Abstract

Care ethics emphasizes responsibility as a key element for caring practices. Responsibilities to care are taken by certain groups of people, making caring practices into moral and political practices in which responsibilities are assigned, assumed, or implicitly expected, as well as deflected. Despite this attention for social practices of distribution and its unequal result, making certain groups of people the recipient of more caring responsibilities than others, the passive aspect of a caring responsibility has been underexposed by care ethics. By drawing upon the work of the French phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion, a care ethical conceptualization of responsibility can by enriched, by scrutinizing how responsibility is literally a response to something else. This paper starts with a vignette of an everyday situation of professional care. After that the current body of care ethical literature on responsibility is presented, followed by Marion’s phenomenology of givenness, using his analysis of Caravaggio’s painting The Calling of St. Matthew and resulting in his redefinition of responsibility. In the next section we present a table in which we juxtapose four distinct paradigms of responsibility, which we will describe briefly. The final section consists of an exploration of the paradigms by an analysis of the vignette and results in a conclusion concerning what Marion’s view has to offer to care ethics with regard to responsibility.

Highlights

  • Care ethics emphasizes responsibility as a key element for caring practices (Gilligan 1982; Noddings 1984; Tronto 1993, 2013; Held 2006; Walker 2007; Kohlen 2009; Van Heijst 2011; Heier 2016; Van Nistelrooij 2015; Visse et al 2015; Visse and Abma 2018)

  • Through givenness the self has been given the chance to cross one of the greatest divides that he can cross: his indifference (p. 308). Concluding this first presentation of Marion’s redefinition of responsibility as radical givenness, we argue that this radical phenomenology offers a profound view of responsibility’s passive aspect that is not lacking in care ethics, but has been underexposed

  • Marion’s view has something to offer to care ethics that can be summed up as follows: first, he offers a view of the passive, receptive dimension of human existence and of responsibility; second, his view widens the horizon of responsibility in caring practices and shows that within these practices much more is given and received that transcends anyone’s responsibility

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Summary

Introduction

Care ethics emphasizes responsibility as a key element for caring practices (Gilligan 1982; Noddings 1984; Tronto 1993, 2013; Held 2006; Walker 2007; Kohlen 2009; Van Heijst 2011; Heier 2016; Van Nistelrooij 2015; Visse et al 2015; Visse and Abma 2018). Tronto (1993, 2013) has already shown that such a distributive view of responsibilities tends to make them personal, which is a way to marginalize and contain caring practices Her analysis uncovers the harmful effects of such an individualizing and apolitical view and underpins her plea for a democratic account of care, making care a collective responsibility. We concur with the care ethical political-ethical analysis of power in which many care ethicists (Tronto 1993, 2013; Kittay 1999; Hankivsky 2004; Walker 2007; Held 2015; Visse et al 2015) argue for care to be given its proper role in morality and politics These pleas mainly focus upon the agents that respond to the need of care. Me? The invisible call of responsibility and its promise for care ethics: a phenomenological

Part A: Care ethical accounts of responsibility
Part B: Marion’s phenomenology of responsibility as givenness
Part C: Four paradigms for thinking responsibility
Part D: Connecting the paradigms with the vignette
Conclusion
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