Philippine President Research Articles

Message - Philippine President

Message - Philippine President

Epistemic Modality in the Inaugural Speeches of Philippine Presidents

This qualitative corpus-based study employing epistemic analysis uncovered the epistemic modality (EM) markers used and their communicative functions in the seven inaugural speeches of the seven Philippine 5th Republic presidents. The findings revealed the preponderant use of epistemic modal verbs with 152 occurrences (81.72%), followed by epistemic lexical verbs with 20 occurrences (10.75%), epistemic modal adverbs with 9 occurrences (4.84%), and epistemic modal adjectives with 5 occurrences (2.69%). Moreover, the top-five modal verbs operated in the presidential inaugurals are will with 97 instances (66.9%), can with 28 instances (19.31%), shall with 9 instances (6.21%), would with 6 instances (4.14%), and could with 5 instances (3.44%). Meanwhile, should and might were never used by any president. In this regard, the presidents are confident, committed, bold, and certain with their statements; some are tentative and quite confident but still communicatively sensitive and polite; and few are uncertain but still diplomatic. Further, the communicative functions of the EM markers were categorized to high-intermediate-low modality values, certain-probable-possible semantic meanings, and close-near-distant epistemic distances.

A Comparative Discourse Analysis of Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s and Joseph Biden Jr.’s Inaugural Speeches

This study aimed to analyze and describe the structure, concepts and language use of the inauguration speeches delivered by Philippine President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Romualdez Marcos Jr. and US President Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., as well as the reasons for their selection. The researchers used a descriptive and qualitative research design to extract data from the transcripts of the two speeches. The findings revealed that both presidents used similar speech structures during their inaugurations, acknowledging important people, recognizing the historical significance of their inaugurations, and expressing hope for the future of their countries. The study also identifies the implications of the content of the message in the inaugural speeches of the two presidents. President Biden Jr. focused on racial fairness, honesty, and unity, while President Marcos Jr. advocated unity and hope for the future. Both presidents employed directive speech acts to encourage certain behaviors and attitudes, illustrating their different leadership viewpoints. It is recommended for linguistics students to have further readings in the application of Speech Act in comparative discourse analysis for political speeches, teachers should encourage more students to conduct research, parents should be aware of the implications of political speeches, administrators should motivate students to conduct study using quantitative research, and future researchers should focus on developing a more nuanced understanding of the discourses used by political leaders in different contexts and investigating the impact of political discourses on public opinion.

Epistemic Modality in the Inaugural Speeches of Philippine Presidents

This qualitative corpus-based study employing epistemic analysis uncovered the epistemic modality (EM) markers used and their communicative functions in the seven inaugural speeches of the seven Philippine 5th Republic presidents. The findings revealed the preponderant use of epistemic modal verbs with 152 occurrences (81.72%), followed by epistemic lexical verbs with 20 occurrences (10.75%), epistemic modal adverbs with 9 occurrences (4.84%), and epistemic modal adjectives with 5 occurrences (2.69%). Moreover, the top-five modal verbs operated in the presidential inaugurals are will with 97 instances (66.9%), can with 28 instances (19.31%), shall with 9 instances (6.21%), would with 6 instances (4.14%), and could with 5 instances (3.44%). Meanwhile, should and might were never used by any president. In this regard, the presidents are confident, committed, bold, and certain with their statements; some are tentative and quite confident but still communicatively sensitive and polite; and few are uncertain but still diplomatic. Further, the communicative functions of the EM markers were categorized to high-intermediate-low modality values, certain-probable-possible semantic meanings, and close-near-distant epistemic distances.

Decoding the Duterte Doctrine: Understanding Strategic Changes in Philippine Foreign Policy during Duterte Administration

This article employs a sophisticated neoclassical realist framework to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the intricate landscape of Philippine foreign policy under the administration of former Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, elucidating the contours of the so-called “The Duterte Doctrine”. This encompasses a nuanced exploration of the nation's role as a middle power, focusing on the pillars of national security, economic diplomacy, and the safeguarding of overseas Filipinos. Employing an analytical lens that intricately weaves systemic pressures and domestic imperatives, the study meticulously unravels the historical trajectory of Philippines-USA relations and the evolving dynamics in the Philippines-China relationship. Methodologically, a discerning review of historical events, policy decisions, and diplomatic maneuvers is undertaken to unveil discernible patterns and strategic recalibrations within the nation's foreign policy landscape. The main findings underscore a diplomatic chess game in the Philippines-China relationship, marked by a strategic departure in defense posture with the cessation of joint military exercises with the U.S. Economic diplomacy, encapsulated in the Duterte Doctrine, manifests as a fervent pursuit of diversified economic partnerships, concurrently raising cogent concerns about potential economic dependence. The analysis accentuates the adaptive resilience of Philippine foreign policy in response to the evolving global landscape, thereby substantively contributing to regional stability. As a middle power, the Philippines astutely leverages its agency amid great power competition while assiduously upholding principles of international law and justice, necessitating nuanced and context-specific approaches to maintain a delicate balance between traditional alliances and emerging economic partnerships.

The Philippine Presidency and Middle-Power Agency

The Philippine Presidency and Middle-Power Agency

Domestic imperative of the Philippines’ South China Sea policy: personality-driven policymaking and constant shifts between China and the United States

This article aims to explain the oscillations of the Philippines’ South China Sea policy vis-à-vis China between accommodation and confrontation from 1991 to 2022. It argues that the Philippines’ personality-driven foreign policymaking was conducive to dramatic shifts in position on the South China Sea issue. The presidential system of government and patronage politics in the Philippines give the presidential inner circles considerable leeway to shape and reshape the country’s foreign policy. Despite being constrained by domestic socio-political conditions at a given time as well as the political and security thinking embedded in its domestic politics, individual Philippine presidents and/or the presidential circles managed the South China Sea issue vis-à-vis China and the United States in particular ways according to their different sets of personal beliefs, professional expertise, and practical experience. This explains why the power transitions in the Philippines often caused major shifts in its management of the South China Sea disputes over time.

A Book Review of Capturing Aguinaldo: The Daring Raid to Seize the Philippine President at the Dawn of the American Century

A Book Review of Capturing Aguinaldo: The Daring Raid to Seize the Philippine President at the Dawn of the American Century

Transnational Affect and the Making of a Moral Public: The War on Drugs in the Philippines

In 2019, IBON International and the Campaign for Human Rights in the Philippines UK (CHRP-UK) made preparations for some relatives of some of the victims of former Philippine President Duterte’s war on drugs to travel to meet members of the European Parliament as well as diasporic and other publics in Europe and the UK. At the same time, the play Tao Po! – ‘Is Anybody There?’ – a dramatic monologue exploring different perspectives of those involved in Duterte’s drug war including those of victims and perpetrators, was touring Europe. These affectively saturated actions and performances were accompanied by social media posts on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, among other platforms, using hashtags such as #Stopthekillingsph and #Warondrugsph. I juxtapose two very different interpretations of these actions and performances. On the one hand, I frame them as elements of a political strategy performed to solicit particular affective responses as a means of assembling a transnational public that could bring international political pressure to bear on the Duterte regime. On the other hand, I suggest that these actions were performed to cultivate a sense of belonging to a moral public. I conclude by arguing that the enactment of affects such as grief and loss – affects which are constitutive of the war on drugs – suggests a model of social and political change that works from the bottom-up, with affective experience as the primary catalyst.

The Marcos Administration’s Foreign Policy towards the Great Powers: Seeking the Elusive Balance in Dealing a Changing Indo-Pacific Region

This article examines the Marcos administration’s efforts to seek the elusive balance in managing its relations with the United States, China and Japan. At the beginning of his term, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr planned a balanced foreign policy marked by China providing the investments and market for the Philippines while the United States extended its security guarantee. In conclusion, the article argues that Marcos Jr’s foreign policy reflects the Philippines’ acumen in practising ASEAN’s age-old and proven statecraft in dealing with the significant powers that require the smaller Southeast Asian countries to accept the presence of big powers in Southeast Asia as a fact of international relations.

A View of Philippine Government Corruption: The Harry Stonehill Scandal Revisited

The corruption scandal involving American businessman Harry Stonehill in the 1960s showed how corruption permeated high government offices in the Philippines. The scandal was the biggest controversy in terms of political and social impact up to that time, and it changed the political fortunes of political leaders like Diosdado Macapagal who lost his bid for a second term for the Philippine presidency in 1965. The Stonehill affair would be later superseded by future corruption scandals in the latter decades such as those involving President Ferdinand Marcos, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Rodrigo Duterte. Corruption always involves two parties: the one that provides the opportunity to do corrupt acts and the other who does the actual corruption. In the case of Stonehill, his rise to prominence as a genius in Philippine business would not be possible without him providing bribes in exchange for favors and advantages. It also made him feel untouchable as he felt “everyone has a price” and he could get away with anything. On the other hand, officials who became corrupt also developed the same impunity knowing that they would not be held accountable for their acts. They developed ways and means to hide their corruption and its fruits which is ill-gotten wealth. This article examines corruption in the Philippines and the factors which led to its pervasiveness in Philippine society. By revisiting the Stonehill scandal in the 1960s, it studies the modes developed by corrupt officials in hiding their wealth and how the Philippine legal system failed in deterring acts of corruption.

A View of Philippine Government Corruption: The Harry Stonehill Scandal Revisited

The corruption scandal involving American businessman Harry Stonehill in the 1960s showed how corruption permeated high government offices in the Philippines. The scandal was the biggest controversy in terms of political and social impact up to that time, and it changed the political fortunes of political leaders like Diosdado Macapagal who lost his bid for a second term for the Philippine presidency in 1965. The Stonehill affair would be later superseded by future corruption scandals in the latter decades such as those involving President Ferdinand Marcos, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Rodrigo Duterte. Corruption always involves two parties: the one that provides the opportunity to do corrupt acts and the other who does the actual corruption. In the case of Stonehill, his rise to prominence as a genius in Philippine business would not be possible without him providing bribes in exchange for favors and advantages. It also made him feel untouchable as he felt “everyone has a price” and he could get away with anything. On the other hand, officials who became corrupt also developed the same impunity knowing that they would not be held accountable for their acts. They developed ways and means to hide their corruption and its fruits which is ill-gotten wealth. This article examines corruption in the Philippines and the factors which led to its pervasiveness in Philippine society. By revisiting the Stonehill scandal in the 1960s, it studies the modes developed by corrupt officials in hiding their wealth and how the Philippine legal system failed in deterring acts of corruption.

Understanding Voters' Preference for Candidates in the Philippine Presidential Elections

Philippine presidential elections have traditionally been characterized by the dominance of political popularity, populism, and financial interests, often marred by incidents of violence and electoral fraud. In this context, higher education is recognized as a pivotal tool for mitigating voter naivety and fostering informed political engagement. This study seeks to assess the preferences of voters, specifically 108 students from BiPSU (the research population), and to identify the significant sources of information that influence their decision-making about the election.

Geopolitical luck or crisis?:Communicating China’s Built and Road Initiative amidst South China Sea Dispute

As the maritime dispute in the South China Sea (West Philippine Sea) continues, this paper speculates on the possible outcomes of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's sustained commitment to have stronger trade ties with China by participating in the Built and Road Initiative (BRI). During Chinese President Xi Jinping's official visit to the United States last year, 29 bilateral agreements were inked. When it comes to military, security, law enforcement, maritime cooperation, transnational crime, and other issues, China, Asia's biggest economy, has both agreements and worries. Even if mistrust in Asia's economic superpower is growing due to debt trap concerns and a maritime dispute, there is still hope for achieving the American goal of financial security because of the government's cooperative influence on China's power aspirations. Although estimates on total investments differ, Chatzky and McBride (2019) cite Morgan Stanley as saying China's entire costs throughout the duration of the Built and Road Initiative (BRI) might reach $1.2-1.3 trillion by 2027.
 In conclusion, the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations need to have room for conversation and cooperation in order to construct shared progress. According to Gou and Yang (2017), it is clear that all Asian nations want to maintain cordial ties with China. China's US$40 billion funding schemes, via the 21st century Maritime Silk Road, may accelerate regional infrastructure development and integration, and there are strong cultural and people-to-people links. The economy and increasing middle class provide significant prospects.

Pretending to Support? Duterte's Popularity and Democratic Backsliding in the Philippines

Abstract The incumbent-led subversion of democracy represents the most prevalent form of democratic backsliding in recent decades. A central puzzle in this mode of backsliding is why these incumbents enjoy popular support despite their actions against democracy. We address this puzzle using the case of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. Although some Philippine analysts have speculated that his popularity was inflated due to social desirability bias (SDB) among survey respondents, there has been limited empirical examination. Our pre-registered list experiment surveys conducted in February/March 2021 detected SBD-induced overreporting at about 39 percentage points in face-to-face surveys and 28 percentage points in online surveys. We also found that the poor Mindanaoans, and those who believed their neighbors supported Duterte, were more likely to respond according to SDB. These possibly counter-intuitive results should be interpreted with caution because the survey was conducted during the height of the COVID-19 lockdown, and the findings cannot necessarily be extrapolated to the other period of his presidency. Nevertheless, this study suggests that preference falsification could be an alternative explanation for the puzzle of popular incumbents in democratic backsliding.

When fake news infects political networks: case study of the Tallano gold myth in the Philippines

Mis-/disinformation has increasingly become a global threat to democratic societies, creating distrust in institutions, fomenting deep societal divisions, and disrupting democratic elections. To complement earlier studies on the Philippines, this paper develops a case study approach to analyze one specific false narrative that went “viral” prior to and during the Philippine Presidential elections in 2022. Specifically, this paper examines the Tallano gold myth, using an empirical analysis of an extensive social media dataset of almost 24,000 social media posts compiled using CrowdTangle. Three key sets of messages appear central to the myth: (1) Marcos gold is critical for economic revival; (2) Marcos’ wealth is legitimate; and (3) the opposition wants to steal the gold. This paper finds evidence that the Tallano gold myth spread across partisan groups prior to the 2022 Presidential elections, proving difficult to overcome with mere fact-checking efforts. A final section concludes by briefly reviewing various country responses to fake news, and outlining possible policy responses with an eye to their possible timing in the virality pattern. Lessons from this case study emphasize the need to catch fake news in time to stop them from reaching virality and generating large adverse impacts on society.

The Illusion of Neutralism: The Indigenous Third Force and the Filipino Republic from the Late 1940s to the 1950s

Abstract It often has been an illusion that Filipinos lack indigeneity due to the ties with the United States since 1898. Lost in these mists were the indigenous agendas that lay underneath the official narratives. The article presents a background and then examines the administration of Elpidio Quirino, president of the Philippines from 1948 to 1953, particularly his neutralist Pacific Pact initiative and the failed use of military force against the Huks. It concludes with a discussion of the rise of Ramón Magsaysay. It then examines Magsaysay, Philippine president from 1953 to 1957, beginning as defense secretary, support from the United States, the Magsaysay myth, his counterinsurgency campaign against the Huks, his election as president, international leadership, and legacies after his death. The study will show how the top-down policies of Quirino reliant on military force gave way to the unifying, reformist, inclusive, and inspirational leadership of Magsaysay, which became a kind of third force apart from the oligarchy and the Communists.

The Philippines’ Surprising Veer West

Many observers expected Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr, to maintain a hedging approach towards the United States and China following his mid-2022 election. Instead, he has highlighted differences with Beijing and sought closer ties with Washington, completing a long-awaited expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the US and authorising unprecedentedly large joint military exercises between the two countries. While China’s coercive behaviour towards the Philippines in the South China Sea is a major factor, Marcos has proven to be instinctively pro-American; the Armed Forces of the Philippines have generally supported the US alliance; and the US has worked harder to engage Manila. Unless Beijing dials back its activities in the South China Sea, Manila and Washington’s rejuvenated security relationship looks likely to endure as long as Marcos is in office.

China–Asean Relations January 2023 to March 2023: Chronology of Events

China–Asean Relations January 2023 to March 2023: Chronology of Events Ryan Ho (bio) As a research institute based in Singapore, the EAI monitors developments in relations and interactions between China and the individual countries of Southeast Asia as well as the ASEAN grouping as a whole. This material is presented in the form of (i) a chronology of events and (ii) a list of important documents. —the Editors JANUARY 2023 2nd Indonesia joins the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The entry into force of the RCEP for Indonesia is an important step towards its full implementation. Under the RCEP, on the basis of the agreements under the China–ASEAN free trade area, Indonesia has granted zero tariff treatment to over 700 additional Chinese products, including some auto parts, motorcycles, televisions, clothing, shoes, plastic products, luggage and chemical products. China’s Ministry of Commerce says that the RCEP agreement will inject new impetus into regional economic integration, regional and global economic growth, and promote regional industrial and supply chain cooperation. 4th Chinese Premier Li Keqiang of the State Council meets with the visiting Philippines President Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr. at the Great Hall of the People. Li stresses that cooperation is key to China–Philippines bilateral relations, and that maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea serves the interests of countries in the region, including China and the Philippines. Marcos also maintains that Philippines–China [End Page 214] relations are of great importance to both sides and to the Asia-Pacific region. 14th Chinese President Xi Jinping and General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Central Committee Nguyen Phu Trong send congratulatory letters to each other for the Spring Festival. Xi comments that China and Vietnam are a community with a shared future that bears strategic significance and China regards Vietnam as a priority in its neighbourhood diplomacy. 16th Chinese Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs of the Foreign Ministry Liu Jinsong holds a video meeting with the Director-General of the Department of East Asian Affairs at the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chatchai Viriyavejakul. Both sides agree to expand cooperation in fields such as the digital economy and scientific and technological innovation, and help Thailand promote the bio-circular-green economic model. Both sides are also keen to explore cultural cooperation and promote development of cultural programmes. FEBRUARY 2023 4th The 22nd Meeting of ASEAN Tourism Ministers Plus Three (22nd M-ATM Plus Three), co-chaired by Indonesian Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno and Japanese State Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Ishii Hiroo, takes place in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The meeting reports that ASEAN Plus Three countries recorded a year-on-year growth in international visitor arrivals by 79.36 per cent in 2022, which also translated to an optimistic outlook for the recovery of the tourism sector in the next two to three years. The meeting also acknowledges appreciation to China, Japan and Korea for the respective support from the ASEAN–China Centre, ASEAN– Japan Centre and ASEAN-Korea Centre in strengthening people-to-people connectivity and enhancing cultural understanding through various tourism activities and projects as well as their contributions to the implementation of the ASEAN Plus Three Work Plan 2021–2025. 7th Officials from China and member economies of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat attend the first round of consultations on the Version 3.0 of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area negotiations via video link. The two sides hold in-depth discussions on topics such as procedural rules, organisational arrangements and work plans for the negotiations, and set a timetable and roadmap for subsequent talks. 10th Chinese Premier Li Keqiang holds talks with Cambodian Prime Minister Samdech Techo Hun Sen at the Great Hall of the People during the [End Page 215] Prime Minister’s official visit to China. Li expresses his hope that both countries will expand exchanges and cooperation in such areas as tourism and cultural heritage protection, and step up cooperation on law enforcement and security. Hun Sen thanks China for its support for Cambodia’s rotating chairmanship of ASEAN and affirms that Cambodia is ready to work with China...

Explaining the pattern of “war on drugs” violence in the Philippines under Duterte

AbstractA national “war on drugs” under former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte killed an estimated 12,000 to 30,000 victims. Duterte used state terror tactics, generating an unprecedented level of violence within a broader process of democratic backsliding. The violence peaked early, within the first few months of his term of office, then declined and remained low for years afterwards. How do campaigns of large‐scale state violence decline? This article explores the context‐specific drivers of the drug war's implementation in the Philippines. It presents findings from a model predicting violence escalation and de‐escalation using a Poisson regression to estimate the weekly number of killings from 2016 to 2021. The study's main finding is that the violence declined, and remained low throughout the rest of Duterte's term, due to the mobilization of accountability mechanisms—particularly over corruption controversies. This study offers insights into how resistance can impede autocratization, even in weak democracies.