Penal Populism Research Articles

Crime Control in Japan: Exceptional, Convergent or What Else?

Abstract Theories about crime control in Japan have largely been based around two opposing traditions. On the one hand, cultural explanations have emphasized the exceptional attributes of Japanese social relations that contribute towards shaming and re-integrative processes. On the other hand, more recent explanations assert that Japanese crime control is converging with other countries, particularly towards penal populism. Both approaches tend to reduce explanations to a monolithic characterization that disguises variegation within Japan. Through considering the governance of illegal drug use and the Kamagasaki area of Osaka, a ‘geo-historical’ perspective is advocated to better capture the complexity and contradictions of globalizing processes and social culture and their resulting manifestations in crime control within contemporary Japan.

\u201cIndiscipline\u201d in context: a political-economic grounding for dangerous driving behaviors among Tro-Tro drivers in Ghana

This paper attempts a better explanation for the causes of dangerous driving behaviors among “Tro-Tro”(minibus) drivers in Ghana. The current media, policy, and academic coverage of the problem reveals an immutable discourse that considers the behaviors (such as over speeding) as a function of moral failure, indiscipline, or bad attitudes on the part of the drivers. Often little consideration is given to the context of the behaviors and their influences. This paper provides an alternative explanation that considers the behaviors as predictable actions that are systematically connected to the Tro-Tro industry. Tro-Tro drivers operate within a precarious work climate marked by problems such as low wages; cut-throat competition; high level of job insecurity; imposition of non-negotiable throat-cutting daily fees by car owners and harassments from bribe-demanding corrupt police officers. The exigencies of meeting these numerous financial and other demands of their work, not moral failure, are what fuel dangerous driving behaviors among the drivers. Based on this analysis, the present public policy of using penal populism (i.e., heavy fines and prison sentences) to address road trauma in Ghana is ineffective for inducing safer driving behaviors among Tro-Tro drivers. Interventions to reduce road transport problems involving such commercial passenger vehicles in Ghana and other developing countries similarly situated must be broad, more-wider reaching and include initiatives that also address the range of political-economic causes, motivations, and constraints that incentivize the drivers to drive dangerously. The paper contributes to the sustainable development goals of ensuring safe and sustainable transport (SDG 11.2), and reducing deaths and injuries from road accidents (SDG 3.6).

A NEW PENAL POPULISM? RODRIGO DUTERTE, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE WAR ON DRUGS IN THE PHILIPPINES

AbstractDrawing on evidence from the Philippines, this paper investigates the so-called penal populism thesis. Penal populism refers to an understanding of justice in which criminal and anti-social activity should be harshly punished. The paper tests whether support for harsh penal policies, including the use of extrajudicial killings, is associated with underlying populist attitudes and preferences for charismatic leadership. Since coming to power in 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte has waged a violent and highly popular campaign against drug-related criminality. Based on survey modules fielded in 2016 and 2017, the paper demonstrates a positive relationship between populist attitudes and support for the campaign against illegal drugs in general and the extra-judicial killing of suspected drug users and dealers in particular. It also demonstrates a relationship between belief in the charisma of Duterte and support for the campaign against illegal drugs. The implications of the theory and results for the fields of populism and penal populism research are discussed.

Prison from a gender perspective: a systematic review

In this study, we developed a systemic literature review (2006-2016) on the prison system considering gender issues, aiming to get to know the themes under study about the incarceration of women and men around the world. The databases used were Scopus, Psycinfo and Virtual Health Library. After the application of the inclusion and exclusion criteria, 32 studies from 13 countries were selected. In the results, it was observed that the theme of mental health, particularly drug addiction, was recurrent. Overall, the studies about women discuss relationships beyond prison and the life trajectories marked by violence. Research on the male prison population, on the other hand, mostly addresses the dynamics established inside the prisons. In addition, the men are given the role of perpetrators of the aggressions, being rarely positioned as victims. Finally, many of the articles analyzed considered gender as dichotomous in gender/sex. That was particularly clear in the studies about mixed penal populations. Beyond critically discussing the different impact and experience of incarceration for both, various studies in the review merely used the concept as a way to descriptively distinguish the collected data.

Court sentences to forensic-psychiatric treatment and imprisonment in Germany: Types of crimes and changes from 1995 to 2009

The management of mentally disordered offenders varies widely across countries. Given the high prevalence of individuals with mental disorders throughout the criminal justice system, it is not always clear why some people receive forensic treatment and others a prison sentence. This project investigated trends in criminal justice sentencing practices in Germany from 1995 to 2009. We analysed officially recorded data taken from 14,100,329 court rulings to describe differences in the index offences committed by individuals sentenced to prison of at least two years and those given a forensic treatment order. The distribution of offence types differed substantially. Forensic patients committed 6.6% of all severe crimes. There was a 50% increase in the number of forensic treatment orders compared to a 11.6% increase in the group of individuals sentenced for crimes of a similar severity. Forensic patients were more likely to have committed a serious offence. This paper provides key epidemiological data and offers a basis for future comparative research. It also concludes that these trends are indicative of a moderate penal policy, without a drift towards penal populism arguably visible in other jurisdictions. Instead, it is argued that the findings are consistent with actuarial social control policies oriented towards risk prediction and crime prevention of high-risk offender groups.

The Two Subalterns: Perceived Status and Violent Punitiveness

From the mid-twentieth century, state and public conceptions of deviance and crime control have turned increasingly punitive (Hallett 115; Hutchinson 138). In a Western context, criminal justice has long been retributive, prioritising punishment over rehabilitation (Wenzel et al. 26). Within that context, there has been an increase in punitiveness—understood here as a measure of a punishment’s severity—the intention of which has been to help restore the moral imbalance created by offending while also deterring future crime (Wenzel et al. 26). Entangled with the global spread of neoliberal capitalism, punitiveness has become internationally pervasive to a near-hegemonic degree (Sparks qtd. in Jennings et al. 463; Unnever and Cullen 100). The punitive turn has troubling characteristics. Punitive policies can be expensive, and increased incarceration stresses the criminal justice system and leads to prison overcrowding (Hutchinson 135). Further, punitiveness is not only applied unequally across categories such as class, race, and age (Unnever and Cullen 105-06; Wacquant 212) but the effectiveness of punitive policy relative to its costs is contested (Bouffard et al. 466, 477; Hutchinson 139). Despite this, evidence suggests public demand is driving punitive policymaking, but that demand is only weakly related to crime rates (Jennings et al. 463). While discussion of punitiveness in the public sphere often focuses on measures such as boot camps for young offenders, increased incarceration, and longer prison sentences, punitiveness also has a darker side. Our research analysing discussion taking place on a large, regional, crime-focused online forum reveals a startling degree and intensity of violence directed at offenders and related groups. Members of the discussion forum do propose unsurprising measures such as incarceration and boot camps, but also an array of violent alternatives, including beating, shooting, dismemberment, and conversion into animal food. This article draws on our research to explore why discussion of punitiveness can be so intensely violent.

Punitive Circuits: The Limitations of Penal Populism Regarding Criminalization Practices of Transgender Women and Transvestites in an Argentinian Red-Light District

This article analyses transgender women and transvestites’ criminalization practices in a red-light district, from two investigations located in La Plata city, Argentina. In order to achieve this proposal, we apply urban and action research tools to analyze security ensembles between different state agencies and neighborhood groups, so that the ways in which such practices are legitimized and become possible can be addressed. The daily regulation of inhabited spaces allows us to visualize disputes over the forms of appropriation, and to historicize social control of the supply of sex in the public space. Under this casuistry, we question limitations of the notion of punitive populism. We propose the figure of punitive circuits to visualize the territorial specificities linked to the insecurity that moral and criminal control practices have over the red-light district, and the multiplicity of people and agencies that intervene in its course.

Social Fear of Crime and Its Consequences

Social fear of crime is a phenomenon of interest to scientific disciplines. The present study draws primarily on the achievements of criminology. It shows that there are different ways of interpreting fear of crime, explaining its causes and responding to it. The conclusions also depend on the perspectives - whether it is the perspective of an individual, small social groups or large social structures. There are always objective and subjective elements in evaluations, including irrational ones. The latter hinder rational criminal policy. Fear of crime has negative social consequences, such as a loss of citizens' sense of security, aggressive attitudes, a loss of trust in law enforcement services, a reduction in the need for social contact, a reduction in the willingness to provide assistance - as a result, an increase in crime and an even greater sense of threat, particularly affecting socially weaker groups. The rigour and emotional approach to the problem of punishing criminals, resulting from the fear of crime, gives rise to the phenomenon of so-called penal populism, often used by politicians with the participation of the media. Finally, the economic costs of social fear of crime are not insignificant. For these reasons, the phenomenon should not be underestimated, but should not be overestimated, because in the context of other threatening situations and various dangers, it does not constitute the main feeling of threat to citizens and is far behind such fears as social, economic, health, fear of war, etc. Favourable developments in areas other than internal security, e.g. increased prosperity reduces social fear of crime more than restrictive criminal law.

Exploring the Bottom-Up Reform of Sex Offender Registration in China: Carceral Feminism and Populist Authoritarianism

In 2017, the Minhang District of Shanghai introduced sex offender registration. This reform attracted positive reactions on social media. Local governments in Jiangsu, Guangdong and Chongqing quickly followed the precedent. In 2019, the central government announced that it will establish national sex offender registries by 2022, although it limited the scope of registration to paedophiles. This study explores how this bottom-up reform unfolded and what implications it has in theory and practice. Based on qualitative and quantitative analysis of 2261 posts on Weibo, the Chinese version of Twitter, this study reveals two major players in the current reform: the Chinese feminists who are pursuing a punitive agenda online (a phenomenon known as ‘carceral feminism’), and the local governments that are eager to win the public’s trust, although such trust is mainly reserved for the central authority in the Chinese political culture (a culture known as ‘populist authoritarianism’). Drawing on the findings, this study pushes the discussion about Chinese penal policy beyond the dichotomy of ‘penal professionalism’ and ‘penal populism’. It argues that while the influence of professionalism is evident in central-level policy making, local penal policies can be easily led by populist punitiveness. The latter deserves more academic attention. This study also takes a non-partisan approach to the feminist movements on Chinese social media. It reveals the class conflicts and regional inequality underlying the gender schism. The polarisation effect in online discussion is also highlighted, which alerts policy makers to the reliability of ‘public opinion’ online. (246 words).

Children of Incarcerated Parents

Psychosocial health of children of incarcerated parents is a critical area of concern and yet acutely neglected in India. Despite Supreme court guidelines on ensuring age-appropriate care for children living along with their mothers in prison, there is variance in practice, which compounds the disadvantage of being a prisoner's child. The children left behind at home due to parental incarceration also experience vulnerabilities that emanate from their pre-existing socio-economic disadvantages, the continued interface of the child with the criminal justice system, as well as societal perception towards them. This results in a pronounced effect on their health, and educational, social and emotional wellbeing. Conscious efforts are required for strengthening the factors that could mitigate the adverse consequences of parental incarceration coupled with a debate on penal populism and the social and economic costs associated with the same.

Jószándékú jogalkotói populizmus a rendészeti jogban

Az írás a nemzetiségi törvény prizmáján keresztül vizsgálja a multikulturális környezetben végrehajtott rendőri intézkedésekről szóló 27/2011. (XII. 30.) és a roma kisebbségi önkormányzatok közötti együttműködésről, kapcsolattartásról szóló 22/2011. (X. 21.) ORFK utasításokat és az előbbihez kapcsolódó (2012. január 19-én kelt.) 29000/126311/2012 ált. számú módszertani útmutatót. Ezt követően rámutat a szabályozás és a jogalkalmazás anomáliáira, végül pedig azt elemzi, hogy mindez értelmezhető-e a büntetőpopulizmus egy formájaként.

Nowy populizm penalny na przykładzie przestępstw przeciwko wiarygodności faktur

New Penal Populism on the Example of Crime against the Credibility of Invoices The article provides an overview of the populist narrative in the legislative process. The author argues that new penal populism affects more and more complicated branches of law, including a tax law. The author conducts a case study, analysing the new crime in the Polish penal code – the crime against credibility invoices. Populist aspects both in the legislation and in the political discourse surrounding it were discussed.

The end of penal populism : the rise of populist politics: Koniec populizmu penalnego i rozkwit polityk populistycznych

Penal populism has radically reshaped and reorganised many aspects of punishment in modern society. It has also shifted the emphasis from protecting the rights of individuals from excessive use of the state’s power to punish to using those powers to protect the public from individuals thought to put them at risk. In so doing, it has acted as a kind of dam, holding back the anxieties and uncertainties unleashed by the neo-liberal restructuring of these societies. However, the ascendancy of populist politics indicates that this containment role is ending. The toxic contents that had been stored behind the dam have now spread throughout the social body. This paper argues that the reasons for these developments lie in the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis and the mass movement of people around the globe. As this has occurred, penal populism has taken on a new role. It is incorporated within the broader thrust of populist politics and is used to punish and control its wider sweep of public enemies which it needs to sustain itself.

Penal populism: Negotiating the feminist agenda. Evidence from Spain and Poland

It is interesting to observe how penal populism intersects with feminism when it comes to gender-based violence, as regards both anti-rape and domestic abuse reforms. There is a vast scholarship (Bumiller, 2008; Gottschalk, 2006; Gruber, 2007) in the US explaining how feminist activism turned to state power to demand more protection and more criminalization, and little focus on the European context. This article aims to analyse the development of what might be called feminist penal populist discourse in Spain and Poland. Whereas penal populist discourse has been conspicuous in Spain, and the authorities there ally themselves with domestic feminist groups and scholars to combat gender-based violence, Poland has never embraced the feminist agenda, despite the widespread influence and effectiveness of penal populism in that country. The article attempts to answer the general question: Why are feminist demands likely to be addressed in some countries where penal populism discourse has emerged in the political and public sphere, but not in others? The analysis demonstrates that the proclivity for penal populism and selection of topics are strongly related not only to some structural factors or political culture, but also to the historical and social context of each country. In Spain, the feminist movement was incorporated and politicized by left-wing parties into mainstream politics, whereas in Poland there was no grass-roots movement for women’s liberation for a long time, and the emancipatory politics during the communist era was superficial.

Populizm penalny — źródła i przejawy w polskim życiu publicznym

Z przeprowadzonych badań wynika, że jedną z przyczyn krytycznych opinii Polaków o sądownictwie jest poczucie, że kary orzekane przez sądy są zbyt łagodne. Zgłaszane oczekiwania wymierzania surowszych kar połączone z przekonaniem polityków o potrzebie reagowania na nie w drodze zwiększania represyjności wpisują się w fenomen populizmu penalnego. Chociaż w literaturze można spotkać się z wyjaśnieniami, że bierze się on z braku poczucia bezpieczeństwa w społeczeństwie, jego źródła są bardziej złożone, tzn. z jednej strony, będzie to pełen zaniedbań sposób komunikowania się sądów ze społeczeństwem i z drugiej wynika z przekazów medialnych nastawionych na konstruowanie fragmentarycznej, sensacyjnej i emocjonalnej narracji. Skala oddziaływania tych dwóch czynników zdeterminowana jest dynamiką społecznych przemian związanych m.in. z globalizacją. Populizm penalny wyraźnie ujawnia się w stylu retoryki dominującym w polskiej debacie publicznej. Prowadzi on do doraźnych, bezrefleksyjnych działań legislacyjnych podejmowanych pod wpływem społecznej presji. Zazwyczaj zamiast rozwiązywać problemy, będzie podsycał konflikty społeczne i poszerzał sferę kontroli państwa.

(Grossly) disproportionate sentences: Can charters of rights make a difference?

A comparison between United Kingdom (UK) and Australian law concerning grossly disproportionate sentences indicates that human rights charters and/or other strong human rights guarantees in a jurisdiction can produce improved protections for offenders against penal populism. While the relevant Australian case law suggests that there are virtually no restrictions on the state’s ability to enact mandatory sentencing laws in those jurisdictions without a charter of rights, the UK and Strasbourg courts have now made it clear that grossly disproportionate sentences cannot be imposed compatibly with art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECH R’), and that mandatory sentencing schemes are particularly likely to produce breaches of that article. When further developing the law in this area, the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) should learn from the relevant North American jurisprudence, avoiding the excessively deferential approach evident in many of those authorities and embracing the Canadian Supreme Court’s more interventionist stance recently in The Queen and Attorney General of Canada v Nur and Charles (‘Nur’). In turn, Nur provides further evidence that, when they are armed with a charter of rights, the courts can make a difference if they are courageous enough to do so.

Populism and the Rule of Law

The resurgence of populism in Europe and North America is widely thought to have placed the rule of law under pressure. But how many of the relevant developments are indeed associated with populism? And is any such association a contingent or analytic matter: Does populism inevitably threaten the rule of law, or do other conditions intervene to shape its impact? After setting out how I understand the rule of law and populism, I examine the ways in which contemporary populist discourse has challenged the rule of law through a variety of mechanisms—notably agenda setting, policy impact, influence on discretionary decisions, and convention trashing—considering the institutional and social conditions that conduce to strengthen or weaken these mechanisms in particular contexts. Finally, I consider the implications of the analysis for contemporary criminalization, assessing how many of the factors producing penal populism or overcriminalization are truly a product of populism.

Penal Elitism: Anatomy of a Professorial Ideology

In recent decades, many scholars have invoked the concept of penal populism to explain the adoption of “tough on crime” measures and a wider politics of “law and order” across the post-industrialized world. But scholars who invoke the concept often betray an implicit commitment to its twin ideology—penal elitism—the belief that penal policymaking should not be subjected to public debate and that matters pertaining to crime control and punishment should be left to experts or specialists. The doctrine contains four key properties: isolationism; scientism; a narrow notion of “the political”; and a thin conception of “populism.” Isolationism involves creating buffers around arenas of social life—including criminal justice systems—to remove them from what is held to be undue democratic influence. Scientism is the overvaluation of scientific reason and the dismissal of a public believed to be emotional, irrational, or exceedingly simplistic. Politics conceived narrowly limits “the political” to that which takes place within the formal political system, ignoring the wider notion of politics as the exercise of symbolic power in everyday life, which extends far beyond the political system as such. The thin conception of “populism” ignores the fact that populism is an ideology promising to protect the public from harms of neoliberal capitalism that nevertheless fails to offer a plausible alternative to market rule. In this article, I argue that in place of either penal populism or penal elitism, academics should engage in democratically grounded practices to reverse harsh justice by including the public in a reformulated politics of punishment.

God’s penology: Belief in a masculine God predicts support for harsh criminal punishment and militarism

Prior research demonstrates that multiple dimensions of religiosity significantly predict punitive attitudes and militarism. This study highlights the importance of believing in a masculine God, an aspect of religiosity with a robust and consistent relationship to punitiveness and militarism, but which has previously been unexamined. After accounting for multiple aspects of religiosity highlighted by previous research—such as frequency of religious practice, religious tradition, fundamentalist identity and beliefs, and other dimensions of God image including love, anger, judgment, and engagement—believing that God is a “He” consistently and strongly increases support for harsh social policies targeting intra-societal enemies (criminals), as well as general militarism and campaigns targeting extra-societal enemies (e.g. “terrorists”). These results highlight the importance of theorizing and measuring gendered dimensions of belief in God, as well as the importance of fine-grained considerations of religion in studies of penal populism and militarism.

イシュー・セイリアンスと刑事政策―「ポピュリズム厳罰化」と「民意なき厳罰化」の政治過程―

イシュー・セイリアンスと刑事政策―「ポピュリズム厳罰化」と「民意なき厳罰化」の政治過程―