The International Conflict Behavior of Dictatorships from an Audience Cost Perspective

Abstract

In this study, I look at the consequences of variations in authoritarian elite coalitions for international conflict behavior, using Fearon's audience cost theory to frame my argument. In dictatorships, the elite coalition is the group that has the power to oust the dictator. Because of this, the coalition plays the role of the domestic audience. Just as voters can make democratic leaders pay for failing to follow through with their commitments, so can the elite coalition in authoritarian regimes. In personalist regimes the elite coalition is the personalist clique, in military regimes it is the military junta, and in single party regimes it is the party cadre. Differences in the institutional nature of the elite coalition affect the ability of the coalition to impose costs upon the leader. Leaders face higher costs for reneging on commitments in regimes in which the elite coalition can more effectively constrain the leader's behavior. In single party and military dictatorships, leaders confront an elite coalition that is unified by a pre-existing party or military. In these regimes, being part of unifying institution increases the ability of the elite coalition to collectively constrain the actions of the dictator. Personalist dictators face a different scenario. There is no pre-existing institution that serves to unify elites, leaving personalist dictators to rule relatively unconstrained. In addition, in military regimes, the military elite have greater access to the security apparatus than do elites in other forms of dictatorship. This increases their ability to stage a coup and thereby impose costs on the military dictator for poor leadership. Due to institutional differences in the nature of the elite coalition, I argue that personalist dictatorships should be the least able to generate audience costs, followed by single party regimes, and lastly military regimes. I also add to Fearon's theory and posit that audience costs are only effective as a signal of commitment when the target regime can correctly identify the signal. Differences in the nature of the elite coalition affect the extent to which leaders correctly identify signals. I argue that personalist leaders tend to receive lower quality intelligence than do leaders in military or single party regimes and as a result. As a result, personalist leaders should be more likely to ignore what are credible threats. To test my predictions, I use quantitative tests. I look at whether or not target states choose to reciprocate initiators' challenges. States that are able to generate high audience costs should yield low rates of reciprocation from their targets. I find substantial support for my argument.