Penal Populism Research Articles

Is Punitiveness Really There in South Korea?: Punitiveness and Penal Populism in Theoretical Contexts

Is Punitiveness Really There in South Korea?: Punitiveness and Penal Populism in Theoretical Contexts

Criminal populism: crime as political capital in the Philippines and the United States

ABSTRACT This study examines the phenomenon of transforming crime into political capital, drawing on cases from the Philippines, then Donald Trump in the United States. It introduces three archetypes of politicians who use crime as political capital: the Criminal Politician, the Political Criminal, and the Fascist Criminal Politician. Additionally, the concept of criminal populism is introduced, highlighting how a politician’s criminal acts can become political assets by enhancing their appeal in electoral processes. The focus here is on intersections of crime and electoral processes, on how criminals use public performance and narrative construction within criminal justice institutions and political arenas to strengthen their support as populist leaders among the electorate. Furthermore, the concept of penal populism, 1 defined as the advocacy for anti-crime policies and legislation , is juxtaposed with criminal populism to offer a comprehensive understanding of the three new archetypes and their impacts on the intersection of crime and politics.

Decarceration in Southern Europe: Notes on Climate Change in the Penal Field

AbstractAgainst the backdrop of the economic and political crises affecting Europe in the late 2000s and early 2010s, incarceration rates began to shrink in many European countries, ushering in a decarceration period that continues to this day—albeit with cross-border divergences. In fact, Europe was the world region with the greatest decline in incarceration rates in the 2010s. Evidently, this unexpected shift stands in stark contrast to the penal populism policies characterising penality in global north regions in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as to the mass incarceration path still followed by many global south jurisdictions in the 2020s. Spain is a suitable national case to examine this recent turn, since Spanish incarceration rates increased almost eightfold in just three decades, before an intriguing and steady decline began that is almost unparalleled in western Europe. This paper focuses on the Spanish case, exploring the background and proximate causes that have enabled the current decarceration scenario. In addition, it scrutinises if and to what extent the changes witnessed in the Spanish case reverberate across wider European regions. In so doing, the paper attempts to grasp the climate change impacting the penal field in many global north jurisdictions.

Influence of feminist mobilization on legal consciousness and the practices of femicide prosecutors in Mexico at the subnational level

Over the last two decades, some feminist organizations in Mexico have applied principles of transnational women’s rights through the use of concepts such as femicide (feminicidio) and also promoted both the pretrial preventive detention for these crimes, and the implementation of “gender-based violence alerts” by the Mexican federal government. The article aims to understand how these federal policies have influenced the legal consciousness and practices of prosecutors in the state of Nuevo León, Mexico, from 2009 to 2021. I argue that feminist discourses have been inspired by federal-level policies based on penal populism and, although they have encouraged prosecutors to defend the rights of femicide victims, they have also promoted violations of defendants’ and victims’ rights. A qualitative methodology based on documental analysis and interviews with prosecutors, defense attorneys, and human rights defenders has been applied. The article compares narratives and practices of femicide prosecutors during two historical periods and claims that feminist discourses have helped to raise consciousness of women’s rights for prosecutors but have also helped to justify some probable violations of human rights.

Confronting the Philippines' war on drugs: A literature review

AbstractUpon election in 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte launched one of the world's most lethal and aggressive anti‐drug campaigns known as the War on Drugs in the Philippines. The War on Drugs unleashed an unprecedented level of violence while enjoying high public approval in the Philippines throughout Duterte's presidency. Scholars from a variety of disciplines grappled with understanding the significance and impact of the War on Drugs, generating a substantial literature. How have scholars contributed to critical understanding and practice that confront the Philippines' War on Drugs? We analyse and assess the state of the scholarship on the Philippines' War on Drugs by reviewing 140 scholarly materials. We find that scholars contextualized the popularity of violence, documented its various actual effects on Philippine society, and to a lesser extent, offered alternatives. Our literature review synthesises two major analytical approaches explaining the drug war: as penal populism and as moral politics. Scholars describe the War on Drugs as a way of governing society through violence and with impunity for extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses, using legitimising moral discourses. We present key findings on the drug war's actual consequences, underscoring its catastrophic impact across various communities except the drug trade itself. Throughout, we offer reflections on blind spots, highlighting the value of considering the historical context and deeper structural and political‐economic drivers. We arrive at a research agenda intended to aid scholars in engaging with the persistent issues in the War on Drugs as it continues to be implemented by the Philippine government.

‘This is what happens to people who don't spank their kids’: An analysis of YouTube comments to news reports of child to parent violence

AbstractChild to parent violence (CPV) is a form of family violence that has seen a growth in research attention over the past decade. However, little research has examined how this problem is understood by those outside of academia. This is despite recognition that public understandings of a particular social problem shape the landscape in which that problem plays out. To address this research gap, we analysed data from 463 public comments posted on YouTube in response to four UK news broadcasts that reported on the problem. Using a discourse analytic approach, we examined how posted comments framed the cause of, and solutions to, CPV. While a range of causes were identified, the posts predominantly blamed the parents, mobilizing child development discourses to attribute the cause of CPV to either parental use of violence, or to a lack of parental violence, towards children. The solutions offered reflect a penal populism that supports extremely punitive sanctions against children who engage in CPV. This study suggests that public campaign and education initiatives need to do more than raise public awareness about CPV—they must also inform the public about how broader social policy operates in relation to children, families and the state.

Looking for trouble: (Infra‐)law enforcement, penal populism, and professional habitus against squatting in Italy

AbstractThis paper reflects ethnographically on law enforcement against squatting in Milan. To this end, it examines labor practices, moral economies, and everyday narratives of those who work with the institutional mandate of tackling squatting in public housing. I propose to grasp these processes considering two specific political and legal configurations that traverse the arena under investigation: the entrenched presence, in the Italian context, of what has been defined as penal populism; additionally, the increasingly pronounced prominence of an infra‐legal dimension of law. Squatting—and the way in which it is publicly managed and punished—represents a privileged lens for examining the specific forms of normative and political governance in contemporary cities.

“Tem uma hora que você tem que puxar o gatilho!”: discurso de ódio, apologia e incitação ao crime na TV no pós-eleições 2022

This article analyzes evidence of hate speech, incitement and apology for crime in television news programs in three critical moments of Brazilian democracy. The objective is to investigate the role played by Brazilian TV in the propagation and normalization of hate speech and incitement to criminal practices against the democratic rule of law. To investigate its roots, we examine media-driven penal populism and the conceptual contours of hate speech. Six episodes of the programs "Os Pingo nos Is" and "Alerta Nacional" were analyzed in conjunction with Critical Discourse Studies.

(NE)OPRAVDANOST SNIŽAVANJA STAROSNE GRANICE NASTUPANJA KRIVIČNE ODGOVORNOSTI U FEDERACIJI BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE

In the middle of 2023, a thirteen-year-old elementary school student in Lukavac (Bosnia and Herzegovina) shot a teacher with a firearm, causing him life-threatening injuries. It happened just one month after a much more monstrous crime had been committed by his peer in a school in Belgrade. Taking into consideration that in accordance with the positive (juvenile) criminal legislation in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, young persons of that age cannot be prosecuted by the criminal justice authorities, because the age limit for the onset of criminal responsibility is 14 years, in light of the aforementioned events, one of the vice presidents of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted an initiative to the competent Ministry of Justice to amend the relevant legislation by lowering, or redefining the age limit for the onset of criminal responsibility. The paper presents different models of defining the age limits of criminal responsibility in comparative law, as well as tendencies related to their lowering, i.e. raising in the national laws of countries around the world in the last few decades. After that, the paper analyses the relevant international and supranational legal standards in this area, as well as the results of certain (neuro) scientific research related to this issue. Based on all of the above, it is concluded that the initiative to lower or redefine the age of criminal responsibility in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a valid scientific and legal foundation and that it represents a kind of moral panic and penal populism.

Penal exceptionalism in countries of Central Europe. Why is the region different?

The countries of Central Europe have for many years occupied a leading position in Europe when it comes to the level of incarceration. This begs the question of what lies behind this state of affairs. It may be connected with the history of the region, being under authoritarian rule for years. Another factor may be the penal populism that is present everywhere in the world, but has specific features in this region. One version of such explanations is the concept of “penal nationalism”. The research also indicates a relationship between social policy and egalitarianism, among other factors, and the size of the prison population. This raises the question of the extent to which the concepts relativizing punitiveness to categories of political economy apply to the region. Finally, there are other explanations that point to some prosaic factors of a “technical” nature that may have an undesirable influence on punitiveness. None of these concepts fully explain the unique situation of the region as a whole. However, they can be a starting point for building a more integrated concept.

Theoretical framework for an analysis of the recent criminal law reforms in Poland

In the article, I analyse certain aspects of recent criminal law reforms in Poland from the perspective of criminal punishment being a complex legal and social institution of a processual nature. It is intended to enable a critical examination of the punitiveness of the penal system, which can hardly be explained by its effectiveness or even by penal populism. In the study I use the following methods: historical legal, comparative legal, formal logical, dialectical, analytical, synthetical and inductive/deductive. The synthesis and triangulation of the methods follow the principles of culturally integrated social and legal studies (Królikowska, Utrat-Milecki 2010).

On (Measuring) Recidivism, Penal Populism and the Future of Recidivism Research

It is common criminological knowledge that recidivism – relapse into criminal behaviour – is a major predictor of future criminal behaviour, one could say a ‘hard-core’ criminogenic factor, esp. when displayed at a young age. Yet, despite its prominence and importance in both criminology and the discipline and practice of criminal law, there is an ongoing confusion about the concept and social construction of recidivism, its basic terminology, approaches to its measurement (methodology), and finally about the best ways to deal with it. In the paper at hand, we aim to unravel at least some of the grand mysteries surrounding recidivism and its research, targeting particularly domestic criminal justice professionals and researchers, since we have found a certain lack of relevant and up-to-date Croatian publications on this topic. Instead of simply presenting or arguing for any of the competing perspectives, such as the criminological, normative or penological, or a more practical instead of a scientific perspective (to name but a few), we critically analyse each of these perspectives, highlighting their pros and cons, while leaving it to the readers to choose any or all of them – depending on their own perspectives and purposes. Thus, key findings from recidivism research are discussed in the context of steadily growing penal populism, which is characterised by broadening the scope of criminalisation and increasing sentencing frameworks as well as harsher punishment practices, targeting in particular recidivists. All this occurs in the context of populist public and media discourse about crime and criminals, which effectively undermines any notion of evidence-based crime policy. But times are changing and the future of recidivism research, spearheaded by neuropenology, might very well provide us with a new kind of knowledge and understanding needed to put a check on penal populism.

The Clean Hands of Populism: The Paradox of the Italian “Tangentopoli”

The corruption scandal of Tangentopoli broke out in Italy in early 1992, playing a capital role in the re-shaping of Italian politics and economics. The claim for legality boosted those reforms that turned the Italian political system from a parliamentary regime to a de facto presidential state. Under the quest for legality, it was also possible to dismantle the active state participation in the country’s economy, so as to also practice in Italy the neo-liberal roll back of the state. Tangentopoli is also characterized by the paradoxical aspect of boosting penal populism. Despite corruption concerned both the political and the entrepreneurial spheres, no meaningful anti-corruption law was passed after 1992.

A Discussion on the Concept of Penal Populism

A Discussion on the Concept of Penal Populism

Japanese public opinion on reporting the real names of juvenile criminals: An examination from the perspective of justification preferences

PurposeThis study examined Japanese citizens’ attitudes toward disclosing juvenile offenders’ real names in terms of justification preferences, which are strongly related to attitudes toward punishment and justice. MethodsA total of 1,207 citizens participated in an online survey. A multiple regression analysis was conducted with attitudes toward revealing real names as the dependent variable and preferences for justification, beliefs about juvenile offenders, perceptions of delinquency, and demographic variables as the independent variables. ResultsThe preference for rehabilitation predicted disapproval, while general deterrence and incapacitation predicted support for reporting real names. This suggests that the fear of hindering rehabilitation leads people to reject reporting real names, while the idea that it is important for deterring crime leads people to support it. Symbolic discrimination against juvenile offenders was also suggested as a reason for supporting the reporting of real names in conjunction with beliefs about juvenile offenders. ConclusionsThe results can be seen as an expression of the penal populism that has emerged in Japan in recent years. The paper also discusses a hybrid measure of preference for justification used in the present study.

Dogmatyczny kształt środków karnych wobec nowelizacji Kodeksu karnego z 1997 r. The Dogmatic Shape of Punitive Measures in View of Amendments to 1997 Criminal Code

Based on the concept of the authors of the Criminal Code 1997, punitive measures were created as an instrument of a rational repression for the crime committed. The dogmatic structure of punitive measures not only perfectly fits the axiology of the Criminal Code, but also corresponds to the needs of modern criminal law. The legal status of punitive measures is based on expanded legal grounds for discretionary powers of courts in applying and creating a variety of punitive measures. Numerous amendments to the Penal Code, especially during the years 2015 to 2022, led to a depreciation of the legal status of punitive measures by introducing an obligatory application of punitive measures, extending their duration as well as creating too wide a scope of application or unnecessarily developing new punitive measures. Having regard to the nature and extent of these changes, it can be concluded that they are the results of penal populism and are unconstitutional. Key words: punitive measures, legal status of punitive measures, expanded legal grounds, discretionary powers, obligatory application, repression

PROTECTION OF VALUES OR MANAGEMENT BY REPRESSION. ON THE FUNCTIONS OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL LAW

The study is devoted to an attempt to determine whether the analyses carried out at the level of the philosophy, theory and analysis and synthesis of criminal law, as well as the approaches presented in various criminological theories can be used in debates about the goals and functions of modern criminal law. The analyses carried out are based on the reconstruction of the current state of criminal law, dominated in many countries by penal populism. The coincidence of the repressiveness characteristic of the populist approach subordinated to the implementation of the concept of extreme deterrence, with the position of the legal elite as to the goals and functions of criminal law, illustrates the state of tensions and crises in which contemporary repressive law has found itself. The image of the public debate, characterized by the unambiguity of positions combined with the lack of perceptual openness to the views presented by the proponents of opposing approaches, provides a premise for the search for rational and verifiable arguments in disputes over the shape of criminal law. Given the limitations of the analysis and synthesis of criminal law in the sphere of disputes about values, an anthropological vision and a model of social structure make it reasonable to search for premises that order the debate about criminal law on other levels. In this regard, the study presents systemic approaches presented in the philosophy of criminal law combined with an attempt to justify that, in fact, complementary elements can be seen in them. Complementing the philosophical perspective is the plane of criminal law theory, on which one can also find elements that are part of the universal approach to repressive law. Adding to this picture of modern criminological theories, the study presents the thesis that modern criminal law serves multiple, sometimes opposing functions justified by reference to other assumptions and models of social structure. The multiple functions of modern criminal law make it unreasonable to refer to the dichotomy capturing alternatively the functions and goals of criminal law either as an instrument for protection of socially valuable values or as a tool of management by repression. The text seeks to justify the position that modern criminal law performs, in part, both functions indicated above. At the same time, there are opportunities to rationally limit the use of criminal law instrumentally as a tool of management by repression in the interest of power and certain social groups. The science of criminal law, encompassing the following planes: theoretical and philosophical, can be a plane that provides premises and arguments to help resolve contemporary dilemmas. In particular, it seems that the approaches presented in the science of criminal law and criminology are not so much of an opposing and radically competitive nature, but are in fact harmonizing, containing a number of complementary elements in a complex set of assumptions and claims that make up a holistic approach to the criminal law system.

„Lipcowa” nowelizacja Kodeksu karnego. Nowa filozofia prawa i wątpliwości konstytucyjne

The Act of July 7, 2022 introduced a thorough reform of criminal law. The effect of these changes is a significant tightening of criminal repression, e.g. in the form of extending the possible sentence of imprisonment from one month to 15 years to a period from one month to 30 years, lowering the age of criminal responsibility in special cases to 14 years or the possibility of imposing a penalty life imprisonment without the possibility of conditional early release. The changes that appeared in the Penal Code can be considered the next stage in the political struggle through activities known as penal populism. However, these changes can be viewed as the result of adopting a philosophy of criminal law different from the previous one and adopting the assumptions of neoclassicism in criminal law. However, some of these changes raise serious constitutional questions.

Penal Populism

Penal Populism

Memory Laws, Rule of Law, and Democratic Backsliding: The Case of Poland

This article argues that the memory laws adopted during the democratic backsliding in Poland from 2015 to 2023 are a perversion of classic European memory laws that aimed at safeguarding democracy from internal dismantlement and protecting the rights and freedoms of individuals from social ills, such as in the case of Holocaust denial. The new wave of Polish memory laws was an element of an anti-liberal turn in Poland and contributed to a further move away from the rule of law, human rights, and European legal standards. The mechanisms adopted in those laws are removed from their stated official purposes and are examples of penal populism and populist revanchism instead of transitional justice. This article argues that adopting such memory laws was possible due to democratic backsliding and that they reinforce the erosion of democratic standards by restricting the rights of individuals. Moreover, the politically subordinate Constitutional Tribunal’s reaction to the motions about the constitutionality of these memory laws further evidences a systemic lack of independent, centralized judicial review. This phenomenon has far-reaching, negative consequences for democratic standards.