Phenomenology Of Mind Research Articles

Indian and Cross-Cultural Philosophy in the Works of Ramakrishna Puligandla

The breadth of the works of Ramakrishna Puligandla in Indian, Western, and crosscultural philosophy over the past four decades has been truly remarkable. Puligandla shifted from teaching physics to philosophy at the University of Toledo in the mid1960s, and he has published writings on topics ranging from B. F. Skinner, Albert Camus, and quantum theory to Vedanta and Madhyamika from the mid-1970s until today, more than twelve years after his retirement. Given the unwavering focus of his philosophical convictions, however, this great range exhibits a diversity that is only apparent, for the thread of Puligandla's thought is woven out of the fundamental Advaita thesis that pure consciousness is the nondual and thus all-encompassing ground of existence. This thesis of the transcendental unity of being informed the basis of his critique of Skinnerian behaviorism, his rejection of the Copenhagen Interpretation, his explication of how mind-body dualism is resolved by seeing into the mechanics of adhydsa, and his attempts at rapprochement between Sanikara and Nagarjuna. In his most recent writing, Puligandla has attempted both to make Advaita Vedanta accessible to the general reader and, in yet another step in his philosophical journey, to uncover how classical Madhyamika, Daoist, Zen, and modern German phenomenological thinkers have pointed the way to showing how enlightenment may be approached through the nonconceptual engagement of language. In Breaking Barriers: Essays on Asian and Comparative Philosophy in Honor of Ramakrishna Puligandla, a Festschrift celebrating his achievements, Frank J. Hoffman and Godabarisha Mishra have collected twenty-four essays under four major themes: Advaita, Buddhism, the intersection between Indian philosophy and contemporary physics and Asian-Western comparative thought. Hoffman and Mishra have gone a long way in this volume toward gauging the reception of Puligandla's work by scholars in all these areas by including both positive and critical appraisals. In Mishra's own submission, a defense is given of the phenomenological similarities between two methods of inquiry into consciousness, namely Husserlian eidetic

Uma concepção dialética da arte a partir da gênese do conceito de trabalho na fenomenologia do espírito de Hegel

A Fenomenologia do Espírito de Hegel não é ainda o lugar específico da posição de sua filosofia da arte propriamente dita. Entretanto, é possível compreender a relação sistemática entre alguns conceitos fundamentais desta obra de 1807 e a concepção hegeliana de arte da maturidade. A partir desta relação, destacaremos em nossa interpretação três diferentes e complementares teses: 1. Da obra de arte como produto ideal do trabalho do espírito (Geist); 2. Do simbolismo da religião natural como produto do trabalho do artesão à beleza da religião da arte; 3. Da necessidade do oráculo à subjetividade concreta do ator de teatro.

Enacted Others: Specifying Goffman's Phenomenological Omissions and Sociological Accomplishments

Erving Goffman's distinctive contribution to an understanding of others was grounded in his information control and ritual models of the interaction process. This contribution centered on the forms of the interaction order rather than self-other relations as traditionally conceived in phenomenology. Goffman came to phenomenology as a sympathetic but critical outsider who sought resources for the sociological mining of the interaction order. His engagement with phenomenological thinkers (principally Gustav Ichheiser, Jean-Paul Sartre and Alfred Schutz) has to be understood in these terms. The article traces basic differences in analytical focus through a range of phenomenological critiques of Goffman and a comparison of salient aspects of Schutz's and Goffman's writings. While the contrasts have perhaps been overplayed, I conclude that Goffman's thinking about others probably owed more to his pragmatist roots than to his later encounters with phenomenology.

Gothic Masculinity: Effeminacy and the Supernatural in English and German Romanticism

Cultural and individual fantasies of enter troubling terrain in gothic tales of British and German Romanticism. In the interiority of dreams and visionary spaces, a male protagonist makes a fateful encounter with a supernatural force and finds himself dispossessed of his real and symbolic masculine estate. Emphasising the interdisciplinary range of this recurring motif, Ellen Brinks traces distressed masculinity in canonical instances of gothic imagination -- Byron's 'Oriental Tales and Coleridge's Christabel -- but also in works such as Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, Keats's Hyperion Fragments, and Freud's letters and scientific writings. tropes and tableaux of the effeminizing supernatural cross a range of genres and perplex social and natural distinctions concerning and male sexuality to produce multiple, often contradictory, identifications. They report, from various sites, increasing anxieties about male effeminacy or the emergence of a male homosexual identity within the fraught cultural desires during the Romantic period and its Freudian afterlife. An account of the construction of sex and gender in the Gothic, Gothic Masculinity should be of interest to scholars of sexuality, gender, queer theory, Romantic subjectivity, and the German and English Gothic.

On Kitcher’s Definition of A Priori Knowledge

In his book Interpreting Modern Philosophy, James Collins notes that concern with the priori has preoccupied twentieth century philosophers of every sort. He explains: It is central to the works of Frege and Quine, C. I. Lewis and Wittgenstein, Carnap and Ayer, Husserl and Dufresne. This major problem crosses the frontiers of every kind of contemporary philosophy. For it raises basic theoretical difficulties for naturalistic, analytic, and phenomenological thinkers alike, and affects their conceptions of scientific law, metaphysical statements, and ethical reasoning. Kitcher's Analysis In his article A Priori Knowledge, Philip Kitcher proposes the following as the conditions required for apriority in knowledge. X knows priori that IFF X knows and X's that was produced by process (a) which is an priori warrant for it. (1) is an priori warrant for X's that IFF is process such that, given any life e, sufficient for X for then (a) some process of the same type were to produce in X that (b) if the process of the same type were to produce in X that then it would warrant X in believing that (c) if process of the same type were to produce in X that then There are some ambiguities in Kitcher's analysis that require treatment before continuing. The more obvious is the employment of the term belief as warranting and especially a priori which, by virtue of its undeniability, is kind of knowledge par excellence. This is hardly characteristic normally associated with and so it is unclear how one can progress from states to any kind of knowledge. One may start with as motivation, but it would appear that some additional epistemic experience is required to move from into knowledge. That an unequal status exists between them is arguable from the fact that it makes perfect sense to say know that I believe that 'p' is but not believe that I know that 'p' is -unless one is referring to something one had known but is now forgotten or unclearly remembered. Adding claim to something clearly known contributes nothing to making it more certain. If one knows p to be true (one's name, to whom one is married, etc.) appending line of beliefs (I believe I know 'p' to be true, believe that I believe that I know 'p' to be true-and so on) adds not single iota of additional certitude to the original knowledge claim. But if one has in p on the grounds of someone else's testimony or on the basis of vaguely formed inference about facts that are certainly known and comes to acquire evidence for the truth of p, one no longer employs the term belief to describe the conditions of accepting its truth, but rather knowledge claim about the truth of p. Belief then holds an inferior epistemic status to knowledge. Possibly Kitcher could have used term such as awareness in place of belief and avoided the terminological difficulty. The second clarification that Kitcher's analysis requires is unpacking the meaning of eany life experience(s). Does he mean single experience or range of experiences, or would such an experience be sets of possible ranges of experiences? It would most likely have to be the latter as it is difficult to imagine that one solitary experience could result in clearly articulated claim whose a-priority would be obvious and undeniable. While objections might be leveled at interpreting Kitcher in this matter, it is necessary if we are to undertake what Kitcher does not do in his article, namely, to examine specific claims variously held as being priori. The furthest Kitcher himself goes is to present what he labels as some promising examples for such knowledge propositions that there are objects ... that some objects have shapes, and other similar propositions. …

Visualizing Hamlet's Ghost: The Spirit of Modern Subjectivity

Plays have always represented a reality that is invisible, whether psychological, biological, metaphysical, or theological. A key problem for the drama since Shakespeare has been to represent or express human interiority on the stage. Understanding what is meant by interiority, however, is also, more generally, a historical problem. The premise of this essay is that a widespread re-imagining of the subject in the early decades of the nineteenth century is fundamental to what we think of today as the modern drama. This period, often characterized as Romantic, sees a re-investment in notions of the spirit and quasi-theological ways of thinking, a new way of imagining the relation of subject to object and the location of truth. In the preface to his Phenomenology of Mind [Ph?nomenologie des Geistes] (1806), Hegel claims that our age is a birth-time, and a period of transition. The spirit of man has broken with the old order of things ... In like manner the spirit of the time, growing quietly ripe for the new form it is to assume, disintegrates one fragment after another of the structure of its previous world.1 This transition is fundamentally related to changes in the concept of

The Phenomenology of Body‐Mind: The Contrasting Cases of Flow in Sports and Contemplation

The demise of Cartesianism as an animating force in conceptualizing mind and body relations has opened up the field to a wider variety of perspectives, like the "embodiment" of phenomenological thinkers. However, because of Cartesianism's deeply rooted psychic legacy it still makes its presence felt in various places in everyday life. This paper will explore two facets of everyday life, sports and contemplation, which lend themselves to a mind‐body cognitive dissonance affected by latent Cartesian thinking. As an alternative, we will propose a more phenomenologically oriented interpretation based on what has been revealed by historical precedents as well as our empirical investigations. Keywords: Flow, Contemplation, Phenomenofogy, Sports

Hegel's Ethics of Recognition (review)

Reviewed by: Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition by Robert R. Williams Lawrence S. Stepelevich Robert R. Williams. Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998. Pp. xviii +433. Cloth, $60.00. The eminent Hegel scholar, Vittorio Hoesle, perceived the major weakness of Hegel’s philosophy in its seeming failure to adequately deal with the issue of interpersonal relations. Hardly a new objection, as Hoesle’s critique has a lineage that reaches at least as far back as Schleiermacher. Against this thesis, Robert Williams had earlier developed a counter-argument which he presented in his work, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other (1992). In this foundational work, Williams drew out and clarified Hegel’s concept of recognition from its inchoate source in Fichte; and by so doing defended “Hegel against charges that his thought violates intersubjectivity and difference by reducing the other to the same.”(1) In the present work, the conceptual and textual grounds established by Williams in his first work on the topic allow for a more extensive extrapolation of Hegel’s doctrine, and argues that “The story of recognition is a story about Fichte and Hegel. Fichte introduced the concept but did not make it the basis of either his ethics or his politics. Hegel appropriated and transformed the concept of recognition and regarded it as the fundamental intersubjective structure of ethical life.” (26) After a brief introductory critical survey of some of the more or less misleading contemporary views of both Hegelians and non-Hegelians regarding Hegel’s concept of interpersonal recognition, Williams proceeds to present its historical genesis, of how it emerged from its early and unfocused appearances in the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling. Williams then traces the further development and elaboration of this concept as it gains expression in the course of Hegel’s own ethical theory, not only as it is found in such major works as the Phenomenology of Mind and The Philosophy of Spirit, but also as it appears in his earlier and lesser known Jena Manuscripts of 1805. After this preliminary doctrinal and historical introduction, Williams turns to the most substantial section of his study, that work of Hegel’s in which the concept of recognition would be expected to and does indeed play its most evident ethical role: The Philosophy of Right. Almost every category within The Philosophy of Right is examined not only for the appearance of the concept, but for the defining role which it plays in the construction of that category. Such an examination is necessary for Williams, since “Reciprocal recognition in its various determinate types and instances is the general structure of ethical life and the embodiment of social reason that underlies and supports the concepts of law and state.” (364) Among the categories considered, categories that Williams discusses within the context of contemporary issues and each of which is taken up in a separate chapter of his work, are Family, Crime and Punishment, Poverty, and the State. In every instance considered he argues that an understanding of the defining role of recognition is a necessary prerequisite not only for a clear and correct comprehension [End Page 174] of Hegel’s ethical theory but of all ethical theory. Certainly, after this scholarly tour de force Hegel’s concept of recognition will have to be taken into account in any credible discussion of his ethical theory. In a final chapter Williams turns to some contemporary ethical theorists who have not taken that concept into consideration, or if they have, have either misunderstood or have rejected it. For Williams, such thinkers as Kojeve, Sartre, Deleuze, Derrida and Levinas, in their misunderstanding or rejection of the ethically mediating concept of recognition, have all contributed toward the “disrupted and fragmented cultural situation at the end of the twentieth century.” (412) In sum, Williams’ presentation and support of Hegel’s ethical employment of the concept of intersubjective recognition cannot but encourage theorists to reconsider the subject, and to see in it not only a conceptual tool which can serve to lucidly contextualize Hegel’s ethical theory into the matrix of his total philosophical system, but also as a needed ethical concept able to transcend both...

Transnational Consumer Cultures and Social Milieus

Using the emergence of postmodern consumer cultures as an example, the paper presents a socio-aesthetic market segmentation model that allows the identification of transnational consumer cultures (Social Milieus) without losing sight of national or regional peculiarities. The model is based on the Everyday-Life approach which combines the research logic of qualitative methods with the cognitive logic of phenomenological thinking. At the root of this is the conviction that an adequate understanding of the dynamics of consumer attitudes and consumer behaviour is only possible by researching people's subjective everyday reality and the structures of meaning linking them to it. It is argued that the Everyday-Life approach provides market research with an effective instrument, deployable the world over, that considerably enhances the accuracy of target group marketing measures and marketing communications.

Remembering Mair Jones (the co-constituency of care giving)

This short account of an episode of nursing care explains the idea of phenomenology and its relationship to professional practice. The author provides a brief overview of phenomenological thinking. A case study illustrates both Husserlian and Heideggerian ideas of phenomenology as he applies them reflexively to ease what the author describes as the ‘craft’ of nursing. The author affords a glimpse of the ‘lived experience’ of illness through this reflection on care provision and concludes with the suggestion that co-constituency forms a basis for all relationships.

Preface and Introduction to “The Phenomenology of Mind”

Preface and Introduction to “The Phenomenology of Mind”

Liberal Strategies of Exclusion

Pure insight, however is in the first instance without any content; it is the sheer disappearance of content; but by its negative attitude towards what it excludes it will make itself real and give itself a content.—Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind

Hegel's Idea of a Critical Theory

H EGEL IS OFTEN regarded as a central figure in the development of the school of modern Critical Theory. ' Yet while his contribution to this school is often acknowledged, his own practice of critique is seldom given the attention it deserves. The reason for this lack of attention is not hard to understand. Unlike Kant, whose most important works take the form of a Kritik of human reason in both its cognitive and practical aspects, and unlike Marx, whose major works bear the subtitle The Critique of Political Economy, Hegel nowhere describes himself or his works as critical.2 Despite this fact, Hegel's work, especially the Phenomenology of Mind, reveals a conception of critical theorizing that would have at least two important implications for the development of that tradition. First, whereas Kant meant by critique an inquiry into the nature and limits of rationality as such, for Hegel it took the form of an internal or immanent examination of the various sources of deception, illusion, and distortion that the mind undergoes in its journey to Absolute Knowledge. Such an activity is critical, or in Hegel's term negative, precisely because it entails a conception of liberation from those historical sources of domination and coercion. Like Marx, Nietzsche, and, later, Freud, Hegel sought to free human agents not only from the coercive illusions that inhibit their capacities for free thought and action, but from the forms of social life within which those coercive illusions thrive and find expression. Philosophical critique necessarily spills over into social theory. Second, underlying the Hegelian conception of critique is the belief that human history expresses an immanent telos the aim of which is the liberation of both the individual and the species from a system of

Hypocrisy and the Highest Good: Hegel on Kant's Transition from Morality to Religion

Hypocrisy and the Highest Good: Hegel on Kant's Transition from Morality to Religion R. Z. FRIEDMAN SHORTON ARGUMENT,rich in ambiguity, Kant's contention that the moral facts of our experience require a religious framework is an important moment in the relationship of philosophical thought and religious belief. The most thorough and penetrating criticism of Kant's position is found in Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" in the PhenomerwlogyofSpirit.There Hegel argues that Kant's position is built on contradiction, not simply that it falls into contradiction but that it needs contradiction in its very foundation in order to present itself to itself as coherent, intelligible, and rational. Kant's insistence that morality requires religion is, in Hegel's view, an affirmation of contradiction in the name of reason. This situation forces consciousness into a posture of "insincere shuffling" (schwindelndenBewegung)for consciousness is "aware of its contradiction and shiftiness."' Unable tO escape from contradiction or from the need to include contradiction within it, and unable to get beyond its own certainty that morality is the highest task for man and his only vantage point on reality, moral consciousness ends in hypocrisy'----a moral affirmation of itself which denies what it knows, that it cannot make itself cogent and intelligible, that it bases itself on reason and yet insults reason by claiming that, rational or not, it is morally necessary and this takes precedence over all other considerations. ' G, W. F. Hegel, Phanomenok~g/e des Ge/su,, edited by Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg, t95~), 454- Hereafter referred to as Philnomenolog'.e_Phenomenologyof Spirit. translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1977), 374. Hereafter referred to as Miller. 9 Ph~nomeno/og/e, 444, Miller, 383 . [5o3] 504 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 24:4 OCTOBER ~986 The commentators, for the most part, agree with Hegel's critique of Kant, although there is not general agreement that all of Hegel's arrows hit their marks. Walsh, for instance, defends Kant against Hegel's accusation that "the moral man cannot be in earnest with morality''s lest by realizing himself morally he cause morality to disappear, and Loewenberg introduces a helpful and critical discussion of Hegel's use of the term 'hypocrisy'? Lauer allows that "as a presentation" of Kant's position, Hegel's analysis "may be superficial" and as "a critique it may be unfair.''5 Lauer, however, like most of the commentators deals with Hegel's analysis not as a critique which itself merits critical attention but as a stage in Hegel's extended argument in the Phenomeno/ogy. In the Phenomenok~gyHegel attempts to demonstrate, among other things, that at various stages in its development to scientific and all-encompassing truth consciousness operates according to "Reason" which deals with reality by fracturing it into subject and objectma move which results in dualisms of various kinds, internal contradictions, and which results in a consciousness divided against itself. Kant figures large in this error, and Kantian reason, which is portrayed as dividing and fracturing, is unfavorablyjuxtaposed with Hegelian spirit which integrates and synthesizes. Most of the commentators see Hegel's treatment of Kant's position in this light. Hyppolite refers to an "unself-conscious dialectic" and a "fraudulent dualism,'~ while Norman refers to "divisions and antagonisms" which attend an "alienated consciousness.''7 Kainz also emphasizes the theme of a contradictory consciousness which cannot escape contradiction and hypocrisy,s At least one commentator, however, looks at Hegel's critique of Kant's Moral Point of View as an issue itself deserving of attention rather than simply as a stage in Hegel's vast argument. Jonathan Robinson, in Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, takes a stand squarely behind Hegel's critique of Kant. In Robinson's view, Kant's moral religion is unconvincing , a demonstration, as Hegel would have it, of the failure rather than the success of Kant's whole enterprise in the sphere of practical reason, s W. H. Walsh, Hegelian Ethics(New York: MacMillan, St. Martin's Press, t9C>9), 33. 4 j. Loewenberg, Hegel'sPhenomenology:Dialogueson the Life of Mind (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1965), ~,7o--72. 5 Quentin Lauer, S...

Hegel's Phenomenology as a Philosophy of Culture

Hegel's Phenomenology as a Philosophy of Culture ALBERT WILLIAM LEVI 1 There are many ways to read Hegel's Phenomenology: strictly for itself as a great classic in the history of philosophy (this is the strategy of the notable commentaries of Hyppolite, Loewenberg, and Lauer); as an introduction to the Hegelian system or a significant segment of the same (the way of Walter Kaufmann, Charles Taylor, and J. N. Findlay), or as a notable illumination of a particular domain of subject matter (as in Judith Shklar's Freedom and Independence: a Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind).' I wish to follow in the footprints neither of Loewenberg and Hyppolite nor of Findlay and Taylor, but of Shklar. However, my reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit places it not in the tradition of political ideas which begins with Plato, but in the tradition of the philosophy of culture which begins with Voltaire and Kant. Kant died in 18o4. The Phenomenology was published in 18o7. But this three year interval signifies something infinitely more important than the end of one philosopher's life and the first significant publication of another. In fact it represents a decisive break between the rationalism of the eighteenth century Enlightenment and the emerging spirit of romanticism coming to life in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Kant died late but his mind was made by Christian Wolff, Leibniz and Newton, and David Hume, and his mode of perception was not unlike that of Lichtenberg, Jean Hyppolite, Genkse et Structure de la Ph~nom~nologie de L'Esprit de Hegel (Paris: Aubier, Editions Montaigne, 1946) ~ vols.; J. Loewenberg, Hegel's Phenomenology: Dialogues on the Li]e ~ Mind (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1965); Quentin Lauer, S. J., A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976); Walter Kauf'mann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation (New York: Anchor Books, 1966); Charles Taylor, Hegel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975); J. N. Findlay, Hegel."A Re-examination (New York: Collier Books, 196~); Judith Shklar, Freedom and Independence: The Political Ideas of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976). [445] 446 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2~: 4 OCT 1984 Lessing, and Laplace. Hegel's mind was formed on other models and his mental slant had much in common with Hoelderlin's lyrics, Goethe's Wilhelm Meister and the more romantic historical dramas of Schiller. It is a question of historical moment and world-feeling. The formation of Kant's mentality predates the great historical divide of the French Revolution. It is not so much that his politics is ancien r~gime (it is, of course, liberal and forward looking) as that his mode of perception is classic. For him, to domesticate experience requires the imposition of order and organization, of rationality and rules. But Hegel's universe is instinct with the flux of post-revolutionary uncertainty, and thus for him all human culture is primarily a matter of movement, growth, and dialectical development. Romanticism implies a triumph of temporality and historicity over logic, of growing and developing concepts over categorial fixity. Kant praised Christian Wolff--"the greatest of all the dogmatic philosophers"--for his rationalist method, for having by his example awakened the spirit of thoroughness in Germany, and Kant himself in his methodological rigor continued this tradition even further. But if the Critique of Pure Reason courts comparison with the exactitude of a scientific treatise, Walter Kaufmann is surely right in denying such scientific rigor to Hegel 's great work. "The Phenomenology," he said, ~ "is certainly unwissenschaftlich : undisciplined, arbitrary, full of digressions, not a monument to the austerity of the intellectual conscience and to carefulness and precision but a wild, bold, unprecented book that invites comparison with some great literary masterpieces." The characterization is just. I have already mentioned the analogy with Goethe's Bildungsroman Wilhelm Meister. Others have likened the Phenomenology of Spirit to Dante's Divine Comedy,Goethe's Faust, and Homer's Odyssey. What is apt and central in all of these analogies is the notion of a spiritual journey through time and history. Here the Phenomenologyemerges less as an epistemology...

The mechanisms and analysis of sperm migration through cervical mucus.

The migration of spermatozoa through cervical mucus has been studied extensively by physiologists and clinicians. Yet our understanding of this biological phenomenon remains superficial. This has been due at least in part to a lack of scientific objectivity in the experimental procedures employed, as well as a tendency to rely upon phenomenological thinking rather than fundamental principles of chemistry and physics. In this chapter our attention will be directed initially to the biophysical context within which the mechanisms of sperm transport in cervical mucus should be considered. Our current knowledge of those mechanisms will be summarized, and some of the applicable experimental techniques and mathematical models of analysis will be discussed. Finally, some new strategies for future investigation will be suggested. We will bring the reader’s attention to a number of scientifically sound and biologically relevent studies, but we will not attempt a comprehensive survey of the research in this area. For this information the reader is referred to a number of recent reviews on sperm transport1 and cervical mucus.2,3,4,5 In beginning this chapter it should be emphasized that among mammals it is primarily the ruminants and primates which produce substantial amounts of cervical mucus, and it is to these species that our comments will apply. The human is by far the best studied of these species and most of the specifics of our discussion will refer to human sperm-cervical mucus interaction.

"The Disorder of Women": Women, Love, and the Sense of Justice

In his essay on Politics and the Arts Rousseau proclaims that "never has a people perished from an excess of wine; all perish from the disorder of women." Rousseau states that drunkenness is usually the sole failing of otherwise upright, decent men; only the immoral fear the indiscretion that wine will promote. Drunkenness is not the worst of the vices since it makes men stupid rather than evil, and wine turns men away from the other vices so it poses no danger to the polity. In contrast, the "disorder of women" engenders all the vices and can bring the state to ruin.1 Rousseau is not the only social or political theorist to regard women as a permanently subversive force within the political order. Freud (to whose arguments I shall also refer) argues in chapter 4 of Civilization and Its Discontents that women are "hostile to" and "in opposition to" civilization. In a similar vein, Hegel writes that the community "creates its enemy for itself within its own gates" in "womankind in general." Women are "the everlasting irony in the life of the community," and when "women hold the helm of government, the state is at once in jeopardy."2 These arguments are by no means of only historical interest. Although women have now been granted citizenship in the liberal democracies, it is still widely believed that they are unfitted for political life and that it would be dangerous if the state were in their hands. This belief is very complex. One of its central dimensions, which I shall begin to explore in this paper, is the conviction that women lack, and cannot develop, a sense of justice. * I am grateful to Anna Yeatman for discussing the questions raised in this paper. 1. J.-J. Rousseau, Politics and the Arts: A Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre, trans. A. Bloom (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 109. Rousseau also notes that wine attracts old men because youth have other desires; beliefs about the subversiveness of youth are outside the scope of this paper. 2. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Ballie (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949), p. 496; Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), addition to par. 166. N. 0. Keohane ("Female Citizenship: 'The Monstrous Regiment of Women"' [paper presented at the annual meeting of the Conference for the Study of Political Thought, New York, April 6-8, 1979]) discusses various aspects of the belief that women should not enter the political sphere, with particular reference to ancient Greece and Bodin's theory.

Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Mind" (review)

Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Mind" (review)

Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind.

Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind.

Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel's `Phenomenology of Mind': An Essay in the Real and Ideal.

Duty and Hypocrisy in Hegel's `Phenomenology of Mind': An Essay in the Real and Ideal.