Parliamentary Oversight Research Articles

Mitigating Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Heterogeneity in Corruption Levels Matter?

In line with Africa’s Agenda 2063 goal 12 of improving governance and building accountable institutions, this article contributes to the literature by examining corruption determinants using survey data from the Afrobarometer. Quantile regression estimates across 31 sub-Saharan African countries show that the effects of the determinants of corruption are heterogeneous across the quantiles. We observe that press freedom, parliamentary oversight, and human development have a reducing effect on corruption, whereas government size, ethnic fractionalization, and bureaucratic quality appear to exert a significant positive effect on corruption. Given the heterogeneity in findings, the “one size fits all” strategy in fighting corruption could be inadequate in mitigating corruption in SSA.

The institutional position of national parliaments in the European Union: developments, explanations, effects

ABSTRACT This article reviews the literature on the institutional position of national parliaments in the EU. It focuses on new institutional developments, explanations, and effects discussed over the course of the last decade. Existing datasets on parliamentary oversight institutions in EU affairs and economic governance have been extended to 2020 to inform the discussion. A systematic overview of new analyses of the effects of oversight institutions in EU and domestic politics is offered as well. Cutting across the debate as to whether parliaments are multi-level or domestic players in the EU, this review concludes that the last decade has seen growing policy specialization in the institutional position of national parliaments at the European and national levels, and that the causes and consequences of this development remain largely unstudied.

The impact of the Covid-19 related emergency measures on the democracy and human rights in Armenia

This paper analyses the adoption, enforcement and parliamentary oversight of the emergency measures in response to COVID-19, and their impact on the democracy, human rights and good governance in Armenia.

Parliamentary Oversight of the Executives – Tools and Procedures in Europe

Parliamentary Oversight of the Executives – Tools and Procedures in Europe

Strengthening parliamentary oversight of defence procurement: lessons from Belgium

ABSTRACT This paper asks: to what extent can a dedicated or special committee with access to classified information empower parliaments to oversee major defence procurement decisions? These decisions often involve a mixture of political, military, economic and societal interests. Particularly after episodes of contestation or controversy, questions tend to arise about how to empower parliaments. The central argument in this paper is that being institutionally empowered and incentivised does not guarantee rigorous oversight. The availability of expertise is an oft-ignored factor in studies of parliamentary oversight. An analysis of oversight behaviour by the Belgian Federal Parliament during the acquisition of new fighter jets (2015–2018) shows that members of parliament also need to be capable of mobilising the necessary expertise in order to translate technical information in such a way that it allows them to influence decision-making, which is often executive-dominated. In this way, this paper contributes to managing expectations about the capacity of parliaments to cope with complex military problems.

The Distribution of Power Over Social Distancing Regulation in the UK: Constitutional Design Principles from Economic Theory

Which groups of elected officials should be in charge of decisions about the imposition of lockdowns and other social distancing rules? People throughout the UK have debated this issue since the start of the pandemic. When central government, local governments, and devolved administrations all enjoy democratic legitimacy, disputes over who should have the power to impose social distancing rules are almost inevitable. The nature of the British constitution also means that the recent debates about parliamentary insight and social distancing rules were predictable. This paper sheds lights on these debates over who should have the power to impose social distancing rules by drawing on economic theory, particularly the work of Nobel Laureates Hayek (1945) and Ostrom (1990). We review UK policy since March 2020 using this lens and then present policymakers with actionable recommendations. We argue that local rather than national governments should be given authority over whether or not to impose lockdowns and similar measures. We argue that in areas in which local government powers are not unified into a single unit and instead dispersed to different levels (e.g. county and borough councils), power over social distancing rules should be vested in the most junior unit of government. We use economic theory to argue that the legislative branches within each level of government should exercise close and continuous parliamentary oversight of all social distancing rules. In light of this pandemic, the UK might also consider investing resources in acquiring a written constitution that would clearly specify who has power over public health measures such as social distancing rules.

The (Missed) Israeli Snowden Moment?

Recent journalistic revelations regarding the metadata collection practices of the Israel Security Agency (Shabak, ISA, or Shin bet), coupled with the public attention to the government’s initiative to harness these powers to identify citizens who came into close contact with coronavirus carriers, could have sparked Israel’s own “Snowden moment,” resolving in a comprehensive reform of its online surveillance legal regime. This article argues that the adamant stand taken by parliamentary and judicial oversight bodies to counter the government’s coronavirus-related surveillance should have been also addressed to tackle the new information regarding the ISA’s database retaining communications data of Israeli residents that has been collected for nearly twenty years.

Brexit a Drama, The Endgame - Part II: Trade, Sovereignty and Control

Brexit a Drama, The Endgame - Part II: Trade, Sovereignty and Control

Parlamente in der Pandemie: Erste Erkenntnisse aus einem international vergleichenden Forschungsvorhaben

During the pandemic, parliaments around the globe suffered a “double shock”: They had to adjust to the challenges of the infectious disease and uphold or (re-)establish their roles with regard to the executive . A closer investigation of 27 parliaments in different political systems gives a first in-depth comparative account for their initial reactions to the crisis . It is based on information from an ongoing collaboration of experts on parliaments and builds on a model of historical institutionalism . In some countries significant measures were taken, including restricting participation in parliamentary proceedings and moving some of them online . Committees served as a field of experimentation for digitalizing par­liaments . While only in a few countries legislative activities were strongly dominated by the pandemic, in most countries continuity across policy areas prevailed . More variety can be seen in institutional changes for parliamentary oversight . Communication activities intensi­fied with the pandemic, particularly from parliamentary leadership . These first results indi­cate that parliaments and established parliamentary democracies, in particular, were able to perform their functions despite unprecedented challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandem­ic .

Marking the Imprecise Territory of Gubernatorial Discretion to Call for a Trust Vote

Under the Indian Constitution, Governors are obligated to act with the aid and advise of the state Council of Ministers except in those matters where they have been conferred discretionary powers. Acting as a ‘linchpin of the constitutional apparatus’, the Governors are expected to ensure that their state functions in conformity with the principles of parliamentary democracy and the Council of Ministers enjoy the confidence of the House at all times. Floor tests have become a conventional way of ensuring such congruity. Reports of the Inter-State Councils and judicial pronouncements have attempted to define the ambit of gubernatorial discretion in summoning an incumbent Assembly for a floor test; however, it lacks precision. This paper argues that the process of summoning the assembly for a ‘floor test’ must be driven by the choices of elected legislators rather than the Governors’ subjective satisfaction. Towards this end, it proposes a four-level formula, with special emphasis on envisaging certain rights for the opposition parties, that must be followed by the Governors to facilitate parliamentary oversight over the executive.

الوظیفة الرقابیة للبرلمان ودورها فی حمایة المصالح العلیا للدولة

يعد البرلمان أهم سلطات الحکم الثلاث في الدولة الحديثة ، إذ هو الهيئة التشريعية التي تمثل الشعب تمثيلا حقيقيا في الدول الدستورية ، کما أنه بحسب الأصل مختص بجميع أعمال السلطة التشريعية وفقا لمبدأ الفصل بين السلطات والبرلمان له ثلاث وظائف دستورية کلها في غاية الأهمية ، هى التشريع والرقابة على أعمال السلطة التنفيذية ، وتمثيل الشعب أمام الحکومة . وتعتبر الوظيفة الرقابية للبرلمان حجرا أساسا في البرلمانات الديمقراطية ، إذ تشکل مؤشرا على الحکم الرشيد ، وهي تهدف إلى مساءلة السلطة التنفيذية عن أعمالها ، وإلى ضمان تنفيذ السياسات بطريقة فعالة . ولما کانت الوظيفة الرقابية للبرلمان من الأهمية والخطورة بمکان ، فإننا خصصنا هذه الدراسة المختصرة لتناولها ، حيث نوضح مفهومها وأهميتها ، وأدواتها ومظاهرها ، وما يترتب عليها من آثار ، لذا فإننا قمنا بتقسيم هذه الدراسة إلى ثلاثة مباحث . المبحث الأول : ماهية الرقابة البرلمانية وأهميتها وأدواتها . وقد قمنا بتقسيمه إلى ثلاثة مطالب الأول : تناولنا فيه ماهية الرقابة البرلمانية ، والثاني : تناولنا فيه أهمية الرقابة البرلمانية ، أما الثالث : فيتناول وسائل الرقابة البرلمانية . المبحث الثاني : مظاهر الرقابة البرلمانية على أعمال الحکومة . وقد قسمناه إلى ثلاثة مطالب الأول : يتناول الرقابة البرلمانية على الموازنة العامة للدولة ، الثاني : يتناول الرقابة البرلمانية على المعاهدات ، أما الثالث : فيتناول الرقابة البرلمانية على الاقتراض. المبحث الثالث : الآثار الناشئة عن الرقابة البرلمانية . وقد قسمناه إلى مطلبين ، الأول : تقرير مسئولية الوزارة کأثر للرقابة البرلمانية ، الثاني : أثر الرقابة البرلمانية على الأداء الإداري . أما الخاتمة : فقد خلصنا فيها إلى جملة من النتائج والتوصيات . Parliament is the most important three authorities of government in the modern state, as it is the legislative body that represents the people in real representation in constitutional states. Acts of the Legislative Authority According to the principle of separation of powers and the parliament, it has three constitutional functions, all of which are extremely important: legislation, oversight of the executive branch, and representation of the people before the government. Parliament's oversight function is a cornerstone of democratic parliaments. It is an indicator of good governance and aims to hold the executive to account for its actions and to ensure that policies are implemented effectively. Since the oversight function of the parliament is important and dangerous, we devoted this brief study to address it, where we explain its concept and importance, tools and manifestations, and the implications, so we divided this study into three sections. The first topic: What is parliamentary oversight and its importance and tools. We have divided it into three demands: the first: we dealt with what is parliamentary oversight, and the second: we dealt with the importance of parliamentary oversight, and the third: deals with means of parliamentary oversight. The second topic: manifestations of parliamentary control over the work of the government. We have divided it into three demands: the first deals with parliamentary oversight of the state budget, the second: deals with parliamentary oversight of treaties, and the third deals with parliamentary oversight of borrowing. The third topic: the effects of parliamentary oversight. We have divided it into two requirements: first, the report of the ministry's responsibility as the impact of parliamentary oversight; Conclusion: We have reached a number of conclusions and recommendations.

Emergency Measures in Response to the Coronavirus Crisis and Parliamentary Oversight in the EU Member States

Emergency Measures in Response to the Coronavirus Crisis and Parliamentary Oversight in the EU Member States

From Boleas to Bangui: Parliamentary oversight of South African defence deployments

CITATION: Van Rensburg, W. J., Vrey, F. & Neethling, T. 2020. From Boleas to Bangui : parliamentary oversight of South African defence deployments. Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, 48(1):1-21, doi:10.5787/48-1-1255.

A Review of Legal Regulation of Religious Slaughter in Australia: Failure to Regulate or a Regulatory Fail?

Simple SummaryReligious slaughter has recently attracted public attention as a result of media portrayal of several high-profile Australian and international events. The requirements of domestic religious slaughter practice, including animal welfare provisions, appear to be poorly understood by the Australian public. This paper summarizes the welfare science and regulatory framework around halal and shechita slaughter in Australia. Current knowledge on public viewpoints on these practices is examined, and areas for future social science research are proposed. In spite of wide-ranging and extensive animal welfare protection being provided by the law, we propose that the complexity of the legislative arrangement reduces transparency and undermines the strength of protection to animals provided by law. Avenues for legal reform are proposed. There is also a need for more active public engagement to increase community knowledge about religious slaughter practices, and to counter Islamophobia and anti-Semitic attitudes. While religious slaughter is not a new practice in Australia, it has recently attracted public concern regarding questions of animal welfare following unfavourable media coverage. However, the details of religious slaughter practices, including related animal welfare provisions, appear to be poorly understood by the Australian public, and no existing literature concisely synthesises current regulations, practices, and issues. This paper addresses this gap by examining the processes associated with various types of religious slaughter and associated animal welfare issues, by reviewing the relevant legislation and examining public views, while highlighting areas for further research, particularly in Australia. The paper finds shortcomings in relation to transparency and understanding of current practices and regulation and suggests a need for more clear and consistent legislative provisions, as well as increased independence from industry in the setting of the standards, enforcement and administration of religious slaughter. A starting point for legal reform would be the relocation of important provisions pertaining to religious slaughter from delegated codes to the responsible act or regulation, ensuring proper parliamentary oversight. In addition, more active public engagement must occur, particularly with regard to what constitutes legal practices and animal welfare standards in the Australian context to overcome ongoing conflict between those who oppose religious slaughter and the Muslim and Jewish communities.

A Stress-Test for Democracy: Analysing the New Zealand Government’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic from a Constitutional Perspective

This article explores the New Zealand Government’s response to the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic through a legal and constitutional lens. It adopts an essentially doctrinal analysis in describing the response but intertwines a comparative law thread, to draw selected comparisons with how other governments have responded. It offers some political, demographical and historical insights to provide background information for non-New Zealand readers. The article aims to provide a comprehensive view of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements and how they have impacted on the Government’s response to COVID-19 as well as a critical analysis of that response by assessing the effectiveness of various measures adopted by the New Zealand Government. The article consists of six sections. Section one provides an introduction to New Zealand’s constitutional framework including some demographic information for non-New Zealand readers. Section two describes the New Zealand Government’s overall response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Section three discusses the declaration of a national state of emergency. Section four examines the Parliamentary oversight mechanism known as the “Epidemic Response Committee”. Section five explores the role of the media and the importance of upholding the right to freedom of expression when responding to the pandemic. Finally, section six draws out some overall recommendations for New Zealand and other countries to consider when moving forward and preparing for the next pandemic.

Smoke with fire: Financial crises and the demand for parliamentary oversight in the European Union

The handling of the 2008 financial crisis has reinforced the conviction that the European Union (EU) is undemocratic and that member states are forced to delegate overwhelming power to a supranational technocracy. However, European countries have engaged with this alleged power drift differently, with only a few member states demanding more parliamentary scrutiny of EU institutions. This article develops a political economy explanation for why only some states have enforced mechanisms to monitor the EU more closely. Our theory focuses on the role of the crisis and the impact of fiscal autonomy in countries outside and inside currency arrangements such as the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). We argue that, in the aftermath of a severe economic shock, member states outside the EMU possess more monetary and fiscal resources to handle the crisis. These would then demand oversight of EU decision-making if their fiscal sustainability depends on the Union. By contrast, Eurozone states that need policy changes cannot address the crisis independently or initiate reforms to scrutinize the EU. Hence, we argue that during the heated moments of severe economic downturns, parliaments in Eurozone countries discuss supranational supervision rarely. As these legislatures have nevertheless to give in to the popular demand for EU control, they express support for more EU supervision in the infrequent times of debate. We provide evidence for our theory with a cross-national analysis of EU oversight institutions, and a new original dataset of parliamentary debates during the Eurozone crisis. Our findings highlight the political consequences that financial nosedives have across the diverse membership of a supranational organization.

Mental health and capacity laws in Northern Ireland and the COVID-19 pandemic: Examining powers, procedures and protections under emergency legislation

This article examines the changes made to mental health and capacity laws in Northern Ireland through temporary emergency legislation, known as the Coronavirus Act 2020. The purpose of the legislation was to respond to the emergency situation created by the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular the increase pressure placed on health services in the United Kingdom. An overview is provided of the government's rationale for the changes to Northern Ireland mental health and capacity laws, as well as exploring how they are likely to be operationalised in practice. Consideration is also given as to how such changes may impact upon existing human rights protections for persons assessed as lacking mental capacity. It is argued that it is important that regular parliamentary oversight is maintained in relation to the potential impact and consequences of such changes during the period they are in force. This should be done in order to assess whether they remain a necessary, proportionate and least restrictive response to the challenges faced in managing mental health and capacity issues in Northern Ireland during this public health emergency.

Applying Post-Legislative Scrutiny to the Analysis of Legislation and SDGs in South and Southeast Asia

Post-Legislative Scrutiny (PLS) is an emerging oversight technique which is applied by parliaments to scrutinise implementation and impact of specific laws or legal frameworks. This article takes stock of PLS practices in countries in South and Southeast Asia and argues that PLS can also be used to scrutinise complex processes at the national or supra-national level, such as the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). First, a wide introduction and the state of play in PLS is provided, with reference to different parliamentary and development approaches emerging from the application of PLS in parliaments worldwide, followed by two specific case studies: the law on microfinance in Myanmar and the law on social practice reform in Nepal. The examination of these case studies offers insights about the application of scrutiny techniques in different parliaments. The outcome of the analysis is used to respond to the main research question of this contribution: whether PLS techniques can be applied for the oversight of extended processes, as is the case with the implementation of SDGs. For this, details of the first world study on parliamentary oversight of SDGs are presented, with a regional focus on South and Southeast Asia. The results seem to support the authors’ claim that PLS as a technique can facilitate oversight both of specific legal provisions and complex multi-stakeholder processes, such as the monitoring of SDGs.

Debating the Legal Status of the Ornaments Rubric: Ritualism and Royal Commissions in Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century England

This article uses the history of the Ornaments Rubric in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to explore the emergence of claims to self-governance within the Church of England in this period and the attempts by parliament to examine how independent the legal system of the church was from the secular state. First, it gives an overview of the history of the Ornaments Rubric in the various editions of the Book of Common Prayer and the Acts of Uniformity, presenting the legal uncertainty left by centuries of Prayer Book revision. It then explores how the Royal Commission into Ritualism (1867–70) and the Public Worship Regulation Act (1874) attempted to control Ritualist interpretations of the Ornaments Rubric through secular courts. Examining the failure of these attempts, it looks towards the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline (1904–6). Through the evidence given to the commission, it shows how the previous royal commission and the work of parliament and the courts had failed to stop the continuation of Ritualist belief in the church's independence from secular courts. Using the report of the royal commission, it shows how the commissioners attempted to build a via media between strict spiritual independence and complete parliamentary oversight.

Parliamentary oversight under the Covid-19 emergency: striving against executive dominance

ABSTRACT The Covid-19 emergency has profoundly challenged the interactions between the legislative and the executive branches of government: while executives have assumed a predominant role in law-making, parliaments are being increasingly marginalised. In the circumstances, many factors make parliamentary oversight of the executive a strategic function for the democratic legitimacy of policy-making. Evaluating the role of parliaments in this domain is the main purpose of this article. It traces and assesses oversight initiatives started by parliaments in Europe in order to evaluate: what types of interaction they are developing with the executives; whether the oversight procedures have been changed, either in a temporary or permanent way; and what sort of influence the oversight function has had on the final outcome of decision-making. The comparative analysis demonstrates that parliaments have followed a realistic and incremental approach to ensure continuity of executive oversight, prioritising the mechanisms that they deemed to be strategic and also feasible in terms of logistical arrangements. Drawing on the lessons learned from this experience, it is questioned whether some of the new oversight (digital) practices should be made permanent. It is argued that prospectively an appropriate and full use of oversight prerogatives will be the marker of parliaments’ ability to create opportunity out of the crisis.