Threat Perception and Audience Costs: Differences in International Conflict Behavior among Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

International conflict behavior is often analyzed by looking at the differences between two regime types: democracies and dictatorships. Dictatorships are generally grouped together into one category regardless of their variations. Numerous patterns emerge, however, once the category of dictatorship is disaggregated. In this paper, I look at how different types of dictatorships respond to threats issued by democracies in the context of James Fearon's audience cost argument. I argue that when a democracy makes a threat, conflict is most likely to escalate with personalist dictatorships than with any other form of regime. Because personalist dictatorships are less able to perceive that democracies are able to generate high audience costs, they are the more likely to ignore what are credible threats. I support my argument using the experiences of the U.S. and Panama in 1989, the U.S. and Haiti in 1994, and the U.S. and the DPRK in 1994.