratic philosophy against the sophistic challenges of Euthydemus and Dionysodoros. I defend two main theses: (1) Isocratean philosophy refutes what McCabe calls ‘chopped logos’ (a sophistic theory of logic and meaning) and (2) Isocratean philosophy, like its Socratic rival, is committed to reflection and to the consistency of logoi but, unlike its Socratic rival, it is committed to them for strictly pragmatic reasons. As support for these theses, I argue that Isocrates holds a pragmatic theory of truth, that Isocratean philosophy meets all the requirements of what McCabe calls a ‘reflective commitment,’ and that Isocrates’ particular brand of pragmatism avoids the unscrupulous opportunism that worries McCabe about pragmatism generally. I conclude with considerations about how Isocrates figures into the central themes and drama of the Euthydemus.

Socratic Ignorance and Platonic Knowledge in the Dialogues of Plato by Sara Ahbel-Rappe

Reviewed by: Socratic Ignorance and Platonic Knowledge in the Dialogues of Plato by Sara Ahbel-Rappe Michael Erler Sara Ahbel-Rappe. Socratic Ignorance and Platonic Knowledge in the Dialogues of Plato. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2018. Pp. 296. Cloth, $90.00. Rappe's book argues for a "contemplative" understanding of Socrates and proposes to distinguish between an "outer Socrates," the one who strives for definitions and denies being wise, and an "inner Socrates," who exemplifies a wisdom that consists in self-investigation. The introduction, "Socratic Ignorance and Platonic Knowledge," presents Socrates as being part of the western "esoteric tradition"—as Rappe calls it—in so far as he stands for an initiation to philosophy that is in essence self-knowledge. According to Rappe, this esoteric tradition is not to be confused with dogmatic or ironic esotericism (as in, respectively, the Tübingen school's and Leo Strauss's readings), but stands for a "lived experience" (x). Nine chapters follow. Chapter 1 highlights some essential elements of what Rappe calls "Socratic philosophy" and shows in what sense virtue and self-knowledge are related. Chapter 2, "Socratic Receptions," discusses the "archaeology of Socratic representations" from Plato to Hellenistic times and suggests that there even is room for a Neoplatonic interpretation of the figure of Socrates. Chapter 3 discusses the problems that Charmides raises concerning the knowledge of knowledge and stresses the importance of focusing on the intellect as the essence of our true self. Chapter 4, "Euthydemus: Native and Foreign," deals with the practical implications of the concept of a knowledge of knowledge and describes how the elenchus of the dialogue helps to distinguish between what is 'me' and what is 'mine.' Chapter 5, "Alcibiades I: The mirror of Socrates," focuses on the 'self' as an essential in Socrates's performance in the dialogues. Chapter 6, "Lysis: The Aporetic Identity of the First Friend," identifies the proton philon in that dialogue as a form of the good and discusses its relation to the self, which—as Rappe claims—must be impersonal (Rappe draws here a comparison with the Upanishads.) Chapter 7, "From Virtues to Forms in the Phaedrus," discusses the myth of the discarnate soul and the importance of Socratic self-knowledge as condition for knowing the forms or ideas. In chapter 8, Rappe tries to show that, in Theaetetus, Plato promotes a Socratic concept of wisdom "free of all objects of knowledge" (xxi). She relates this "Socratic emptiness" with teachings of Buddhism. Chapter 9, centred on Parmenides and Apology, analyzes the Apollonian claim that he who knows that he has no wisdom is the wisest of all. Finally, the concluding part reminds the reader of the many facets of the persona of Socrates in the dialogues and argues that this persona functions as a paradigm and model for emulation. The questions that Rappe raises are interesting and her analyses are thought-provoking. One can easily agree with many theses in the book. Indeed, introspection and self-knowledge function as a leitmotif in the dialogues. Even the late Philebus regards the lack of ability to analyze and judge for oneself as the essence of the laughable, and the unmasking of this self-delusion, that is, the call for introspection, is the topic of many dialogues. It is also true that the puzzlement of the reader of the dialogues mirrors the puzzlement of Socrates's interlocutors. This puzzlement is meant to inspire him or her to start a self-investigation; it is therefore part of Socrates's philosophical caring for the soul (epimeleia tes psyches). Finally, it is right to stress the importance of Socrates's performance in the dialogues. Plato himself, one might add, suggests taking into account both the performative and the argumentative aspects of the dialogues: in Phaedo, the narrator is asked to tell both "what was said and what [End Page 339] was done" (58c). However, this means both that one should not separate the two aspects, and that one should not neglect the doctrinal part. I am not convinced that the "inner Socrates" stands for a "doctrinal emptiness." After all, Socrates claims that "invincible reasons" prove his thesis that no one errs willingly (Gorgias 509a...

Formation of the national history of philosophical thought. The phenomenon of Socrates

«Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и конфликтология» — научно-теоретический рецензируемый журнал, обобщающий результаты исследований ученых всего мира в области традиционных философских дисциплин — онтологии, теории познания, логики, этики, социальной философии, эстетики, истории философии, философии культуры и философии религии, а также актуальные разработки в конфликтологии, философии политики и права.

Socrates – his philosophy and dialogical method

In this article I look at the life of Socrates and his philosophy for a bit. Putting spiritual values to the forefront, Socrates considered their creation as the main goal of human life. And since, according to Socrates, spiritual blessings are not transmitted in finished form from one person to another, but are revealed and acquired in the search, in the study of oneself and others, in “taking care of the soul”, so far the rejection of such a search is tantamount to the rejection of life. . According to Socrates, dialogue and the dialectic (question-answer) method of defining concepts are necessary conditions for a joint search for truth. The Socratic Dialogue and Dialectic method assumes the freedom of a person and is based on the democratic idea that man is a responsible being, capable of knowing the truth and making decisions at his own peril and risk. Through the "test" of irony, Socrates exposed the unjustified claims of omniscience and infallibility, overthrowing all imaginary, pseudo-serious and all sorts of false authorities. Socratic irony is a search for true and positive, a call for a truly serious and significant, for their constant ordeal. Socrates proclaimed: virtue is knowledge. But not all knowledge in general, but only good and evil, knowledge that leads to right, virtuous deeds. On this basis, he came to the conclusion that no one is angry at will, but only out of ignorance. The ethical paradoxes of Socrates marked the beginning of the ongoing and to this day controversy about the relationship of knowledge and virtue. The idea of Socrates about self-knowledge, popular in the period of antiquity, often became the leading idea at the turning points of history and significantly changed the way people thought. Socrates, who spoke of the impossibility of final knowledge about something (“I know that I do not know anything”), was equally known as the fact that a person is able to acquire knowledge and multiply it, as well as that knowledge and “art” by themselves - great power. However, he was convinced that this power could be used both for the good and to the detriment of man. According to his teaching, if a person did not make the question of self-knowledge, the alternative to good and evil, while consciously preferring good, any other knowledge — for all their usefulness — would not make a person happy if he did not make his main issue. Moreover, they can make him miserable. It is not surprising, therefore, that Socrates' doctrine of self-knowledge is in close connection with the discussions that have been conducted lately not only in philosophical and scientific circles, but also among wide circles of intelligentsia both in our country and around the world around the problems of “man - science - technology, "science - ethics - humanism". The themes of these discussions echo the Socratic understanding of the task of philosophy and the value of knowledge in general. These discussions and discussions are often accompanied by direct and indirect references to the teachings and personality of Socrates. And this is not by chance: polls, over which the ancient philosopher fought, did not lose relevance, which is why Socrates was and remains one of the eternal “companions” of humanity. Thus, the philosophy of Socrates not only made a great impression on his contemporaries and students, but also had a noticeable influence on the entire subsequent history of philosophical and political thought.

Kierkegaard’s Existential Conception of the Relationship Between Philosophy and Christianity

Abstract This paper explores the implications of Kierkegaard’s concern with the existential meaning of Christianity on his treatment of the relationship between philosophy and theology. It will be argued that Kierkegaard offers an existential corrective to the predominantly scholarly-scientific engagement with this debate, to point to the much more serious matter of the individual’s existence and the impossible difficulty and challenge that the religious sphere poses to the human being, both epistemologically and ethically. This will be shown by taking into account Kierkegaard’s definitions of the terms philosophy, theology, and Christianity, as well as the distinction he draws between objective and subjective philosophy: Whereas Kierkegaard separates from Christianity what can be termed objective philosophy (in particular Hegelian-speculative philosophy), subjective philosophy (specifically Socratic philosophy) is revealed to have a much more complex relationship to the religious sphere. Socratic philosophy’s relationship to Christianity is ultimately kept in a dynamic tension of similarity and dissimilarity, or analogy and contrast, which reflects the difficulty of Christian existence. As such, this reconceptualised debate, for Kierkegaard, does not belong within a scholarly academic context, but rather annihilates such inquiry.

Socratic Silence in the Cleitophon

Plato’s Cleitophon is the only dialogue in which Plato presents an unanswered rebuke of Socratic philosophy by an interlocutor. Consequently, most commentators have thus rejected the dialogue as inauthentic, or have otherwise explained away the bewildering Socratic silence at the dialogue’s conclusion. In this paper I explore why Socrates chooses silence as the response to Cleitophon’s rebuke of Socrates. I argue that (and why) Socratic silence is the only way of “talking” with Cleitophon: Cleitophon’s “Socratic speech” implies notions about nomos, the soul, and philosophy that turn out to be uniquely anti-Socratic. The dramatic disjunctions between Cleitophon’s distorted image of Socrates and the real Socrates, and between Cleitophon himself and Socrates, not only make most poignant the tension between the philosopher and the city but also point to the very conditions of philosophical dialogue.

Saznanje u atletici - od prakse do inovacija

Continuous improvement of practical and theoretical knowledge represents the basis for further cognitive paradigm and innovations leading to new, more efficient practice in athletics. The need for affirmation of knowledge (everything we know) stimulates the process of acquiring knowledge about a human in this sports discipline (ontological context) including knowledge based on scientific-research work (methodological context). It is a fact that application of the scientific method has led to new knowledge in favour of athletic practice and to establishment of new cognitive horizons in studying the scope of human sports performances. The source of knowledge is athletic theory and practice. At the same time they are the starting point for studying dynamics of human performances manifested through various athletic disciplines. For a number of analysers, results achieved on big athletic competitions provoked a discussion about platforms and 'conservation' of human abilities, whereas for the others it was a starting point for inquiry about the final reach of knowledge about human athletic being (gnoseological context). The origin of knowledge about the athletic being of humans dates back to the ancient philosophy of Plato and Socrates. us it can be claimed that the source of knowledge is as old as discussions about nature of change of a human being under the influence of exercising. In this study athletics is presented through the space of knowledge (subject of the study) integrating primordial and scientific with the outcome such as new and efficient training and competition practice.

Hunting Hares and Lovers: Socrates’ Playful Lesson in Xenophon, Memorabilia III, 11

Memorabilia III, 11 is a masterly example of Socrates’ ability to combine seriousness with playfulness. By comparing Theodote’s search for so-called “friends” with the hunt for hares (III, 11, 6–9), Socrates describes the heteroerotic matrix of the hetaira’s economics in terms usually associated with male-male relationships. To give Theodote a lesson on the ethical values of friendship (philia), he uses euphemistic language and constantly alternates (gender) roles, being either the philosopher and lover, or the object of desire. Socrates ultimately proves to be a perfect connoisseur of a hetaira’s expertises, witchcraft and alluring talk, easily outdoing the wealthy Theodote herself. By this means, Memorabilia III, 11 offers a delightful picture both of Socratic teaching and of the erotic structure of Socratic philosophy.