Personalist Regimes Research Articles

The Failure of Presidentialism in Central Asia

Institutional design can impact the dynamics of power relations in Central Asian states. Majoritarianism and the rigidity of the fixed terms of presidential systems are amplified by the personalist regimes of Central Asia, often leading to instability. A parliamentary system may reduce the political repression of these regimes by decreasing the stakes in each particular election. It may also increase stability due to the higher flexibility of the system. The effectiveness of the parliamentary system, however, depends largely on the existence of strong cohesive parties.

Governing Civil Society: The Political Logic of NGO–State Relations Under Dictatorship

This paper attempts to take the first steps toward developing a theory of non-governmental organizations (NGO)–state relations under dictatorship. Drawing on evidence from East Asia, the author argues that dictatorships typically employ one of two strategies in attempting to govern NGOs. First, some dictatorships follow a corporatist strategy, in which business associations, development, and social welfare organizations are co-opted into the state and controlled through a variety of strategies. Second, other dictatorships pursue an exclusionary strategy in which NGOs are marginalized and replaced with state institutions. Variation in the strategy chosen may be explained by differing levels of elite competition and the type of development strategy. Single-party states tend to regulate elite conflicts better and thus often choose corporatist strategies. In personalist regimes dictators tend to fear the organizational and mobilizational potential of NGOs and thus tend to pursue exclusionary strategies. This choice, however, is conditioned by the development strategy employed, as socialist development strategies reduce the incentives to allow NGOs.

Are Dictators Immune to Human Rights Shaming?

This paper examines whether human rights naming and shaming destabilizes the rule of authoritarian leaders. We argue that human rights shaming can destabilize autocratic leaders by signaling international disapproval to elites in the targeted country, increasing their capacity to replace the incumbent. In personalist regimes, shaming increases the risk of irregular exit because regime elite do not have a means to peacefully replace the incumbent. Shaming campaigns also decrease foreign aid and international trade in personalist regimes, denying the leader access to resources to pay his coalition – further destabilizing his rule. In non-personalist regimes where parties or the military allow elites to peacefully replace incumbents, human rights shaming increases the risk of regular turnover of power, but has little effect on the risk of irregular exit or international flows of aid and trade. These findings have implications for understanding when and where shaming campaigns are likely to reduce or deter repression.

Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions

This paper explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers’ decisions concerning repression and public spending composition, and how different authoritarian rulers respond to foreign pressure. If sanctions are assumed to increase the price of loyalty to the regime, then rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. In contrast, when constraints are severe due to reduced aid and trade, dictators are expected to greatly increase their levels of repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending composition (1970–2000) as well as on repression levels (1976–2001), we show that the empirical patterns conform well to our theoretical expectations. Single-party regimes, when targeted by sanctions, increase spending on subsidies and transfers which largely benefit more substantial sectors of the population and especially the urban classes. Likewise, military regimes increase their expenditures on goods and services, which include military equipment and soldiers’ and officers’ wages. Conversely, personalist regimes reduce spending in all categories, especially capital expenditures, while increasing repression much more than other regime types when targeted by sanctions.

Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes

We study the determinants of corruption in a sample of 40-odd authoritarian polities at the turn of the 21st century. Recent studies have proposed several parallel mechanisms potentially relevant for variations in the extent of corruption in authoritarian regimes. We put these various theories into a unified empirical model in order to investigate the wide range of corruption observed in non-democratic political systems. We investigate the importance to variations in corruption in authoritarian countries of the type of group in power, various indicators of rulers' perceived time horizons, and as control variables, the availability of natural resources, the extent of foreign aid, the level of economic development, and the degree of institutionalized autocracy. Our results indicate that personalistic and personalistic-hybrid regimes are more prone to corruption than single-party and military regimes, and that rulers who expect to remain in power for longer are less corrupt. We also find that the availability of natural resources and higher level of institutionalized autocracy are associated with greater corruption and that wealthier countries experience less corruption.

Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and Autocrats' Duration

This paper enquires into whether economic sanctions are effective in destabilizing authoritarian rulers. We argue that this effect is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Thus, personalist regimes and monarchies, which are more dependent on aid and resource rents to maintain their patronage networks, are more likely to be affected by sanctions. In contrast, single-party and military regimes are able to maintain (and even increase) their tax revenues and to reallocate their expenditures and so increase their levels of cooptation. Data on sanction episodes, authoritarian rulers and regimes covering the period 1946-2000 have allowed us to test our hypotheses. To do so, duration models have been run, and the results confirm that personalist autocrats are more vulnerable to foreign pressure. Concretely, the analysis of the modes of exit reveals that sanctions increase the likelihood of an irregular change of ruler, such as a coup. Sanctions are basically ineffective when targeting single-party or military regimes.

The International Conflict Behavior of Dictatorships from an Audience Cost Perspective

In this study, I look at the consequences of variations in authoritarian elite coalitions for international conflict behavior, using Fearon's audience cost theory to frame my argument. In dictatorships, the elite coalition is the group that has the power to oust the dictator. Because of this, the coalition plays the role of the domestic audience. Just as voters can make democratic leaders pay for failing to follow through with their commitments, so can the elite coalition in authoritarian regimes. In personalist regimes the elite coalition is the personalist clique, in military regimes it is the military junta, and in single party regimes it is the party cadre. Differences in the institutional nature of the elite coalition affect the ability of the coalition to impose costs upon the leader. Leaders face higher costs for reneging on commitments in regimes in which the elite coalition can more effectively constrain the leader's behavior. In single party and military dictatorships, leaders confront an elite coalition that is unified by a pre-existing party or military. In these regimes, being part of unifying institution increases the ability of the elite coalition to collectively constrain the actions of the dictator. Personalist dictators face a different scenario. There is no pre-existing institution that serves to unify elites, leaving personalist dictators to rule relatively unconstrained. In addition, in military regimes, the military elite have greater access to the security apparatus than do elites in other forms of dictatorship. This increases their ability to stage a coup and thereby impose costs on the military dictator for poor leadership. Due to institutional differences in the nature of the elite coalition, I argue that personalist dictatorships should be the least able to generate audience costs, followed by single party regimes, and lastly military regimes. I also add to Fearon's theory and posit that audience costs are only effective as a signal of commitment when the target regime can correctly identify the signal. Differences in the nature of the elite coalition affect the extent to which leaders correctly identify signals. I argue that personalist leaders tend to receive lower quality intelligence than do leaders in military or single party regimes and as a result. As a result, personalist leaders should be more likely to ignore what are credible threats. To test my predictions, I use quantitative tests. I look at whether or not target states choose to reciprocate initiators' challenges. States that are able to generate high audience costs should yield low rates of reciprocation from their targets. I find substantial support for my argument.

Breaking Down the Residual Category: Policy Stability among Dictatorships from a Veto Players Perspective

In this paper, I argue that policies in dictatorships require the tacit support of two actors: the leader of the regime (an individual veto player) and the individuals the leader relies on for support (a collective veto player). I show that the collective veto player differs across personalist, military, and single party dictatorships in important ways. Due to such differences, it should be easiest to change policy in personalist regimes and most difficult in single party regimes. I test this statistically by comparing responses to exogenous economic shocks and fluctuations in inflation rates across dictatorships. I find substantial support for my argument.

Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations

In this article, the authors investigate the relationship between states'political leaders'ages, their regime type, and the likelihood of militarized dispute initiation and escalation. They examine more than 100,000 interstate dyads between 1875 and 2002 to systematically test the relationship between leader age and militarized disputes. The results show that, in general, as the age of leaders increases, they become more likely to both initiate and escalate militarized disputes. In addition, the interaction of age and regime type is significant. In personalist regimes, the general effect reverses; as age increases, the relative risk of conflict declines in comparison to other types of regimes. Increasing leader age in democracies increases the relative risk propensity for conflict initiation at a higher level than for personalist regimes, while the impact of increasing leader age is most substantial in intermediate regimes.

The Conflict Behavior of Authoritarian Regimes

In order to understand what makes democracies unique, we need to develop a deeper understanding of the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes. If any of the competing explanations of the democratic peace can also account for similar behavior among specific types of authoritarian regimes, we can have more confidence in the power of that approach for understanding the relationship between political regimes and international peace. Previous work using a data set compiled by Barbara Geddes indicates that single-party authoritarian regimes tend to be somewhat more peaceful than other types of authoritarian regimes, while personalist dictatorships tend to be more conflict prone. This article extends this research by examining the initiation of militarized disputes among all combinations of authoritarian regimes coded by Geddes, including military, personalist, single-party, and hybrid regimes that involve combinations of these three pure types. We find that this more comprehensive examination of the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes suggests that there is indeed something distinctive about the behavior of single-party and personalist regimes. Single-party regimes are significantly less likely to initiate disputes against many of the specific types of authoritarian regimes coded by Geddes. They are also less likely to be targeted by other types of authoritarian regimes. In contrast, personalist regimes are both more likely to initiate and be the target of disputes. This article suggests that the Bueno de Mesquita et al. ‘selectorate’ theory provides a useful approach for understanding this pattern of results.

Constitutionalism and dictatorship: Pinochet, the junta, and the 1980 constitution

It is widely believed that autocratic regimes cannot limit their power through institutions of their own making. This book presents a surprising challenge to this view. It demonstrates that the Chilean armed forces were constrained by institutions of their own design. Based on extensive documentation of military decision-making, much of it long classified and unavailable, this book reconstructs the politics of institutions within the recent Chilean dictatorship (1973–1990). It examines the structuring of institutions at the apex of the military junta, the relationship of military rule with the prior constitution, the intra-military conflicts that led to the promulgation of the 1980 constitution, the logic of institutions contained in the new constitution, and how the constitution constrained the military junta after it went into force in 1981. This provocative account reveals the standard account of the dictatorship as a personalist regime with power concentrated in Pinochet to be grossly inaccurate.

Peaceful Parties and Puzzling Personalists

Reiter and Stam advance the study of the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes in two ways. First, they clearly demonstrate the importance of using directed dyad data sets for studying mixed pairs of political regimes. Second, they have refocused our attention on the question of decisional constraints and international conflict. This response examines the dispute patterns of a specific mixed pair of authoritarian regimes, single-party regimes, and personalist dictatorships. We find that single-party regimes are significantly less likely to start militarized disputes against personalist dictatorships than is true of other types of regime dyads. In contrast, personalist regimes are somewhat more likely to initiate militarized disputes against single-party regimes than is the norm for other regime dyads. These findings indicate that the relationships among specific types of authoritarian regimes may be as consequential as the relationships between democracies and authoritarian regimes of any type. They also indicate that we need to examine further the role that institutional constraints play in shaping the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes.We thank Chris Butler for his comments and Dan Reiter for sharing his data.

…And yet they persist: Explaining survival and transition in neopatrimonial regimes

Although the literature on transitions from neopatrimonial regimes provides many accounts of chaotic breakdown, it seldom explains why some personalistic regimes survive the kinds of intense domestic crises that topple similar systems. This article introduces cases of regime restabilization to a previous analysis of change, showing that while patrimonial authority often isolates leaders and provokes unrest, extensive patrimonial ties can help the regime endure these same challenges and defeat its domestic foes. Specifically, when their repressive capacity is not inhibited by foreign powers during crises, neopatrimonial leaders can withstand insurgencies and prevent regime change. Building upon Richard Snyder's study of neopatrimonial transitions, I explore this argument through a variable of “hard-liner” strength derived from the regime's domestic patrimonial networks and its relationship to a foreign patron. Adding four original case studies of enduring neopatrimonialism (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia) to Snyder’s prior work, I find the revised voluntarist framework explains both transition and restabilization in a composite set of fifteen cases.

Personalization and Institutional Constraints: Pinochet, the Military Junta, and the 1980 Constitution

AbstractThe standard account of military dictatorship in Chile (1973–1990) portrays the case as a personalist regime, and uses the dynamics associated with this type of regime to explain General Pinochet's control of the presidency, the enactment of the 1980 Constitution, and the longevity of military rule. Drawing on records of the decisionmaking process within the military junta, this article presents evidence for a different characterization of the dictatorship. It shows that Pinochet never attained the supremacy commonly attributed to him, that the commanders of the other branches of the armed forces retained significant powers, and that the 1980 Constitution was not enacted to project Pinochet's personal power. More generally, this study suggests that personal power is not a necessary condition for regime longevity; collective systems can also produce cohesion and stability.

The collapse of socialist development in the Third World

For about 140 years, since the publication of Marx and Engels' The Communist Manifesto, it has been usual to think in terms of two broadly contrasted ways of organising political and economic arrangements, very loosely describable as capitalist on the one hand, and socialist on the other. For about half of that time, since the Soviet revolution of 1917, it has been possible to point to actual examples of societies plausibly claiming to be socialist as well as capitalist; and these alternatives could be regarded not merely as mechanisms for managing the production and distribution of a given stock of goods and services, but as means of substantially increasing the total stock over a long period-in other words, as alternative strategies of development. For rather more than half of this period, since the rapid accession to independence of formerly colonial Asian and African states in the aftermath of the Second World War, this simple dichotomy has likewise provided the framework for rival strategies of development within what is now known as the Third World. The dramatic developments in Eastern Europe have effectively destroyed the pretensions of socialism as a system of economic and political management in industrial societies, with obvious knock-on effects for the Third World. But the question may also be raised of whether the capitalist/socialist dichotomy has had its day in the Third World too, on the grounds that the idea of a socialist path to development has collapsed beyond the point of resuscitation. A working definition of socialism Having bluntly posed the question, a fair amount of preliminary work is needed before we can tackle it. We need, in particular, a workable definition of 'socialism', which will distinguish states or economies deemed to be socialist in a way precise enough to produce useful generalisations, without being so restrictive as to be almost inapplicable. Like many terms in common political use, 'socialism' has acquired both a high emotional content, and an almost infinite plasticity of meaning. It has extended from the abolition of the state on the one hand, to the creation of the most rigid and centralised structures of state control on the other. It appears sometimes as a blueprint for producing rapid industrialisation, at other times as a distributive mechanism which assumes that the major articulation of productive forces has already taken place. And it encompasses a wide variety of political arrangements, from preindustrial communalism, through personalist and populist regimes, to multiparty liberal democracies and states ruled by Leninist vanguard parties.

Controlled Repression in Salazar's Portugal

The first of Portugal's two experiments with liberal democratic forms ended in 1926 when the civilian right, the landed oligarchy, and the military joined forces in a counter-revolutionary movement that seized power and laid the ground for Europe's lengthiest dictatorship of the right. For the next forty-eight years, organized opposition to Portuguese authoritarianism was miniscule and ultimately it was contradictions within the apparatus of state that caused the regime to topple in 1974. This was a sudden demise, but over the long term, the regime's dependence on the capability of a single individual Professor Ant6nio d'Oliveira Salazar had been a fatal weakness. At no time did the dictator virtually a reclusive personality encourage internal debate or establish mechanisms for choosing a successor. His was an informal personalist regime that might have come under sustained challenge sooner but for a key mitigating circumstance. Portuguese authoritarianism consistently displayed a high degree of rationality in the area of internal security. For many years, an extremely efficient undercover police apparatus kept down opposition without resorting to total repression: over four decades, political murders committed in metropolitan Portugal amounted to less than 500. However, opposition forces remained continually diffuse and inactive in a country where, after the first few years, the governing elite was not popular, to say the least.

Opportunity Costs of Defense: Some Cross-National Evidence

This paper assesses the impact of changes in military spending on spending levels for public education and public health in a number of countries for selected years from 1950-1972. First, the opportunity costs argument is evaluated across all the nations selected and then two intervening variables — level of economic development and regime type — are introduced to specify the relationship. The major findings are: (1) opportunity costs do exist for education and health across all nations and all years, but they are weak in magnitude; (2) levels of economic development have little or no impact upon the opportunity costs for these policy areas; (3) personalist regimes tend to have higher opportunity costs of defence than do centrist and polyarchic regimes. With regard to the latter two regime types, an additional finding occurs: centrist regimes in recent years are lowering their opportunity costs of defense for education and health while polyarchic regimes have been increasing theirs. Implications of the findings for the opportunity costs notion are then summarized.