Party Congress Research Articles

New Trends in Chinese Foreign Policy

ABSTRACTThis special issue attempts to examine some of the major new developments in China’s international relations since the 18th Party Congress in 2012. We suggest that new nuanced patterns in Chinese foreign policy have emerged. These include but are not limited to: subtle shifts in Beijing’s strategic thinking; an omni-directional peripheral policy that is increasingly “rebalancing” westwards; an evolving and more “flexible” brand of Chinese foreign policy assertiveness; a more sophisticated approach towards the handling of its maritime disputes; and new attitudes and ideas towards global governance.

Guoguang Wu, China’s Party Congress: Power Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation

Guoguang Wu, China’s Party Congress: Power Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation

China in 2016

As the next Party Congress loomed in 2017, China’s top leaders in 2016 endorsed President Xi Jinping as the leadership “core,” a move that may allow his further consolidation of political power. The economy grew at a targeted 6.7%. Beijing challenged the new Taiwan administration, and sought to consolidate its muscle-flexing in the South China Sea. The likely direction of US relations under Donald Trump remained uncertain.

Laos in 2016

Briefly entering the international media spotlight coinciding with the first-ever visit by a sitting US president along with a galaxy of regional leaders, Laos in 2016 saw a new leadership lineup following a quinquennial party congress. Questions of Chinese versus Vietnamese influence over Laos and even the legacy of US bombing all gained an airing.

Vietnam in 2016

The 12th party congress showed a preference for stability. Vietnam and the US grew closer over trade and China, but the US election results introduced uncertainty. The Vietnamese economy grew steadily despite drought and global economic weakness. Reform of state firms fell behind schedule, productivity growth lagged, and an environmental disaster sparked vigorous dissent.

Проблемы разграничения подсудности судебных учреждений Челябинской губернии в начале 20-х гг. XX века

The article reveals the problem of differentiation of jurisdiction of cases between the Soviet judicial institutions of Chelyabinsk Province in the early 1920s. The Province Department of Justice clearly defined the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Tribunal, of the People’s Courts and of the Special Court at the Cheka. Traced the evolution of this issue which was considered at Party Congresses and sessions of the local law enforcement departments during the analyzed period of time.

Old Wine in a New Bottle?: China’s Korea Problem

China's dealings with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) have not been easy, not even during the Korean War in which the two fought side by side. The relationship has experienced many ups and downs over the years. Most recently, the nuclear tests by North Korea and the United States' planned deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea have forced China to rethink its policy toward North Korea.This essay will analyze the recent interactions between China and the DPRK and examine the factors that prompted China to adopt a tougher stance toward Pyongyang. However, this policy change has been complicated and mitigated by the United States' decision to deploy THAAD in South Korea. Given its multiple strategic interests, China must constantly balance between different players and options, and this has put it in an awkward situation. Nevertheless, together with the United States and other UN Security Council members, China supported UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2321. Looking forward, China is also faced with the uncertainties that result from South Korea's political crisis and the transition to the Donald Trump administration in the United States.Balancing ActSince Kim Jong-il's death and his son Kim Jong-un's assumption of power in December 2011, the Sino-DPRK relationship has been lukewarm. Four years after the 18th Party Congress and Xi Jinping's rise to the Chinese Communist Party's top post, no Xi-Kim meeting has happened yet. By contrast, in that time China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have not only exchanged state visits but also formed a free trade area, as the ROK has risen on China's foreign policy agenda.In October 2015, Liu Yunshan-one of the seven members of China's top leadership-traveled to Pyongyang for the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK). China made an effort to improve the Sino-DPRK relationship, but less than three months later North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016. The test immediately changed the dynamic of relations, and two months later China and the other UN Security Council members reached a consensus and released UNSCR 2270 to impose the toughest sanctions to date against North Korea. The resolution contains unprecedented inspection and financial provisions, including mandatory inspections of cargo to and from North Korea and a requirement to terminate banking relationships with North Korean financial institutions. Most significantly, it includes for the first time sectoral sanctions, which prohibit the DPRK from both exporting key resources such as coal, gold, iron, titanium, and rare earth materials and importing aviation and rocket fuel.1With UNSCR 2270, China became much more serious with respect to implementing the Security Council resolutions concerning North Korea's nuclear and missile development activities. In early April, the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs released a new list of embargoed items that cannot be imported from or exported to North Korea, though the list excluded items needed for maintaining the livelihood of ordinary people or providing humanitarian assistance.Pyongyang could not have been happy with the sanctions imposed by China. However, neither Beijing nor Pyongyang wanted to sever ties, and instead the two tried to maintain a normal relationship during this time of heightened tension. Shortly after the WPK had held its 7th Party Congress in May 2016-the first of its kind in more than 30 years-North Korea sent a high-level delegation to China to give a briefing on developments at the congress. The delegation was headed by Ri Su-yong, a member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Central Committee of the WPK, who met with President Xi. The delegation delivered a message from Kim Jong-un expressing his hope to work with China to strengthen and develop the two countries' traditional bilateral friendship and, ironically, maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia. …

China’s Politics 2016: Xi Jinping As “Core Leader” and Massive Personnel Reshuffles

Chinese President Xi Jinping has been consolidating his power over local affairs and preparing for the next round of power transfer at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. The Congress is likely to effect a far-reaching change in the composition of the central leadership. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are expected to retain their seats in the Politburo Standing Committee, while Wang Qishan may stay on due to his role in the anti-corruption campaign.

《流动人口“中国梦”社会心理表征问卷》的编制及初步应用

目的：“中国梦”是党的十八大以来提出的最重要的概念，广义的“中国梦”是指中华民族在实现国富民强的同时，为世界做出贡献的美好愿望，而狭义的“中国梦”是指每一个中国人的梦想。对于流动人口来说，他们对于“中国梦”的社会心理表征是怎样的？本研究编制了流动人口理解对“中国梦”的社会心理表征的问卷，并对该问卷进行了初步应用，对800名北京流动人口进行问卷的初步应用，调查他们对“中国梦”社会心理表征的特点。方法：采用文献法、访谈法、开放式问卷调查、项目分析、探索性因素分析、验证性因素分析和信度分析等方法。结果：问卷包含三个维度：国家梦(8个项目)、社会梦(12个项目)和个人梦(5个项目)。三个因素累计方差贡献率83.948%，旋转后的各项目负荷均在0.6以上。总量表、国家梦、社会梦和个人梦的内部一致性系数分别为0.986、0.979、0.918和0.983，分半信度分别为0.985、0.974、0.978和0.908。验证性因素分析结果表明三因子模型有良好的拟合指数(χ2/df = 3.781, NFI = 0.927, RFI = 0.919, IFI = 0.945, TLI = 0.939, CFI = 0.945, RMSEA = 0.087)，问卷具有良好的结构效度。结论：1) 流动人口“中国梦”社会心理表征问卷包括国家梦、社会梦和个人梦三个维度，问卷有较好的心理测量学特性。2) 流动人口对“中国梦”的社会心理表征得分最高的是个人梦，其次是国家梦，最后是社会梦。3) 流动人口对“中国梦”的社会心理表征具有性别差异。 Objective: “The Chinese Dream” is an important concept of the 18th party congress. In broad terms, “The Chinese Dream” means the willing of the China’s national prosperity and contribution of China to the world. While, in narrow terms, “The Chinese Dream” is every Chinese dream. What’s the means of “The Chinese Dream” for the immigrant group? This study developed the questionnaire of immigrants’ understanding of “The Chinese Dream”, which is their Social-mental Representation of “The Chinese Dream”. And then, using the questionnaire, the social-mental representation of “The Chinese Dream” among 800 Beijing immigrant people was investigated. Methods: The literature method, interview method, open-questionnaire investigation, item analysis, exploratory elements analysis, confirmatory factor analysis and reliability analysis were used. Results: The Social-mental Representation of “The Chinese Dream” Questionnaire had three dimensions: national dream (8 items), social dream (12 items), and personal dream (5 items). The cumulative explanation of the three variances was 83.948%. Internal consistency (Cronbach’s α) of the questionnaire, national dream, social dream and personal dream were 0.986, 0.979, 0.918 and 0.983. The split reliability of the questionnaire, national dream, social dream and personal dream was 0.985, 0.974, 0.978 and 0.908. Confirmative factor analysis revealed that the three-dimension model was proper (χ2/df = 3.781, NFI = 0.927, RFI = 0.919, IFI = 0.945, TLI = 0.939, CFI = 0.945, RMSEA = 0.087). It indicated that the questionnaire had better construct validity. Conclusion: 1) The Social-mental Representation of “The Chinese Dream” Questionnaire has three dimensions, which are personal dream, social dream and national dream. The questionnaire has satisfactory psychometric characteristics. 2) The personal dream scores the highest, followed by national dream, and finally social dream. 3) The social-mental representation of “The Chinese Dream” among Beijing immigrant people has significant gender difference.

China Is Corrupt, but There Is More to the Story

Minxin Pei's China's Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay is a major contribution, likely to significantly influence discussions about China and its future. He argues that China's political economy is characterized by crony capitalism, manifest in collusion between political and business elites, leading to the fundamental decay of China's Leninist system in its late stages. Moreover, the legacy of crony capitalism bodes poorly for a post-Leninist democratic regime in China.There is much in this work with which I agree. Yet I have some major areas of disagreement as well. Pei uses a principal-agent framework to make his argument. In this framework, he sees lower-level officials (agents) unresponsive to the norms and incentives established by the upper levels of the political system (the principals). The agents use their ability to control and distort information as well as the limited time and resources the principals have to monitor their subordinates to evade central directives and expectations. It is certainly clear from the cases that Pei uses as evidence that there is a great deal of corruption in the Chinese political system. But does this mean that the principals are helpless or that local officials are unresponsive to the incentives established by the center? Corruption may be endemic, but is it the whole story or even the most important part of the story?A significant amount of research has been undertaken suggesting that at least officials who want to rise to higher positions are responsive to upper-level incentives emphasizing economic growth targets, as well social stability and (perhaps until very recently) population control. While corruption has been a characteristic of party-state rule, so too has growth. Moreover, some of the activities that Pei sees as endemic corruption may also be critical to growth. As one study argued, higher land sales in one year correlate with higher transportation infrastructure spending in following years, which are correlated with higher growth. Higher transportation infrastructure spending is also correlated with higher land prices in subsequent years.1 The allocation of land, insider trading, and takings of land from rural communities may all be deeply corrupt activities and an inefficient allocation of scarce resources. But it is not clear that this is as predatory and rapacious as Pei suggests, nor is it clear that the results are not in keeping with overall central (and regime) goals.The principal-agent framework originates from writings in institutional economics and, as with many economic models, assumes that actors are maximizing their preferences or utilities. In this book, it appears that Pei believes that corrupt actors in the Chinese system are maximizing their income and/or power. But as I have suggested above, one might be both corrupt and advancing broader goals. Consider several cases. Mu Suixin was mayor of Shenyang before he was toppled in 2001, having been implicated in a bribery ring exercised by a local criminal element (p. 246). But Mu was also seen as an up-and-comer. He was featured on a PBS documentary, China in the Red, and he gave extensive access to the camera crew. He was portrayed as decisive, working hard to cope with Shenyang's unemployment problems, at least until his arrest (also covered in the documentary). Presumably, he received approval from the Liaoning provincial party committee to have his work so publicly covered. Indeed, PBS access to Mu may have been approved by the party center. He was corrupt, but he also was seen as trying to meet popular demands and respond to central directives.In a similar vein, we might view the situation of Bo Xilai, the former party secretary of Chongqing Municipality who was tried and convicted for corruption (and whose wife was convicted in the murder of a British citizen). Bo also appears to have challenged the leadership arrangement made for the 18th Party Congress, culminating in Xi Jinping's ascendency. …

Important Expositions by Xi Jinping on Running the Country According to Law After the Eighteenth Party Congress

"Important Expositions by Xi Jinping on Running the Country According to Law After the Eighteenth Party Congress." Chinese Law & Government, 48(6), pp. 475–476

Vietnam 30 years after Doi Moi: achievements and challenges

Thirty years ago, the Vietnamese government was forced to change its economic policy. The inefficiencies of the economic system led to deteriorating living conditions in the 1980s. During the 6th party congress in December 1986, the communist party decided to reform the economic system, called Doi Moi (renovation). The political elite opted for a gradual change of the economy, without changing the political system. The economic development induced by the reforms was remarkable. The living conditions of the Vietnamese have improved drastically as a consequence of high growth rates. Despite economic and social success since the introduction of reforms, Vietnam has reached now a distinctive moment. The country has to tackle five challenges in order to enhance the future welfare of its citizens. Firstly, macroeconomic stability and especially a functioning financial market is a precondition for future economic growth. Secondly, the successful catch-up model based on cheap labour as well as mineral and agricultural resources is reaching its limitations. Thirdly, a stronger spatial perspective has to be taken into account as the economic development is unevenly distributed and leaving the rural areas behind. Fourthly, environmental issues need to be considered more seriously, especially pollution from intensified agricultural production, mining, and industrialization. Fifthly, due to increasing income disparities, more attention has to be paid to social justice and participation.

Xi Jinping Reshuffles Provincial Leadership in China

With recent reshuffles at the provincial level, Chinese President Xi Jinping has been consolidating power in preparation for the 19th Party Congress in 2017. Since early 2016, more than 40 political stars have been promoted or transferred to new provincial posts. Only the party chiefs and governors of Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, Guangdong and Tibet have retained their positions since 2013. Substantial changes to the leadership in these regions are expected before the 19th Party Congress.

Reshaping the People’s Liberation Army since the 18th Party Congress: Politics, Policymaking, and Professionalism

ABSTRACTFollowing the pivotal decision by China’s last paramount leader to change the course of China’s development in the latter years of the previous century, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone profound changes that have enabled it transform itself more quickly than ever before. Under its current commander-in-chief, these developments have become more pronounced, with Xi Jinping taking a noticeably greater interest in harnessing the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) coercive forces as his domestic powerbase and as a foreign policy instrument complementing his country’s hard economic assets. Following the 18th Party Congress, reforms to the PLA’s command and control functions have continued apace. It is thus timely to scrutinize the PLA’s continued efforts to further enhance its operational capabilities, in terms of both its hardware – including its hard power projection and procurement – and its heartware – the softer aspects of its development, such as its operational doctrine and military ethos. With the CCP keen to continue devoting substantial political and economic capital to strengthen the capabilities of its armed servants, the present period is a critical phase in the reshaping of the PLA into a force on par with the world's other advanced militaries.

Factors Limiting Nomination of Women Candidates for Elections in Nigeria

This paper interrogates constraints to women participation in elective politics from the point of party structure and organization mechanism. The paper is informed by the following statistic in Nigeria: in 2003 gubernatorial elections, 2 women candidates, (out of 72 Governors and Deputy Governors) were elected as deputy Governors. The results of 2011 elections show that only 7 women were elected as senators (out of 109) and 19 as members of the House of Representative (out of 360). This is a downward trend in comparison to 2007 elections when, 9 and 23 women were elected to the Senate and House of Representative, respectively. So far, not a single woman has been elected as Governor in Nigeria. Data sources consisted of governmental documents, party constitutions, oral interviews, data from non-governmental organizations such as European Election, Observation Mission (EU EOM), and observation of party meetings, conventions and congresses. Our findings show that lack of internal party democracy; which is as a result of private ownership of political party by godfathers (political notables); and weak executive committees are responsible for poor nomination of women candidates. Within this tight control of party organization by the godfathers, party members lost their democratic rights to participation in candidate nominations, and women group are the most disadvantaged. In as much as there are serious issues of lack of internal democracy, women condition will not likely improve in political participations. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2016.v7n5p202

Rašytojai Lietuvos komunistų partijos XX suvažiavime / Writers at the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party

The article discusses the general situation of the Lithuanian Communist Party (LKP) in the Soviet period, analyses the motives which determined the entry of Lithuanian writers into the party and the approach of communist writers towards the party during the period of the National Revival with a special focus on the role of communist writers at the 20 th Congress of the LKP which took place on 19–23 December 1989 and in which the party split into an independent LKP and a pro-Soviet LKP-CPSU, which remained a part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Keywords: Lithuanian Communist Party (LKP), Central Committee (CC), Writers’ Union (WU), National Revival, government, Reform Movement of Lithuania Sąjūdis. Summary After living through a complicated period during the National Revival, at the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party (LKP) held at the end of 1989 the LKP split into two parts: an independent LKP and a Moscow-dependent LKP. It was the moment which meant that Mikhail Gorbachev lost its main pillar – the support of the already independent LKP leader Algirdas Brazauskas (he was one of the most popular politicians among Lithuanian residents at that time) and the party under his leadership; the Kremlin had to rely on a small group of local communists which had not yet broken their ties with the CPSU but was not really popular in the Lithuanian society. On the scale of the Soviet Union the separation of the LKP was an unprecedented event in the whole USSR (a good example is contagious; it could have given rise to a fear that other union communist parties could have followed in the footsteps of Lithuania); it was a certain misdemeanour in the CPSU. The research revealed that the rapid Lithuanization of the LKP during the post-Stalin era was determined by a number of motives the main of which was the adjustment of its members to the Soviet system which enabled the communists to survive and opened the ways for active work in their own favour and often in favour of the Lithuanian nation. Whereas there was a number of Lithuanian patriots among the communists, including writers, in the face of the changing political circumstances they did not only choose to serve their nation and got involved in the processes of reform movement which began during the Lithuanian National Revival period but were also among the initiators of the reforms implemented at that time and the leaders of reform driving organisations (Writers’ Union) and the Reform Movement of Lithuania Sąjūdis. The membership in the communist party had a certain advantage over others as it protected its members from the potential repressions of the government during the National Revival. The active position expressed by the leaders in favour of the party renewal and their contribution to the drafting of documents of the independent LKP prompt a conclusion about an important role undertaken by the writers in preparing the soil for the emergence of the independent LKP even before the 20 th party congress. The 20th Congress of the LKP was attended by ten writers – delegates some of whom took the leading positions in the Reform Movement of Lithuania Sąjūdis: Vytautas Bubnys, member of the Sąjūdis Seimas’Council; Romas Gudaitis, secretary of the party organisation of the Writers’ Union, member of the Sąjūdis Seimas’Council, the USSR People’s deputy; Mykolas Karciauskas; Aleksandras-Raimondas Kasauskas; Kostas Kaukas; Alfonsas Maldonis; Justinas Marcinkevicius, member of the Sąjūdis Seimas’Council, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR (1985–1990), USSR People’s deputy; Vytautas Martinkus, chairman of the Board of the Writers’ Union (WU); Vytautas Petkevicius, member of the Sąjūdis Seimas’Council; Valentinas Sventickas, secretary of the Board of the Writers’ Union. The election of writers into the majority of commissions during the 20th Congress of the LKP, chairmanship in the event, participation in discussions, voting in favour of establishment of the independent LKP, election of several writers to the leadership of the new independent LKP enable us to speak about their substantial contribution to the process of democratization of the communist party. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15823/istorija.2015.14

Angola – Ruling Party Congress

Angola – Ruling Party Congress

Reclaiming the Party’s Control of the Gun: Bringing Civilian Authority Back in China’s Civil-Military Relations

ABSTRACTSince emerging as China’s top leader following the 18th Party Congress, Xi Jinping has moved swiftly to consolidate his formal authority as Central Military Commission chairman over the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In redressing the civil-military imbalance wrought by Dengist economic reforms, the commander-in-chief has combined institutional mechanisms with the use of fear to impose authoritative civilian control over the military. This paper proposes that a combination of changes to the Chinese strategic environment has contributed to Xi’s utility of the anti-corruption campaign to purge the regime’s coercive forces of its previous underpinnings, and advances that the war on military malfeasance has given rise to a new set of dynamics in civil-military relations in post-Reform China.

Research on People’s Livelihood Concept of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics

According to 18th Communist Party Congress Report spirit of China, strengthening the construction of Socialist people’s livelihood is a major social issue which needs to be solved urgently at present. As a major part of the construction of the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics, constructing people’s livelihood needs to absorb classical Marxist concept of people’s livelihood, summarize the development course and experience in constructing people’s livelihood of Chinese characteristic socialism, and clarify the basic provisions of the people’s livelihood idea of socialism with Chinese characteristics theoretically, so as to construct the socialist core value concept of people’s livelihood.

North Korea, nuclear weapons, and the search for a new path forward

In an address to the Workers’ Party Congress on May 7, Kim Jong Un told his audience that North Korea was “a responsible nuclear weapon state” that would not use nuclear weapons – “unless its sover...