Partisan Manipulation Research Articles

Democracy's moment: reforming the American political system for the 21st century

Part 1 Introduction and Historical Background Chapter 2 Remembering Florida for the Right Reasons Chapter 3 History as Hope: The Legacy of the Progressive Era and the Future of Political Reform in America Part 4 Eliminating Barriers to Political Participation: Tearing Down Walls Chapter 5 The Weight of History: Election Reform During the Progressive Era and Today Chapter 6 More Choice Please! Why U. S. Ballot Access Laws are Discriminatory and How Independent Parties and Candidates Challenge Them Chapter 7 Freeing Politics from the Grip of Money: The Limits of Campaign Finance Reform and the Need for a New Approach Part 8 Engaging Citizens: Building Citizens Chapter 9 Democratic Theory and the Case for Public Deliberation Chapter 10 Educating for Democracy Chapter 11 Community as a Source for Democratic Politics Chapter 12 Can the Internet Rescue Democracy? Toward an On-line Commons Part 13 Making the System More Responsive Chapter 14 Instant Runoff Voting and Full Representation: Keys to Fulfilling Democracy's Promise Chapter 15 Putting Democracy Back into the Initiative and Referendum Chapter 16 The Debate Gerrymander and America's Electoral-Industrial Complex Chapter 17 The Electoral College: Constitutional Debate, Partisan Manipulation, and Reform Possibilities Part 18 Challenges and Prospects for Democratic Reform Chapter 19 What Makes Reform So Difficult: The Case of America's Cities and the Problem of Elites Chapter 20 Looking Backward While Looking Forward to Democracy's Moment Chapter 21 Appendix: National and Regional Democracy Organizations

The Protection of Freedom of Expression in the Public Service Media in Southern Africa: a Botswana Perspective

This paper critically examines the public service media (PSM) in Southern Africa with particular emphasis on Botswana. The PSM, which is considered to be one of the key institutions that needs to be strengthened if the current transition to democracy and the building of an open and accountable system in Africa is to take root, faces many challenges due to its vulnerability to state control and manipulation. After an analysis of the PSM concept and an examination of how the public service media was introduced into and has evolved in the region, particularly in Botswana, it concludes that this medium of communication, on account of its reach, remains the most important means of disseminating information, education and entertainment for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, it is argued that for it to effectively accomplish these objectives certain important reforms must be carried out designed to disentangle it from the state and make it more independent and accountable. It is made clear that the new PSM model neither requires a public monopoly or public sector control nor that the state should be totally cut off, but rather a new redefined role for the state. The new model is built around at least five fundamental principles that should be crafted into any new media legislation dealing with the public media which will ensure public accountability, independence from partisan manipulation and a level playing field for all political actors.

Domestic political determinants of inflation

Abstract. Political economists have advanced a variety of diverse and competing hypotheses to explain the domestic political dimension of inflation. With few exceptions, however, these hypotheses have been tested individually without regard to competing explanations. This study uses pooled time‐series data on fifteen industrial democracies to examine five prominent political hypotheses that purport to explain either political pressures that cause inflation or institutional arrangements that insulate governments from these pressures. The results indicate that: (1) Central Bank independence provides an effective counterweight to inflation by insulating monetary policy making from inflationary (particularly, partisan) impulses; (2) Government spending increases caused by distributive and redistributive politics intensify inflationary pressures even in countries with independent Central Banks and neocorporatist arrangements; (3) Inflation is determined partially by the ideology of the party controlling government. Leftist governments in pursuit of income redistribution produce higher inflation than conservative governments; (4) Elections do not have significant effects on inflation under any structural circumstances; and (5) Neocorporatism does not consistently reduce inflation or contain the inflationary effects of partisan manipulation and fiscal expansion. However, neocorporatism may stop inflation if wage moderation by labour is accompanied by the government's commitment to pursue restrictive monetary policy.

Partisan Manipulation of the Economy: Another Look at Monetary Policy with Moving Regression

This research addresses a paradox: While there appears to be a significant partisan effect on economic outcomes, there is little or no persuasive evidence of partisan differences in the manipulation of policy instruments. This paradox appears to result from uncertainties about the specification of reaction functions for policy instruments. One implication of these uncertainties is that studies of policy instruments are biased against finding partisan differences. The proposed remedy for this situation is further empirical and theoretical work that could improve reaction function specifications. An example of this is moving regression. Results presented here from moving regressions are consistent with a model of partisan policy that does not involve large average differences in policy instruments.