Game Perspective Research Articles

Identifying influential nodes in social networks from the perspective of attack-defense game.

Influence spread analysis, a critical component of social network studies, focuses on the patterns and effects of information dissemination among interconnected entities. The core of influence spread analysis is to identify influential nodes that involve two distinct aspects: influence maximization (IM) and influence blocking maximization (IBM). However, when IM and IBM occur simultaneously, identifying influential nodes becomes an intricate decision-making challenge. This study addresses identifying influential nodes in social networks through an attack-defense game perspective, where an attacker maximizes influence and a defender minimizes it. We first develop a two-player static zero-sum game model considering resource constraints. Based on the equilibrium strategy of this game, we redefine the concept of influential nodes from various viewpoints. Extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world networks show that, in most cases, the defender preferentially defends critical nodes, while the attacker adopts the decentralized strategy. Only when resources are unevenly matched do both players tend to adopt centralized strategies. This study expands the connotation of influential nodes and provides a novel paradigm for the social network analysis with significant potential applications.

Improving Prefix Hijacking Defense of RPKI From an Evolutionary Game Perspective

Improving Prefix Hijacking Defense of RPKI From an Evolutionary Game Perspective

Consensus methods with Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining game for large-scale group decision-making

With the significant advancements in communication technology, group decision-making (GDM) can now be implemented online, allowing a large number of decision-makers (DMs) to participate concurrently. However, current methods for large-scale group decision-making (LSGDM) are primarily suitable for 20 to 50 DMs, and their effectiveness in scenarios involving thousands or even tens of thousands of participants has yet to be fully validated. Furthermore, as the number of participants increases, the evaluation information becomes increasingly diverse and complex. At the same time, the social networks associated with the DMs typically become sparse, making information sharing and consensus building more challenging. In light of these challenges, we develop two new methods based on cooperative games to effectively address the challenges in super LSGDM. First, we propose a two-stage semi-supervised fuzzy C-means (FCM) clustering method with trust constraints, which aims to address the issue of sparsity in relationships within large-scale social networks. This method utilizes trust relationships as reliable resources and prior knowledge to guide and supervise the clustering process. On this basis, we discuss three scenarios from the perspective of cooperative games: (i) subgroup optimal consensus adjustments in non-cooperative situations, (ii) group optimal consensus adjustments in cooperative situations, and (iii) subgroup optimal consensus adjustments in cooperative situations. Subsequently, we view the consensus adjustment allocation as a cost cooperative game problem and propose two new LSGDM consensus methods based on Nash Bargaining (NB) and Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining (KSB). Finally, experiments on real datasets demonstrate the superiority and reliability of our proposed LSGDM methods.

An analysis of optimal equilibrium in the carbon trading market - From a tripartite evolutionary game perspective

As the climate crisis intensifies, achieving the global consensus of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality has become imperative. Carbon trading is an important financial measure to address the environmental crisis, and the realization of the dual‑carbon goals requires the cooperation and joint efforts of all parties involved in the carbon emissions trading market. This study constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model involving enterprises, government, and financial institutions while considering consumers' influence. By solving for equilibrium points and conducting numerical simulations, we explore optimal strategy choices for each stakeholder. Our findings reveal that the success of enterprise low-carbon transition is contingent upon market dynamics and requires active cooperation from government, financial institutions, and the public. Furthermore, factors such as financial market efficiency and internal governance capacity significantly impact enterprises' transformation decisions by influencing low-carbon transition costs. Public feedback indirectly affects enterprise decisions through its influence on financial institutions' provision of green services. Additionally, gradual reduction of carbon quotas by government entities facilitates progress toward low-carbon transformation objectives.

The role of behavioral decision-making in panic buying events during COVID-19: From the perspective of an evolutionary game based on prospect theory

Sudden public health crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic have triggered widespread panic buying incidents globally, causing disruptions in commodity markets characterized by imbalances between supply and demand. This has posed a serious threat to social stability. During sudden public health events, panic buying typically complicates epidemic prevention and control efforts, leading to adverse consequences such as resource wastage, supply-demand imbalances, and market failures, which pose a threat to social stability and economic development. The progression of panic buying is significantly influenced by the actions and choices of both the public and local authorities. Therefore, studying the impact of the behavioral decisions made by the public and local governments plays a pivotal role in the evolution of such events. Building upon this premise, this paper studies the role of behavioral decisions in the COVID-19 panic buying event from the perspective of an evolutionary game. First, the public’s attitude toward the development of the event is divided into two categories: those with a negative attitude and those with a positive attitude. At the same time, the concepts of mental benefits and mental costs are introduced and quantified, serving as key factors in public decision-making. Second, prospect theory is used to elucidate the risk preferences and loss aversion of decision-makers. An evolutionary game model is constructed with the public and local governments as the main entities based on prospect theory. The replication dynamic equation is constructed using the benefit perception matrix, and the equilibrium point and stability conditions of the model are deduced. Third, the impact of participants' behavioral decisions during the panic buying event on the event’s evolution process is discussed through numerical simulation analysis. The results show that (1) in the context of sudden public health emergencies, material demand is the primary cause of public panic buying behavior. Postpanic buying events, such behavior is influenced primarily by the proportion of individuals with negative attitudes within the population. Local governments should release positive information regarding supplies in a timely manner during the nascent stage of panic buying events and actively monitor the proportion of individuals with negative attitudes. (2) There is a positive correlation between risk preference and public panic buying behavior, whereas loss aversion has the opposite effect. The spiritual benefits perceived by the public from engaging in panic buying increase with higher risk preference, whereas perceived costs related to health issues increase with deeper levels of loss aversion. (3) When response costs exceed what local governments are willing to bear, reputation gains and losses play a crucial role in their decision-making. The probability of local governments adopting responsive strategies increases with their emphasis on reputation and aversion to reputation losses. Higher-level governments should enhance the dissemination of positive and negative examples of government handling, enhancing local governments' sense of responsibility and honor to improve their perception of reputation gains and losses, thereby encouraging proactive management of panic buying events.

Dynamic Research on the Collaborative Governance in Urban and Rural Black-Odorous Water: A Tripartite Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective

The issue of black-odorous water (BOW) represents a formidable challenge to the current aquatic ecosystems, and its governance exhibits characteristics of low efficiency, susceptibility to relapse, and fragmented management under the Central Environmental Protection Inspection, thereby emerging as a dynamically complex issue in the ecological governance of urban and rural settings. This study introduces Gaussian white noise to simulate environmental uncertainty and design a stochastic evolutionary game model encompassing the central government, local governments, and societal forces based on evolutionary game theory and classical governance theories and concepts. Numerical simulations are conducted to explore trajectories of the strategic evolution of various subjects influenced by numerous factors. Results indicate that under the environment of random disturbances, the strategies of the game subjects show significant fluctuations, but actively cultivating the subject’s initial willingness facilitates collaboration governance in inspection. Moreover, joint construction of a “belief system” by multi-subjects, the intensity of inspection interventions, the integration of heterogeneous resources, and effective punitive measures all influence the governance of BOW, but the efficiency of resource allocation should be considered throughout the governance process. Recommendations are made finally for collaborative governance of urban and rural BOW, promoting the sustainable development of the ecological environment.

Incentive mechanism and scenario simulation of residential energy-efficiency retrofits – From the perspective of tripartite evolutionary game

Energy-efficiency retrofits (EER) are increasingly becoming a key tool for sustainable building development. Compared to extensive urban renewal, refined building energy retrofits hold more practical value. Of this, the complexities arising from the differences in the claims of multiple stakeholders deserve our attention. However, limited efforts have been made in the existing literature to explore this issue. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model for residential EER from the perspective of engineering management. Taking a typical building in an old neighborhood in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province as an example, the theoretical model is validated. The results indicate that participants in the residential EER market display varying decision-making behaviors at different developmental stages. The government’s implementation of appropriate punitive measures in the early stages will encourage enterprises to participate in EER. Simultaneously, attention should also be paid to the demands of residents to ensure the smooth progress. Market-based renovation models should be actively promoted, and specific renovation programs should be created to accommodate varying requirements. This paper offers theoretical guidance for decision-making and developing residential EER.

The application of restorative justice in China’s environmental crime: an evolutionary game perspective

The application of restorative justice in China’s environmental crime: an evolutionary game perspective

Resilient energy management strategy in smart residential buildings considering price attack: An aggregative game perspective

Smart building techniques have drawn considerable attention for the potential to accommodate renewable energy resources and achieve local energy sustainability. However, information privacy, growing number of users and vulnerability of communication channels have led to energy management and cyber-security issues. In this paper, a cyber-attack resilient energy management system for smart residential buildings is proposed. An aggregative game is formulated to describe the non-cooperative interactions among smart buildings that are coupled through dynamic electricity pricing. The existence of the variational equilibrium is analyzed theoretically. Moreover, a semi-decentralized algorithm is employed to attain the equilibrium solution without disclosing private information of individual buildings. To detect potential price attacks, a cyber-attack detection mechanism is proposed by comparing the predicted and actual electricity costs and exchanged power based on the long short-term memory network model. Numerical simulations demonstrate the performance of the semi-decentralized algorithm in term of convergence speed and robustness against disturbances. Additionally, the effectiveness of the resilient energy management strategy is investigated.

Synergizing stakeholder collaboration for value co-creation in China's prefabricated decoration diffusion: A tripartite evolutionary game perspective

The emerging prefabricated decoration (PD) sector in China offers a compelling avenue for revolutionizing the construction industry, aligning with the imperatives of sustainability and industrialization. However, the outlook for the diffusion of PD in China's construction industry is less than promising. The development of PD is closely related to its value creation and the intricate interplay of stakeholder strategies and their ramifications on PD's value co-creation necessitates thorough exploration. Based on evolutionary game theory, this study elucidates the dynamic interactions among local governments, developers, and decoration contractors in China's evolving PD landscape. A tripartite evolutionary game model was established, investigating the evolutionary stable equilibriums and the corresponding strategies. Then, an empirical analysis in Chongqing City validates the game models and primary conclusions. Scrutinizing subsidy thresholds, local subsidy biases, PD proportion in prefabrication, and binary innovation allocation, the research unveils nuanced insights pertinent to boosting PD's value co-creation. Findings advocate an assembly rate threshold of subsidy (65%–70 %) and a shift towards incentivizing decoration contractors to catalyze PD adoption. Additionally, excessive PD proportion and immature product investments may hinder industry development, prompting stakeholders to recalibrate strategies dynamically. These findings characterize the mechanisms of stakeholder value co-creation during the PD diffusion, enriching the implications of value co-creation theory in the emerging industry of the construction sector. They also furnish stakeholders committed to promoting the diffusion of PD in the domestic and international construction sectors with practical strategic guidance, particularly tailored for cities in the early stages of PD development.

Research on closed-loop supply chain decision-making of power battery echelon utilization under the scenario of trade-in

PurposeThe management issues of this article, and the author is attempting to address these issues, are as follows: What is the optimal decision of each entity in the closed-loop supply chain for the cascading utilization of power batteries under three government measures: no subsidies, subsidies and rewards and punishments? How do different measures affect the process of cascading the utilization of power batteries? Which measures will help incentivize cascading utilization and battery recycling efforts?Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses game analysis methods to study the optimal decisions of various stakeholders in the supply chain under the conditions of subsidies, non-subsidies and reward and punishment policies. The impact of various parameters on the returns of game entities is tested through Matlab numerical simulation.FindingsThe analysis discovered that each party in the supply chain will see an increase in earnings if the government boosts trade-in subsidies, which means that the degree of recycling efforts of each entity will also increase; under the condition with subsidies, the recycling efforts and echelon utilization rates of each stakeholder are higher than those under the incentive and punishment measure. In terms of the power battery echelon’s closed-loop supply chain incentive, the subsidy policy exceeds the reward and punishment policy.Originality/valueThe article takes the perspective of differential games and considers the dynamic process of exchanging old for new, providing important value for the practice of using old for new behavior in the closed-loop supply chain of power battery cascading utilization.

An exploration of omni‐channel retail from a three‐party evolutionary game perspective: Brand strength vs. platform stream

AbstractThis study builds a three‐party evolutionary game to study the contributing factors of commission rate, productivity expansion, cooperation subsidy, brand strength, and platform stream. The proposed model investigates the diverse paths the three parties are motivated to pursue at different phases of omni‐channel integration and further explores which party, the band owner with strong brand strength, or the platform with a mass consumer stream, dominates omni‐channel negotiation regarding profit distribution arrangements.

Low-Carbon Construction in China’s Construction Industry from the Perspective of Evolutionary Games

Low-Carbon Construction in China’s Construction Industry from the Perspective of Evolutionary Games

How to Promote the Development of Cultural and Creative Industries from an Evolutionary Game Perspective: Policy Mechanisms for Certification + Incentives

Existing studies need to pay more attention to the policy mechanisms of how to promote the development of cultural and creative industries through coordinating multi-stakeholder participation. Based on evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a three-party evolutionary game model to analyze the behavioral patterns of the government, cultural and creative enterprises, and consumers under different support policies. In addition, it takes the Chinese intangible cultural heritage of “Huaihe willow weaving” as a typical case for simulation. The results show that the probability of the system converging to the expected equilibrium point is low after implementing the certification policy, but the probability of the system converging to the expected equilibrium is significantly increased after implementing the incentive policy. Producer subsidies have significant advantages over consumer subsidies. At this stage, the government should consider jointly implementing the “certification + incentives” policy in phases to promote the development of cultural and creative industries.

Government subsidy and benefit distribution mechanisms for transportation PPP projects: An evolutionary game perspective

Public-private partnerships (PPP), as an important model for collaboration between the public and private sectors, is an urgent and critical topic due to the serious financial losses of governments involved in transportation PPP projects in recent years. Current research focuses on the government subsidy model, in which the effective implementation of government subsidies relies on the design of incentives for stakeholder behavior. Although the positive externalities are strong, they are prone to the problem of “free riding,” which leads to low project performance and challenges in compensating for the government's financial losses. Therefore, this study proposes a novel dynamic subsidy mechanism that can be adjusted based on actual changes in transportation demand and that is linked to project performance. We use evolutionary game theory to construct a two-party evolutionary game model of the government and social capital, focusing on the stability and influencing factors of these interactions. Our research unveils that reaching specific thresholds in both the incentive coefficient and benefit distribution ratio induces an “positive management–negative management” shift in the behavior of involved parties, leading to enhanced project outcomes. Notably, fluctuations in operational quality substantially enhance the efficiency of the active management of private sector, with no discernible impact on the subsidy efficiency of the government. Therefore, our study provides a theoretical framework for improving the revenue allocation and government subsidy mechanism, which has theoretical and practical implications for enhancing the effect of government incentives and improving the quality of operational social capital.

How does fiscal policy affect the green low-carbon transition from the perspective of the evolutionary game?

The implementation of effective fiscal policy is an inevitable choice to help green low-carbon transition and strengthen the construction of ecological civilization. This paper constructs a dynamic model of the tripartite evolutionary game among the central government, the local government and the high pollution and high carbon emission (Double-high) enterprises. Accordingly, we examine the impact of the central government's regulatory mechanism and local government's implementation intensity on green and low-carbon transition. Taking Comprehensive Demonstration Cities of Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Fiscal Policies as the entry point of the study, a staggered differences-in-differences model is used for empirical evaluation, which reveals the effect of fiscal policy on green and low-carbon transition. The theoretical modeling shows that the strategies of Double-high enterprises are affected by the interaction between the central government and local governments, and there is diversity in the strategy stability and equilibrium state of each subject. Under the premise that the central government pays attention to the motives of enterprises and local governments, the fiscal subsidies, tax incentives and penalties of local governments, as well as the supervision, reward and punishment mechanisms and transfer payments of the central government, directly shape the impact of fiscal policy on green and low-carbon transition. The empirical results show that effective fiscal policy can promote green low-carbon transition, in which fiscal decentralization has a moderating role. Finally, the paper emphasizes the importance of the leading role of the central government and the implementation capacity of local governments, as well as the key role of internal changes within firms in addressing the relationship between emissions reduction and development.

Research on the "multi-agent co-governance" system of unfair competition on internet platforms: Based on the perspective of evolutionary game.

Unfair competition on internet platforms (UCIP) has become a critical issue restricting the platform economy's healthy development. This paper applies evolutionary game theory to study how to utilize multiple subjects' synergy to supervise UCIP effectively. First, the "multi-agent co-governance" mode of UCIP is constructed based on the traditional "unitary supervision" mode. Second, the government and internet platform evolutionary game models are built under two supervision modes. Finally, MATLAB is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary stage and parameter sensitivity. In addition, we match the model's evolutionary stage with China's supervisory process. The results show that (1) the Chinese government's supervision of UCIP is in the transitional stage from "campaign-style" to "normalization." (2) Moderate government supervision intensity is essential to guide the game system to evolve toward the ideal state. If the supervision intensity is too high, it will inhibit the enthusiasm for supervision. If the supervision intensity is too low, it cannot form an effective deterrent to the internet platforms. (3) When the participation of industry associations and platform users is low, it can only slow down the evolutionary speed of the game system's convergence to the unfavorable state. Nevertheless, it cannot reverse the evolutionary result. (4) Maintaining the participation level of industry associations and platform users above a specific threshold value while increasing punishment intensity will promote the transition of government supervision from the "campaign-style" to the "normalization" stage. This paper provides ideas and references for the Chinese government to design a supervision mechanism for UCIP.

Praktik Permainan Mesin Capit Manusia (Human Claw Machine) dalam Pandangan Hukum Islam dan Maqashid Syariah

The human claw machine game is an innovative model of the doll claw machine game. The problems arising from this contemporary phenomenon are related to applicable law. In the human claw machine game, the laws of the game and the form of transactions used are not yet clearly known. The aim of this research is to explore the laws of human claw machine games from the perspective of Islamic law and maqashid sharia. The research method used in this research is normative legal research which will examine legal issues with the provisions in the Al-Qur'an and hadith. The results of the analysis show that the law of human claw machine games when viewed from a gaming perspective is a form of game that is prohibited because it contains elements of chance and speculation which are similar to qimar. Meanwhile, as a business tool, this game is a form of buying and selling transaction that contains elements of gharar and maysir. The position of maqashid sharia in the practice of human claw machine games includes two main things, namely the protection of reason and wealth.

How to promote the digital business model innovation of high‐tech SMEs through government venture capital? An evolutionary game perspective

AbstractDigital business model innovation plays a crucial role in the growth of high‐tech small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). In this research, we introduced tripartite evolutionary game models that include the government, venture capital (VC) institutions, and high‐tech SMEs, operating within the context of government venture capital. Within the scenarios of government revenue and loss compensation, we assess the evolutionary stable strategies of each stakeholder and analyze variations in the evolution results. Using numerical simulation, we investigate how factors impact players' strategic choices and the evolution of the system. The findings indicate the presence of an indirect transmission mechanism among players' strategic choices, which collaboratively stabilizes the game system. Furthermore, we investigate the policy consequences of various compensation mechanisms and find that high‐tech SMEs' strategic choices are not influenced by these compensation approaches. However, the incentive effects of different compensation on the government and VCs' investment strategies vary. Revenue compensation is more favorable for VC institutions but places a greater financial burden on the government. In contrast, loss compensation is a more efficient approach for the government. This study offers valuable insights for the management and operation of government venture capital funds, and the advancement of digital business model innovation for high‐tech SMEs.

Research on Green Design Strategy of Electrical and Electronic Manufacturing Enterprises Based on the Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Green design emphasizes the environmental attributes of the product life cycle, which can prevent environmental pollution at the source and reduce resource consumption. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a tripartite game model between “government-electrical and electronic manufacturing companies-consumers”, explores the influence of participants’ strategic choices and parameters on the evolutionary behavior of the three parties in different situations, and uses Matlab software to conduct numerical simulation analysis. Simulation analysis is the process of simulating real-world events and system behavior through computer models to assess, validate, and predict their performance and response. The research results show that the strategic choices of the three parties influence each other and government supervision and green consumption are conducive to incentivizing manufacturing companies to carry out green design. Consumer green preferences, environmental tax rates, corporate recycling revenue, and increases in consumer recycling revenue are all conducive to product design. Compared to environmental taxes, corporate subsidy policies have a greater impact on the behavior of the government, manufacturing companies, and consumers. Compared to consumer subsidies, corporate subsidy policies have a more significant effect on the behavior of governments and manufacturing companies, while for consumers, the opposite is true.