Phenomenology Of Givenness Research Articles

The Phenomenological Counter-intentionality of the Icon

The main goal of this paper is to show Nicholas de Cusa’s influence on the notion of Icon (icône) as counter-intentionality in Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness. In order to do this, first, we offer a study of the early conception of Icon in Marion, as it appears in L’Idole et la distance (1977) and Dieu sans l’être (1982), showing the passage from an early conception of the icon to its first phenomenological formulation. As we will see, in this early period there is already an influence of the christian neoplatonic tradition (Dionysius the Areopagite). Secondly, we analyze the reception practiced by Marion of the Nicholas of Cusa’s thought. In this case, we indicate specifically how the Cusanian notion of eicona dei appears as a fundamental historical antecedent of the Icon as a saturated phenomenon, thus revealing the importance of Christian Neoplatonism in the phenomenology of givenness.

The Aesthetic Path to Hermeneutics in J.-L. Marion’s Phenomenology

Recently, Jean-Luc Marion has developed the role of hermeneutics within his phenomenology of givenness. This paper aims to demonstrate that there is an aesthetic path to accessing hermeneutic engagement of a basic kind in his previous work. The Marionian hermeneutic management of the gap between what gives itself and what shows itself finds its heuristic model in the artist’s task of making the unseen visible, as becomes clear in his studies of painting.

Disassembling Descola: Phenomenological Intersections in Onto-Typological Anthropology

Abstract One of the effects of the so-called ontological turn has been to take the other so seriously that radical difference has been conceptualized ontologically. This stance has given rise, in some authors, as Descola, to a typological classification. However, we would suggest the possibility of a non-onto-typological anthropology based on Marion’s phenomenology of givenness. With the phenomenology of givenness, from which phenomena are given to a gifted – and therefore secondary – subject, this new understanding of subject allows us to think of phenomena as significations much more than as representations and to replace the discontinuity of ontological categories with the continuity of hermeneutics.

From Blind to Blinding: Saturated Phenomena and the Speculative Lyric of the Invisible in Andrew Joron’s Poetry

This essay presents a critical reading of Andrew Joron’s speculative oeuvre from a phenomenological standpoint. Proceeding from the poet’s cosmic perspectives, it focuses on the central issue of language in relation to the emergence of meaning and the world. Through a close reading of both Joron’s poetry and poetics, this essay demonstrates his conceptual affinity with the work of contemporary French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion, arguing that both Joron’s poetry and Marion’s phenomenology of givenness postulate an emergence of meaning and the world that is absolutely unconditioned and unconditional, an emergence characterized by an intuitively blinding richness that saturates the phenomenon over and beyond any limit and, hence, makes the phenomenon invisible.

Phenomenology as Apologetics

In this article, we analyse the relation of philosophy and theology in the work of Jean‑Luc Marion in order to be able to see not only how the phenomenology of givenness can serve as a “new apologetics” for theology, but also how Marion’s phenomenology itself, in its historical development and in its core principle and method, is influenced and changed by theological phenomena. We present three ways of describing the relation, tension, mutual influence and separation of philosophy and theology: firstly, in line with Pascal’s distinction between the orders of reason and of the heart; secondly, in phenomenology, in terms of indications to the effect that there can be a phenomenon of revelation in the mode of possibility that is distinguished from the phenomenon of Revelation in theology in the mode of historicity; and thirdly, by analogy with Christian apologetics. In particular, we analyse this third dimension, putting forward the thesis that Marion’s phenomenology itself has some characteristics of the Christian apologetics he describes. We try to demonstrate this interpretation of his phenomenology in its key dimensions, such as the counter-method and descriptions of the phenomena of love and revelation, which constitute the culmination of the phenomenology of givenness, although at the same time, as it were, its limit, crossing over into the theological order.

Phenomenology and Transcendence: On Openness and Metaphysics in Husserl and Heidegger

In this paper I examine the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics by reassessing the relationship between phenomenological and metaphysical transcendence. More specifically, I examine the notion of phenomenological transcendence in Husserl and the early Heidegger: Husserl defines transcendence primarily as the mode of givenness of phenomena that do not appear all at once, but must be given in partial profiles; Heidegger defines transcendence primarily as Dasein’s capacity to go beyond entities toward being. I argue that these divergent understandings of phenomenological transcendence have resulted in a significant difference in reception among French phenomenologists of religion. These thinkers assert that phenomenology, when properly conceived and utilized, can make room for the divine and its revelation, i.e., for a metaphysical transcendence. I further argue that these thinkers prefer Heidegger’s phenomenology to Husserl’s because they understand Heidegger’s transcendence as the subject’s openness to being, while they understand Husserl’s transcendence as a limit, as the inability to capture worldly objects. I take up Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness as a “case study” to illustrate this point. Finally, I argue that this preference for Heidegger over Husserl is misplaced and should be reversed. A close reading of Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life shows that Dasein is confined to its own possibilities and cannot be open to a relationship with the divine. By contrast, Husserl’s phenomenology provides the radical openness necessary to welcome revelation. While Husserl cannot envision a “worldly God,” the structures of horizonality and temporality characterize a subject capable of an authentic openness to revelation.

Jean-Paul Sartre and Jean-Luc Marion

Abstract Jean-Paul Sartre is not an influential author in the work of Jean-Luc Marion. Yet, as is the case for the phenomenology of givenness, Sartre thinks love in terms of God. However, for Marion, Sartre is exemplary of those authors who have remained prisoner to metaphysics and to thinking God as the causa sui. By comparing the Sartrean and Marionian conceptions of love, the author shows that both are based on radically different conceptions of divinity, demonstrating at the same time how the link between God and being determines human love.

Nicholas of Cusa’s Mystical Theology in Jean-Luc Marion’s Phenomenology of Affectivity

Abstract The main goal of this paper is to analyze Nicholas of Cusa’s reading on the dispute of Mystical Theology through Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness. To do this, first of all, we will address the analyses offered by Jean-Luc Marion on the problem of affectivity. Secondly, we examine Nicholas’ interpretation of Mystical Theology through the aenigma of the eicona dei in De visione dei (1453). Thirdly, we present Jean-Luc Marion’s interpretation of Cusanus eicona dei as an antecedent of his phenomenological conception of Icone as “saturated phenomenon.” Finally, we suggest that Cusanus eicona dei appears in Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology as a precedent of his strategy when approaching the field of affectivity. Both authors try to show an instance preceding the distinction between affectivity and rationality.

Jean-Luc Marion and the Phénoménologie de la Donation as First Philosophy

Jean-Luc Marion proposes what he calls the “phenomenology of givenness” (phénoménologie de la donation) as the true “first philosophy.” In this paper I consider his critique of previous first philosophies and his argument for the phenomenology of givenness as their replacement. I note several problems with the phenomenology of givenness and conclude that it does not seem ready yet to assume the title of “first philosophy.”

Hannah Arendt y Jean-Luc Marion. El acontecimiento y los márgenes de la metafísica

El “acontecimiento” aparece, en la filosofía contemporánea, como el sendero que manifiesta la posibilidad de superar el fin de la metafísica, puesto que rompe tanto con las condiciones metafísicas del aparecer como con las del conocer. Gracias a un análisis comparativo de las obras de Arendt y de Marion, el presente artículo muestra que, aunque el acontecimiento aparezca en tanto que destrucción del concepto moderno de historia en los textos de la primera, y en tanto que modalidad de la saturación de los fenómenos en la fenomenología de la donación de Marion, el uso del acontecimiento nos permite reevaluar la relación que ambos autores mantienen con la metafísica. Después de haber señalado una diferencia fundamental en el uso del acontecimiento que hacen estos dos autores, nos es factible evaluar su posición frente a la posibilidad de seguir pensando después del fin de la metafísica.

The Renewal of Phenomenology in France: Levinas and Marion

Starting from Hans-Dieter Gondek’s and L/szl7 Tengelyi’s statement concerning the recent development of French phenomenology, I examine the relation between Marion’s phenomenology of givenness and Levinas’ ethics. Focusing on their common concept of the call (appeal), I demonstrate, first, that Marion’s general concept of the phenomenon is based on Levinas’ idea of the manifestation of the Other, which he deprives of its original ethical meaning. In the second part I criticize Marion’s anti-ethical reading of Levinas, while trying to give a tenable interpretation of the meaning of the ethical. Taking into consideration the results of the second section, in the third part, I look into the possibility of a different general phenomenology starting from Levinas’ ethics. By this rather sketchy idea I intend to provide a possible alternative to Marion’s general phenomenology of givenness, which maintains the privilege of the Other and, consequently, the primacy of ethics

Givenness and existence: On the possibility of a phenomenological philosophy of religion

The so-called theological turn in recent French phenomenology has been the subject of a heated debate in France and elsewhere. This article outlines a possible future for this movement by considering the possibility of a phenomenological philosophy of religion distinct from a phenomenological theology. It argues that Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness does not establish this possibility, as it aims at a theophanic experience and is therefore ultimately inscribed within a logic of faith. It is then with Jean-Luc Nancy’s phenomenology of existence that a more plausible, though undeveloped, possible future for phenomenological philosophy of religion comes into view: not aimed at theophany (from faith), but rather at, what the article calls, the existential situation that facilitates or inhibits religious experience (about faith). This, the article argues, is the only way of limiting phenomenological philosophy to the possibility of revelation, leaving it to theology to consider the actuality of Revelation, as Marion deems necessary. It is thus also the only way for a phenomenological philosophy of religion to have a future as distinct from theology, that is to say, for it to be possible to speak phenomenologically about religious experiences regardless of whether this is done from a position of faith or not. In establishing this possibility, the article will emphasise the often neglected phenomenological and existential aspects of Nancy’s thought.

Me? The invisible call of responsibility and its promise for care ethics: a phenomenological view

Care ethics emphasizes responsibility as a key element for caring practices. Responsibilities to care are taken by certain groups of people, making caring practices into moral and political practices in which responsibilities are assigned, assumed, or implicitly expected, as well as deflected. Despite this attention for social practices of distribution and its unequal result, making certain groups of people the recipient of more caring responsibilities than others, the passive aspect of a caring responsibility has been underexposed by care ethics. By drawing upon the work of the French phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion, a care ethical conceptualization of responsibility can by enriched, by scrutinizing how responsibility is literally a response to something else. This paper starts with a vignette of an everyday situation of professional care. After that the current body of care ethical literature on responsibility is presented, followed by Marion’s phenomenology of givenness, using his analysis of Caravaggio’s painting The Calling of St. Matthew and resulting in his redefinition of responsibility. In the next section we present a table in which we juxtapose four distinct paradigms of responsibility, which we will describe briefly. The final section consists of an exploration of the paradigms by an analysis of the vignette and results in a conclusion concerning what Marion’s view has to offer to care ethics with regard to responsibility.

Hermeneutics of Resistance in Marion’s Phenomenology of Givenness

Abstract My goal in this paper is to investigate the role of the subject in Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology aided by his interpretation of the Kantian categories in ‟Being Given” and ‟In Excess”. I shall relate Marion’s hypothetical saturation of the Kantian categories to the suspension of the I-identity. The inner mechanism of this suspension will be shown to consist in a critical resistance to an excessive intuition that is defined by a failed attempt at the conceptualizing of intuitions. This failure shall manifest the saturated phenomenon as a counter-experience. The critical resistance to an excessive intuition acts as a temporary activity of the subject leading to its role as interpreter inscribed in an infinite hermeneutic. Based on this I argue that Marion’s subject is not destroyed by an excessive intuition but is only called upon to investigate a phenomenon from a multitude of perspectives. I hold this to be of the essence for Marion, as it explains the possibility of interpreting and experiencing the given as a given during the encounter with the given in which both the subject as well as the given become manifest. I shall argue thus that the recourse to Kant further clarifies Marion’s account of a critical, resistant subject. However, this does not mean that I am arguing for Kant’s categories, but that I hold them to have an important explanatory role for Marion’s phenomenology.

Raturer la théorie mimétique : Marion au-delà de Girard

La théorie mimétique de René Girard est totalement close sur la violence parce que la déconstruction des mécanismes victimaires, mis à nu sur la Croix, n’a fait qu’accélérer l’advenue de l’Apocalypse. En montrant que cette clôture est due à un enfermement métaphysique d’un premier moment de la théorie mimétique, enfermement porté par un chemin qui nous mène inexorablement de l’objet à l’être, en passant par l’image et l’idole, nous ouvrons une brèche dans la violence grâce à la phénoménologie de la donation de Marion. Contre le modèle de l’image et de son idolâtrie, Marion nous permet de dépasser la violence par le paradigme de l’icône qui, loin d’en passer par l’image et l’être, nous porte vers le signe et les phénomènes saturés. En percevant le monde non plus à l’aune de l’objectité, mais selon la modalité phénoménologique de la saturation, la boucle autoréférentielle de la violence mimétique est mise en question et nous ouvre la possibilité de relations pacifiques. Aussi, le grand défi de notre temps n’est pas tellement de savoir donner que d’apprendre à recevoir.

마리옹의 증여의 현상학에 대한 일고

마리옹의 증여의 현상학에 대한 일고

Une réflexion herméneutique et anti-linguistique sur la langue dans le cours de Vladimir Bibikhin

In his 1989 lecture series entitled “Philosophy’s Language”, the Russian philosopher Vladimir Bibikhin constructs a singular ontology of language dedicated both to the question of the specific language of philosophy (what should the language of thinking be?) and the one of natural language as an alternative to the conventional system of terms. This article offers to show how Bibikhin, while integrating two strong traditions, works toward overcoming them both: Losev and Florenskij’s philosophy of language, as well as Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Bibikhin attempts a synthesis leading to a radical realist position according to which language, like things, is the locus of the originary unveiling of the world. This third path echoes certain contemporary discussions, such as speculative realism or Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness, thus revealing the originality of Bibikhin’s thought.

“What Is This Love That Loves Us?”: Terrence Malick’s To the Wonder as a Phenomenology of Love

Terrence Malick’s To the Wonder (2013) considers the relationship of Divine Love with the individual soul, and its corresponding relationships to the other as neighbor. In this article, I analyze the congruency of Malick’s form and content by correlating the relationship of his dynamic, existential filmmaking style with the film’s phenomenologically constructed plotline. Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness and Søren Kierkegaard’s Works of Love contribute to my analysis, aiding our understanding of love’s sheer gratuity and sacrificial labor, amid inevitable idolatry and despondency, in To the Wonder’s intersecting narratives. While Marion helps us comprehend the affective qualities of “saturated phenomena” in the film’s formal dimensions, Kierkegaard elucidates the film’s many iterations of love. Malick aesthetically demonstrates the reciprocity of love and the experience of wonder as contingent operations, making To the Wonder a cinematic phenomenology of the fractured yet indissoluble dimensions of love.

The borders of phenomenality

This text is based on the lecture held by Jean-Luc Marion at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory (University of Belgrade), on December 4., 2015. By thematizing the ?limits of phenomenality?, Marion analyzes what exceeds the horizon of objectivity and the framework of subjectivity. By relying on some of the most important philosophers of the history of (post)metaphysics (Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger), Marion offers an alternative way, namely, a phenomenology of givenness that focuses on saturated phenomena.

Jean-Luc Marion: Pengantar atas ‘Keterberian’ dan ‘Fenomen yang Melimpah’

<p>For some contemporary thinkers, traditional and modern metaphysical systems were not considered as an adequate account, for they might have abolished the ontological difference. Such circumstances might have taken place because metaphysics was thought of as circumscribing by considering the whatness of any phenomena in form of, or oder of, the same, i.e. substance, essence or first cause. Jean-Luc Marion moves further and suggests phenomenological accounts that culminate in the givenness and the saturated phenomenon – ideas which open the possibilites to overcome the inadequacy of metaphysics. With the phenomenological third reduction, Marion shows that givenness already presents itself which is anterior to the dichotomy between essence and existence. This phenomenology of givenness enables phenomena to appear by itself in the saturated phenomena. In a paradoxical way, he shows that the constituting subject had already been constituted. Phenomenology, therefore, allows the subject to describe any phenomena in the form of, or order of, the other such as Marion proposed. Considering the contexts, this article may serve as an introduction to the notion of givenness and the saturated phenomenon.</p>